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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000201260001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
U policon
OL FOR SYSTEMATIC POLITICAL ANALYSIS
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A Tool for Systematic Political Analysis
This manual was prepared by
Office of Global Issues. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief,
Political Instability Branch, OGI,
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Introduction ....................................................... 1
How POLICON Supports DI Analysis ..................................... 2
POLICON Shortcomings ............................................... 4
Where to Start: Defining the Intelligence Problem .......................... 6
Data Collection ...................................................... 7
Results of Modeling ................................................. 13
Testing Alternative Hypotheses ........................................ 17
Integrating Text and Graphics ......................................... 21
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POLICON is an analytic tool that can help country specialists in the Directorate of
Intelligence assess complex situations quickly and with consistency. This
computer-assisted methodology aids analysts in sharpening judgments, designing
alternate scenarios, and analyzing patterns of political interaction in greater detail than
conventional analytical methods. Although POLICON's simulation of the decisionmaking
process is a relatively new approach to political analysis, intelligence analysts have used
the methodology to make predictions on political developments in more than 25
countries during the past four years.*
The POLICON methodology is based on expected utility analysis. It assumes that
political behavior is purposeful, that individuals and groups compete with each other to
obtain policy outcomes they desire, and that policy outcomes are the result of this
competition among political actors. POLICON is a mathematical model that expresses
this competitive dynamic. It presumes that political groups will strive to maximize their
gains according to their evaluation of the costs and benefits associated with the policy
choices open to them and their assessment of the levels of risk acceptable to them.
`/ The model compares expected utility calculations for various policy proponents and
challengers. Taken together, these calculations define the environment in which policy
choices are made. The model can suggest the outcome of current policy debates and
assess the impact of hypothetical political changes on policy directions. 25X1
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V
How POLICON Supports DI Analysis
Building on the DI's greatest resource--its country experts--POLICON is designed
to help analysts gain new insights into the possibilities of political 'change in their
countries. POLICON findings can be integrated into in-depth studies prepared by the
Regional Offices or the NIC, or they can become the focal points for separate innovative
papers looking at present and future political dynamics.
POLICON analyses look very much like other intelligence products, despite their
derivation from computer-modeling. The following overview sections--much like the
Key Judgments in DI publications--were taken from two of the POLICON studies
completed in the spring of 1986.
POLICON analysis of the political situation in Egypt indicates a high prospect for
instability and regime change. The results suggest that a domestic crisis is very likely
to erupt over President Mubarak's economic policies; a crisis that probably will threaten
the stability of his administration. As groups on both sides of the austerity question
attempt to impose their will on this issue, Mubarak's position will become extremely
tenuous. In addition, Egyptian policy on relations with Israel could become regime
threatening. The analysis indicates that relatively minor modifications in the positions of
extremist, anti-Israeli groups could create a coalition strong enough to force Egypt to
abandon the Camp David Accords and place President Mubarak in a precarious position.
No change in current policy is forecast on the issues of increasing Islamization in Egypt
or relations with the United States.
According to POLICON analysis, Panama appears relatively stable over the short
term. On the issues examined, political groups toward the right of center tend to
balance those toward the left of center on both political and economic issues. Modeling
shows that this inherent stability is. not dependent on the role of the powerful armed
forces commander General Norlega--or any other individual political actor or group.
Some of these issues, however, are likely to become more contentious as the 1989
election nears.
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Supporting DI Analysis
Our use of POLICON shows that the United States has enough influence to press
for a more democratic form of government in Panama. To do so, however, would run
the risk of destroying the current political balance and increasing the country's
vulnerability to a military takeover, according to the analysis. On the other hand, if the
current pattern of bilateral relations and domestic political dynamics were maintained,
Panama is likely to continue to make policy decisions more-or-less in accordance with
US interests on most issues.
While the overview sections address the policy-relevant implications of POLICON
findings, the individual stages of the POLICON process--from defining the intelligence
problem and collecting data, to running the model and testing alternative
hypotheses--provide their own unique insights into a country's political dynamics.
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POLICON Shortcomings
Computer-supported analysis, like all other methods of inquiry, is critically
dependent on the quality of data used. The data that go into political decision models
are the judgments of country specialists, and POLICON--despite its methodological
sophistication--cannot compensate for a lack of expertise. POLICON studies also work
(D best when the country analysts become fully engaged in the process. A richer picture
of political possibilities emerges when each stage is approached with imagination and
inquisitiveness.
While POLICON provides insights into what political developments will occur, it
cannot forecast when and how fast events will unfold. This difficulty in incorporating a
time element into the model is compensated for by the analysts estimating the
conditions under which changes might occur and the rates at which groups may
become stronger or weaker, alter their agendas, or modify their positions on issues.
v Scenarios incorporating various possible changes in the
political system can be
examined at the same time the basic modeling is done to anticipate the changes and
assess their implications. However, when a crisis occurs in a country or the political
lineup shifts significantly, a new POLICON study needs to be undertaken.
The POLICON methodology has some additional technical characteristics that
determine which issues and which political environments can be addressed. First, the
issues must have more than two possible outcomes. Questions such as whether a
treaty will or will not be signed are inappropriate queries for political decision analysis.
These situations are analagous to a tug of war and can be analyzed without a model as
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Shortcomings
complex as POLICON. Second, the political system to which the model is applied must
contain at least five political groups. With fewer groups, some of the equations in the
o model become unsolvable. These technical features have not restrained applications of
the methodology in the DI, however, because the complexity of intelligence problems
meshes well with POLICON's specifications.
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Where to Start: Defining the Intelligence Problem
To use political decision modeling successfully, analysts must translate their
concerns about a country into a set of issues and scenarios. A country specialist using
this computer-based methodology for the first time would work with a POLICON
specialist to develop a research strategy. This team would discuss the country situation
until the intelligence problem could be clearly described. Moving from the abstract to
the concrete, the POLICON specialist then would help the analyst select which types of
lJ issues should be modeled to give the clearest insight into the main intelligence
problems. For example, analysts concerned about the potential for instability would
direct their analysis toward issues over which a governing group would be likely to face
strong opposition--such as leadership succession, the degree of fairness in elections, or
the level of government economic subsidies. A country's East-West orientation, on the
other hand, could be explored by examining pressures for a shift in trade patterns, a
reduction of foreign basing rights, or support for wars of national liberation.
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The POLICON approach assumes that political behavior is purposeful, that
individuals and groups compete with each other to obtain policy outcomes they desire,
and that policy outcomes are the result of such competition among political actors.
0i Thus, like many approaches to political analysis, POLICON assumes that once the
~~// political environment has been defined inferences can be made about how political
actors will behave, how issues will be resolved, and what policy outcomes will be.
To define a country's political environment, POLICON requires that analysts
provide six types of data. Country specialists are asked to identify the most critical and
contentious issues in their country; determine the range of possible outcomes for each
issue; list the groups that will try to influence policy decisions; define their preferred
positions on each of the focal issues; and assess each group's relative political clout
and policy priorities.
Process: Examples:
Selecting
the
Issues
Although POLICON can provide quick insights into a single country,
it makes its fullest contribution by examining a variety of policy
questions simultaneously.
For many analyses, the choice of issues is straightforward.
Forecasting economic or foreign policies generally requires only a
statement reflecting the context of the policy debate. The query
should be phrased in a way that provides for a range of possible
v policy outcomes for an issue. For example, "What will be the
minimum wage in pesos that the Mexican government will adopt in
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Collecting Data
o How much of a role should the military play in the
government?
o What are the prospects for free elections?
To assess the stability of a regime, however, one usually selects a
set of issues around which opposition groups might rally or which
would otherwise cause problems for a government. In examining
the stability of Panama in March 1986, for instance, the following
issues were selected:
o How extensive should government control over the economy
be?
or other foreign creditors?
Clarifying
Policy
Options
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The next step is to identify the range of possible outcomes on each
issue. POLICON asks that each issue-question be framed so that
possible policies form a logical progression that can be arranged
along a continuum.
o The endpoints of such a continuum represent the most extreme
opposing policy positions espoused by groups in the country at
0 the time.
o Intermediate points along the continuum represent various
policy options--arranged in logical sequence--that could be
endorsed by other groups.
A continuum may represent simple quantitative policy choices that
can be placed at regular intervals along a policy-options tine, such
as the size of the Mexican budget deficit as a percentage of GDP in
FY 86:
5% 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15%
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Collecting Data
Identifying
the Groups
The policy preferences of the groups can be plotted on the
policy-option continuums. Using the previous example of what
policy Egypt should adopt toward Israel, the groups appear
dispersed across the political spectrum:
T
Alternatively, a continuum can represent more irregularly-spaced
policy options, such as what Egypt's policy toward Israel might be:
r--
Break
Relat ions,
Hostile
Tension, Renounce Camp
But Not David Accords
Hostility
Improve Extremely
Relations Close Ties
For the purposes of a POLICON analysis, a "group" is usually
defined as a collection of people who have a common sociological,
economic, or political identity; take the same stand on an issue;
and have resources to commit. Groups can include:
o members of an organization: a political party, religious group,
branch of the military, civil servants, the IMF, etc.
o people who share socio-economic characteristics: the middle
class, labor, landowners, Urdu speakers, etc.
o people from the same region: Tamils, southerners, Persian Gulf
states, the United States, etc.
leftists, anarchists, hawks/doves, etc.
o individuals who promote the same ideological coals: radical
If there are factions within a group and those factions do not take
Qj the same position on an issue or do not have the same political
An individual political leader who exercises influence independent
of a political party or office is also considered a separate "group".
Determining
Policy
Positions
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Collecting Data
g wg
(SA)
41
ti
% vg g+
nFb?, ggg
Break
Relations,
Hostile
Tension,
But Not
Hostility
NQP ^/ g
t~?a w~^T~ w'1~g ^0~~ w0~`~ gg
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Renounce Camp Improve Extremely
David Accords Relations Close Ties
The simple positioning of groups can give some preliminary
insights into a country's political dynamics. In some POLICON
studies, for example, the political actors have appeared clumped at
opposing ends of the political continuum, indicating substantial
polarization--and therefore a certain rigidity--in the political
system. In other cases, groups have gravitated toward one end of
the spectrum, leaving only one or two players at the other end. In
these cases, the isolated groups usually wield little real power,
even if their activist tactics draw considerable media attention.
Estimating
Political
Strengths
For a POLICON analysis, the country specialist is asked to estimate
Q the relative clout of each group.
Groups use a variety of political, economic, and coercive resources
to pursue policy goals. The analyst first must decide whether an
overall estimate of a group's resources will give a good
of approximation of its power, or whether the analysis would benefit
from assessing the three resource dimensions separately.
The country specialist then identifies the most powerful
group--often the leader of the country--and arbitrarily assigns that
political entity a value of 100. Other groups are given values that
reflect their strength relative to the most powerful group.
Analysts attributed the following resources to groups in Nigeria in a
January 1986 study:
President Babangida 100
Armed Forces Ruling Council 60
Senior Military Officers 40
Middle-Junior Grade Officers 50
Housa-Falani Tribes 40
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Collecting Data
Yoruba Tribe
20
Small Central Tribes
10
Bureaucrats
40
University Radicals
10
Muslim Fundamentalists
20
Darika Botherhood
20
Christians
10
Traditionalists
5
France/Westerners
5
Israel
1
Libya/Iran
5
Saudi Arabia
10
A quick look at the resource list often yields some preliminary
insights into domestic political dynamics. A rough tally of the
combined resources of groups considered to be on the political
Right or Left may suggest policy trends or stresses on the regime.
Or, the possibility of a coup might be considered if the sum of the
values assigned to various factions within the armed forces
exceeds the total resources of the national leader and his close
advisors.
Assessing
Political
Priorities
lot
priority of the issue in their overall political programs.
The last phase of data collection draws most heavily on the
analyst's intuition. The country specialists are asked to determine
is likely to push to influence a particular policy decision.
how important each issue is for each group, or how much a group
Again, a value of 100 is assigned to the group or groups for whom
the issue is a top priority. These are the groups that are willing to
devote all their resources toward getting their way. The rest of the
groups/actors are assigned numerical values that reflect the relative
These salience values will change from issue to issue.
o For example, when the question of whether Chun should leave
the presidency of South Korea was examined in late 1985,
analysts gave both Chun and the radical students interested in
ousting him salience values of 100. The military and the
middle class, on the other hand, were assigned values of 50,
indicating that they were only about half as interested as Chun
in maintaining his leadership position.
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Collecting Data
o In contrast, the salience of the issue of trade policy was only
15 for Chun, while groups such as the business class and the
United States considered this economic issue much more
important than the question of Chun's tenure in office.
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Results of Modeling
The POLICON specialist next codes the country data into the computer model.
The computer software incorporates a series of sophisticated mathematical equations
that approximate the logic of decisionmaking. Known as Expected Utility Theory, this
approach to decision analysis assumes that ?people behave as if they weigh the costs
and benefits of the options open to them and then chose those actions with the
greatest benefit/cost ratio.
The model usually can be run in less than 15 minutes, but it generally takes a
few hours to analyze the computer results. Findings will include forecasts of the most
likely policies to be adopted, probable patterns of conflict and cooperation among the
various groups, and insights into the strengths and vulnerabilities of each of the groups.
n
D
Process:
Forecasting
Policy
Decisions
Examples:
forces in the country come into balance.
'Based on all the information collected about the issues and groups
in a country, the model predicts which policy options are most
likely to be adopted. The policy forecast for each issue can be
thought of as a fulcrum, the point at which all of the political
In the April 1986
that Cairo would
its policy towards
study of Egypt, for example, the model predicted
not abandon the Camp David Accords in setting
Israel. The ? indicates the policy forecast:
~gti ~} y~F
eNJ
Break Tension,
Relations, But Not
Hostile Hostility
Le
2
0~ D "0o- ~~ 2g
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bw . fiw ~
5 Q~ 01' Iva o~ 0
o- v
~ti~ '~N w4wo- ?~g 0?fiN Jfiw yg~
_.T
Renounce Camp
David Accords
Improve
Relations
Extremely
Close Ties
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Modeling
In many cases, POLICON results will confirm the views of the
country analysts. A study of the post-Marcos government in the
Philippines in February 1986, for example, bore out the opinion of
the Intelligence Community that President Aquino was unlikely to
call for a reduction of US military base rights early in her term.
The computer-supported analysis revealed that leftist groups had
little real influence 1 on this issue, despite their anti-American
In other cases, POLICON forecasts may run counter to the
conventional wisdom. Examples of past studies where unexpected
predictions proved correct include the following:
o POLICON accurately forecast in May 1983 that after The
Peoples' Republic of China claimed the China seat at the Asian
Development Bank, Beijing would modify its position to permit
some Taiwanese participation in the bank.
o Computer-assisted analysis in May 1984 correctly showed that
the Italian government under Bettino Craxi was in a strong
position on the question of wage indexing, while country
analysts believed the government would fall over this issue.
o Almost a year before the January 1985 Brazilian presidential
election, POLICON correctly predicted the victory of a
non-government, consensus candidate. At the time,
Intelligence Community analysts strongly favored a government
party candidate.
o In October 1985, a POLICON study predicted that moderate
opposition groups in the Philippines would form an ad hoc
coalition that could extract major concessions from the Marcos
government. The conventional wisdom held that the moderate
opposition groups were too diverse and competitive to
cooperate politically. Subsequently, a snap election was called
and the unexpected voting strength of the then-unified
moderate opposition triggered such extensive government fraud
Identifying
Winners and
Losers
Groups whose positions on an issue continuum are closest to the
model's forecast policy can be considered the relative "winners" in
the policy debate, because they get the results they wanted.
Groups far away from the forecast position may have exerted
l% considerable pressure during the policy debate, but ultimately the
balance of political forces prevents them from achieving their policy
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Modeling
off policy challenges.
o In an April 1986 study of Panama's debt policy, for example,
strongman Noriega shared the forecast position with civilian
government leaders, several business and labor organizations,
and the United States--a collection of groups that could ward
In other cases, a policy "victory" does not equate to political power.
If the political system is polarized, for example, or if groups are
dispersed across the policy spectrum, a group could find itself
alone and under seige at the compromise fulcrum position.
o In the April 1986 study of Egypt, for example, Mubarak was the
closest group to the forecast position on the issue of economic
policy, but he was caught in a crossfire between determined
0 domestic groups to his left and influential foreign financial
organizations to his right. The charged political atmosphere
appeared likely to prevent him from implementing his economic
program.
Assessing
Ad Hoc
Coalitions
Politics sometimes makes for strange bedfellows. The POLICON
process can help analysts identify emerging coalitions and measure
Groups act as ."ad hoc" coalitions when their similar policy
positions or openness to accommodation result in indirect support
,-~ for each other during the resolution of an issue. If the same
U groups take mutually supportive positions on a number different
09,
Sometimes "winning" puts a group in a genuine position of
strength, especially if a number of powerful groups that might make
good political allies lie nearby.
issues, a formal or quasi-formal alliance might emerge.
o A POLICON analysis of the Philippines in late 1985 showed that
moderate opposition groups had moved closer together on key
issues compared to a study done a year earlier. The tightening
of this ad hoc coalition contributed to its increased political
influence. These POLICON findings helped analysts anticipate
the subsequent decision by opposition groups to field a unified
slate of candidates to contest Marcos' reelection.
o In another example, an assessment was done in advance of
the French parliamentary elections of 1986 to test the
cohesiveness of a cluster of small center-right groups. The
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Modeling
analysis showed that these conservative groups would be an
influential coalition as long as they didn't try to accommodate
with the extreme right. Efforts to forge an alliance with the
popular--but ultra-conservative--National Front would cause
internal dissension and be counterproductive, the model
indicated. Ultimately, the center-right groups decided to go it
alone and were successful in capturing the premiership.
Estimating
Risks and
Opportunities
POLICON provides the analyst with a perspective on how groups
see themselves in relation to others. This information about
groups' perceptions can tell analysts whether a group is likely to
risk intense conflict or yield to others in pursuing policy goals. It
also can indicate whether a group is reckless or judicious in
Sometimes groups needlessly give up on a policy struggle,
underestimating their own strength or the support they can get
from others.
o In a study of Mexico in 1984, for example, modeling showed
? that the major opposition party was unlikely to win concessions
on certain issues because it mistakenly believed that the de la
Madrid government held the upper hand.
Other times, groups become risk-takers, thinking they have more of
a chance to win on an issue than they actually do.
o For instance, an October 1985 POLICON analysis showed that
President Marcos was overconfident, misperceiving the strength
of the political opposition. He failed to see that calling an
election would be risky, a mistake that subsequently cost him
the Philippine presidency.
.20
If each of two groups thinks it will win on an issue, compromise is
unlikely and the resulting political conflict may get out of hand.
o A June 1986 study of Nicaragua noted such a contentious
standoff between the powerful Minister of the Interior and the
Catholic church over the issue of political liberalization.
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Testing Alternative Hypotheses
Once the basic modeling is done, POLICON can help analysts test the balance of
power to simulate the impact of hypothetical political developments.
SAMPLE QUESTIONS THAT ANALYSTS MAY WANT TO ASK OF THE MODEL
AT THIS STAGE OF THE POLICON PROCESS
o Would a leader strengthen his position if he modified his stand on a
contentious issue?
o Would the military gain the upper hand if the current civilian leader were
to die?
o What would happen if a foreign country or organization were to throw its
weight behind a domestic political group?
o What would be the best policy a country could adopt to weaken an
insurgency?
o How would the use of repression affect prospects for political reform?
o What would be the political consequences if traditionally apolitical
institutions--such as the the church and the military--become
politicized?
o How would inter-group dynamics and policy forecasts change in a crisis
situation?
o How much influence would the political opposition have if all the groups
worked together?
o What impact would a change in world oil prices--or other economic
conditions, such as foreign aid--have on regime stability?
o What would be the best policy for the United States to adopt toward a
country to strengthen that country's government?
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,n To address such questions, data inputs are varied to simulate the hypothetical
political developments and the POLICON model is rerun.
Process: Examples:
Varying
Resources
Political fortunes change over time and under different
circumstances. A group might begin to receive financial support
from an external donor, decide to cooperate with a faction of the
military, or break up over internal policy disputes. Such changes
would alter the influence the group would have on policy matters.
The model can simulate changes in clout by adjusting the level of
political, economic, or coercive resources a group can -bring to
bear.
o In the April 1986 study of Egypt, for example, analysts were
concerned that the resources of some groups would change if
domestic security conditions continued to deteriorate. They
decided to provide two data lists, one for the current
environment and another for crisis conditions.
o One of the simulations showed, for example, that Mubarak
would not be likely to prevail on contentious economic issues
even with increased resources. He would have to pay much
0 more attention to the austerity debate and modify his policy
posit keep this issue from becoming regime threatening.
109
In another case, a POLICON study of Panama in April 1986 analyzed
the prospects for a reduction in the influence of the armed forces.
o The resources of the most powerful military leader--General
Noriega--were removed from the model to simulate his death
or exile.
o The computer analysis showed that Noriega's fall would cause
no change in policy forecasts, suggesting that the strength of
the military institution in Panama is independent of Noriega's
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Varying
Groups'
Priorities
To anticipate the impact of a group changing its political
program--deciding either to fight harder to get its way on certain
01 issues or to shift its attention to other areas--analysts can adjust
the salience values for the group to reflect the hypothetical
situation and then re-run the model.
In studying US policy options in the Philippines after the fall of
Marcos in February 1986, the salience values for the United States
first were increased, then decreased.
o The model suggested that if the United States were to become
more heavily involved in Philippine politics, tensions among
competing groups within the new Aquino coalition probably
would increase, reducing the chance that productive working
relationships would develop.
o On the other hand, a reduction of US involvement in Philippine
affairs could have negative repercussions, causing Philippine
policy decisions to move away from US preferences.
o Thus, the model suggested that the United States would most
likely exert a stabilizing influence in the Philippines if it
continued to express concerned interest over developments
there but refrained from pressing hard for specific policy
The same study of the Philippines simulated the potential impact if
both the church and the military were to reduce their political role
in the new government and devote more time, respectively, to
pastoral care and to fighting the insurgents.
o The computer-assisted analysis indicated that the Aquino team
probably would be more vulnerable to extremist pressures
under the hypothetical circumstances, and could end up
1 devoting more time to deflecting attacks from the right and the
-A left than to getting on with their reform program.
o Therefore, according to the POLICON study, the continued
involvement of the church and the military probably would
strengthen the new government, at least over the short term.
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Varying
Policy
Positions
The model allows analysts to evaluate the effect of groups altering
their positions on an issue either to respond to changes in the
1 political environment or to ally with other groups to improve their
chances of prevailing on an issue.
To anticipate a potentially divisive debate over how long President
Sarney should stay in office in Brazil, a January 1986 POLICON
study exaggerated the groups' positions on the tenure issue to
simulate a polarized political environment.
o Groups in favor of retirement before 1989 were moved toward
one end of the issue continuum, while groups in favor of
extension in office beyond 1989 were moved toward the other
end.
o Modeling showed that if the debate heated up and groups
become strongly divided over this issue, the political balance
probably would favor the conservatives who advocate Sarney's
extension in office, with the leftists having to compromise.
In another example, simulations done for the Egypt study suggested
that 'Mubarak could improve his chances of staying in office by
modifying his stand on economic policy matters. The model
ca) showed that there were few groups who would see anything to
gain from challenging him if he stopped pushing for additional
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Integrating Text and Graphics
Graphics derived from the POLICON process are able to communicate complex
political dynamics in a straightforward manner. They add a creative dimension to
support and enliven the final product.
In the February 1986 POLICON study of the Philippines, for example, a barchart
arranged data to illustrate the shift of power from the Marcos conservatives to the
moderate political opposition over a four-month period. The same study included a
section that introduced each issue through a diagram followed by textual discussion. In
each of these graphics, the groups were listed according to how important the issue
was to their overall political agendas. Below the list, a continuum showed the policy
options, the groups' positions, and the model's policy forecast. The barchart and the
graphics/text combinations for three of the issues addressed in the Philippines study
follow.
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The Philippines: Evolving Strength of the
Political Center
O Left
~ Center
Right
This barchart was generated from data collected for POLICON
analyses done in mid-November 1985, and twice in February 1986.
For each POLICON exercise, analysts assigned a value of 100 to
the group that had the most political resources. Proportional
values were assigned to the other groups. Between 8 and 16
domestic Philippines groups were identified in these POLICON
exercises.
30
20
10
Post-
Marcos
Groups were clustered into analytical categories representing the
"Left", "Left Center", "Center", "Right Center", and "Right" based
on an analysis of where they stood on the sets of issues examined.
In order to determine the strength of the political Center, the Left
Center was merged with the Left; the Right Center, with the
Right. The strengths of the groups assigned to each category were
summed to give measures of relative strengths of these loose
coalitions. By aggregating relative strengths in this way we were
able to provide a quick overview of the distribution of power in
the society.
In order to compare power distributions across time, the
strength of each coalition within a set was converted to a
percentage of the total strength possessed by all three coalitions
at a given time. This percentage is indicated on the barchart by
the index of power. Note that for each time period, values for the
Left, Center, and Right sum to 100. Although this technique
facilitates comparisons, it does not describe the growth or decline
in absolute strength of individual coalitions over time.
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Issue 1: Reform of the Military Command
Groups to which Very important Moderately important Of low importance
this issue is:
Communist and Communist- Church Middle class/business/
influenced left technocrats
Non-Communist radical left Marcos supporters
Aquino/Laurel group
US Government
Reform-minded military
Old-line military
Non-Communist radicals
Church
Communists
I
Old -line military
US
Government
Maximum
reform
Wholesale Accelerated Removal of
housecleaning promotions for Vcr's proteges
Abolish officers of high
civilian home professional
defense force caliber
Marcos
supporters
Minimum
reform
Quick retirement
of over- extcndcd
generals
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Using Graphics
Issue 1: Reform of the Military Command
Under Marcos and former Armed Forces Chief of Staff, General Fabian Ver, the
ability of the military to deal with threats to national security was vitiated. Their use of
the military for political purposes, encouragement of corruption among officers, and the
personal use of military staff and equipment undermined morale and deprived the
professional forces of necessary funds, equipment, and materiel to carry out the
campaign against the insurgents, in our view.
The issue facing the new administration is how to restore a high degree of
professionalism to the military. Within the Philippines, the public debate on this issue
ranges from advocating the continuation of old policies to promoting a comprehensive
structural overhaul of the armed forces (see Issue Diagram). According to our analysis,
l.J the Old-line Military, who benefited by abusing their ranks under Marcos and Ver, and
the remaining Marcos Supporters want little or no reform. The Communists also want
no reform because they believe that they will have a better chance of success if
corruption and low morale continue to undermine military capabilities.
As the issue diagram illustrates, the groups favoring little or no reform are
politically isolated and therefore relatively weak. They are unlikely to find other political
allies on this issue. We do not believe that the Non-Communist Radical Left will work
with the Communists on the issue of military reform.
the Non-Communist Radicals appear genuinely to want the military cleaned
up to bring an end to military abuses of people in the countryside.
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Using Graphics
Decision analysis indicates that the balance of power on this issue centers on the
position advocated by the Reform-minded Military. The latter favors rapidly promoting
men of the highest professional caliber into the upper ranks--preceded by the
pensioning of officers whom Marcos kept on beyond retirement age--and a moderate,
but not a thorough, restructuring of the armed forces over the near term. Other strong
groups who care a lot about military reform--such as the Aquino/Laurel Group--want
outcomes close to that. Based on modeling results, we believe these groups will
compromise and accept the policy advocated by the Reform-minded Military. Indeed,
Manila has already begun to move in this direction. Armed Forces Chief of Staff Ramos
is replacing MarcosNer loyalists both in the capital area and in regional commands with
a new group of professional officers.
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Issue 3: Economic Reform-Elimination of
Crony Capitalism
Groups to which Very important Moderately important Of low importance
this issue is:
Communist and Communist- Church
influenced left Old-line military
Non-Communist radical left Marcos supporters
Aquino/Laurel group
US Government
Reform-minded military
Middle class/business/
technocrats
Maximum
reform
US Government
Church
Reform-minded
military
Minimum
reform
Confiscation of Confiscate most Fair effort to Sri iholic sciiurc \o rclon i
all crop} assets assets in a sys- reeo%er crony of,omc croni
regardless of tematic way but assets through ass tts
consequences allow some legal or bureau-
exceptions cratic processes
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Using Graphics
Issue 3: Elimination of Crony Capitalism
Marcos's power rested on the symbiotic relationship he created with his wealthy
and powerful friends by lending government support to their economic ventures. This
state backing ranged from low interest bank loans to legal support for monopolies in the
coconut and sugar export industries. The widespread desire for the elimination of
economic favoritism was a major factor in Aquino's defeat of Marcos.
At one extreme of the debate on this aspect of economic reform, the Communist
Party would prefer that all of the cronies' assets be confiscated, expecting that the
radicals could take advantage of resulting economic disruption (see Issue Diagram). At
0 the other extreme, Marcos Supporters and the Old-line Military want little or no action
CJ taken because confiscation of ill-gotten economic assets would reduce their personal
wealth.
19
Our analysis indicates that the Aquino government is likely to decide to recover
crony assets gradually through the courts or through administrative procedures. The
members of the ruling coalition cover a fairly broad range of policy positions, but the
Aquino/Laurel Group and the Reform-minded Military are not far apart. They are likely
to find it easy to compromise as a result of pressures from the Middle
Class/Business/Technocrats on their right and the Church and US Government on their
left. As in other areas, the Communists and other radicals are isolated on this issue.
They are unlikely to exert any influence on policy but can be expected to try to
embarass the government and score propaganda points.
25X1
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Issue 6: Legal Status/Political Role of Radical Leftists
Groups to which
this issue is:
Non-Communist radical left Communist and Communist- Aquino/Laurel group
US Government influenced left Marcos supporters
Church Old-line military
Reform-minded military
Middle class/business/
technocrats
Aquino/Laurel group Reform-minded military
Church
Middle class
US Government
Radicals given Radicals given No government Bayan and other
high-level low and mid- positions for radical left groups
positions level positions radicals, but outlawed
radical groups
not outlawed
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Using Graphics
Issue 6: Legal Status/Political Role of Radical Leftist Groups
Under the new government of national reconciliation, the Aquino administration
will have to decide how far to go in opening up the political process. At present the
Communist Party is illegal. Although the Old-line Military, Marcos Supporters, and the
0
Reform-minded Military would like to see even more groups outlawed, many other
political participants would like to see all groups invited to participate in open debate as
a symbol of the new order (see Issue Diagram). Communists and Non-Communist
Radical Leftists would like to work their followers into government positions where they
could influence policy.
The scope of the debate on this issue among members of the ruling coalition is
quite broad, and the Reform-minded Military and the Aquino/Laurel Group are at
opposite ends of the political center. The Aquino/Laurel Group does not want BAYAN or
other Communist-influenced groups to participate in the government but would allow
them to continue to operate in the political arena. The military, on the other hand,
considers Aquino naive and favors continuing to restrict political expression.
Decision modeling suggests that the Aquino/Laurel Group and the
Reform-minded Military may eventually meet each other halfway on this issue, but that
the process of compromise is likely to be highly contentious. Compared to other issues,
the Aquino/Laurel Group and the Reform-minded Military are far apart. Moreover, as
can be seen on the issue diagram, the Aquino/Laurel Group, along with the Church,
appears closer to the Radical Left on this issue than they are to the military. The
Reform-minded Military, for its part, is closer to the Old-line Military and Marcos
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Using Graphics
Supporters in this issue than to the Aquino moderates. These centripetal forces will
slow the process of compromise.
The Middle Class/Business/Technocrats and the United States hold the balance of
power between Aquino and the military on this issue. Decision analysis indicates they
will play their pivotal roles differently, however. The Middle Class/Business/Technocrats
group is likely to get caught in a political crossfire while trying to battle for its own
position, which consists of tolerating popular political expression but resisting the
appointment of radicals to positions of major importance. With both the Aquino/Laurel
Group and the Reform-minded Military vying for middle class support, the latter might
try to ease pressures by seeking US mediation on this issue. Removed from partisan
politics and viewed as influential by contending groups, the US according to our model
would be in a good position to help smooth a path to compromise.
Tensions may stay under control as long as the question of the radical left's
political role remains of only moderate importance to members of the government
coalition. If the Communists, BAYAN, and other radical organizations make enough
noise to put this issue near the top of the government's political agenda, however, the
centrists could find themselves In a heated internal political battle. Thus, although
radical leftist groups are unable to influence policy regarding their political inclusion,
they could weaken the government or even bring the current honeymoon period to an
end by provoking serious conflict between the Aquino allies and the Reform-minded
Military.
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