(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000200010023-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: March 15, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence Daily
Thursday
15 March 1984
Top Semei'
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Denmark: Security Debate in Parliament ................................ 10
Special Analyses
France-US: Mitterrand's Agenda in Washington .................... 11
South Africa: Regional Policy Developments ........................ 14
Contents
Ell Salvador: Political Opinion Polls ........................................
2
Nicaragua: Reaction to Insurgent Attacks ..............................
3
Poland: Church-State Problems ..............................................
4
Greece: Government Floundering ..........................................
5
Chad: Military Developments ..................................................
Cyprus-Greece: Results of Summit Meeting ..........................
8
Jamaica: Possible Election Postponement ............................
9
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EL SALVADOR: Political Opinion Polls
Two recent polls show Christian Democratic candidate Duarte still
ahead of ultrarightist D'Aubuisson in the presidential race, but many
voters remain uncommitted.
The US Embassy reports that a nationwide sampling taken by a
firm associated with Duarte's Christian Democrats shows him leading
D'Aubuisson by better than 2 to 1. In a poll conducted at the Jesuit-
run Central American University, Duarte also ran ahead of
D'Aubuisson. Nevertheless, both polls indicate that more than 30
percent of the voters are still undecided and that Duarte is well short
of the majority needed to win the election.
The three leading parties are directing their campaigns at the
uncommitted voters, according to the Embassy. Duarte and moderate
rightist leader Guerrero campaigned last weekend in the strife-torn
eastern part of the country, with both drawing crowds of about 4,000
in San Miguel City. Christian Democratic officials are charging that
local military officers harassed their supporters in an effort to hold
down attendance.
Some 15,000 members of the democratic labor front also turned
out to support Duarte during a demonstration in San Salvador over
the weekend. The Embassy reports, however, that there are
continuing indications that labor support for Duarte is flagging.
Comment: The only consistencies in these and other recent polls
are the positions of Duarte and D'Aubuisson as first and second
among the candidates, and the apparent inability of either to win a
majority. The armed forces are still committed to remain neutral, but
the charges by the Christian Democrats will add a new irritant to the
party's uneasy relationship with the military.
The labor demonstration may have been an effort to reunite the
democratic unions behind Duarte. They had split last week over the
issue of work stoppages, which coincided with attempts by the leftist
labor front to foment a general strike. Although the strikers returned
to work, the dispute remains unsettled and a resurgence of strike
activity could hurt Duarte's chances in the election.
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NICARAGUA: Reaction to Insurgent Attacks
The Sandinistas are trying to line up political support before
calling for a meeting of the UN Security Council.
Nicaragua wants the Security Council to discuss its claim that
the US helped insurgents to mine the port of Corinto. It is trying to
mobilize support among the seven other Third World countries who
Junta Coordinator Daniel Ortega charged on Tuesday that the
US is organizing increased sea and air attacks and an economic
blockade as steps leading to direct intervention. He asked foreign
governments to put pressure on the US to withdraw its troops from
the region, halt attacks on Nicaragua, and seriously pursue solutions
to its problems with Nicaragua and to the conflict in El Salvador.
Sandinista leaders have suggested that Salvadoran and
Guatemalan revolutionary groups might retaliate for recent sabotage
attacks against Nicaragua by taking similar action in their own
countries. Guatemalan insurgents recently issued a communique
threatening to acquire mines as an act of revolutionary solidarity, and
the Salvadoran guerrillas also have publicly supported Nicaragua
Comment: The Sandinistas are sensitive to the complaint that
they are overusing the Security Council, and they are consulting
nonaligned nations to ensure that they have support. If they do, they
are likely to offer a resolution along the lines of Ortega's speech. They
also may push for a UN investigation and more active involvement by
the UN Secretary General in the region.
The Sandinistas probably will emphasize that US actions,.
including Congressional discussion of covert aid to anti-Sandinista
insurgents and deployment of naval forces to Central America, are
undermining regional peace talks. They are unlikely to supply
insurgents in El Salvador and Guatemala with mines because this
would compromise their diplomatic efforts and their ability to deny
responsibility.
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The regime may be trying to break the impasse over the hanging
of crucifixes in public buildings by linking the issue to a more general
agreement regulating the legal status of the church.
On Tuesday the government press spokesman said that, as a
result of the student protests over the removal of crosses from a state
agricultural school, the joint government-church commission will .
examine the legal principles that guide the functioning of the church.
He said these talks could lead to a "joint declaration" on church-state
relations and, eventually, to a law outlining the church's rights and
obligations. Senior church officials admit that such a law has been
on the agenda of church-state talks.
Cardinal Glemp told an interviewer in Rome last weekend that the
passage of such a law could open the way for diplomatic relations
between the Vatican and Warsaw-a step the regime has been
pushing for since January 1983. Glemp dropped his earlier insistence,
however, that the law be the prerequisite for establishing relations.
Comment: Church leaders probably are anxious to avoid a
showdown and are interested in strengthening the church's position
in the long term. They may use the prospect of more serious
negotiations as a way to calm the current protests.
Negotiations for a law or even a less ambitious church-state
declaration would be long and difficult, partly because of pressure
from party militants who would resist improving the standing of the
regime's strongest opponent. Moreover, some churchmen would
point to the quick abrogation of similar declarations concluded with
the regime in the 1950s as proof that the authorities cannot be
trusted.
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GREECE: Government Floundering
Prime Minister Papandreou's overreaction to the recent naval
incident with Turkey probably reflects his anxiety over what he sees as
the government's declining popularity.
The US Embassy believes that most Greeks are
skeptical of the government's account of the naval incident and that
it has hurt Papandreou's credibility.
Some opinion polls and recent conservative gains in trade
association elections indicate that the Socialists are losing support.
Comment: The government does not appear able to cope with
intractable foreign and domestic problems, such as the Cyprus issue,
labor strife, an acute shortage of foreign investment funds, and many
other economic problems. The Socialist leadership is increasingly
hampered by a lack of talent in the cabinet, Papandreou's autocratic
administrative style, and self-imposed ideological constraints.
Papandreou's assertion during the naval incident that Turkey's
alleged hostile action was in part a consequence of US military aid,
together with his renewed criticism of the terms of US military aid for
Greece, suggests that he is looking for a scapegoat. His behavior is
consistent with his past performance in difficult situations, and,
problems mount, his actions are likely to become erratic again.
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CHAD: Military Developments
A dissident force of 1,000 men plans to attack the government
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Meanwhile, some 200 Zairian troops performing garrison 25X1
duty near N'Djamena returned to Kinshasa last week. Zaire and Chad
also have agreed that the three Zairian battalions will be withdrawn,
possibly by the end of the month, and replaced by two fresh
battalions.
Comment: The dissidents are likely to seize Ito, which is held by
300 government troops. Ito is north of the 16th parallel, the declared
limit of French operations. As a result, the French probably would be
unwilling to go to the aid of President Habre's forces. The main value
to Habre of the Zairian troops has been symbolic, but any withdrawal
without replacement would require him to spread his forces thinner.
CYPRUS-GREECE: Results of Summit Meeting
The US Embassy in Nicosia reports that Cypriot Foreign Minister
Iacovou has said that President Kyprianou and Greek Prime Minister
Papandreou decided last week that the deployment of Greek troops
to the island would be "inopportune" at this time. lacovou also stated
that the two governments would again take their case on the Cyprus
problem to international forums. He said this move and possibly
severing "all links" between the two communities would occur if the
UN Secretary General fails in his current efforts to achieve progress.
Comment: Kyprianou and Papandreou probably will not
undertake any action until they learn the results of the Secretary
General's meeting tomorrow with Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash.
lacovou's remarks could presage a Greek move to curtail low-level
exchanges across the "green line" or possibly a cutoff in electricity
and water supplies to the Turkish side.
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JAMAICA: Possible Election Postponement
Jamaican officials say that Prime Minister Seaga soon will ask
parliament for legislation empowering him to postpone for up to a
year local parish elections scheduled for this month. Seaga reportedly
wants more time to negotiate a standby loan with the IMF, to deal with
economic repercussions of the shutdown of Reynolds bauxite mining
operations, and to persuade backers of his party to resume their
Comment: By postponing local elections until the economy
improves, Seaga presumably hopes to forestall opposition leader
Manley's demands that a general election be held when updated
voter registration lists are ready-probably in June.
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DENMARK: Security Debate in Parliament
The two political parties on the extreme left are reviving the
debate on security issues today in parliament. The US Embassy
reports the Left Socialists and Socialist People's Party are trying to
force Prime Minister Schlueter's minority government to declare its
position on a number of security and defense issues, including
keeping no nuclear weapons on Danish soil under any circumstances,
the establishment of a Nordic nuclear weapons-free-zone, and no-
first-use of nuclear weapons.
Comment: The pro-NATO government is likely to face a difficult
parliamentary session this spring. Schlueter almost certainly will fight
any resolutions that would undermine Denmark's membership in
NATO, but he will continue to try to avoid pushing the opposition
Social Democratic Party closer to the left's extreme views. Although
the Social Democrats are split more deeply after their election defeat
in January, they probably will still push the government to consider a
nuclear weapons-free-zone and other issues.
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Special Analysis
FRANCE-US: Mitterrand's Agenda in Washington
President Mitterrand, who visits the US next week, evidently wants
to emphasize agreement on fundamentals and to avoid contentious
subjects. He will stress France's political solidarity with the Atlantic
Alliance and try to show that his country is a worthwhile partner in the
development of advanced technology. Mitterrand also will want to
push plans to reform the international monetary and financial systems.
Differences could emerge, however, on international economic
questions and other issues.
Mitterrand's trip comes at a time when his policies increasingly
are under attack at home. His government's efforts to restructure the
economy recently have caused strikes by auto workers, coal miners,
and civil servants as austerity measures begin to take effect. There
also have been large demonstrations against the government's plans
to increase its control over church-run schools. As a result,
Mitterrand's leftist coalition may suffer a symbolic setback in the
election in June for representatives to the European Parliament.
The President will arrive in Washington directly after an EC
summit meeting in Brussels. He has staked much of his political
prestige on trying to reach an agreement on EC reforms, and he
may be preoccupied if the summit goes badly.
Security Issues
Members of Mitterrand's staff have told US Embassy officials that
Paris favors increased cooperation with the Alliance. The French are
participating discreetly in NATO exercises and developing a Rapid
Action Force that would enable them to join in a forward defense of
West Germany. Nonetheless, the Embassy reports that the French are
not considering a full reintegration into NATO's joint command.
Mitterrand will assert that his recent efforts to revive the Western
European Union and improve defense cooperation with West
Germany will increase the contribution that the West Europeans make
to their own defense and thus strengthen NATO. French military
analysts have admitted for many years that the long-term US
commitment to Western Europe can be maintained only if the
Europeans make a serious defense effort.
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In discussing revitalization of the Western European Union,
Mitterrand is likely to play down its potential problems. The
Europeans could use the the Union to challenge Washington's
leadership and to push for a larger share in providing arms for NATO.
Paris publicly supports a resumption of US-Soviet arms control
talks, but Mitterrand believes that it is unwise to make concessions
just to get the Soviets back to the bargaining table. He continues to
insist that the nuclear forces of the superpowers have to be cut before
the French can consider reducing their own limited nuclear arsenal.
Paris is opposed to including its nuclear forces in the agenda on arms
control talks and to restricting its plans for modernizing these forces.
Technological and Economic Cooperation
Mitterrand's aides say that he sees this trip as an opportunity to
explain Socialist economic policies and his commitment to modernize
the economy. He has requested a trip to "Silicon Valley" to
underscore his interest in advanced US technology and investment.
The French responded favorably to the President's invitation to
cooperate on building a space station, and they also have expressed
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At the same time, however, the French remain concerned that the
US budget deficit and high US interest rates will continue to attract
capital from Western Europe and to slow French investment.
Mitterrand probably will argue against US controls on high technology
exports, which many West Europeans believe are protectionist
measures.
Mitterrand also may express his concern about subsidized sales
of agricultural commodities by the US in established EC markets. In
addition, he is likely to reassert that the US should share the costs of
agricultural reform in the EC by accepting limits on US farm exports
to the Community.
The President's staff also says Mitterrand will raise again the
proposal he made last year to study reforms of the international
monetary and financial system. Paris argues that world economic
recovery requires more stable exchange rates, increased flows of
economic aid to the Third World, and a decline in US interest rates.
Mitterrand probably recognizes that progress in these areas requires
lengthy negotiations, but he wants to keep his initiative alive.
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Foreign Policy Cooperation
Mitterrand may want to discuss a number of other issues where
French interests overlap with those of the US. In Chad, the French
want the US to continue its aid to President Habre's government. On
the other hand, they want Washington to avoid actions that would
complicate France's diplomatic efforts to obtain the withdrawal of
both French and Libyan forces.
Paris plans to increase economic aid to Africa, especially the
countries affected by drought. Mitterrand will encourage the US to
do the same and to coordinate closely with Paris.
Mitterrand also will want to consult closely on the next steps in
Lebanon. Although he believes US participation is essential for any
Middle East peace settlement, he is concerned that the US might
become preoccupied with domestic demands in an election year.
Mitterrand is trying to improve France's ability to be an intermediary
with neighboring Arab states, the Lebanese factions, the Soviets, and
the Palestinians.
In discussing the war between Iran and Iraq, Mitterrand may be
wary of joint contingency planning with the US. As in Lebanon, Paris
fears that being too closely identified with US policies could backfire
and could provoke attacks by Iranian terrorists.
As-for Central America, Mitterrand is likely to regard favorably the
Kissinger Commission's recommendation to increase economic aid to
the region. He may be critical, however, of the recommendations for
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Namibia
*
WINDHOEK
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
Congo
BRAZZAVILLE
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South`
Africa
Lake
Tanganyika
*Burundi
BUJUMBURA
*M
Tanzania
Lake
Nyasa
Indian
Ocean
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Special Analysis
SOUTH AFRICA: Regional Policy Developments
South Africa is having some success in its efforts to reconcile
its differences with its neighbors, including the negotiation of a
nonaggression pact with Mozambique. In southern Angola the cease-
fire is holding, although recent activity by SWAPO insurgents has
caused a suspension in the disengagement of South African forces.
On the other hand, Luanda has rejected Pretoria's proposal for an all-
party meeting on Namibia. Successful negotiations with Mozambique
and Angola would help South Africa achieve legitimacy for its minority
white regime and a reduction in the threat posed by SWAPO and the
ANC. The agreements reached thus far are prompting other states in
the region to initiate efforts to improve relations with South Africa.
Since Prime Minister Botha took office in 1978, South Africa has
pursued a strategy that combines promises of regional economic
cooperation and an aggressive policy of undermining hostile
governments. In the past three years, Pretoria has used economic
pressure, direct military action, and support to insurgents to punish
neighbors who harbored anti-South African guerrillas.
Negotiations With Mozambique
South African and Mozambican negotiators held further talks
earlier this month in Cape Town and issued a communique agreeing
that neither side would allow its territory to be used for acts of
violence against the other. Prime Minister Botha and President
Machel are scheduled to sign a formal nonaggression pact tomorrow.
Although the ANC and the main Mozambican insurgent movement
may still try to disrupt the agreement by staging major terrorist
incidents, their chances of doing so appear to be declining.
Mozambique badly needs an agreement in order to obtain relief
from the insurgency and to secure economic assistance. South Africa
views the treaty as a major diplomatic victory that improves its
security situation, and it would be unlikely to abandon it lightly.
Relations With Angola
The cease-fire between South Africa and Angola remains fragile.
On 6 March South Africa halted the scheduled disengagement of its
forces from southern Angola, because the Angolans had failed to halt
the deployment of SWAPO forces from that region into Namibia.
continued
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Pretoria claims that, since the disengagement began on
16 February, several hundred insurgents have infiltrated into Namibia.
It says SWAPO units have carried out mortar and rocket attacks on
military bases and have sabotaged a strategic railway.
Despite the suspension of the disengagement process, senior
South African officials remain optimistic and report improving
cooperation between their personnel and the Angolan members of
the Joint Monitoring Commission. Over the weekend the Angolans
agreed to a South African airstrike against a concentration of SWAPO
forces in.southern Angola.
Some small South African units are still in southern Angola,
Pretoria believes that reconciliation in Angola has to accompany
settlement in Namibia. This view presumably lies behind the proposal
made last weekend by Foreign Minister Botha that talks should be
held among South Africa, SWAPO, the political parties in Namibia,
Angola, and UNITA. Luanda, however, does not appear ready to
negotiate with UNITA.
Responses From Other Neighbors
South Africa's other neighbors also are responding to overtures
Prospects
A successful disengagement in southern Angola could build
mutual confidence and facilitate progress toward an internationally
accepted settlement in Namibia. South Africa, however, almost
certainly will continue to insist on linking the withdrawal of Cuban
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combat troops from Angola with such a settlement. Moreover, the
intensity of UNITA military operations throughout most of Angola will
force Luanda to continue to rely on Cuban forces.
A durable cease-fire in southern Angola would benefit both
Luanda and Pretoria. Reduction of the South African military threat
would allow Angola to concentrate its beleaguered forces against
UNITA. Luanda's continued willingness to limit SWAPO military
activity and the demilitarization of southern Angola would reduce
the costs Pretoria is paying in both money and lives.
South Africa's improving relations with Mozambique and
Angola may encourage other regional states to negotiate security
arrangements with Pretoria. To persuade its neighbors to cooperate,
however, South Africa is likely to continue to mix threats with
promises of economic assistance.
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