(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000200010031-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: March 17, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of 1 Op 5eCft-
National Intelligence Daily
Saturday
17 March 1984
CPAS NID 84-064JX 25X1
WrCh 1984
Copy 2 8 5
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i Top Secret
Contents
Libya-Sudan: Bombing of Radio Station ................................
Ell Salvador: Insurgents' Military Plans .................................... 3
Argentina: Opposition to Alfonsin ........................................... 4
Africa: Increasing Refugee Problems ....... ............................... 5
Kuwait: Continuing Security Concerns .................................... 6
Nicaragua-Costa Rica: More Border Clashes ........................ 8
Afghanistan: Attacks Cause Fuel Shortage ............................ 9
USSR-US: Reentering the Grain Market ................................ 9
Netherlands: Luns's Remarks on INF Deployment ................ 10
Poland: Strategy on Debt Negotiations ........ :......................... 10
Guatemala: Opium Poppy Cultivation .................................... 11
Special Analysis
Angola-Cuba-USSR: The Troop Withdrawal Issue ................ 12
Top Secret
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LIBYA-SUDAN: Bombing of Radio Station
Comment: Qadhafi may have ordered the attack to demonstrate
Nimeiri's inability to protect Sudan against external threats. He also
may have hoped to encourage domestic opposition, especially by
southern Sudanese dissidents, and to increase Libyan influence
among the various groups opposed by Nimeiri. The airstrike,
Khartoum remains calm following the attack yesterday by Libyan
aircraft on Sudan's main broadcasting facility.
Sudanese officials claimed at least one Libyan aircraft,)
made the strike.
Damage to the station was minor, although bombs falling nearby
caused several casualties. The US defense attache said an
unexploded bomb appeared to be of Soviet origin.
President Nimeiri publicly accused Libyan leader Qadhafi of
masterminding the attack, and he alleged that Ethiopia was colluding
with Libya to undermine his regime. The Libyan news agency denied
the charges and said the attack was carried out by dissident
Sudanese Air Force elements.
Egypt placed its forces on alert and moved a scheduled visit to
Khartoum by Defense Minister Ghazala from Saturday to Friday.
Cairo called the attack a "serious aggression" and requested that the
US send AWACS aircraft to Egypt to provide radar coverage of
Libyan airfields.
however, does not appear to be part of a larger, coordinated action.
The radio station would be a target easily recognized by bomber
pilots. In addition, it is the source of the increasingly vitriolic
broadcasts Nimeiri has directed at the Libyan regime recently.
Qadhafi's use of conventional military forces for what amounts to a
terrorist attack is a radical departure from his past preference for
using assassination teams, paramilitary operations, and support for
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dissidents.
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y,'Possib'le
uerrilla t
Chaletgu.
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ossi6letguerrilla `
,,attacks ohj ~/
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North Pacific Ocean
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EL SALVADOR: Insurgents' Military Plans
The guerrillas apparently are planning to seize temporarily a major
city before the presidential election on 25 March.
San Vicente, Usulutan, and San
Miguel in the east are the insurgents' primary targets and that
Chalatenango in the north also may be attacked. A soldier who
recently escaped from the guerrillas claims that San Miguel will be
attacked soon, according to the US defense attache.
the insurgents have been moving
forces into Cuscatlan Department since early this month, in order to
launch attacks against nearby government garrisons and to control
the territory north of San Salvador the insurgents plan
to disrupt all traffic on the inter-American High ay and the Littoral
Highway between now and the election.
Insurgents attacked Suchitoto in Cuscatlan Department
yesterday. Preliminary reports indicate that three national policemen
and 25 insurgents were killed.
The Army, meanwhile, is continuing a large sweep operation in
northern Morazan Department.
Comment:. The government hopes its operation in Morazan
Department will deal a severe blow to insurgent military capabilities in
the region
IBy committing some 5,000 troops
to the operation in Morazan, however, the Army might be hard
pressed to reinforce its garrisons in central El Salvador if they were to
come under strong attack.
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ARGENTINA: Opposition to Alfonsin
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President Alfonsin faces growing discontent in the military and
more determined opposition from key civilian groups.
Officers reportedly are upset about organizational changes and
proposed budget cuts, as well as press attacks on the military for
human rights abuses. Several retired generals recently have been
punished, and a commander on active duty has been retired for
criticizing government policies.
On the labor front, Alfonsin's proposal for reforming the unions
was defeated in the Senate by a coalition of Peronists and
conservatives, according to press reports. The proposal would have
forced the heads of the Peronist-dominated unions to face new
Comment: Opposition to Alfonsin is beginning to coalesce as
indictments and trials of officers accused of human rights violations
move forward, reforms are debated, and summer vacations end. The
President probably realizes that the euphoria from his election victory
is dissipating and that the success of future legislative initiatives will
require greater concessions. The Peronists are encouraged by the
defeat of the labor reform bill, and they are likely to take a strong
stand in congressional debates, the budget, IMF negotiations, and
other sensitive issues.
In the military, the service chiefs and most officers remain
committed to civilian rule. As a result, they probably will countenance
convictions of the 12 or so former commanders under investigation or
detention. Unrest will spread among the military, however, unless the
President can ease public criticism and prevent human rights.
investigations from reaching the middle-level officers.
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African Refugee Movement
South
Atlantic
Ocean
Mauritius
PORT LOUIS*
Reunion (Fr.)"
Names and boundary representation
are not necessarily authoritative.
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AFRICA: Increasing Refugee Problems
Drought and insurgent activities are adding to the refugee burden
in Zimbabwe, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan.
Between 100,000 and 180,000 Mozambicans have crossed into
Zimbabwe during the past few months, according to sources of the
US Embassy in Harare. They are suffering from malnutrition caused
by three years of drought and by disruptions in food distribution
resulting from the insurgency.
The flow of refugees accelerated after a storm in late January
destroyed crops and further impeded Maputo's already inadequate
relief effort. Zimbabwe is troubled by its own drought-related food
shortages.
Drought conditions also are causing some of the 700,000 ethnic
Somali refugees in Somalia to return to Ethiopia's Ogaden Region.
The US Embassy in Addis Ababa believes, however, that the
Ethiopian claim that 300,000 have returned is highly exaggerated.
Many of the ethnic Somalis are nomads who cross the border to
follow the seasonal movements of livestock. The US Embassy in
Addis Ababa says that Somali military conscription efforts have
prompted others to cross the border.
Anti-Ethiopian sentiment in Sudan has led to a decrease in the
influx of Ethiopian refugees during the past few weeks, from some 300
per day to about 200 per week, according to the US Embassy in
Khartoum. Some 40,000 drought victims and refugees from the
insurgency in northern Ethiopia have entered Sudan in recent months,
however, adding to the nearly 700,000 refugees already straining its
Comment: The refugees are competing for scarce food and
sometimes for jobs in the countries where they are staying. All of the
host countries have substantial internal economic problems and
cannot care for the refugees without considerable external
assistance. They are getting help from UN agencies and international
voluntary organizations, but some are likely to appeal to the US and
other Western countries for additional aid.
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KUWAIT: Continuing Security Concerns
Kuwait remains vulnerable to Iranian-inspired terrorism or military
attack, despite increased security precautions.
Kuwait has expelled over 1,000 Iranians since the bombings in
December. Tehran has denounced the deportations and continues to
threaten reprisals if any of the bombing suspects now on trial are
executed. Verdicts are to be announced and sentences passed on
27 March.
. The US Embassy reports that Kuwaitis fear that an Iranian push
against Al Basrah will spill over into Kuwait. Embassy sources say that
National Guard units have reinforced regular Army units on the
border and that an ammonia and phosphate plant has been closed to
prevent the release of toxic fumes.
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Los chiles
Anti-insurgent a ?ti i b
Costa Rican border guards
SANrJOSE
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San y`~
Cailu
rms interdiction
ca paign, 6-12 Febru
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Attacks by anti-Sandinista insurgents on Nicaraguan towns along
the border with Costa Rica continue to aggravate relations between
Managua and San Jose. Press reports state that the latest attack on
the border post of Penas Blancas was staged from inside Nicaraguan
territory, although the Sandinistas claim it was launched from Costa
Rica. San Jose was quick to deny this charge. Meanwhile, the US
defense attache in Panama reports that Costa Rican border guards
continue to crack down on insurgent activity in the north-central
border region.
Comment: Government officials from both countries appear
anxious to reduce border tensions. The Sandinistas' protest note
apparently is intended only to publicize the continued presence of the
insurgents in the border area without holding San Jose directly
responsible. The Costa Ricans probably hope their security
crackdown will demonstrate they are trying to enforce their neutrality.
A renewed dialogue between high-level officials from the two
countries and increased security measures on both sides of the
border are likely in the weeks ahead.
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17,March 1984
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Top Secret
AFGHANISTAN: Attacks Cause Fuel Shortage
Afghan insurgents hit a petroleum
storage area in the USSR with rocket fire from Jeyretan in
Afghanistan. Sources of the US Embassy in Kabul say insurgent
attacks on fuel convoys to Kabul have been intense in recent weeks,
and the city is suffering an acute shortage. Long lines have appeared
at gasoline stations, prices have gone up on the black. market, and
many private vehicles and taxis are out of use.
Comment: The reported cross-border incident would be the most
serious to date, and probably would cause the Soviets to mount more
intensive sweep operations in northern Afghanistan. Winter weather
and attacks on convoys may prompt the Soviets to divert some fuel
supplies from military storage to keep the Afghan Government
functioning. The shortages also may limit Soviet and Afghan military
operations, as they have in the past, and they probably will improve
insurgent morale.
USSR-US: Reentering the Grain Market
The director of the Soviet grain purchasing agency told a Western
news service during his recent visit to the US that the USSR probably
will buy several million more tons of grain than it already has
purchased from the US. He also said that Soviet purchases in th
current market year are unlikely to exceed 12 million tons.
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Comment: Purchases of the magnitude implied by the Soviet
official suggest that Moscow anticipates Argentina, because of its
port congestion and shipping delays, will be unable to meet the rest of
the USSR's corn requirements during the marketing year that ends
30 June. Soviet grain officials had said in the past few months that the
USSR would purchase only the minimum amount required under the
grain agreement with the US. This amount was fulfilled in January.
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NETHERLANDS: Luns's Remarks on INF Deployment
NATO Secretary General Luns, a former Dutch Foreign Minister,
said on Thursday that the Netherlands would lose most of its
influence in NATO by rejecting INF. He also said that the Allies would
be surprised by a Dutch decision to deploy less than the full 48 cruise
missiles called for but that they would accept such a decision.
Comment: The Dutch have long sought to serve as a bridge
between NATO's major powers and its smaller members. Luns
probably hopes his remarks will increase support for a positive
decision, which is due by July. His statement on cutting the number
of missiles to be deployed, however, almost certainly will hurt the
chances for full deployment in the Netherlands. The failure of the
Dutch to hold out at least the possibility of full deployment would
make it more difficult for the Belgians to accept all 48 of their allotted
cruise missiles.
POLAND: Strategy on Debt Negotiations
some high-level Polish officials are
urging the regime to discontinue dealing with Western governments
as a group on debt and to strike separate deals with individual
governments. They believe that Warsaw should begin making debt
service payments to those governments that are more willing to
accommodate Polish concerns. These officials want to put this
strategy into effect if Polish negotiators fail to reach agreement with
Western government representatives at the meeting scheduled to
begin next Wednesday.
Comment: The Poles have tried unsuccessfully in the past two
years to break up creditor unity, and they may be eager to exploit
what they see as a growing rift between the US and other creditor
governments. Consequently Warsaw may appear more conciliatory at
the meeting next week in hopes that the West Europeans will urge the
US to accept a West German proposal for multiyear rescheduling.
Although the West Europeans want to break the impasse over Polish
debt rescheduling, none seem eager to extend large, new credits
immediately or to deal with Warsaw on a bilateral basis.
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GUATEMALA: Opium Poppy Cultivation
Customs police destroyed three opium poppy fields, one of them
allegedly as large as 21 hectares, near Guatemala City in late January,
according to a report by the US Drug Enforcement Administration. A
Mexican trafficker arrested during the raid said that for the last two
years he had supervised 50 local farmers who cultivated the crop.
After harvesting, helicopters were used to transport the opium to
heroin laboratories in Guatemala. The trafficker also reported that the
Mexican organization which employed him had similar poppy-growing
operations in other Central American countries.
Comment: This is the first report of large-scale poppy cultivation
in Guatemala. The size of the poppy field, which is more than 300
times the average size of similar fields in Mexico, has not been
confirmed. The number of farmers involved, however, is consistent
with an operation of this scale. Mexican traffickers probably are
attracted to Guatemala because it does not have a systematic
antinarcotics program and much of its terrain is ideal for poppy
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Special Analysis
ANGOLA-CUBA-USSR: The Troop Withdrawal Issue
Angolan President dos Santos will arrive in Havana today, and
Angola's ruling party secretary Lara was scheduled to arrive in
Moscow earlier this week. The trips probably are intended to bring the
Cubans and the Soviets up to date on Luanda's negotiations with
Pretoria and to explore the possibility of withdrawing Cuban troops
from Angola. Dos Santos recognizes that he needs the Cubans to
protect his regime against the UNITA insurgency. Nonetheless, he
and Lara may seek agreement from the Cubans and the Soviets on a
limited withdrawal and a broader timetable for a complete pullout,
hoping that this would sustain Angola's talks with South Africa and the
US. Havana appears troubled by the discussions between Pretoria
and Luanda, and it recently has displayed signs of a less rigid position
on a troop withdrawal. Before undertaking any withdrawals, however,
the Cubans would seek Soviet approval.
Angola continues to insist publicly and privately that it will
address the Cuban troop issue only after South Africa removes all of
its troops from Angola, ends aid to UNITA, and begins implementing
the UN plan for Namibia's independence. Luanda appears
determined to follow through with the disengagement of forces in
southern Angola. The Angolans probably believe that a reduced
South African threat to southern Angola would allow them to
concentrate on the fight against UNITA insurgents.
Luanda may seek the approval of Havana and Moscow for a
partial Cuban withdrawal for now and an extended timetable for a
complete pullout as a negotiating card in its talks with Pretoria and
Washington. As a result of the increasing threat from UNITA,
however, Angola is unlikely to push for an early substantial reduction
in the Cuban presence.
Cuba's Current Position
Cuban Vice President Rodriguez recently told a US journalist
that prospects for bringing Cuban troops home from Angola have
improved. Rodriguez conditioned a troop withdrawal on assurances
for Angola's security and for Namibia's independence, but he clearly
departed from Havana's standard line that Cuban troops would leave
when asked to do so by Luanda.
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Top Secret
Rodriguez also told a Western diplomat in Havana that he takes a
positive view of the agreement reached at the talks in Zambia last
month among Angola, South Africa, and the US. He indicated that, if
an acceptable agreement is reached on Angola's security, Cuba
would be likely to recall its troops.
Reports from the US Interests Section in Havana
indicate that the Cubans, in recent conversations
with other Western diplomats, appeared to be resigning themselves
to a withdrawal. Moreover, the Cuban press seems to be preparing
Cuba's statements may represent nothing more than tactical
maneuvering. There are no reports, however, that Cuba is trying to
upset the negotiations between Angola and South Africa.
There are other sources of friction between the Angolans and the
Cubans. Some Angolan diplomats, for example see the Castro
regime as blatantly racist. Cuban military leaders have displayed
anger about the inability of the An olan military to measure up to
Cuban standards.
Domestic Discontent
In Cuba, popular support for continued military involvement in
Angola has waned. Much of the euphoria created by Cuba's
"liberation" role in the late 1970s has been replaced by frustration
over the seemingly endless flow of casualties. The Interests Section
believes that, by suggesting the possibility of a withdrawal, Havana
risks raising public expectations to dangerous levels.
Moreover, withdrawal of Cuban troops would increase
substantially the number of unemployed in Cuba. It also would
reduce-perhaps by as much as $150 million per year-the hard
currency Havana has been charging Angola for the services of Cuban
troops.
The Soviet Role
Havana's cautious new flexibility on the issue seems aimed at
allowing President Castro to avoid the role of spoiler in the process of
rapprochement in southern Africa, while giving him the option of
reverting to a harder line if Moscow requires him to do so. Although
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Castro has pledged publicly to withdraw his troops at Angola's
request, he cannot afford to ignore the massive military and economic
leverage the USSR has on Cuba's policy.
The Soviets would oppose a US-brokered settlement that
undercut their position in Angola, and they would put pressure on
Luanda not to go along. If Luanda persisted, however, the Soviets
would make the best of the situation. They would presumably
maintain a military assistance relationship with Luanda and seek to
establish a similar relationship with a SWAPO-dominated government
in Namibia. If the Soviets believed the Angolans were determined to
proceed on the Namibia question, they might viewa constructive tack
as more conducive to their long-term interests in Angola and
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