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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00096R000800970002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

Post-Khomeini Era
The Struggle for Control
in Iran: Looking to the
Secret
NESA 87-10052
December 1987
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Post-Khomeini Era
The Struggle for Control
in Iran: Looking to the
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
This paper was prepared by Office of
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division, NESA,
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Secret
NESA 87-10052
December 1987
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The Struggle for Control
in Iran: Looking to the
Post-Khomeini Era
Key Judgments The Iranian political scene is likely to be highly volatile after Ayatollah
Information available Khomeini's death as rival leaders maneuver to control policy, undermine
as oft November 1987 their opponents, and build support. Radical and conservative clerics and
was used in this report.
their lay allies are deeply divided over the direction of the economy, the
role of clerics in government, and the continuation of the war with Iraq.
The ideological struggle is complicated by personal rivalries, familial ties,
and the decentralized nature of the clerical regime.
The succession process will probably go smoothly at first with Ayatollah
Montazeri succeeding Khomeini as Iran's supreme religious jurisprudent.
At least in the first few months rival leaders are likely to fear that
challenges to the existing political balance would destabilize the regime.
Consultative Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani, one of many pragmatists who
maneuver among the factions, has emerged as the front-runner to wield
power after Khomeini. Montazeri lacks the religious standing and political
skills to be more than a titular leader. Rafsanjani has achieved his position
by brokering compromises among the factions and by putting together a
coalition of key leaders in the Cabinet, the Revolutionary Guard, the
intelligence services, and the parliament.
Rafsanjani's ability to secure control, solidify his coalition, and preserve a
rough balance among the factions will be the key to the stability of the re-
gime after Khomeini dies. If Rafsanjani allows any of the major factions to
become too strong, his power would quickly wane. His task will be greatly
complicated without Khomeini, whose unchallenged authority and political
skills have helped contain factional infighting. Rafsanjani's efforts to
consolidate his power have created new opponents among both radicals and
conservatives. His role in directing the war with Iraq may hurt him if Iran
suffers setbacks, and he probably remains vulnerable for his role in the
contacts with the United States.
Rafsanjani probably will face his toughest challenge from the radicals,
many of whom believe Iran's foreign and domestic policies are not as
ideologically pure and therefore not as true to the revolution as they should
be. The radicals are well entrenched throughout the government, including
the Cabinet and the Revolutionary Guard. Some radical leaders will favor
confronting Rafsanjani and the conservatives as the best way to secure
radical control over policymaking. At a minimum, the radicals appear
powerful enough to force Rafsanjani to support the most important points
Secret
NESA 87-10052
December 1987
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in their agenda, which include centralizing control over the economy and
aggressive export of the revolution. The radicals, however, are hampered
by serious divisions within their ranks that Rafsanjani may be able to
exploit.
Rafsanjani's ability to consolidate his power will depend in large part on
whether he can maintain the support of the Revolutionary Guard. The
Guard will probably back Rafsanjani as long as he remains clearly in
charge and does not threaten the radical agenda. Although factions within
the regime have been trying to line up support within the force, no other
leader appears to command sufficient support in the Guard to make a
successful bid for power.
The radicals probably will have a decided edge over the conservatives if
factional infighting turns violent. They are better prepared to take to the
streets-many radicals have formed militias-and probably can count on
the support of senior leaders of the Revolutionary Guard in a showdown.
Many officers in the regular armed forces are sympathetic to the
conservatives, but they are unlikely to act on the faction's behalf because
the military is carefully supervised and most regular Army units are at the
front. Over the longer term, however, the radical factions may exhaust
themselves in a prolonged struggle with one another, giving the conserva-
tives, backed by the regular Army, an opportunity to fill the leadership
vacuum.
The regime is unlikely to change course in the war with Iraq in the period
immediately following Khomeini's death. Khomeini's commitment to the
overthrow of the Ba'thist regime in Baghdad and continued pressure from
the radicals are likely to keep any leader from seeking peace. The
leadership would probably respond to regime-threatening popular opposi-
tion or economic problems by winding down the conflict rather than by
seeking a formal settlement.
Prospects for a significant improvement in relations with either superpower
will be bleak immediately following Khomeini's death. The image of the
United States as the "great Satan" will be an important symbol of
continuity with Khomeini's legacy, and, for the radicals, hostility toward
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Secret
the United States will remain a test of revolutionary zeal. Prolonged
hostilities between Iran and the United States in the Persian Gulf would
foreclose the possibility of an improvement in US-Iranian relations for the
foreseeable future.
The clerics' hostility toward Communism, the Soviet occupation of Af-
ghanistan, and Moscow's support for Iraq are likely to remain obstacles to
a fundamental change in Iranian-Soviet relations. The current US involve-
ment in the Persian Gulf is pushing Iran to seek better relations with
Moscow to avoid having to confront both superpowers at once, but the
improvement in relations is likely to remain limited unless military and
economic setbacks convince the clerics that a turn to Moscow is necessary
to stave off disaster. The Soviets would have opportunities to increase their
influence if the radical clerics or a coalition of leftists should gain control.
Both groups hold strong anti-Western, anticapitalist views that probably
would encourage them to seek Moscow's help in consolidating their power.
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Key Judgments
The Setting
The Emergence of Rafsanjani
Challenge From the Left
Challenge From the Right
6
Will the Regime Hold Together?
6
Will Popular Support Wane?
8
The Impact of the Power Struggle on Major Issues Facing the Regime
8
Implications for the United States
11
Principal Iranian Factions and Positions on Key Issues
13
vii Secret
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0 200 Kilometers
0 200 Miles
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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The Struggle for Control
in Iran: Looking to the
Post-Khomeini Era
The struggle to determine who will control Iran after
Ayatollah Khomeini's death is under way. Khomeini's
deteriorating health, the prolonged war with Iraq, and
the country's severe economic problems are spurring
increased political infighting as leaders and groups
jockey for position in anticipation of his death.[
Eight years after the revolution, Iran's clerical estab-
lishment is deeply divided over the correct path for
the regime. Radical and conservative factions dis-
agree on the role of clerics in politics, the degree of
government intervention in the economy, and the
continuation of the war with Iraq. Radical clerics and
their lay allies have dominated the Cabinet and taken
the initiative in formulating policy. Conservatives are
strong in the Consultative Assembly, the seminaries
of Qom, and among the bazaar merchants. A group of
pragmatists, many of whom follow the lead of power-
ful Consultative Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani, ma-
neuvers between the factions trying to forge a consen-
sus on major issues confronting the regime.
Ideological differences are complicated by personal
and institutional rivalries, as well as by the multiplic-
ity of power centers,
The most important institutions, both in-
side and outside the government, have leaders who
play key roles in the struggle for power and influence.
We believe many revolutionary organizations, such as
the nationwide system of revolutionary committees
and the Revolutionary Guard, retain a great deal of
autonomy.
many within these organizations are loyal to local
leaders rather than to the central government.
Until this past year, Ayatollah Khomeini provided
constant policy guidance, arbitrated disputes between
leaders, and tried to maintain a rough balance of
In our judgment, political infighting will
mediating role declines.
Khomeini probably is no longer capable of rethinking
long-held positions, such as his commitment to con-
tinue the war with Iraq until the Bath Party is
overthrown. This rigidity limits policy options for
Iranian leaders who might conclude that it is neces-
sary to change Iran's policy on the war to avert
serious domestic unrest. We believe that suspicion
among leaders that those with access are manipulat-
ing Khomeini will grow and fuel animosity among the
factions.
Nevertheless, if Khomeini survives for a long time in
a twilight state, unable to play his former role, we
believe there are potential benefits for the current
leadership. His presence helps to maintain popular
support, legitimize government policies, and restrain
tendencies among factions and leaders toward all-out
confrontation, while giving his subordinates the op-
portunity to devise mechanisms for resolving policy
disputes without constant resort to him.
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.'Rafsanjani's Leadership Style
Rafsanjani is a pragmatic political operator whose
ruthlessness, opportunism, and interpersonal skills
have contributed to his dramatic rise to power in
revolutionary Iran. He has maintained Ayatollah
Khomeini's support, proven an effective manipulator
of major levels of power, and positioned himself to
dominate a post-Khomeini regime.
Rafsanjani is primarily governed by self-interest, not
principles-for him the end justifies the means. He
adapts his plans as opportunities and threats arise,
prefers following the political current rather than
setting its course, and views his relationship with
others as utilitarian and temporary. Indeed, Rafsan-
jani is a master of manipulation-a seductive bar-
gainer, an adept intimidator, and a skilled trader in
bribes. He can be charming and good humored one
minute, pugnacious and cruel the next. Moreover, his
observable behavior often masks his covert
maneuverings.
Rafsanjani cannot be trusted as a negotiator. He
prefers to tempt his opposites with seductive bargain-
ing positions to gain as much as possible without
making concessions. His self-interest and ambitions
for Iran are uppermost in his mind. Although he is
unlikely tofinch in the face of a direct threat, he will
try to forestall anything that could strengthen his
rivals, harm his base of support, or aid Baghdad's
cause in the region.
No leader has gained dominance in the power strug-
gle, but Consultative Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani
has emerged as the front-runner to wield power in the
post-Khomeini era. We believe that Khomeini's desig-
nated successor, Ayatollah Montazeri, lacks Kho-
meini's religious standing, his popular appeal, and his
political skills and, therefore, is likely to be only a
titular leader. We believe Rafsanjani orchestrated the
selection of Montazeri in 1985 as Khomeini's succes-
sor. In our view, he supports Montazeri because he
Figure 1. Consultative Assem-
bly Speaker Ali Akbar
Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Iran's
second most powerful political
believes Montazeri can be manipulated and because
he needs Montazeri's endorsement for his policies.
Despite this support, Rafsanjani has curbed the power
of Montazeri's associates to ensure that Montazeri
does not establish a strong personal power base.
Rafsanjani has used his skill at brokering compro-
mises between contending factions to build support
among key Iranian leaders,
He has:
? Assumed a prominent role in directing the war with
Iraq and has won the support of senior officers in
the Revolutionary Guard, including Guard Com-
mander Rezai. We believe the Guard will be critical
in determining the outcome of the post-Khomeini
power struggle.
? Secured the cooperation of Ahmad Khomeini, the
Ayatollah's son and confidant. Ahmad helps super-
vise his father's office and plays a key role in
determining access to him.
? Won the support of Prime Minister Musavi, a
leading radical layman, on most issues. Musavi acts
as liaison between Rafsanjani and radical secularist
factions in the regime.
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Figure 2. Ayatollah Hosein
Montazeri, the designated
successor to Ayatollah Kho-
? Enlisted Minister of Intelligence Mohammadi-
Reyshahri as an ally. Reyshahri has acquired sub-
stantial power over the past two years as his minis-
try has gradually taken over internal security from
the Revolutionary Guard and other revolutionary
bodies.
the 270 deputies
? Built a strong base in the Consultative Assembly,
where he can command the support of about 100 of
nors, according to the Iranian press
Rafsanjani also may be trying to build a nationwide
political network among lower ranking officials. Since
1985 the Minister of Interior, a Rafsanjani ally, has
appointed over 400 Rafsanjani loyalists to positions as
provincial officials, including several provincial gover-
Rafsanjani appears to have strengthened his position
over the last year by eliminating many radical and
conservative opponents. In October 1986 the regime
arrested a radical clique led by Mehdi Hashemi that
had been conducting acts of terrorism-Hashemi's
group smuggled explosives into Saudi Arabia during
the 1986 Hajj-out of Ayatollah Montazeri's office
3 Mehdi Hashemi's followers retaliated for their leader's arrest by
leaking the story of secret Iranian-US contacts to a Lebanese
newspaper. Hashemi and two of his associates were executed in
An Alternative View of Ayatollah Montazeri's
Prospects
Some analysts of Iranian affairs believe that Ayatol-
lah Montazeri is a serious rival to Consultative
Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani and that Montazeri
rather than Rafsanjani will emerge as the dominant
political -figure after Khomeini dies. According to this
view, Montazeri has a significant following in the
Revolutionary Guard and considerable popular sup-
port among the lower classes. As a result, radicals in
the Guard and their clerical allies will back Monta-
zeri to reduce Rafsanjani's power. Moreover, Monta-
zeri will have considerable formal powers as Kho-
meini's designated successor, and, according to this
view, he will be able to use these powers to assume a
dominant political role. These observers argue that,
despite Montazeri's reputation for political ineptness,
his efforts to broaden his political base over the last
several years indicate his political savvy.
If Montazeri rather than Rafsanjani becomes Kho-
meini's successor in power as well as in position:
? Iran probably would pursue a more hardline policy
toward the West and more aggressively seek to
export the revolution. Montazeri would probably be
less adept at restraining the most radical elements
in the leadership.
? The political scene almost certainly would be less
stable than under Rafsanjani because rival leaders
would have more maneuvering room under
Montazeri.
? Prospects for improved US-Iranian relations would
be worse under Montazeri than under Rafsanjani
because Montazeri appears to share Khomeini's
view that the United States represents the greatest
threat to the Islamic republic.
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radicals by ordering the arrest of a conservative
member of the Consultative Assembly and six Army
officers, including the chief of military intelligence,
Figure J. Minister of Intelli-
gence Mohammad Moham-
madi-Reyshahri, an ally of As-
sember Rafsanjani.
Figure 4. Revolutionary Guard
Commander Mohsen Rezai, an
ally of Assembly Speaker Raf-
sanjani.
the indirect nature of his role and claimed that
charges of multiple shipments of US arms to Iran
are an attempt to slander Iran.
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for criticizing the regime.
Both sets of arrests probably enhanced Rafsanjani's
standing with the Revolutionary Guard. The Iranian
press reports that Guard leaders perceived Hashemi
as a threat. The conservatives arrested in November
had been criticizing the regime's preference for the
Guard over the regular armed forces. The arrests of
Army intelligence officers probably reduced conserva-
tive influence in the Army's intelligence apparatus.
Rafsanjani's efforts to consolidate his power have
created liabilities for him:
? The arrests of radicals and conservatives have an-
gered leaders in each group, who will look for
opportunities to retaliate.
a senior radical cleric publicly
criticized the arrest of Hashemi, and allies of the
Assembly deputy threatened to launch an
investigation.
? Rafsanjani's role in promoting the war with Iraq
may backfire if Iran suffers a major setback.
? Rafsanjani's role in the US arms sales to Iran may
hurt him over the long term even though his adept
handling of the affair and Khomeini's public sup-
port have protected him so far. Rafsanjani's con-
cerns about his vulnerability on this issue are re-
flected in his public statements, which have stressed
? The arrest of Hashemi almost certainly has strained
the relationship between Rafsanjani and Montazeri
and has reduced Montazeri's willingness to cooper-
ate with Rafsanjani.
We expect the transition to the post-Khomeini era to
go smoothly at first, with Ayatollah Montazeri as-
suming Khomeini's role as Iran's supreme jurispru-
dent. We believe Rafsanjani and other leaders will use
the 40 days of public mourning called for by Shia
custom to channel the highly charged emotions of the
populace toward support for the government. At least
in the first few months, rival leaders are likely to fear
that challenges to the existing political balance would
risk destabilizing the regime.
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After a brief honeymoon, however, the political scene
is likely to become highly volatile. We expect rival
leaders to maneuver to increase their influence over
policy, undermine their opponents, and build support.
We expect that Rafsanjani will try to strengthen the
coalition he has forged and maintain a rough balance
between radicals and conservatives. The existing fac-
tional balance has benefited him because both sides
turn to him to work out compromises. If he allows one
side to become too strong, we believe that his power
would wane.
Rafsanjani's task will be greatly complicated without
Khomeini at the helm. Montazeri lacks Khomeini's
religious and political charisma and will be less
effective in legitimizing Rafsanjani's policies. Fac-
tional disputes over key issues promise to intensify.
Moreover, Montazeri will inherit substantial formal
powers as successor that he may try to use to advance
his own policies or to thwart Rafsanjani. As the
supreme religious leader, he will become the Com-
mander in Chief of the Armed Forces, can declare
war or peace at the recommendation of the Supreme
Defense Council (the body charged with setting Irani-
an military policy), and can appoint members to that
Council. He also will have a national pulpit for
addressing government leaders and the people on
major issues
We believe that Montazeri has demonstrated political
savvy by trying to broaden his base of support. Since
1984 he has attempted to soften his radical image by
advocating a larger role for the private sector in
distributing certain goods and by criticizing the ex-
cesses of revolutionary organizations such as the
Revolutionary Guard. To gain leeway to advance his
own policies, Montazeri may try to exploit the fact
that efforts to undermine him would risk destroying
the legitimacy of the regime.
Challenge From the Left
We expect that the radicals will present the greatest
threat to Rafsanjani's probable goal of maintaining a
rough balance between the factions. The Iranian press
indicates that many radicals believe that Iran's poli-
cies are not as ideologically pure and therefore not as
true to the revolution as they should be. We believe
that the radicals also have been extremely frustrated
by the ability of conservatives in the Consultative
Assembly, in combination with the Council of Guard-
ians, to block radical-sponsored social and economic
programs.' The radicals have occasionally attacked
the conservatives so stridently in the press and in the
Assembly that Rafsanjani has cautioned them not to
create further discord.
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radicals consider Rafsanjani an opportunist with few,
if any, deeply held views. We believe the revelation of
secret Iranian-US contacts has convinced some prom-
inent radicals that Rafsanjani would sell out their
cause to maintain his hold on power. We believe that
some radical leaders, including Revolutionary Guard
Commander Rezai, have political ambitions of their
own and may be ready to put themselves forward or
support other candidates if Rafsanjani begins to op-
pose the radicals on key issues.
At a minimum, we expect that the radicals will try to
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his continued support for their policies. They domi-
nate the Revolutionary Guard and the komitehs (local
revolutionary committees), and
some have private militias. 25X1
Their possession of weapons and their demonstrated
willingness to use them will give them considerable
leverage. Rafsanjani has built his alliance with radi-
cals in the Revolutionary Guard and among the
clerics in part by advocating an aggressive military
strategy and by favoring the Guard over the regular
Army. We believe the radicals will press Rafsanjani
to quit avoiding a stand on domestic economic issues
and support their agenda.
' The Council of Guardians consists of six clerics and six laymen,
experts in Islamic jurisprudence, who ensure that legislation does
not violate Islamic law or the Constitution. Members of the Council
serve a six-year term. The clerics are appointed by the supreme
religious jurisprudent and the laymen by the Supreme Judicial
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We believe that some radicals will favor confrontation
with Rafsanjani and the conservatives as the best way
to reverse what they see as a drift from the true
principles of the revolution, but they are hampered by
serious divisions within their ranks that Rafsanjani
may be able to exploit. Secular radicals, such as
Prime Minister Musavi and Minister of Heavy Indus-
tries Nabavi, have drawn fire from clerical radicals,
such as Prosecutor General Musavi-Khoiniha and
Assembly Deputy Sadeqi-Givi-Khalkhali, for trying
to promote economic development through the return
of expatriate experts and the denationalization of
some unprofitable industries. Prime Minister Musavi
and other radicals in his office apparently were deeply
involved in the secret contacts with the United States,
and Iranian press reports indicate that some radical
clerics have publicly condemned the contacts as a
betrayal of the revolution.
Challenge From the Right
We believe that, in the months immediately following
Khomeini's death, the conservatives will be more
accommodating toward Rafsanjani and will avoid
provoking direct confrontations with the radicals be-
cause they realize instability works to their disadvan-
tage. As long as institutions like the Consultative
Assembly and the Council of Guardians remain intact
and constitutional procedures are followed, we believe
the conservatives will be able to prevent the radicals
from advancing key elements of their legislative agen-
da. The conservatives almost certainly will try to
exploit popular disaffection with the war and the
deteriorating economy to strengthen the loosely knit
network they have put together, which includes ba-
zaar merchants, the regular armed forces, elements of
the educated elite, and many local clerics.
The conservatives will try to remedy their lack of
direct influence over policy by strengthening ties to
President Khamenei-one of Rafsanjani's major ri-
vals-as well as to Ayatollah Montazeri. A Khamenei
alliance with the conservatives began to emerge in
1985 when he tried to replace Prime Minister Musavi
and key radicals in the Cabinet with pragmatists and
conservatives. The Iranian press
report that in the last two years Khamenei has
supported conservative calls for less government inter-
vention in the economy and argued for winding down
Figure 5. Deputy Assembly
Speaker Mohammad Yazdi,
the war to rebuild Iran's economy. We believe the
conservatives will exploit Ayatollah Montazeri's need
for political and religious allies to try to gain his
backing for their agenda.
Will the Regime Hold Together?
In our judgment, Rafsanjani's ability to maintain his
political dominance will be the key to stability after
Khomeini's death. If Rafsanjani's opponents succeed
in substantially reducing his power or in removing
him from the scene, we expect that the chances of an
all-out power struggle will increase significantly.
Many contenders are likely to make a bid for political
control, but, in our view, no other leader has Rafsan-
jani's ability to effect compromises between the vari-
ous factions and prevent political infighting from
threatening the stability of the regime.
Rafsanjani's ability to maintain his hold on power will
depend largely on whether the bulk of the Revolution-
ary Guard lines up behind him. We believe the
Revolutionary Guard will continue to support Rafsan-
jani as long as he remains clearly in charge and does
not try to eviscerate the radical agenda. No other
leader appears to command sufficient support in the
Guard to have a reasonable chance of succeeding in a
bid for power.
=many leaders realize that any bid for power
would force other contenders to make countermoves
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Wild Cards: Factors That Could Destabilize a
Post-Khomeini Regime
the Guard,
Any of the following events would cause us to rethink
our assessment of the prospects for stability in post-
Khomeini Iran:
? The assassination of key regime figures such as
Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani, Khomeini's desig-
nated successor Ayatollah Montazeri, or key Revo-
lutionary Guard leaders.
? A serious, immediate challenge after Khomeini's
death to Ayatollah Montazeri or Rafsanjani's au-
thority, leading to a constitutional crisis and to
supporters of various factions taking to the streets.
? A major setback for Iran on the battlefield, with
heavy casualties, leading to large-scale antiwar
protests among the regime's key urban, lower class
constituency.
? A major defeat for the radicals in the 1988 Consul-
tative Assembly election, provoking them to use
force to prevent a loss of power.
? A collapse in oil prices, or a sustained and effective
Iraqi bombing campaign against Iranian economic
targets. Either event would compound Iran's al-
ready severe economic problems-including high
unemployment, inflation, and chronic shortages of
food, fuel, and consumer goods-and make it im-
possible for the regime to continue providing subsis-
tence support to its lower class supporters.
that could quickly lead to confrontations. We do not
rule out the possibility that an ambitious opponent
might miscalculate and try to seize control despite the
odds against him.
Because the Revolutionary Guard will be crucial to
control, all factions in the regime have been trying to
line up support within the force. Other leading figures
besides Rafsanjani have significant followings within
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Revolutionary Guard elements in the capital.
Moreover, because
almost all regular Army units are at the front, any
power play by the regular forces would almost cer-
If radical factions exhaust themselves in a prolonged
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the conservatives, possibly backed by senior military
officers, to fill the leadership vacuum. If violent
fighting destabilizes the regime, we believe that at
mander Rezai, a leading radical, also has built a large
personal following. We believe that, after Khomeini's
death, Rezai will try to use his power base and his
alliance with Rafsanjani to expand the Guard's con-
trol over the regular Army and to increase his political
standing as well as that of his allies.
The probability of a violent power struggle will in-
crease significantly if the radicals suffer a major
political reversal or believe they must act to prevent
such a development. In our view, the prospect of a
major change in war policy without the concurrence
of radical leaders or a major loss of seats in the 1988
Consultative Assembly election could provoke the
radicals and their allies in the Revolutionary Guard to
resort to force to protect their interests.
If infighting among factions in the regime turns
violent, the radicals' control of the guns would almost
certainly give them a decided edge, at least at first.
Many regular armed forces members are sympa-
thethic to the conservatives,
but they could not provide signifi-
cant support to the conservatives in the initial stages
of a showdown. The radical-dominated Cabinet re-
mains suspicious of the loyalty of the regular armed
forces and maintains extremely tight supervision over
them. Radical clerics have been inserted at all levels
as political-ideological commissars. The radicals have
advanced their supporters into positions of command,
and they have conducted repeated purges
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The 1988 Consultative Assembly Election:
A Potential Turning Point?
The 1988 Consultative Assembly election is likely to
be an important test of the regime's ability to keep
political differences between the factions from getting
out of control, especially if Khomeini is no longer
alive. We believe both radicals and conservatives will
consider the election a critical opportunity for shift-
ing the political balance decisively in their favor. The
conservative gains in the 1984 election ensured their
ability to thwart radical-sponsored legislation and
encouraged Khomeini to tilt more in their direction
on major policy issues.
L__] the Iranian media indicate that some conserva-
tive leaders want to increase the independence of the
Assembly and make it the focus of a parliamentary
theocracy. Conservatives probably would try to use
any gains in 1988 to force the resignation of Prime
Minister Musavi and some of his Cabinet and win the
appointment of a more conservative prime minister.
Following their success in 1984, they rejected five of
the Prime Minister's Cabinet nominees, almost bring-
ing the government down, despite an admonition from
Khomeini that the Assembly should support the
government.
The radicals recognize that continued deadlock in the
Assembly will, in effect, represent a defeat for them
and will try to gain enough seats to allow them to
override all constitutional barriers to the implemen-
tation of their proposals for a fundamental restruc-
turing of Iranian society. The Iranian press
report that radicals in the
Cabinet are appointing provincial officials who they
believe can help ensure victory for radical candidates.
The high stakes in 1988 almost certainly will guaran-
tee a repeat of the political tensions of 1984. During
the 1984 election, members of political groups and
revolutionary organizations intimidated voters and
clashed with each other, according to the Iranian
press. Charges of election fraud were frequent, and
radicals challenged-unsuccessfully-the credentials
of many newly elected conservative Assembly depu-
ties.
some point a "man on horseback" will seize control.
He almost certainly would try to legitimize his rule by
presenting it as a defense of Islam and the fruits of the
revolution. The institution most likely to produce such
a leader is the Revolutionary Guard.
The urban and rural lower classes-the mainstays of
the Khomeini regime-are likely to remain loyal to
the regime for the foreseeable future. The government
has devoted considerable resources to maintaining
their support. Welfare programs, administered by the
government and the mosque network, have helped
maintain an adequate supply of essential goods to the
poor, shielding them from the impact of the deterio-
rating economy. Hundreds of thousands of civil ser-
vice jobs have been created primarily for the lower
classes; the Revolutionary Guard and the myriad
revolutionary committees have provided jobs, prestige,
and opportunities for advancement; and extensive
rural development projects have been undertaken.
The poor also have been favored over the wealthy in
education, housing, and public services. Nevertheless,
Khomeini personifies the revolution for many Irani-
ans, and his death will make the clerics more
vulnerable
The Impact of the Power Struggle on
Major Issues Facing the Regime
We believe that the regime will make no abrupt policy
shifts on the major issues after Khomeini dies unless
there is a significant change in the current political
balance. Khomeini's blessing has been required to
bring about dramatic policy changes, and even he has
been reluctant to change course abruptly when faced
with significant opposition. Policy changes after Kho-
meini are more likely to be incremental as long as the
current factional balance continues and to be the
product of considerable compromise among compet-
ing groups.
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The Implications of Rule by Committee After
Khomeini
We believe both radical and conservative leaders may
eventually try to reopen the succession issue by
pushing for the selection of a leadership council
instead of a single government head, as allowed by
the Constitution. Many radicals oppose Montazeri as
Khomeini's designated successor because he has
adopted moderate positions on key issues over the
last two years. The Iranian press
report that many conservative clerics,
on the other hand, believe the choice of a successor by
the Assembly of Experts is a heretical concept. a The
conservatives believe that only the most senior clerics
have the wisdom to choose a cleric capable of serving
as a model for all Shias and that he should not be a
political leader. We believe the conservatives fear
Montazeri has adopted a moderate position on some
issues for tactical reasons and will eventually show
his radical colors.
a The Assembly of Experts is a body of 83 men named to select
Khomeini's successor and to formalize arrangements for the
transition of power once Khomeini dies. The Assembly confirmed
The War
The regime is unlikely to alter Iran's war policy
dramatically after Khomeini's death, particularly in
the short term:
? Khomeini's clear support'for the war and the over-
throw of Iraqi President Saddam Husayn and the
Ba'thist regime will prevent Khomeini's successors
from abandoning the war. Even if they did,
Khomeini's death will deprive the regime of the one
person with the standing to bless a negotiated
settlement.
? The need for radical support will deter Rafsanjani
or any other leader from seeking peace. For the
radicals, support for the war is a test of commitment
to the revolution.
Although the major factions are unlikely to get a
consensus on a single cleric as an alternative to
Montazeri, they could argue that a leadership council
is necessary to adequately represent each of the
important regime constituencies. The Constitution
allows for the selection of a single outstanding theo-
logian to lead the country or a leadership council of
on the council.
A leadership council, however, would intensify the
already deep and bitter divisions and personal rival-
ries within the leadership and could lead to govern-
mental paralysis. Factional disputes now handled
behind the scenes would be pushed increasingly into
public view. Iranian society probably would become
more highly polarized as members of the council
solicited the support of various groups-such as
bazaar merchants, factory workers, or the urban
poor-to promote their policies over those of others
? Efforts to seek peace without achieving the over-
throw of Saddam would challenge the regime's
claim that its adherence to Islam guarantees its
victory and the wisdom of pursuing a war that has
produced so many deaths without accomplishing its
primary objective.
? In the unlikely event that significant popular opposi-
tion to the war develops or that the Iraqis launch a
bombing campaign that cripples the Iranian econo-
my, we believe the regime will respond by allowing
the conflict to wind down rather than by seeking
peace.
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Opposition Groups: A Threat to the Regime?
Exile opposition groups are unlikely to wield signifi-
cant influence in Iran in the period immediately
following Khomeini's death. None have a leader or a
platform able to galvanize popular support. The
Mujahedin-e Khalq (Islamic Marxists)-now based
in Iraq-appears to be the largest and best organized
opposition group. Despite being ruthlessly suppressed
by the regime in 1981, the Mujahedin remains able to
carry out sporadic terrorist operations inside Iran.
The Mujahedin also carries out small-scale guerrilla
operations in western Iran from its bases in Iraq, but
at present these appear to be no more than a nuisance
to Tehran. During a period of prolonged instability,
the Mujahedin might become a factor, especially if it
could ally itself with one of the secular radical
factions. We believe the Mujahedin may try to insti-
gate a campaign of terrorism after Khomeini's
death-including attempts to kill key Iranian lead-
ers-to destabilize the regime.
The Communist Tudeh Party, apparently inactive in
Iran since the government suppressed it in 1983,
probably could quickly revive its organization during
a period of prolonged instability, especially if it
received help from Moscow.
Reza Pahlavi, the late Shah's son, and former Prime
Minister Bakhtiar retain a weak following among
Westernized middle- and upper-income Iranians, but
these elements are politically the least influential in
the country and have shown little enthusiasm for
organized active opposition.
Alternative Scenario: Iran Will End the War After
Khomeini Dies
Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani
stated publicly that the doors are open for those who
invite Iran to end the war through political means
and that a political solution brokered by regional
states is not impossible.
According to this scenario, the leadership may believe
that, without Khomeini to rally the populace to
continue the war, popular opposition will become
unmanageable. The leadership may have convinced
Khomeini that, after his death, the regime must have
the latitude to consider a variety of options for ending
the war should the conflict appear to threaten the
survival of the Islamic republic.
believe that senior conservative clerics will try to rally
the faithful by more aggressively challenging the war
in private as un-Islamic. Conservatives also will press
President Khamenei and Ayatollah Montazeri~
power.
for ending the war. A conservative-dominated regime
probably would seek a negotiated settlement to the
war, but such a regime is the least likely to come to
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Foreign Policy
We believe that Iran's clerics will continue to struggle
over the direction and objectives of Iran's Islamic
revolution as they try to reconcile Iran's national
interests with often conflicting revolutionary goals:
? We expect that Rafsanjani and other leading cleri-
cal contenders for power will continue to support the
export of the revolution and some terrorist activity.
The struggle will be between pragmatists, such as
Rafsanjani, who see terrorism as a tool of statecraft
to be used selectively to further Iranian national
interests, and radicals who advocate the widespread
use of terrorism primarily as a tool for exporting the
revolution.
? Support for radical Shias in Lebanon is almost
certain to remain a centerpiece of Iran's effort to
export-the revolution. We believe the pragmatists
see involvement in Lebanon as a relatively cheap
way to keep the radicals at bay by convincing them
that Iran is working to expand Iranian influence in
the Islamic world. We also believe that Iran will
continue to proselytize among Islamic groups world-
wide and to provide them with financial support and
occasional training in subversion.
? Iran's policy toward the Persian Gulf states will be
shaped by the war with Iraq and the increased US
influence in the region. Iran will continue to use a
combination of military action, terrorism, and pro-
paganda, along with offers of improved ties, to
weaken Gulf state support for Iraq. Pragmatists will
probably go along with efforts to build subversive
capabilities in the Gulf states as a means of intimi-
dating those states.
Economic and Security Policy
Factional disputes are likely to prevent major depar-
tures in domestic economic policy. The conservatives
and their bazaar merchant allies appear strong
enough to prevent the radicals from advancing key
elements of their legislative agenda for centralizing
government control of the economy and redistributing
wealth. The regime nevertheless will be under consid-
erable pressure to develop a coherent economic policy
that can produce prosperity and jobs. Oil is the only
resource available to finance whatever economic poli-
cies eventually are adopted, and Iran will work for
stable or rising oil prices.
Iran must eventually rearm to play its traditional role
in regional affairs. Even if it winds down the war, the
regime will assume that a resumption of hostilities
with Iraq is inevitable until the underlying issues are
resolved. This will reduce the amount of financial
resources available for economic development and
force decisions about the structure of a new military/
Revolutionary Guard security force.
Implications for the United States
There is little chance for an improvement in Iran's ties
to the United States even after Khomeini's death.
Most Iranian leaders share Khomeini's view that the
United States is the greatest threat in the world both
to the Iranian revolution and to Islam. The image of
the United States as the "great Satan" will almost
certainly be an important symbol of continuity with
Khomeini's legacy. Rafsanjani is unlikely to make
overtures that would risk jeopardizing the radical
support that is so important to the consolidation of his
power. Moreover, a prolonged military confrontation
between Iran and the United States in the Persian
Gulf over the Kuwaiti tanker issue would foreclose
improved Iranian-US relations for the foreseeable
future.
The conservatives would be most favorable to a
gradual improvement in ties, but even they are suspi-
cious of the United States. They are also the group
least likely to gain the upper hand in the short run and
lack the influence to reorient policy toward
Washington.
Efforts by the United States to influence the post-
Khomeini power struggle would be fraught with risks
and have little likelihood of success. It would be
difficult to identify a suitable group to support amidst
the factionalism and complex maneuvering on the
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political scene. Moreover, any revelation that a group
had been receiving US support would badly damage
its quest for power.
US interests could be advanced indirectly if allies
such as Pakistan, Turkey, China, Japan, and the West
Europeans maintained their respective dialogues with
the Iranians. Washington could thus keep open indi-
rect lines of communication with Tehran and exert
pressure through them. The establishment of commer-
cial ties between Iranian and US firms would be
possible in several key areas, including pipeline
construction.
The Khomeini regime's hostility to Communism,
Moscow's military support for Iraq, and the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan will continue to weigh
against a fundamental change in Iranian-Soviet rela-
tions. Nevertheless, the increased US presence in the
Persian Gulf has prompted Tehran to seek better
relations with Moscow to avoid trouble with both
superpowers at once. The thaw in relations is likely to
remain limited, however, unless the clerics believe
military and economic setbacks have become critical
and see a turn to Moscow as essential to stave off
disaster.
We believe the Soviets would have better opportuni-
ties to increase their influence if radical clerics or
laymen dominated the government after Khomeini.
Although radical clerics share Khomeini's view that
Communism is dangerous to Islam, they are even
more strongly anti-Western, anticapitalist, and com-
mitted to undermining pro-US Arab regimes. With-
out Khomeini's restraining influence, they might con-
clude that improved relations with Moscow would
help them to consolidate their power.
We believe the Soviets' best opportunity to make
major gains after Khomeini would come if the clerics
lost power to a leftist coalition of Revolutionary
Guards and secular radicals. We believe that many in
these groups would ultimately like to push the clerics
into the background. Moreover, such a coalition's hold
on power probably would be tenuous, and its leaders
could well ask for Moscow's help in consolidating
power. The Soviets also would gain greater opportuni-
ties for exploitation, particularly among Iran's ethnic
minorities, if Iran experienced a prolonged period of
political upheaval.
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Secret
Appendix
Principal Iranian Factions and
Positions on Key Issues
The labels used to describe Iranian factions are not
intended to suggest similarities to Western political
categories, but rather to indicate points of view in the
Iranian political spectrum. Iranian factions are not
clear-cut, well-defined entities. Many leaders are
conservative on one issue and radical on another, and
individuals shift their positions on the same issue over
time. Personal ties and generational and institutional
rivalries cut across ideological dividing lines. Never-
theless, the factions differ on fundamental issues and
have become a fixture on the Iranian political scene.
The Iranian press uses the labels radical (or reformist)
and conservative in characterizing the principal
groups and their positions.
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Principal Iranian Factions and Positions on Key Issues
Minister of Heavy Industries
Nabavi
Revolutionary Guard Com-
mander Rezai
Deputy Foreign Minister
Sheikh-ol-Eslam
Dominate Cabinet; Assembly
(about 100 deputies); strong in
Revolutionary Guard; appear
strong in revolutionary commit-
tees; urban lower class.
Want to centralize government
control of the economy; want
sweeping land reform; new tax
system. Clerical radicals favor
more extreme centralization
than secular radicals; oppose
secular counterparts' call for re-
turn of exiled technocrats to
help manage economy.
Favor continuing war until Sad-
dam and Bath Party toppled.
Prosecutor General Musavi-
Khoiniha
Deputy Assembly Speaker
Mahdavi-Karubi
Deputy Assembly Speaker
Yazdi
Assembly Deputy Azari-Qomi-
Bigdeli
Assembly (about 100 deputies);
dominate Council of Guardians;
majority of senior clerics at reli-
gious seminaries; bazaar mer-
chants; ties to regular armed
forces.
Favor minimal government role
in economic matters; view pro-
posals for land reform, new tax
system, government control of
business and foreign trade as
un-Islamic.
Many privately favor negotiat-
ed end to war.
Council of Guardians member
Emami-Kashani
Grand Ayatollahs Golpayegani,
Marashi-Najafi, and
Tabatabai-Qomi
Rafsanjani: Assembly (probably
can count on consistent support
of 100 deputies); allied with
Revolutionary Guard leaders,
intelligence and security ser-
vices; Rafsanjani allies have ap-
pointed several hundred provin-
cial officials. Khamenei: Has
courted the regular Army and
conservatives in the Assembly.
Montazeri: Elements of the
Revolutionary Guard; has
courted bazaar merchants on
domestic issues.
Rafsanjani has tilted toward
radical position. Khamenei and
Montazeri have recently sup-
ported conservative position;
both earlier supported more
radical policies. Montazeri as-
sociated with radical position on
export of revolution.
No evidence of disagreement
that Iran must force United
States to abandon escort of Ku-
waiti tankers.
Rafsanjani has favored aggres-
sive military strategy over last
two years; prominent role in
directing ground war. Kha-
menei last year argued for
winding down ground war, re-
building economy.
Montazeri's position ambigu-
ous; last year backed initiatives
to get Khomeini to postpone
major offensive, wind down
ground war.
Minister of Intelligence
Mohammadi-Reyshahri
Minister of Interior
Mohtashemi-Pur
Ahmad Khomeini, Ayatollah
Khomeini's son
Ayatollah Montazeri, Kho-
meini's designated successor
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Secret
Principal Iranian Factions and Positions on Key Issues (continued)
Policy Toward United
States/USSR
Support widespread use of ter-
rorism as tool for exporting
Iran's revolutionary ideals.
Oppose violent export of the
revolution.
Rafsanjani and Khamenei sup-
port selective use of terrorism
as tool of statecraft to advance
Iranian national interests. Mon-
tazeri: evidence is sketchy, asso-
ciates have been linked to
terrorism.
Rafsanjani and probably Kha-
menei behind Iran's efforts over
last several years to lessen inter-
national isolation, expand trade
ties to West.
Montazeri in first years of revo-
lution identified as radical
hardliner, but over last few
years has advocated return to
moderation.
Anti-Soviet but see United Major source of friction. Many
States as a greater threat. secular radicals would eventual-
ly like to push clerics of all
political stripes out of govern-
ment. Clerical radicals favor
tight clerical control.
Most anti-Soviet group; suspi- Views range from support for
cious of United States, but loose clerical supervision to be-
probably favor improvement lief that clerics should stay out
over long term. of government, provide only
general guidance.
Reject relations with the United Favor tight clerical control.
States for the foreseeable fu-
ture. Mistrust Moscow but ad-
vocate improved relations be-
cause of increased US threat.
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Secret
Secret
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