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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00096R000400520002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 26, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Islamic Republic
Iran's Revolutionary Guard:
Armed Pillar of the
See
NESA 87-10004
January 1987
Copy 4 4 3
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Islamic Republic
Iran's Revolutionary Guard:
Armed Pillar of the
Division, NESA,
=Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis.
It was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf
This paper was prepared by
Secret
NESA 87-10004
January 1987
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Secret
Summary
Information available
as of 2 January 1987
was used in this paper.
Islamic Republic
Iran's Revolutionary Guard:
Armed Pillar of the
Khomeini's death.
Iran's Revolutionary Guard has evolved from a dedicated, but loosely knit,
ill-trained, and ineffectively controlled organization into a multifaceted
formal government institution with a pervasive influence throughout
Iranian society. The Revolutionary Guard's military assets and political
clout virtually guarantee it an important and powerful role in Iran after
rivalries and disputes appear to be intensifying.
Like other institutions in Iran, the Guard is beset by factionalism, and the
regime's efforts to impose order on its organizational structure and to
tighten control of the Guard's activities have not been completely success-
ful. The Guard's civilian components continue to exceed the authority
granted them by the government. Recurrent, often deadly, clashes still
occur between regular army and Guard units on the war front. Factional
security and police force.
Revolutionary Guard leaders have used the authority granted under the
1979 Islamic Constitution to develop a major domestic security role. The
Guard has succeeded in molding various religious and revolutionary law
enforcement groups into a powerful security network backed by a formida-
ble intelligence capability. Concerns about the Guard's abuse of authority
and fear of the threat its power and influence could pose to the regime have
prompted the clerical leadership to cut back the Guard's role as an internal
Force.
The regime intends the Revolutionary Guard to become the core of a new
"army of the revolution" that will eventually replace the regular armed
forces. The Guard's experience in the war with Iraq has made it a more ef-
fective military force. It has learned from its defeats, improved its
operational skills, tightened its discipline and control, and assumed an
increasingly significant role in planning war strategy. Despite numerous
purges of the military and the creation of a political control apparatus
attached to all regular armed forces units, the clerical leadership remains
suspicious of the loyalty of the country's Ground Forces, Navy, and Air
The Guard's domestic intelligence network and military capabilities will
make it a major factor in the transition of power once Khomeini is gone.
Nonetheless, factionalism and political infighting will significantly test the
Secret
NESA 87-10004
January 1987
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Guard's ability to maintain order during the transition. The Guard's
institutional cohesion will be challenged and could break down as those
vying for power and control seek support from elements within the Guard.
The Revolutionary Guard is not an ideologically monolithic organization.
Although generally characterized by a fanatical loyalty to Ayatollah
Khomeini and the zealous propagation of the ideals of the Islamic
revolution, the Guard has a diverse membership and is split along both
factional and "generational" lines. Coalitions and loyalties within the
Guard are highly fluid.
The dominant elements within the Guard, however, maintain a strong,
anti-US position and will be a major obstacle to any renewal of US-Iranian
relations in the post-Khomeini era. This deep-seated animosity toward the
United States could lead the Guard, as a way to preserve the regime or its
own position, to support improved relations with the Soviet Union. Such
support would present Moscow with significant opportunities to expand its
influence in Iran.
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Summary
Early Evolution of the Revolutionary Guard
The "Civilian" Side of the Revolutionary Guard
2
Guarding the Revolution Within
4
Regime Concerns
5
The Revolutionary Guard as a Military Force
7
Organization and Manpower
9
The Revolutionary Guard and Basij in Combat
10
Improving Performance
10
Creating an "Army of the Revolution"
11
Protectors of the Revolution: A Sampler of 17
Enforcement Groups
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Iran's Revolutionary Guard:
Armed Pillar of the
Islamic Republic
The fundamental role of the Revolutionary Guard is
to protect and promote the interests of the Islamic
republic. It is one of the key institutions through
which the clerical regime has consolidated its control
over Iranian society, countered internal and external
threats to the republic, and exported fundamentalist
Islamic ideology.
As the regime in Tehran solidified its power, it
focused on transforming the Guard from a loosely
knit collection of ragtag propaganda groups and pri-
vate armies into a structured, tightly disciplined force.
The Guard's civilian component is organized primari-
ly to operate in population centers-where they are
closely associated with the local mosque-rather than
in rural areas. Its military arm has evolved under the
pressure of the war with Iraq into a more conventional
armed force. Most observers believe that the Revolu-
tionary Guard will be a key factor in any future power
struggle in Iran
Early Evolution of the Revolutionary Guard
The Revolutionary Guard (Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enge-
lab) was an important force in establishing the Islamic
republic. The concept of a Revolutionary Guard
appears to have originated among members of Ayatol-
lah Khomeini's entourage long before the ouster of
the Shah. Clerics and secular figures alike saw the
value of an armed force loyal to Khomeini and his
ideals. They believed such an organization would not
only help bring about the Shah's downfall, but would
be useful in creating a revolutionary government and
in propagating the values of the new Islamic order,
The Revolutionary Guard was formally established in
May 1979 by Ayatollah Khomeini under the auspices
of the then governing Revolutionary Council to re-
store and maintain order. Concern over the multitude
of "revolutionary" committees that had sprung up
after the Shah's downfall prompted the new regime to
give the Guard considerable autonomy and encourage
its rapid expansion. Hastily pulled together from
trusted anti-Shah groups, clerics' militias, and ex-
servicemen, the Guard was immediately called upon
to sustain the new government by intimidating opposi-
tion elements and absorbing or co-opting a variety of
independent armed groups throughout Iran. It served
as one of the principal and most trusted means
available to the new regime for consolidating its
control. As a result of the hectic circumstances sur-
rounding its birth, however, the Guard had little time
to develop effective control over its units.
The Guard took on a wide variety of functions and
responsibilities to support the new republic. It bore
the brunt of clashes with dissident ethnic minorities,
took over many routine law enforcement activities,
and performed special security duties at key installa-
tions. The Guard was also charged, early on, with
political organization and propagandizing on behalf of
the Islamic revolution.
Working closely with the clerical leadership and
implementing its orders, the Revolutionary Guard
quickly became the point of daily contact between
many citizens and the new regime. Contrary to
Khomeini's design, however, the Guard-poorly
trained and ineffectively controlled-generally did
not make a good impression. As a result, the Guard's
activities and the attitudes of its members often
conflicted with the authority of religious and secular
leaders and local security forces. Moreover, despite its
close ties to the regime, the Guard's zeal in promoting
the revolution sometimes ran counter to the govern-
ment's wishes or resulted in local challenges to the
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Figure 1. Mohsen Ra lq-Dust,
Minister of the Revolutionary
Figure 2. Mohsen Rezai,
Revolutionary Guard Corps
Administering the Guard's
Civilian Components
each
subordinate command within the Guard's civilian
organizational structure is administered by a revolu-
tionary council or committee. In most cases these are
led by a mullah who is assisted by a cadre of
Revolutionary Guards. They serve as the focal point
for communications between higher Guard authority
and local Guard units. We believe the size of these
committees and their supporting cadre varies in
relation to the population density of the region.
Typically, a committee consists of seven to 12 men
and is backed by a force of 400 to 500 Guards with
responsibility for several villages, towns, or other
cities. Tehran, however, is administered by 15 such
Information on the internal structure of the area
commands is sketchy, but it is probably broken down
into major staff elements that have specific-but
probably overlapping-responsibility and authority.
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regime's authority. To control extremists within the
Guard, repeated local and national campaigns were
conducted to purge undesirable Guards and control
Guard activitiesa
The Ministry of the Revolutionary Guard, headed by
Mohsen Rafiq-Dust, was established in late 1982. It is
responsible for supporting Revolutionary Guard com-
bat units on the war front and has administrative
authority over the "civilian" programs and units of
the Guard. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC) is the military arm of the Revolutionary
Guard. Although nominally equal to the Ministry, the
IRGC apparently enjoys a higher status within the
regime because of its importance in the war, the
stature of its commander Mohsen Rezai, and the
prospect that it will eventually replace the regular
military
while at least four focus on manpower, recruitment,
and training for Revolutionary Guard and Basij
units. Coordination of thesefunctions is the responsi-
bility of the area commander, aided by his deputy
and chief of staff.
The "Civilian" Side of the Revolutionary Guard
Civilian elements of the Revolu-
tionary Guard are organized in a hierarchical struc-
ture based on geographical areas and population
centers from cities to small villages. The basic unit
within the Guard's civilian organization appears to be
the "post" or "base"-normally a group of about 20
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Figure 3
Iran: Old and New Revolutionary Guard Area Commands
Soviet Union
Area 1
Area 2
Area 3
Area 4
Area 5
Old guard boundary
New guard boundary
290 Kilometers
Mashhad
Arabian
Sea
709264(544499)1-87 25X1
B' GHDAD
~I,a
l(marsh.~
vta%noo
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Revolutionary Guards-located in a town or village.
In larger cities these units are located within 1 or 2
kilometers of each other or in each city precinct.
Posts or bases are under the jurisdiction of city
subordinate commands located in larger towns and
cities. District central commands are based in the
largest provincial cities and are responsible for over-
seeing and directing Guard activities within their
region F__~
Revolutionary Guard area commands oversee the
provinces and report directly to central Guard au-
thorities in Tehran. In late 1985 the regime combined
several of the original 10 commands, reducing the
number of Revolutionary Guard area commands. All
the lower echelon elements probably were kept intact
and resubordinated to the new area commands. We
believe this reorganization was part of a continuing
process designed to strengthen the central govern-
ment's control over Guard elements, reduce the
Guard's nonmilitary role, and improve the logistic and
administrative support each area provides combat
units.
At the apex of the civilian structure is the Ministry of
the Revolutionary Guard. The Ministry is nominally
the main executor of the regime's domestic policies
and ensures logistic and administrative support for
IRGC combat units. Although supervision and con-
trol of the civilian organizational structure are pri-
marily the responsibility of the Ministry, we believe
actual authority is shared with the IRGC. Mobiliza-
tion and training of the Basij-Iran's irregular militia
forces-for example, appear to be jointly controlled
by the Ministry and the IRGC.
We believe that the acquisition of arms and equip-
ment is another area in which the Ministry "shares"
authority and responsibility with the IRGC.
Nonetheless, the Ministry ap-
pears to be acting, in most cases, as an agent. Its
procurement of arms is geared to requests by the
IRGC.
Guarding the Revolution Within. The principal mis-
sion of the Revolutionary Guard-defined by Ayatol-
lah Khomeini to "keep the Revolution alive and
strong"-has been subject to various interpretations.
Within six months of the Guard's formal creation,
Khomeini indicated that its focus on internal security
in response to local disturbances was only temporary,
Nonetheless, Revolu-
tionary Guard leaders continued to use the responsi-
bilities given to the Guard in the 1979 Islamic
Constitution to maintain a major domestic security
the Guard's major internal security functions have
evolved into a broad range of duties, including:
? Training its members in Islamic ideology and poli-
tics as well as in military skills.
? Ideological and political proselytizing.
? Helping implement revolutionary and religious judi-
cial orders and enforcing law and order, especially
with regard to counterrevolutionaries, leftists, and
ethnic minorities.
? Defending against attack by foreign military forces
or infiltrators.
? Cooperating with the regular armed forces, but
maintaining the capability to prevent a military
coup.
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Initially, the Guard's small size, its lack of training
and discipline, and a chronic shortage of funds and
equipment hampered its ability to perform its domes-
tic security mission. The force included lower-class
criminals, extortionists, and bullies whose strong-arm
tactics and brutality created or worsened local distur-
bances. In some cases Guard excesses forced local
authorities to demand the withdrawal or reorganiza-
tion of Guard forces.
The regime's first attempts to remedy these deficien-
cies were only marginally successful. Despite repeated
national and local campaigns to weed undesirable
elements out of Guard units, clashes with local au-
thorities and charges of brutality, corruption, and
abuse of power continued in 1982,
In our judgment, these problems led to the formal
incorporation of the Revolutionary Guard into the
government in 1982. The creation of the Ministry of
the Revolutionary Guard was intended to:
? Bring order to the rapidly expanding Guard
organization.
? Establish an effective chain of command for con-
trolling Guard activities.
? Centralize control over Guard financial, logistic,
and legal affairs.
Although the Ministry proved to be no panacea for
the Guard's problems, Minister Rafiq-Dust imposed
some order on the Guard's civilian organization. A
formal chain of command was established through
which local Guard elements would-at least in the-
ory-be under tighter central control. More impor-
tant, the Ministry focused on improving its internal
security apparatus and increasing support for the
regime.
the Ministry suc-
ceeded in molding Guard units and various religious
and revolutionary law enforcement groups into a
pervasive and powerful security network backed by a
formidable internal intelligence capability. Moreover,
the Guard's reputation for ruthlessness was not dimin-
ished. It continued to cow the populace and destroyed
the ability of dissident groups to affect the course of
events in Iran.
Through the Ministry the clerical leadership sought to
bring order to the Guard's financial, logistic, and
legal affairs. We believe that Minister Rafiq-Dust
interpreted this as a broad mandate to expand signifi-
cantly his control over arms purchases abroad as well
as over Iran's indigenous arms production.
In our judgment, the Ministry's arms purchasing
authority and its near total control over Iran's indige-
nous arms industries are the source of much of its
political power.
however, Iran's deteriorating economy, combined
with charges of fraud and corruption in the upper
echelons of the Guard Ministry, may have prompted
the regime to transfer at least some of the authority
for weapons procurement back to the Ministry of
Defense in mid-1986.
Regime Concerns. The Ministry's growing internal
security role, combined with the IRGC's greater part
in the war, made many regime leaders fear that the
Guard was becoming too powerful and a potential
threat to clerical rule,
This fear was partly responsible for the formation of
the Intelligence Ministry in 1984. By early 1985 the
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Figure 5
Iran: Organization of the Ministry of the Revolutionary Guard
Minister of the
Revolutionary
Guard
Prosecutor's
Office
? Interrogation
? Detention
Operations
Department
? Plans
? Security patrols
Intelligence
Department
? Investigations
? Surveillance
? Technical
Operations
? Foreign
Operations
(Liberation
Movements)
? Operational
Support
Training
Department
? Domestic
? Foreign
Administration
Department
? Finance
? Personnel
Logistics
Department
? Arms procurement
Regional district
and city commands
h
N
Basij (Mobiliza-
tion) forces
Mobilization,
training, and
logistic support
Guard's internal intelligence and security responsibil- committees whose main function was to ensure public
ities had been handed over to the Intelligence Minis- conformity to religious laws and revolutionary mores)
t r y - - The autonomous, was put under the control of the Interior Ministry,
national, mosque-centered network of komitehs (local and its ties to the Revolutionary Guard were cut.
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at the same time,
The Constitution gives the Revolutionary Guard re-
sponsibility for exporting the revolution in addition
to its security functions.
the International Relations Unit oversees the
Guard's revolutionary duties and is responsible for
contacts with liberation movements worldwide. Mem-
bers of this unit receive specialized training and are
posted to Iranian diplomatic missions abroad. They
are charged with propagandizing on behalf of the
Islamic revolution and with recruiting sympathetic
Muslims. Those judged most dedicated are brought
to Iran for religious and ideological indoctrination
and paramilitary training.
Lebanon is the primary target of Iran's attempt to
export its Islamic revolution, and the Revolutionary
Guard has been at the forefront of that effort. Besides
the Iranian Embassy in Damascus, the 300 to 500
Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon are the principal
means by which Iran has sought to unify rival Shia
factions particularly the Hizballah-under its
control:
Lebanese Shias,
? Deliveries of small arms, ammunition, mortars,
and rocket propelled grenades are made under
Guard auspices.
? In addition to its military training mission, the
Guard contingent in Lebanon has engaged in reli-
gious and ideological proselytizing and indoctrina-
tion to gain new converts to the fundamentalist
cause.
? The Guard also plays an important role in social
welfare and community health projects.
responsibility for the Guard's religious morality pa-
trols (Gasht-e Sarollah) was transferred to the
komitehs.
Guard leaders and some influential clerics have op- 25X1
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sponsibilities.
Guard leaders assert that they cannot fulfill
their mandate to preserve the Islamic republic unless
they can control domestic security operations.
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We believe the reduction of the Guard's domestic
security responsibilities indicates that Iranian leaders
are wary of the consequences of investing too much
power in any one element of the government. Ironical-
ly, the result is to perpetuate the conflict between
Revolutionary Guard leaders and the Intelligence
Ministry over control of the internal security appara-
tus. Competition among and within security and
intelligence groups is likely to contribute to factional
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smooth succession when Khomeini dies.
The Revolutionary Guard
as a Military Force
Iran's goal to create a revolutionary Islamic army
built around the IRGC has been tempered by the
exigencies of the war with Iraq. After the ouster of
the Shah, the revolutionary leadership announced
plans to create a mass militia to replace the regular
army. Domestic unrest and the outbreak of the war
with Iraq forced the new regime to abandon this
course and bring the army back to full strength. Still
suspicious of the armed forces' loyalty, the regime
expanded the military role of the Revolutionary
Guard, forming combat units that would both aug-
ment and rival the regular military
Guard combat units initially suffered the same defi-
ciencies as the Guard's civilian components. Inade-
quate organization, lack of training and discipline,
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Profile of a Revolutionary Guard
The majority of the Guard's rank and file is drawn
from the younger, uneducated lower class-specifi-
cally the urban poor. It is the Guard's 'permanent
cadre' -those who choose service with the Guard as
a career-however, who provide the basis for its
considerable power and influence in Iran. Members of
the permanent cadre are generally better educated
and come from all segments of Iranian society. For
both groups, the Islamic revolution and, more partic-
ularly, membership in the Revolutionary Guard have
a powerful attraction and offer significant political
and personal opportunities. We believe that, in most
cases, an individual joins the Guard for a variety of
reasons. The following profile is a composite, intend-
ed to portray the more "typical" characteristics of a
Revolutionary Guard:
? Age: Mid-twenties to early thirties.
? Family background: Comes from a Shia family
that has been found to be ideologically and politi-
cally "acceptable" as a result of a Revolutionary
Guard background investigation. A family member
or close relative has been "martyred"-killed in
the war with Iraq or died under other suitably
"revolutionary" circumstances. Was recruited
from among Hezbollahis (Party of God)-loosely
organized street gangs acting as self-appointed
religious and revolutionary law enforcers.
? Social and economic status: Belongs to the lower
class or lower middle class. Saw little evidence of,
or few prospects for, upward mobility under the
Shah. Believes the clerical regime will eventually
lead to a more equitable social order, but is
prepared to take advantage of opportunities for
personal gain in the meantime.
? Education: Secondary level formal education, sup-
plemented by extensive religious and political in-
doctrination by mullahs and Revolutionary Guard
cadre.
? Military training: One to three months of initial
military training focusing on light weapons, basic
infantry tactics. More specialized training available
to brighter, better educated Guards include artil-
lery, armor, air defense, naval warfare, or flight
courses.
? Military experience: Has had several tours at the
front and has participated in a variety of operations
from counterinsurgency campaigns against the
Kurds to large-scale offensives against Iraq. Repu-
tation as a zealous, aggressive fighter is well de-
served, as is reputation for lack of discipline in
combat.
? Other characteristics: Advocates radical positions
on most issues affecting the Islamic republic, espe-
cially aggressive prosecution of the war with Iraq,
virulent opposition to the United States, and contin-
ued export of the revolution. Idealistic zeal is
mixed with opportunism.
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and a chronic shortage of funds and equipment
hampered their performance. To improve the Guard's
combat capability the regime ordered the army to
provide training and logistic support
We estimate the Revolutionary Guard has between
125,000 to 175,000 combat personnel. F_
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As the Guard gained experience in the war against
Iraq, it improved its capabilities as well as its prestige
within the regime. Equipped primarily for guerrilla
and light infantry operations, Guard forces often bore
the brunt of the fighting and acquired a reputation for
aggressiveness. The Guard emerged as a serious com-
bat force in 1981, regaining occupied Iranian territory
when the regular army's conventional armored coun-
terattacks failed. As a consequence, the Guard was
given additional military responsibilities and assumed
an increasingly influential role in decisionmaking on
the war. It increased its abilities to counter the army
in the event of an internal struggle as well.
Organization and Manpower. The demands of the
war have led Tehran to expand the Guard's combat
role and gradually to shape it along more conventional
military lines.
Guard combat units are arranged in a fairly standard
organizational structure-divisions, brigades, battal-
ions, and companies. There are at least 19 Guard
divisions and probably more than 46 brigades, most of
which are subordinate to the divisions. At times,
several divisions have been noted under the operation-
al control of one of several Revolutionary Guard
corps-level headquarters, but we believe this subordi-
nation is temporary and changes with operational
needs at the front. More often, command and control
is exercised by joint Revolutionary Guard/army
headquarters activated to provide coordination during
larger offensive operations.
Although IRGC forces are primarily light infantry,
there are possibly as many as three armored or
mechanized infantry divisions. In addition, some divi-
sions have their own artillery, commando, and air
defense units,
experienced and best equipped troops.
men, and a typical brigade is manned by 2,000 to
3,000 soldiers. With few exceptions, these forces are
deployed along the front and include the IRGC's most
each IRGC division has from 6,000 to 8,000
IRGC combat units are augmented by Basij-"Mobi-
lization of the Oppressed"-forces. Recruited,
trained, and led by the Revolutionary Guard, the
Basij is a mass militia that was created in 1979 in
response to Ayatollah Khomeini's call for a 20-
million-man army to defend against a possible US
invasion and later to fight Iraq. The number of Basij
combat personnel on active duty fluctuates with oper-
ational needs at the front, and masses of volunteers
are called up and sent to the front in preparation for
major offensives, according to Iranian press reports.
We estimate that there are at least 100,000 Basij on
frontline combat duty at any given time and probably
more than 400,000 available for mobilization. F_
Until recently, nearly all Revolutionary Guard per-
sonnel were strongly motivated volunteers who chose
the Guard as a career. Individual motives differed
considerably, however,
Some would enlist out of revolutionary
fervor or ideological commitment to the Islamic revo-
lution. Others sought to take advantage of the special
benefits-higher pay than the regular military, status,
political or economic advantages-associated with
membership in the Guard.
Career or "permanent" Guards-the core of the
IRGC-are generally recruited through the families
of "martyrs" and among the radical street gangs,
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The larger combat role of the IRGC and the growing
war weariness of the Iranian populace are causing
problems for the Guard's voluntary enlistment pro-
grams. Apparently starting in 1984, conscripts have
been assigned to fill rank-and-file positions in the
IRGC, An
Iranian press report in June 1986 indicated that
government agencies and employees were "duty-
bound" to comply with IRGC "requests" for person-
nel required to fill key positions.
The Revolutionary Guard and Basij in Combat. Dur-
ing the first two years of the war, the Revolutionary
Guard and Basij acquired a well-deserved reputation
as a fanatic, aggressive, but ill-trained and undisci-
plined combat force. In contrast to the Guard's early
successes are some notable failures caused by lack of
training, inadequate weapons and supplies, and poor
coordination with regular military forces:
? In March 1984, Revolutionary Guard and Basij
units involved in the spring offensive to capture the
Majnoon Islands suffered high casualties-includ-
ing the near total loss of a 12,000-man combined
Guard/Basij force that spearheaded the attack. An
investigative commission tentatively concluded that
the regular army commander had failed to provide
adequate support and termed his conduct "deliber-
ate sabotage."
? During the "Badr" offensive to cut the Baghdad-Al
Basrah road on the west bank of the Hawr al
Hawizah in 1985, at least 30,000 Iranian soldiers-
mostly Basij and Revolutionary Guards-were
killed. Many of these deaths were attributable to
poor planning, logistic problems, and poor coordina-
tion between regular and irregular forces,
Improving Performance. The regime has tried various
measures to bring Revolutionary Guard training more
in line with that of the regular military.
armor,
artillery, and pilot training have expanded since the
war began. In 1984, Tehran created a joint military
organization composed of senior Ground Forces,
Navy, and Air Force officers to formalize and coordi-
nate Guard training. The IRGC has established its
own advanced officer training course,
Army technicians also are
occasionally attached to Revolutionary Guard units
for up to six months as instructors in communications,
electronics, and advanced weapon systems.
Tehran has attempted to remedy the Guard's shortage
of weapons and supplies by giving it priority in
weapons procurement. Although the Guard is still
primarily a light infantry force,
it is receiving much, probably
most, of the Soviet-designed tanks, artillery, and other
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military equipment captured from Iraq or supplied by
North Korea, China, Libya, and Eastern Europe. The
Guard has also conducted an aggressive effort to
purchase arms and equipment abroad since at least
1982.
Finally, the clerical leadership has attempted to im-
prove coordination between the Revolutionary Guard
and Basij units and the regular armed forces. Joint
operational headquarters, low-level joint training of
battalion-size units, and closer cooperation between
regular and irregular forces in planning as well as
executing operations are among the specific steps
the regime
as ordered a wider integration of regular and irregu-
lar forces, including the transfer of large numbers of
army personnel to Revolutionary Guard units.
In our judgment, these changes have made the Revo-
lutionary Guard a more effective military force. It has
learned from its defeats, improved its operational
skills, tightened discipline and control among its own
combat units and attached Basij troops, and increased
its cooperation with regular army forces.
In September 1985, Ayatollah Khomeini announced
publicly that ground, naval, and air branches would
be formally established within the IRGC and ordered 25X1
the Ground Forces, Navy, and Air Force to assist in
organizing and equipping these units.
headquarters and training areas for 25X1
the new Guard branches were established at facilities
near Tehran, and arrangements were made to transfer
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The Guard's senior headquarters has also been reor-
ganized, probably to improve its ability to oversee and
direct the IRGC's expanded military duties. 0 7FX1
a Joint Staff (Sepah-e 25X1
Keshvari) has been established to take over the duties
of the Central Staff and facilitate the expansion of 25X1
IRGC military units, including the new air and naval
branches.
We believe the Revolutionary Guard's role in plan-
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Creating an "Army of the Revolution. " In our judg-
ment, the regime intends the Revolutionary Guard to
become the core of a new "army of the revolution"
that will eventually replace the regular armed forces.
Khomeini has long given at least tacit endorsement to
such a proposal, in part because he and other Iranian
leaders continue to doubt the loyalty of the military.
Tehran's original plans to replace the regular military
with Guard forces were disrupted by Kurdish rebel-
lions and the war with Iraq, but considerable progress
has been made toward that objective in recent years.
Factionalism and the Guard. In our judgment, the
Revolutionary Guard's future cohesiveness and viabil-
ity as the primary military force of the Islamic
republic will be undermined by political factionalism.
Despite the Guard's institutionalization, the clerical
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'actional alliances and infight-
leadership's tightened control over its activities, and
the apparent unity of purpose within the Revolution-
ary Guard, we believe it is highly susceptible to
infighting and external factional pressures.
nternal
infighting and factionalism within the Guard are
growing. A wide variety of issues, ranging from broad
ideological disputes to more narrow political or even
personal disagreements, is involved:
? Veterans who have been with the Guard since 1979
are increasingly disillusioned with the progress of
the revolution. The more idealistic deplore Iran's
ineffective war strategy and what they see as "un-
Islamic" power plays and government corruption in
Tehran. Others resent being forced to serve multiple
tours on the front while giving up the economic and
political benefits of nonmilitary service with the
Guard.
We believe that Ayatollah Khomeini's ability to
resolve such disputes and dampen factionalism within
the Guard has declined because of his deteriorating
health.
ing have undermined the fierce loyalty to Khomeini
that used to be the Guard's principal unifying force.
In our judgment, factionalism within the Guard will
gain momentum as the clerical leadership continues
its efforts to redefine the Guard's internal security
role and expand its military responsibilities. This,
along with the decline-or absence-of Khomeini's
influence, suggests that infighting will become more
intense and disputes more difficult to resolve. If more
open political infighting among other groups and
factions within the regime occurs, the likelihood of
armed clashes in the Guard will increase.
Outlook-The Guard in Post-Khomeini Iran
In our judgment, the Revolutionary Guard will re-
main an important factor in Iranian politics after
Khomeini's death. Despite the reduction of its internal
security duties, the Ministry of the Revolutionary
Guard will continue to serve as a primary guardian of
the ideals of the Islamic revolution, and it is likely to
maintain, or even try to expand, its domestic intelli-
gence network. With its expanded military role and
improved combat capabilities, the IRGC is likely to
play a major role in the transition of power once
Khomeini is gone.
We believe there are cracks in this "pillar" of the
Islamic republic that may contribute to another up-
heaval in Iran. Factionalism and political infighting
would significantly reduce the Guard's ability to
maintain order during the post-Khomeini transition.
The Guard's institutional cohesion would be strained
and could break down as those vying for power in the
government seek the support of elements within the
Guard.
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Figure 9
Iran: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Joint Staff Organization
Ironically, the regime's efforts to avoid giving one
organization full control of Iran's domestic security
and intelligence apparatus could seriously undermine
the government's ability to ensure a smooth succes-
sion. So far the clerical leadership has managed to
check opposition to its restructuring of these services,
but this is probably because of Khomeini's extraordi-
nary ability to command loyalty and compliance from
his subordinates. Revolutionary Guard Minister
Rafiq-Dust and Intelligence Minister Reyshahri, for
example, both owe their positions to Khomeini and
derive their power directly from him as well as from
their strong connections to other prominent clergy and
government leaders. When Khomeini dies, loyalty to
his memory probably will not be enough to prevent
various factions from attempting to suborn the coun-
try's security apparatus.
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Factions Within the Revolutionary Guard
The Revolutionary Guard, like most large national
institutions with a diverse membership, is not an
ideologically monolithic organization. Although fa-
natical loyalty to Ayatollah Khomeini and zealous
propagation of the ideals of the Islamic revolution
are characteristics that apply to the Guard generally,
within the Guard there are several different factions.
Each of these groups has its own interpretation of the
fundamental role and purpose of the Guard, and
competition among them for control of the Guard's
direction is growing,
to the ultraconservative Hojatieh Society, suggest-
ing important links to upper and middle ranks of
the bureacracy, the judiciary, and the security
forces as well as technocrats and bazaar
merchants.
? Radicals: We believe this is the dominant faction
within the Revolutionary Guard. It is composed of
those who support a hardline policy on the war,
aggressive export of the revolution, and greater
government control over the economy. This faction
is fiercely loyal to Khomeini, and in a post-Khomei-
ni power struggle it would probably align itself with
radical religious and secular leaders.
We believe there are three or four major groups, but
factional coalitions and loyalties are highly fluid:
? Conservatives and Moderates: Revolutionary
Guards who generally favor a far less aggressive
prosecution of-if not a negotiated end to-the war
with Iraq. They seek to limit government involve-
ment in the economy and oppose violent export of
the revolution. This group is probably the most
anti-Soviet, but it is also suspicious of the United
States. It is aligned with President Khamenei. C
this faction also in
cludes Revolutionary Guards who secretly belong
Similarly, the emergence of the IRGC as a serious
military force could prove a double-edged sword for
the regime. By its nature the Guard is far from being
a "professional," nonpolitical military organization,
and after Khomeini's death it will be increasingly
vulnerable to factional pressures and political infight-
ing. Should the succession struggle in Tehran turn
violent, we believe those vying for power will look to
their allies in Guard combat units for armed support
and order them back from the front. Such a move
would significantly escalate the political conflict and
raise the chances of all-out civil war.
? Pragmatists: Members of this group maneuver be-
tween the two other factions, for the most part
choosing policies they believe advance the Guard's
interests-and their own careers.
The Guard is split along "generational" lines as well,
The "old
Guards" who have worked in the organization for six
or seven years have gained experience and expertise
and are now prone to question regime policies. The
"new Guards" who have been brought in within the
last two or three years tend to carry out their orders
unquestioningly.
There is a better than even chance that the regime
will face serious instability after Khomeini is gone.
Although the point at which such instability would
become a threat to the regime's existence cannot be
precisely predicted, we believe that the Guard's vul-
nerability to factional infighting will quickly reduce
its ability to maintain order or keep the regime intact.
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Implications for the United States
On the basis of our analysis, we believe the Revolu-
tionary Guard has been-and remains-a source of
virulent anti-US sentiment in Iran. Its anti-US rheto-
ric reflects deeply ingrained attitudes and beliefs that
are not likely to change. We believe the Guard will be
a major obstacle to the renewal of US-Iranian rela-
tions in the post-Khomeini era as long as it retains
significant influence in the government:
? Any efforts by Khomeini's successor to improve
relations with the United States would alienate
major elements of the Guard and would increase the
prospect of the Guard joining in a major power
struggle.
? In the event a post-Khomeini power struggle leads
to serious upheaval in Iran, the Guard is likely to
back the more radical factions vying for power.
? Although opportunism among some Guard leaders
may eventually lead them to expand ties to Western
nations other than the United States-primarily to
replenish arms and acquire needed spare parts-we
believe these contacts will be closely monitored and
limited to protect the Guard's political and ideologi-
cal integrity as a pillar and agent of the Islamic
revolution.
We believe the Guard's intense animosity toward the
United States also makes it more prone to supporting
improved relations with the Soviet Union and its
allies, especially if the Guard believes the regime or
its own position are seriously threatened. Such a move
would be a pragmatic effort to expand and improve
the Guard's arms inventory by adding to the Soviet-
designed weapons it has captured from Iraq or pur-
chased from China, North Korea, Libya, and Syria:
? The emergence of a radical successor regime with
Guard support would provide an opportunity for
significantly expanded Soviet influence in Iran,
possibly prompting Moscow to consider relaxing its
embargo on the sale of major weapon systems to
Iran.
? Serious instability resulting from a post-Khomeini
power struggle also would increase Soviet opportu-
nities to expand contacts with radicals in the Revo-
lutionary Guard who would view this connection as
a way to protect both the revolution and their own
power.
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Appendix
Protectors of the Revolution:
A Sampler of Enforcement
Groups
Official Agencies
In addition to the Revolutionary Guard, the komitehs
and the Qazi (Judicial) Police stand out among the
multitude of revolutionary and religious law enforce-
ment groups that sprang up during the revolution.
Both have been recognized by the central government
and given a nationwide mandate through a formal
charter. They complement and monitor the police and
Gendarmerie-the traditional civil law enforcement
agencies in Iran-which are controlled by the Interior
Ministry:
? Komitehs: An autonomous, national, mosque-cen-
tered network that was put under the control of the
Interior Ministry in 1984. The komitehs' 30,000-
man paramilitary force-the Komiteh Guards-is
considered a law, order, and security enforcement
agency alongside the police. Komitehs are responsi-
ble for many of the so-called special-purpose patrols
designed to ensure public conformity to Islamic and
revolutionary mores.
? Qazi (Judicial) Police: A group of highly select and
specially trained individuals, this agency was
formed in 1982 to ensure correct implementation of
religious law. The Qazi Police operate under the
Justice Ministry and closely monitor the entire
judicial system to prevent incompetence and impi-
ety. We estimate they number fewer than 5,000, are
generally well educated, and have records of reliable
service in other law enforcement agencies.
Unofficial Organizations
The revolution also spawned a wide variety of groups
that have not received the central government's seal of
approval through formal inclusion in the bureaucracy,
but which have become part of Iran's ubiquitous
domestic security network. The Iranian press has
accurately noted that at any given time there are too
many independent street patrols and watchdog units
to be counted. Among the more notorious are:
private gangs attached to influential bazaaris and
clerics. They are used by individuals trying to
influence government policies and by government
figures to intimidate the populace.
? Anjoman-e Islami (Islamic Societies): Organized
within almost every segment of society to urge
individual Iranians to observe and report on those
around them.
? Jondollah (Army of God) Forces: Composed of
army, Gendarmerie, Revolutionary Guard, and
Basij personnel, these groups were formed in 1983
to seek out draft dodgers and monitor the loyalty of
personnel within the military and law enforcement
agencies. We believe Jondallah units are loosely
organized along military lines and probably number
between 4,000 and 5,000 men.
? Sarollah (Revenge of God): An all-male religious
morality police that used to be controlled by the
Revolutionary Guard, but whose functions have
ostensibly been the responsibility of the komitehs
and the police since 1985. Sarollah patrols quickly
developed a reputation for brutality, which probably
led to the regime's efforts to curtail their activity.
? Khahari-ye Zahra (Sisters of Zahra): Religious
morality squads composed of armed females who
patrol cities in vehicles. Zahra was probably formed
because of protests against the Sarollah and may
have been absorbed into the Ershad patrols in 1985.
? Khahari-ye Zaineb (Sisters of Zaineb): Mixed
male-female religious morality patrols that may also
have been formed in response to complaints of
misconduct by Sarollah units; also may have been
absorbed into the Ershad patrols.
? Ershad (Guidance) Patrols: Mixed male-female reli-
gious morality patrols, some of which use vehicles
marked with the insignia of the Islamic courts.
? Hezbollahi (Party of God): Ill-defined bands that
exist throughout Iran but have no known national
leadership or organized structure. They seem to be
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Figure 10
Iran: Revolutionary Guard Organizational Structure
Corps and Ministry believed
to have dual responsibility
for Basij
Internal Security
forces
District
Bases
Ministry Corps
Support role
Minister Mohsert _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Commander
Deputy for
Administration
and Finance
Deputy for
Logistics and
Engineering
Deputy for
Parliament and
Legal
F
F
Formation/
training
Planning and
operations
Engineering
Support units
Supplies and
logistics
Training
Naval wing
Politico-
ideological
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Secret
Secret
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