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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000202240001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 18, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
18 April 1986
Afghanistan: Resistance Views of Peace Negotiations
Summary
The Afghan resistance is growing increasingly concerned
over the UN sponsored peace negotiations--a process they have
previously shunned. Progress in the talks, more determined
efforts by Kabul to coopt resistance leaders, and resistance
concerns that the superpowers are about to cut a deal, have
forced the resistance to begin thinking seriously about how
Differences among the resistance leaders will likely
prevent them from achieving a unified position on the
negotiations. The fundamentalists and the traditionalists do
not share the same vision of a post-Soviet Afghanistan;
attempting to define a new regime would risk splitting the
alliance and forcing its collapse.
Although we do not believe any resistance leader is now
ready to risk joining a coalition government with elements of
the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA),
we believe that the traditionalist groups--some of whom have
cooperated with the PDPA, in the past--are more likely than
the fundamentalists to change their stripes. The risk of
defections from resistance ranks will be greatest if and when
the UN -sponsored talks appear to be nearing completion.
This memorandum was prepared byl I Afghanistan Branch, South
Asia Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Comments
and queries are welcome and should be directed to Chief, South Asia
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Signs of Resistance Concern
Since last fall, Afghan resistance leaders have been increasingly
concerned about the possibility that an unfavorable peace settlement, a
change in Pakistani policy, or a superpower deal on Afghanistan would
separate them from their primary sources of material and financial support.
Rumors of a US-USSR deal on Afghanistan circulated widely in resistance
circles after President Reagan's meeting with Soviet Secretary General
Fundamentalist leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar complained to US officials in
March that publicity surrounding the Geneva talks raised resistance
concerns that a political settlement would be reached, forcing them to make
"gigantic" efforts to maintain the military struggle.
the resistance began making
plans in late January for sustaining their fighting effort in case Pakistan
came under increased pressure to submit to an "unacceptable" settlement in
Afghanistan. These plans--some of which have been implemented--included
training small self-sufficient units, establishing mobile headquarters, and
stocking base camps inside Afghanistan.
Reinvigorated Afghan regime political and military efforts are also
worrying the resistance, in our view. In Qandahar
resistance commanders are deeply concerned that Kabul's
political campaign to attract support--by buying off tribal leaders,
offering financial incentives to residents, and agreeing to cease offensive
military operations in exchange for local support--is working, although the
evidence is sketchy.
Resistance leaders, worried about these developments as well as the
success of Soviet special forces (Spetsnaz), are weighing possible courses
of action and taking a closer look at their negotiating options.
In late February, an Iranian-based
resistance leader publicly called for a peace conference that would include
the resistance, Pakistan, Iran, the Soviet Union, and President Babrak's
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government. Resistance leaders have also tried--so far unsuccessfully--to
get briefings from UN negotiator Cordovez on the status of the Geneva
Resistance Alliance Thinking on Negotiations
We believe there is little difference within the resistance over basic
objectives. All groups want the withdrawal of Soviet forces, the return of
the refugees to Afghanistan, and the eventual ouster of the Karmal
government. There are, however, significant differences among the
insurgents over approaches to the Geneva process, contacts with the Kabul
regime, and the nature of a post-Soviet Afghanistan.
The Traditionalist Perspective
The traditionalist leaders--exemplified by Sayed Ahmad Gailani,
Sibghatullah Mojadedi, and Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi--represent an older
political and religious school of leadership that favors returning
Afghanistan's traditional elites to power, including former King Zahir
Shah. Deriving their support from Afghanistan's tribal social structure,
historic elites, and their religious prestige, they hope to restore
pre-Communist political institutions. Most traditionalist leaders would
support elections for a parliament, the creation of a broadly-based Islamic
alliance, and the separation of mosque and state.
Although the traditionalist leaders agree that military pressure is the
best way to force the Soviets out, their attitudes toward the indirect
peace talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan vary:
--In discussions with US officials last August, Gailani said he
believed the Geneva process was useful and that Pakistan was
adequately representing resistance concerns.
--Mohammadi has questioned the worth of the Geneva process,
although he has concluded it should continue.
--Mojadeddi is suspicious; after hearing reports that
Washington had agreed to join Moscow as guarantors of the
final accord, he told US officials in January that "many Afghans
in Peshawar wondered Just what it was the US had offered
to guarantee."
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The traditionalists, moreover, are susceptible to Kabul's
blandishments, in our view. The relatively flat terrain in the southern
areas where the traditionalist groups operate makes both military success
and resupply for them difficult. Their tribally based structure is also
amenable. to regime manipulation.
If someone of Gailani's stature were to agree to an accomodation with
Kabul, it would be an enormous political coup for to the Babrak government.
Gailani's Islamic credentials--he claims descent from the Prophet Mohammad
and spiritual authority over six million Afghans--would be exploited by
Kabul to demonstrate its respect for Islam.
We do not believe that the defection of Gailani would have serious
repercussions for the resistance's military capabilities, although it would
probably cause some diminution in fighting in the important border province
of Paktia Province, where Gailani's group is strong. We would expect that
clashes between groups favoring and opposed to reconciliation with the
regime would deflect resistance attention from fighting Soviet-Afghan
The Fundamentalists' Hold Firm
The fundamentalists take a much harder line than the traditionalists.
Led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Mohammad Yunus Khalis, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, and
Burhanuddin Rabbani, they generally seek to establish an Islamic state and
to restructure Afghanistan's traditional political and social institutions.
Most blame former King Zahir Shah for creating the conditions that led to
the Communist coup and would reject a role for him in any future
The fundamentalists disapprove of the Geneva negotiations. In our
view, they would prefer direct negotiations with the Soviets and see little
chance that the Geneva format will provide any opportunity for meaningful
negotiations. We believe that fundamentalist leaders, to a greater extent
than traditionalists, regard the Babrak regime as illegitimate and would
not agree to even indirect negotiations if Kabul were involved:
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--Rabbani, in press interviews last July, called "the form of
these talks entirely unsuited to the situation since the two
sides involved--the Soviet Union and the Afghan resistance--are
not represented." He called the latest round of talks a
"blind" that "will get [the resistance] nowhere."
--Gulbuddin told US officials in March that he believed the only
reason the Soviets participated in the Geneva talks was to shift
the blame for the war from Moscow to the resistance's "outside
supporters." He said the resistance has nothing to say to the
Soviets, and claimed that it has consistently rejected Soviet
--Khalis doubts the utility of the Geneva talks and, in discussions
with US officials, mused recently that it would be difficult for
the refugees to return while the Soviets were in Afghanistan.
--In 1984 press interviews, Sayyaf said the resistance "won't
accept the result of negotiations carried out by someone else on
its behalf." Last August he told US officials that the
Soviets are liars who use the Geneva talks merely to postpone
consideration of troop withdrawal.
Some of Gulbuddin's public statements suggest what a fundamentalist
negotiating position might look like. In radio interviews as spokesman for
the resistance alliance last October, Gulbuddin called for a Soviet troop
withdrawal, reparations for the human and material losses suffered by
Afghans, and a pledge by Moscow never to interfere in Afghanistan. He
added that in exchange, a new Afghan resistance-led regime would not enter
into any military alliances, would pursue a non-aligned foreign policy
based on the teachings of Islam, and would "co-exist as peaceful neighbors
We believe other fundamentalist leaders agree with most of Gulbuddin's
demands. Although some--particularly Gulbuddin--are extremely hostile to
the West, we believe that all fundamentalists would insist that a new
government be strictly non-aligned.
Rabbani probably is more sympathetic to the United States than other
fundamentalists. he was upset when
Gulbuddin refused to meet with President Reagan and the US Congress during
his visit here last year and, in 1984, proposed to US officials that
scholarships be established for Afghans wishing to stud in the United
States to counter "Soviet brainwashing."
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Resistance Commanders Inside
The Soviets have sought for several years to work out agreements with
important insurgent commanders inside Afghanistan--such as Panjsher Valley
leader Ahmad Shah Masood and Herat commander Ismail Khan--but to no lasting
avail. Moscow's success rate has not improved recently, but we believe
that its chances of obtaining one or two credible resistance defectors will
increase if commanders see a settlement coming,
The Pakistani Angle
Pakistan and the resistance generally agree on most of the fundamental
conditions necessary for a negotiated settlement, but we believe that
Islamabad is much more willing than the resistance to tolerate a coalition
government in Kabul dominated by the People's Democratic Party of
Afghanistan, if not Babrak Karmal. The Pakistani Ambassador in Moscow, for
example, told US officials recently that it might be possible to find some
sort of "honorable place" for the PDPA in a future Kabul regime--a prospect
that would be anathema to most fundamentalists and many traditionalists.
The Resistance After a Settlement
If the Pakistanis agreed to a settlement which included a major role
for the PDPA or otherwise did not meet what we believe are minimum
resistance requirements, we believe the insurgents would continue to fight
the Soviets and the Kabul regime.
We believe the insurgents could maintain their current level of
fighting without resupply in many parts of the country--especially in the
Panjsher Valley and northern Afghanistan--for at least six months to a year
using weapons from stockpiles, captured weapons, and acquisitions through
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In the long run, we believe that the insurgents would be able to
sustain only a small-scale resistance without Pakistani or Iranian support.
The resistance's ability to carry on without Pakistani support for more
than a year would depend in part on Iran's willingness to offer them the
kind of support that Pakistan now provides. Iranian leaders have recently
begun to take a larger role in Afghanistan--mostly with Shia groups in the
Hazarehjat--but we believe it is unlikely that they would agree to anything
like the role that Islamabad now plays, especially while the Iran-Iraq war
Prospects for Negotiations
Wide-ranging differences between insurgent groups are likely to
continue to prevent the resistance from working out a common approach to
negotiating issues. Even if the resistance were invited to play a role in
the Geneva process, we think it unlikely that the Peshawar groups could
agree even on participation, much less on a coherent approach to the
various issues. Indeed, because many resistance leaders are aware that
discussions over negotiating issues would seriously split the insurgent
coalition, they would want to avoid talks.
In our view, the resistance will continue to insist that negotiations n
are a matter for them and the Soviets. Although indirect expressions of
interest in a negotiated settlement are likely to continue to come from
both traditionalist leaders and some commanders in the field, we think it
hightly unlikely that any resistance leader will risk striking a separate
deal with Kabul or Moscow. If Kabul succeeds in luring a traditionalist
resistance leader such as Gailani into the government, however, Pakistan
would face ircr_easeddomestic political pressure to recognize the Kabul
government.
Lack of resistance unity on the peace negotiations will make it nearly
impossible for Pakistan to sign an agreement that meets with resistance
approval. Islamabad, which has been closest to the fundamentalists, is
likely to consider the views of Gulbuddin and Rabbani more carefully than
those of the traditionalist resistance groups--particularly because the
fundamentalists have been the most effective in the fighting and have
repeatedly asserted their intentiontinue the war if an agreement is
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SUBJECT: Afghanistan: Resistance Views of Peace Negotiations
Distribution:
Copy 1 - Robert Peck, State
2 - George Harris State
3 - DIA
4 - even o en, State
5 - Herbert Hagerty, State
6 - Ronald Lorton, State
7 - Charles Dunbar, State
8 - Desiree Milliken, State
9 - Vincent Cannistraro, NSC
10 - Stephen R. Sestanovich, NSC
11 - Michael Pillsbury, DOD
12 - Darnell Whitt, DOD
13 - DDI
14 - NIO/NESA
15 - D/NESA
16 - DD/NESA
17 - C/PPS/NESA
18-19 - PPS/NESA
20 - C/PES
21-26 - CPAS/IMB CB
27 - DC/DD0/NE/
28 - PDB Staff
29 - NID Staff
30 - C/NESA/PG
31 - C/NESA/AI
32 - C/NESA/IA
33 - C/NESA/SO
34 - DC/NESA/S0
35 - C/NESA/S0/P
36 - C/NESA/S0/A
37 - C/NESA/SO/S
38 -
DDI/NESA (18Apr86)
raw " 11
Vic...
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