(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000201980001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 4, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Afghanistan Situation Report
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Top Secret
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Cope n f3 1
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
CONTENTS
SOVIET OPERATIONS IN EASTERN AFGHANISTAN
Soviet and Afghan units continued operations in
Nangarhar Province in late February. The Soviets
also carried out helicopter strikes near Herat
They lost three helicopters in the Kabul
region.
CHINA DISAPPOINTED WITH SOVIETS' STANCE ON WITHDRAWAL
Chinese officials, skeptical of the Soviets'
willingness to withdraw their troops from
Afghanistan, probably will continue to support
Pakistan's refusal to engage in direct talks with
Kabul.
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PERSPECTIVE
AFGHANISTAN: SAYED AHMED GAILANI--THE GUCCI PIR
Sayed Ahmed Gailani, the current spokesman for the
resistance alliance, is articulate, polished, and
well-known in the West. However, his -personal
shortcomings and
inefficient combat organization will hamper any
efforts he might make to increase his role in the
resistance.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near
Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet
Analysis.
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SOVIET OPERATIONS IN EASTERN AFGHANISTAN
Soviet and Afghan regime units were involved in
fighting in Nangarhar Province that began in
January. According to a well-informed diplomatic
source, Soviet forces have gradually been forced to
assume more of the combat duties from Afghan forces
during the operation.
The Soviets lost three helicopters in the Kabul region
in as many days beginning on 20 February, according to
the US Embassy in Kabul. Although Soviet officials
apparently ordered increased use of flares to protect
aircraft using Kabul airport from guerrilla
antiaircraft missiles, they did not curb helicopter
and transport flights.
conducted repeated helicopter strikes during the past
two weeks that have destroyed several villages and
damaged a vital irrigation network.
CHINA DISAPPOINTED WITH SOVIETS' STANCE ON WITHDRAWALS
the Soviets have
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China remains pessimistic about the Soviet Union's
willingness to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan.
A senior Chinese Foreign Ministry official in Beijing
told US Embassy officers recently that Soviet signs of
flexibility are only meant to play for time to
consolidate control. Sun Yuxi, acting director of the
Ministry's South Asia Division, dismissed Gorbachev's
remarks at the Soviet Communist Party Congress as
"nothing new." Sun stated that China continues to
support the UN-sponsored indirect talks on
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TOP SECRET
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Afghanistan, but is dissatisfied with Cordovez'
ostensibly uncritical acceptance of the Soviets'
claims of willingness to pull out their forces.
Earlier, Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian, reacting to
Gorbachev's overtures at the US-USSR Geneva summit,
told the Chinese National People's Congress in January
that the Soviet Union had "shown no sincerity" about a
pull-out.
Comment: We believe that Beijing will remain firm in
its opposition to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan
and will continue to support Pakistan's refusal to
engage in direct talks with the Kabul regime.
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IN BRIEF
-- US aircraft carrying humanitarian aid for Afghans
landed in Pakistan on 3 March, according to the
US Embassy in Islamabad. The initial shipment--
originally intended to be channeled through the
seven-party alliance and private voluntary
organizations (PVO)--will go entirely to the
alliance for distribution inside Afghanistan. It
is unclear whether Islamabad will permit PVOs to
distribute future shipments.
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- According to the US Consulate in Peshawar, Afghan
resistance alliance spokesman Sayed Ahmed Gailani
is considering visiting Washington 20-21 March
and hopes for an appointment with President
Reagan.
- The Afghan Government is seeking to open an
embassy with a resident ambassador in Helsinki in
an effort to enhance the legitimacy of the Karmal
regime.
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PERSPECTIVE
AFGHANISTAN: SAVED AHMED GAILANI--THE GUCCI PIR
Sayed Ahmed Gailani, who began a three-month term as
spokesman of the Afghan resistance alliance on 1 January,
represents insurgents who favor the return to power of
Afghanistan's traditional elites. Well-known in the
West, where he has traveled widely and demonstrated
strong public relations skills, he is an articulate,
polished, and highly visible resistance spokesman. He
also has significant shortcomin reputation for
lavishness, involvement in
opium traffic ing, and poor relations with Pakistani
officials. Moreover, his resistance group--the National
Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA)--is reputed to be
corrupt and inefficient on the battlefield. These
problems will prevent him from using the spokesman
position to expand his base of support.
Tied to the Past
Gailani, a man strongly identified with the pre-Communist
Afghan regime, probably envisions a post-Communist
Afghanistan that would provide for the separation of
church and state, a parliamentary form of government, and
possibly the participation of erstwhile King Zahir Shah
as a figurehead leader. He was a religious adviser to
Zahir Shah for nearly 15 years (1956-70), and his wife is
the granddaughter of former King Amir Habibullah Khan
(1901-1919). Gailani has frequently visited the King in
exile and in 1984 spearheaded an aborted movement to
convene a grand assembly (jirga) to elect Zahir Shah as
the figurehead leader of a resistance government-in-
Restoring Zahir Shah to power is anathema to
fundamentalists--such as resistance leader Gulbiddin--
who blame the former monarch for creating conditions
that led to the Communist coup and subsequent
invasion. They also view Gailani's officials as effete
intellectuals who harbor dangerous secular ideas about
social reform and modernization.
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Public Relations Prowess
Gailani's speaking skills, secular outlook, and attire
contribute to his effectivness as a proponent of the
Afghan resistance cause in the West. According to the
US Consulate in Peshawar and foreign journalists, he
appears by far the most intelligent, sophisticated, and
elegant of the Peshawar resistance leaders. He has
traveled widely--including trips to the United States,
Europe, and throughout the Near East--to publicize the
resistance cause.
Gailani has also shown himself to be an able
representative of the resistance in Third World
international forums. His January trip to the 16th
Foreign Ministers Conference of the Organization of the
Islamic Conference (OIC) was quite effective
Islamic Credentials: Impeccable but Tarnished
Gailani's impressive Islamic credentials account for
much of his following within Afghanistan. He claims
descent from the Prophet Mohammad and, as the head of a
"saintly" family and leader of the Qaderi school of
Sufism, Gailani claims spiritual authority over six
million Afghans--primarily in Paktia, Paktika, and
Qandahar Provinces, and the cities of Herat, Jalalabad,
and Mazar-e-Sharif. An expert on Afghanistan estimates
Gailani has a few hundred thousand followers in the
areas bordering Pakistan.
Despite his respected religious lineage, Gailani is
often attacked by fundamentalist resistance leaders and
some of his own commanders for insufficient devotion to
Islam and an extravagant and self-indulgent lifestyle,
including his reputation for preferring designer
clothes to traditional Islamic dress.
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Gailani also sullied his reputation by
1?or two months in 1978 as religious adviser to
Marxist former President Taraki.
An Inconsistent Showing on the Battlefield
Gailani's military organization, in our view, has
performed far worse then its fundamentalist
counterparts. It also is among the least respected
the resistance groups, both by other insurgents and
the Pakistanis.
of
Gailani has a poor y disciplined military command and
not up to the demanding task of forming one. His
appointment of family members to key leadership positions
in NIFA, moreover, has been a frequent source of
criticism by other resistance leaders.
Gailani's reportedly corrupt lifestyle and his inability
to supply his forces are a large part of the problem, in
our view.
Nevertheless, Gailani's group has had a few successes.
The resistance succeeded in capturing more than half of
the city's surrounding outposts and precipitated a major
Soviet offensive to relieve the besieged Afghan garrison
at Khowst. Gailani's group also claimed responsibility
for blowing up 150 power transmission pylons in Paktika
Province during a single attack in 1984, according to the
Prospects
January that the Pakistanis had recently threatened to
cut off all military assistance to Gailani by September
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1986. Because of the Gailani group's relatively poor
performance, Pakistan currently does not give NIFA as
much military aid as other more adept--and mainly
fundamentalist--resistance groups.
Gailani may also find his group at a disadvantage in
obtaining humanitarian assistance. The new head of a
recently formed cross-border relief program, for example,
may favor the fundamentalist groups at Gailani's and
other traditionalists' expense, according to the US
Embassy in Peshawar.
Even with material support, traditionalist resistance
leaders like Gailani will often be at a disadvantage in
military operations because their following is based
primarily among the highly tribalized and fractious
Pathans. It is also difficult to establish an effective
command structure in groups whose tradition requires that
decisions be taken by a village elder, rather than
someone trained in modern warfare. Tradition also
dictates that each group fight for its region alone--a
value system that virtually precludes the establishment
of such effective tactics as use of mobile units.
Gailani's media skills and knowledge of Arabic are likely
to help the alliance gain support for the Afghan
resistance internationally during his tenure as spokesman
of the seven-party resistance alliance. But because the
spokesman position lasts only three months, Gailani, or
any other resistance leader, will be unable to use the
post as a political stepping stone.
More importantly, Gailani's organization and leadership
are unappealing to the new breed of resistance commander
that is professional, fundamentalist, and has no interest
in restoring Afghanistan's traditional elites. Gailani's
lack of support among the new commanders and the
fundamentalists, in general, will severely circumscribe
his chances for a larger role in the resistance.
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Ton Secret
Top Secret
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