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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00096R000300350001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
Intelligence 25X1
The Maghreb:
Population Problems
and Political Stability
Secret
NESA 86-10037
September 1986
322
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
The Maghreb:
Population Problems
and Political Stability
This paper was prepared by
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Office of Near Eastern and South
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Asian Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations)
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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division
Reverse Blank Secret
NESA 86-10037
September 1986
I I
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The Maghreb:
Population Problems
and Political Stability
2000.
Key Judgments The serious and deepening social and economic problems in North
Information available Africa-high unemployment, overcrowded cities, and a growing food
as of I1 September 1986 deficit-are undermining the foundations of political stability in the
was used in this report.
region. Rapid population growth is a major factor in these problems, and
the situation will worsen as the population in Morocco, Algeria, and
Tunisia jumps from 53 million today to a projected 84 million in the year
The rapid population growth is destabilizing because it is eroding the old
land-based, family-oriented, traditional Islamic society of the Maghreb
faster than governments in the area have been able to promote develop-
ment of economically advanced, urban-based societies. The traditional
rural economy cannot absorb the population increase, and, as a result, the
cities are drowning in an excess of youthful jobseekers. Rapidly expanding
public education systems try to inculcate the skills and habits of thought
needed to adapt to modern society, but all too often they only broaden hori-
zons and whet ambitions faster than the job market can grow to satisfy
them.
As these developments have gathered momentum, increasingly large
numbers of people-especially the younger generation-have become
alienated from their societies. Some of these socially and intellectually
uprooted individuals have started to turn their backs on modernization and
reject along with it the United States and other Western countries that
they see as principal agents of change. This impulse has been the driving
force behind the spread of the Islamic fundamentalist revival in the
Maghreb. Other individuals are discontented that their governments are
not doing more to promote change, and this group-substantially smaller
than the fundamentalists-is the recruiting ground for radical leftists.
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Political protest is not yet a major force, but it almost certainly will become
so as social and economic conditions deteriorate in the region. Political
leaders who fail to accommodate either leftist or fundamentalist aspira-
tions almost certainly will be forced to use more repressive measures to
shore up their authority. Leaders who lean too far toward either fundamen-
talism or leftist radicalism, however, will probably stir up opposition from
the other quarter. Moreover, fundamentalism and leftist radicalism imply
different political blueprints, and the underlying conflict between them
suggests that politics in the Maghreb will become increasingly turbulent.
Secret
NESA 86-10037
September 1986
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Maghreb leaders are aware of the dangers that rapid population growth
poses to long-term political stability, and they have begun to deal
constructively with some of the principal causes and consequences of the
problem. In Morocco, family planning is slowly gaining acceptance,
especially in the cities and among the better educated. Algeria recognizes
the need for family planning, though a national program is still in the
initial stages of implementation. Tunisia already has made limited gains in
controlling population growth through goverment-sponsored family plan-
ning programs. In spite of these efforts, progress in population control is
likely to remain limited in North Africa for some years to come.
Inadequate education is a fundamental obstacle, and governments will
proceed cautiously in order to avoid offending traditional values.
The strong possibility that rapid population growth will continue and could
contribute to increased political instability and anti-US sentiment is of
particular concern because of the region's strategic location. Political
leaders in the region are well aware of the Maghreb's strategic importance.
We anticipate that Morocco, Tunisia, and possibly Algeria will try to
exploit that fact by pressing Washington for financial assistance as they
struggle with the economic and political consequences of rapid urban
growth. Maghreb governments almost certainly will view Washington's
response to their requests for assistance as a measure of US commitment to
their needs and-in the case of Morocco and Tunisia-as an indication of
US reliability as an ally.
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Key Judgments
The Demographic Millstone
Jobs and Unemployment
Rising Urbanization
Constraints on Water, Land, and Food Supplies
5
Political Strains in Maghreb Societies
7
Efforts To Cope With the Demographic Crisis
9
Implications for the United States
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Figure 1
The Maghreb: Urbanization of the Population
Weste
SO.,
Madeira
Islands
(Port.)
0
Morocco:
Urbanized Population (percent)
Canary
Islands d
n l/ (SP-)
France
El Aaidn
lestern
Sahara
M rok6W---
N
Spain
al {Sardinia
41 Balearic (it.)
Islands
(Sp.)
Mediterranean Sea Sr,~r Sicily
Bi:e of 'It
.)
01 ir_
l ALGIERS NIS?
/Gibraltar `C~fft~ ~~
Strait of Gibraltar (U.K.)
',' asah
Tong' t t Malta
i del
Kenitra, Ids ~~ Abb)~ ~.r;, C fiqis
RABAT tri
North Casabl nb
Atlantic RIPOII
Safi MC O Ocean
O Arable land
The term urbanized represents
communities of 2,000 or more.
0 400 Kilometers
0 400 Miles
~iorsic8
(Fr.) Italy
nAlgeria j Libya
Algeria:
Urbanized Population (percent)
Tunisia:
Urbanized Population (percent)
Lake
ti MA 6?~ BurkinaIAMEY~Nlgeri~a had
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The Maghreb:
Population Problems
and Political Stability
Tension between a large, rapidly growing population
and the meager financial resources available to meet
basic human needs is producing serious social prob-
lems throughout the Maghreb.' These problems are as
apparent in leftist Algeria as in moderate Morocco
and Tunisia. In each country rapid population growth
undermines governmental efforts to maintain social
stability, equity, and living standards for the popula-
tion and limits further social and economic develop-
ment.' These problems almost certainly will lead to
major political challenges in these countries over the
next decade. Four major demographic problems
plaguing the Maghreb today will be even more pro-
nounced in the future:
? Rapid population growth. The Maghreb is already
burdened by a large population-53 million-which
the national economies can barely support. The
population is projected to grow to 84 million by the
year 2000. Family planning efforts have been limit-
ed by traditional values and Islamic beliefs.
? Unemployment. Already high unemployment and
underemployment-approaching 25 percent-in
both rural and urban areas will be compounded by
the addition of over 9 million people, a 53-percent
increase, to the labor pool by the turn of the
century.
' This study defines the Maghreb-Arabic for west-as Morocco,
Algeria, and Tunisia. These three countries have the same colonial
heritage and similar demographic problems. The study does not
include Libya because its small population and relative wealth
' A demographer under contract to the CIA provided unclassified
population data and projections that served as the basis for the
judgments in this assessment. The contractor's estimates for popu-
lation in 1985 are based on UN adjustments to the Moroccan
census of 1982, the Algerian census of 1977, and the Tunisian
census of 1984. The contractor also used fertility and mortality
trends to make population projections for the years after 1985.
Unless otherwise stated, all population data are from the
? Urbanization. About 53 percent of the population
now lives in cities, and the annual rate of urban
growth-4.6 percent-exceeds that of the popula-
tion as a whole by almost 2 percentage points.
Maghreb cities will face a steadily mounting need
for housing, water, food, and education.
? Scarce resources. Arid conditions limit the quantity
of cultivated land-less than 10 percent of the total
land area-and water available to meet growing
domestic demand for food. Imports will consume an
increasing share of scarce foreign exchange.
The Demographic Millstone
The region's explosive population growth of 2.8 per-
cent annually will continue with only slight abatement
well into the next century. High population growth
over the last 30 years has been largely a result of a
steady decline in mortality with no comparable
change in the birthrate. As a result, just over 1.5
million people were added to the population in the
past year alone. The United Nations projects only a
slight decline in the annual growth rate, to 2.4
percent, in the year 2000, when the projected popula-
tion will be about 84 million, almost triple the total
during the independence period in the late 1950s. We
estimate that even with population growth held to
only 2 percent annually-an optimistic assumption-
projected population in the region would reach 71
million by the end of the 1990s.
Fertility control programs will not significantly alter
these projections, since it would take two decades
under the best of circumstances to stabilize lower
birthrates. Moreover, that segment of the population
that will exert the greatest demand for jobs and
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Table 1
Maghreb Demographic Statistics
Population (millions)
23.64
22.28
7.29
37.26
36.21
10.38
Annual population growth rate
3.0
2.8
2.3
2.8
2.5
2.0
Urban population (millions)
10.38
14.11
3.81
20.51
27.67
7.03
Annual urbanization rate
4.3
5.2
3.7
4.2
4.0
2.8
Percentage of urban population
to total population
44
67
57
55
76
68
Life expectancy at birth (years)
59
60
62
66
66
69
Percentage under 20 years old
56
57
51
50
55
47
Unemployment and underem-
ployment (percent)
25
25
Demand for physicians b
2,130
3,986
1,518
3,365
6,478
2,162
Literacy (percent)
28
35
62
58
65
79
GDP per capita (1985)
490
2,230
1,136
NA
GDP Growth (1981-85)
2.5
4.3
3.9
NA
a Projected.
b Holding the patient-to-physician ratio constant; 11,100 patients
per physician in Morocco, 5,590 patients per physician in Algeria,
and 4,800 patients per physician in Tunisia.
resources over the next 15 years is now in the 1- to 15-
year-old age group. The governments of the Maghreb
have all begun to recognize the need for population
control, but only Tunisia has allocated more than 1 or
2 percent of its health budget to family planning
programs. Indeed, a wide gap exists between the
regimes' stated goals and their implementation of
such programs. According to the respective US Em-
bassies, Moroccan and Algerian officials have public-
ly stated that their national economies can accommo-
date twice the current population, but they privately
admit that rapid population growth is one of their
most urgent problems.
Most social scientists believe that the strength of
traditional views regarding women's role in society
and the desire for sons are greater barriers to family
planning than the teachings of Islam. Even though
Islamic scholars acknowledge that no Islamic tenets
directly prohibit the use of contraception, we believe
that family planning could be slowed by the spread of
Islamic fundamentalism because of its condemnation
of such practices as a "Western evil."
Jobs and Unemployment
The rapid surge in population has contributed to
increasing unemployment. Since 1980 poor economic
performance has added to the problem. Regional
GDP growth of 3.6 percent over the past five years
was only marginally ahead of population growth and
down by almost half from the previous five-year
period,
As a result, unemployment and underemploy-
ment have risen steadily to an estimated 25 percent of
the labor force. Even during the 1970s, a period of
strong economic growth, the Maghreb states could
never provide jobs for all new entrants to their labor
pool. We estimate that, to accommodate the swelling
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Figure 2
Morocco: Age Structure of Population,
1985-2000
0 Male 0 Female Born after independence
1985
Age
0-4
2000
Age
75+
70
65
0-4
number of entrants into the job market, regional GDP
would have to grow at an unrealistically high average
rate of over 9 percent annually. Such a high level of
growth would be needed because the increasingly
capital-intensive economies of the future will create
fewer jobs for a given increase in GDP:
? Morocco will need to provide 320,000 jobs per year
for new entrants over the next 15 years.
? Algeria will have to provide 275,000 new jobs
annually.
? Tunisia will need to find positions for as many as
80,000 new jobseekers each year.
Rising Urbanization
The rapid increase in population and the limited job
opportunities in rural areas, along with improved
education and broadening horizons for youth, have
fueled an enormous increase in urbanization. Over 53
percent of the Maghreb's population is already con-
centrated in urban areas. Casablanca, Algiers, and
Tunis, which have experienced the most rapid growth
since the beginning of the century, have the most
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Figure 3
Algeria: Age Structure of Population
1985-2000
Male
1985
Age
0 Female
Born after independence
2000
Age
severe overcrowding. City residents are a key constit-
uency for political leaders, who have consequently
invested heavily in urban improvements. Investment
in urban food subsidies, piped water, social services,
and the protection of urban wages further encourages
rural-to-urban migration and has led to a vicious cycle
where each new increase in urban population pro-
duces pressure for further investments.
We believe that efforts by each of the Maghreb
governments to limit the flow of rural migrants to the,
cities will continue to be inadequate. In many cases,
measures to accommodate migrants only make them
permanent urban residents,
In our view, government efforts to raise rural
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Figure 4
Tunisia: Age Structure of Population
1985-2000
1985
Age
0-4
0
I I I II I I I I
3 2 1 0 1 2 3
Hundred thousands
2000
Age
75+
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0-4
0
incomes and improve social services in the countryside
in many instances have been little more than make-
work projects and an added drain on national budgets.
Constraints on Water, Land, and Food Supplies
We believe that demand for water, land, and food-
commensurate with population pressures-will be-
come major political issues for the Maghreb before
the end of the century. Demand for water, already in
short supply, will probably double by the year 2000,
with limited options for expanding supplies,
We expect that urban areas
especially will feel the pinch because delivery systems
are already inadequate. In addition, the pressure for
government policies that favor irrigated agriculture
will intensify competition between rural and urban
areas.
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Figure 5
Maghreb: Indexes of Per Capita
Cereal Production, 1981-2000'
200
1981 82 83 84 85 95 2000
a Assumes that the average increase in production over the 1981 to 1985
period is maintained over the next 15 years.
Land usage is a serious issue in the Maghreb because
less than 10 percent is under cultivation. The prob-
lems in agricultural usage are numerous: erosion,
primitive cultivation methods, and inadequate use of
fertilizers. Although urban-oriented governments
have paid lipservice to land reform and agricultural
development, this sector has been neglected, accord-
ing to US embassies in the region
As a result, the Maghreb is experiencing a growing
gulf between food production and demand, with limit-
ed prospects for closing the gap. Although the region
was roughly self-sufficient in food at independence,
it now imports over half of
its food. According to Moroccan and Tunisian Gov-
ernment statistics, agricultural productivity has in-
creased at barely half the rate of population growth
Figure 6
Maghreb: Cereal Production Gap,
1981-2000
4 percent
average growth
Average growth b
0 percent
average growth
0 1981 82 83 84 85 95 2000
a Average consumption per capita is held constant over the next 15 years.
b Future production is based on the average level of production over the
1981 to 1985 period for each Maghreb state.
for the last 20 years. Poor government management,
low farm prices, and inadequate agricultural exten-
sion services share much of the blame.
agricultural imports already account for 20
percent of total imports and are a significant drain on
foreign exchange. We estimate that the cost of annual
food imports will grow by at least 40 percent-$1
billion-by the year 2000, if agricultural productivity
is not improved.
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Downturn in Emigration
Labor emigration to Western Europe-particularly
France-and to a lesser extent the oil-rich Gulf states
has had substantial, but now declining, benefits for
the Maghreb. The approximately 2.3 million
Maghreb workers abroad represent about 14 percent
of the labor force. Europe and the Gulf states have
absorbed as many as 100,000 North African workers
annually over the past 20 years, according to the US
embassies in the Maghreb. The flow of remittances
from expatriates, rising from $950 million in 1975 to
more than $1.6 billion in 1985,
is one of the largest single sources of foreign
Labor emigration is rapidly waning as a safety valve
for the growing number of unemployed. According to
the US Embassy in Rabat, Paris is planning to initiate
tighter controls and visa requirements for Maghreb
workers entering France. Moreover, a decreased need
for unskilled workers in French industry threatens to
force the return of workers to the Maghreb. Political
leaders in each Maghreb country are concerned about
the influence radical Islamic elements may exert on
North African workers in Europe and the ideas they
might bring home. Although returning workers have
been successfully reintegrated into North African
society thus far, their relative affluence may well sow
discontent among their less well-off countrymen in a
time of growing economic austerity.
Political Strains in Maghreb Societies
Rapid population growth has eroded the old land-
based, family-oriented, traditional Islamic society of
the Maghreb faster than governments in the area
have been able to promote development of economi-
cally advanced and urban-based societies. The popu-
lar unrest fueled by this circumstance has been
aggravated by the economic slump of the past several
years. Since 1980 public disturbances occasionally
have occurred in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia as a
result of discontent with austerity, and significant
restiveness exists among students, the unemployed,
and some religious fundamentalists. Islamic funda-
mentalism and leftist philosophies probably will have
increasing appeal under conditions of growing social
adversity. We believe that managing these challenges
will tax already strained budgets and the will of each
country's political elite.
The Maghreb's economic situation is aggravated by a
widening gap between the wealthy few and the impov-
erished many:
? The US Embassy in Rabat estimates that 5 percent
of the Moroccan population is in the upper class, 15
percent in the middle class, and 80 percent in the
lower class-at, or below, the poverty line. World
Bank statistics for Morocco indicate that 10 percent
of the population controls 50 percent of the coun-
try's wealth, a gulf that is growing.
? In Tunisia, economic power is increasingly in the
hands of a narrowing spectrum of the population.
This shift is visible in World Bank statistics that
show that the poorest 20 percent of the population
accounted for 6 percent of total consumption in
1966 and only 5 percent in 1980. In contrast, the
share of the richest 5 percent rose from 18 percent
in 1966 to 22 percent in 1980.
? Limited available evidence suggests that wealth
distribution in socialist Algeria has become more
even since independence. Nevertheless, the sharp
restrictions on private consumption probably have
kept real gains to a minimum.
Youth and Students
In all three countries, unmet rising expectations
among the burgeoning better educated youthful popu-
lation are becoming a major source of discontent,
according to US Embassy reporting. Social scientists
of the region say that young people are increasingly
blaming their governments for mismanagement of the
economy and are refusing to make sacrifices. The US
Embassy in Rabat says that crime in urban slums is
rising at an alarming rate as a result of the growing
number of unemployed youths.
Morocco's
educational system is not geared to providing the
skills needed for technical and industrial jobs and
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contributes instead to urban unemployment, a condi-
tion we believe also prevails in Algeria and Tunisia.
Student strikes protesting shortages in educational
services have led to violence, especially in Morocco
and Tunisia. Such protests have increased over the'
past several years, despite the governments' stationing
of police on campuses. The US Embassies in Rabat
and Tunis report that this police presence has in-
creased unrest among most students.
Some socially and intellectually uprooted young peo-
ple are starting to turn their backs on modernization
and, as a corollary, to reject the United States and
other Western countries that they see as principal
agents of change. This impulse has been the driving
force behind the recent spread of Islamic fundamen-
talism in the region, according to regional scholars.
On the other hand, others-we believe a smaller
number-are discontented that their governments are
not doing more to promote change, and this group is
the recruiting ground for radical leftists.
Islamic Fundamentalism
Rapid population growth and related social change
are contributing to the appeal of militant fundamen-
talism, which calls for a return to Islamic principles.
The movement extends well beyond the youth and
consists of two principal currents.
The first-"fundamentalists of conviction"-is com-
posed of fairly well-off intellectuals. The intellectuals
are generally dissatisfied with what they consider to
be social and economic injustices, and they see that
ruling cliques are running the North African coun-
tries on the basis of favoritism and corruption. This
group agrees that the path of reform lies in strict
adherence to the Koran, and some share the wide-
spread fundamentalist belief that the West must be
rejected because of its association with Israel.
The second group-"fundamentalists from frustra-
tion"-is made up of unemployed or underemployed
urban residents who are denied access to wealth or
positions in society. A group of Moroccan scholars has
recently argued that rapid population growth has
aggravated this problem. Frustrated individuals of
this sort frequently do not have an intellectual appre-
ciation of Islam but hope that fundamentalism will
improve their bleak prospects. To date, class and
education differences have kept the two groups from
cooperating.
Although fundamentalism and leftist agitation have
been fed by rapid population growth, they have not
reached dangerous proportions. There are clear signs,
however, that these movements pose a potential
threat:
? Morocco experienced violent outbursts in Casablan-
ca in 1981 and nationwide rioting in 1984 over
reduced food subsidies. This violence resulted in
several hundred deaths after the military was called
in to restore order. During the riots in 1984 Islamic
fundamentalists helped foment unrest by distribut-
ing tracts attacking King Hassan's economic mis-
management. Last fall the US Embassy in Rabat
reported that the decision to enlarge the royal
palace by demolishing adjacent neighborhoods in
Casablanca set off new demonstrations. In our view,
harsher austerity likely to be mandated under Mor-
occo's next IMF and debt rescheduling programs
will increase discontent. With limited economic
options, we believe the King will be forced to be
more repressive, calling on his security and military
forces more frequently and quickly to quell dissent.
? Algeria's inability to meet the demand for basic
social services-primarily housing-in urban areas
caused riots in the Casbah in the summer of 1985.
Violence also erupted in several rural communities
in 1985 as farmers clashed with local authorities
over land and water reforms, according to the US
Embassy in Algiers.
We esti-
mate that the sharp drop in oil prices threatens to
halve foreign exchange earnings this year and to
undermine President Bendjedid's program of eco-
nomic liberalization. Despite its pervasive security
apparatus, the regime will have to move cautiously
to avoid further unrest and criticism by remaining
hardliners opposed to Bendjedid's reforms, in our
view.
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? Tunisia also was rocked in 1984 by riots that were
brought on by a sharp hike in the price of bread.
Islamic fundamentalist agitators helped to fan the
protests of disadvantaged workers in poorer rural
areas that spread to urban centers, according to the
US Embassy in Tunis. In our view, falling prices for
Tunisia's chief exports-oil, phosphates, and agri-
cultural products-and a rising debt service burden
will continue to limit the government's ability to
deal with unemployment and the needs of a rapidly
urbanizing society. We believe President Bourguiba
and his successor will become even more repressive
as economic options diminish.
Efforts To Cope With the Demographic Crisis
North Africa's population crunch will not ease signifi-
cantly for decades to come even if population growth
slows-as may have begun to occur in Tunisia. In the
meantime, Maghreb governments will have little
choice but to focus their attention and resources on
politically pressing symptoms of the population cri-
sis-unemployment, shortages in education, and inad-
equate food supplies.
Since 1980 governments in Morocco, Algeria, and
Tunisia have begun to deal constructively with some
of the principal causes and consequences of the
population problem:
? Morocco has begun to adjust government-controlled
farm prices in an effort to improve agricultural
income and productivity. Priority is being given to
vocational training programs to counteract the se-
vere shortage of skilled technicians. Family plan-
ning is slowly gaining acceptance, especially in the
cities and among the better educated.
? Algeria is making a significant effort to return
farmland to private holders and to bolster stagnant
agricultural productivity. Algeria also is experi-
menting with vocational education to absorb the
growing number of unemployed youths. Family
planning is recognized by the government as essen-
tial, but a national program is still in the prelimi-
nary stages of implementation.
? Tunisia has already made limited gains in control-
ling population growth through government-spon-
sored family planning programs. Increased use of
fertilizer, liberalized prices for agricultural produc-
tion, and better credit terms for farmers have led to
improved yields. Education has long been a primary
goal of the regime, which is attempting to reform
curriculums to meet national needs.
Obstacles to Improvement
Progress in population control is likely to remain
limited in the Maghreb for some years to come.
Inadequate education is a fundamental obstacle to
implementation, and governments will proceed cau-
tiously in order to avoid offending traditional religious
values.
We believe that Maghreb leaders will face growing
difficulty mobilizing the financial resources needed to
tackle the social and economic problems resulting
from population growth. An inadequate fiscal base
will make it especially hard to revitalize food produc-
tion. Most farmers cannot afford needed investments
in agricultural technology and expertise, and govern-
ment budget deficits will continue to curtail subsidies
for new equipment. We believe, moreover, that lead-
ers will be reluctant to dismantle inefficient govern-
ment organizations that control food production,
prices, and distribution because they provide an im-
portant source of patronage and political control.
Leaders also recognize that eliminating the current
system of subsidizing urban consumers would produce
unrest in the cities. Moreover, the governments' poli-
cies are not addressing the disparity between agricul-
tural and industrial wages, which encourages the
migration of the youth to urban areas.
Water will remain a key constraint to infrastructure
development. According to social scientists, many
existing sources of water are already overused, lead-
ing to saltwater encroachment, pollution of aquifers,
and reduced supplies. Improving the efficiency of
current water resources-through methods such as
emphasizing drip irrigation and water-efficient
crops-will require a significant improvement in edu-
cation and changes in traditional farming methods.
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Table 2
Maghreb Current Account
Trade balance
-1,557
2,500
-1,070
-800
730
-1,362
Exports (f.o.b.)
2,283
13,500
2,110
2,300
6,730
1,078
Petroleum and gas
13,349
1,310
6,380
198
Phosphates
405
367
950
270
Agricultural goods
587
151
240
450
50
100
Imports (f.o.b.)
3,840
11,000
3,180
3,100
6,000
2,440
Fuel
1,200
600
500
123
Food
892
2,200
430
450
1,300
600
Net services
-360
-4,100
560
640
-4,000
300
Worker remittances
963
497
360
950
310
200
Current account balance
-1,917
-1,600
-510
-160
-3,270
-1,062
Foreign exchange
reserves
230
3,695
536
70
2,000
100
Development of new water resources will entail even
greater expense and require significant foreign exper-
tise to achieve. Limited financial resources probably
will preclude the construction of a major new water
supply infrastructure, including dams, desalination
plants, pipelines, water wells, and pumping stations.
The Maghreb region's harsh environment is likely to
increase the impact of these shortcomings. Much of
the remaining uncultivated land is in semidesert zones
that receive barely sufficient rainfall even in good
years. If the population projection of 84 million in the
Maghreb by the turn of the century is correct,
regional agricultural productivity would have to in-
crease by an average of 8.1 percent annually-6.3
percent in Morocco, 11.2 percent in Algeria, and 7.1
percent in Tunisia-to achieve a balance between
cereal production and demand. Such increases have
rarely been achieved even in the United States, where
fertile land, water, and skills are plentiful.
We believe that regardless of their different political
complexions, the Maghreb governments are commit-
ted to reducing population growth, and we expect
them to try to develop more successful family plan-
ning programs. At the same time, Moroccan and
Algerian leaders, in particular, and even Tunisian
leaders, to a lesser extent, will continue to worry that
aggressively promoting population control could of-
fend the traditional values of many of their citizens.
The governments' concerns with minimizing that po-
tential source of political unrest are likely to hinder
their population control programs for some years to
These governments, moreover, have only limited re-
sources at their disposal. Regional leaders are already
well aware that demographic problems do not yield to
quick fixes and that the payoff from expensive and
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Figure 7
Maghreb Urban-Rural Ratios,
1970-2000
socially sensitive programs to lower population growth
rates will not be apparent for a decade or more. They
are also likely to continue to believe that their most
immediate and overriding concern must be to ensure
political stability and their continuance in power.
That concern is likely to exert sustained pressure on
leaders to divert attention and scarce resources from
treatment of the root cause of their demographic
crisis-rapid population growth-to treatment of its
more politically pressing symptoms, such as unem-
ployment and urban slums
In the meantime, the demographic crisis and the
increased social and economic problems flowing from
it almost certainly will continue to grow and to fuel
Islamic fundamentalist and leftist unrest. Political
leaders who fail to accommodate or co-opt either
fundamentalist or leftist aspirations are likely to have
increasing difficulty governing. Those leaders who
lean too far toward either fundamentalism or leftist
radicalism, however, will probably stir up opposition
from the other quarter. We doubt that any Maghreb
leader can arrive at a fully satisfactory resolution of
these challenges. Fundamentalism and leftist radical-
ism point ultimately in very different political direc-
tions, and the underlying conflict between them
means that politics in the Maghreb countries will
become increasingly turbulent.
Implications for the United States
Decreased stability in the region is of particular
concern to the United States because the countries of
the Maghreb possess strategic importance dispropor-
tionate to their population, size, and resources. Mo-
rocco and Tunisia, in particular, occupy strategic
locations along the Strait of Gibraltar and the Strait
of Sicily, respectively-potential choke points for
Western merchant and military shipping. In the
hands of a hostile power, any of the Maghreb states
could offer ports, airfields, and other facilities poten-
tially useful against US and NATO military opera-
tions.
We believe Morocco, Tunisia, and possibly Algeria
will try to exploit that fact by making increased
demands for financial assistance from the United
States over the next 15 years. As the Maghreb
governments struggle with the economic and political
consequences of rapid urban growth, they are likely to
call on the United States to provide more financial aid
for the cities and assistance in urban policy formation.
Morocco, Tunisia, and even Algeria also may press
the United States to influence Western donors and the
IMF to be more responsive to Maghreb financial
problems. Servicing the region's foreign debt, which
exceeds $39 billion, will be increasingly difficult as
governments shift their scarce resources to meeting
growing domestic demands. Over 11 percent of the
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region's foreign debt has been provided by US institu-
tions, and an additional 48 percent has been provided
by other Organization for Economic Coo eration and
Development states, Overall,
US aid to the region in 1985 of about $250 million
paled in comparison with the $955 million in debt
owed to the United States and US banks last year. In
our judgment, debt repayment almost certainly will
become a point of contention between the Maghreb
and Western capitals
In addition, the United States may be asked to help
governments improve agricultural yields and alleviate
food crises. US assistance in establishing agricultural
extension networks, introducing more productive crop
and livestock varieties, and cooperating in the man-
agement of intermittent food shortages could reach a
broad segment of society. Maghreb leaders would
press for such aid on concessional terms. In general,
although US aid could win some good will, highly
visible US aid will increase the risk that Washington
will be blamed either for failing to provide sufficient
assistance to solve immense problems or for exerting
too much influence over domestic policies.
Maghreb governments almost certainly will view
Washington's response to requests for assistance as a
measure of US commitment to their needs and-in
the case of Morocco and Tunisia-as an indication of
our reliability as an ally. We believe that the Soviet
Union could benefit from a perceived shortfall in US
assistance, especially if growing disgruntlement or
unrest undermine vulnerable pro-Western regimes.
The Soviet Union most likely will continue to play a
lesser role than the United States in Morocco and
Tunisia, however, since Moscow-because of its own
economic problems-probably will be unwilling or
unable to fill any gap left by the United States.
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