(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00590R000300450001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Indonesia: The Cloudy
Presidential Succession
'S*Cief
EA 85-10156
CR 85-12950
September 1985
Copy 486
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Indonesia: The Cloudy
Presidential Succession
Southeast Asia Division, OEA,
welcome and may be addressed to the Chief,
25X1
This paper was prepared by
Office of
East Asian Analysis, and
F
I Office of
25X1
Secret
EA 85-10156
CR 85-12950
September 1985
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Indonesia: The Cloudy
Presidential Succession I 25X1
Key Judgments Jakarta is unprepared for a presidential succession even though the issue is
Information available surfacing more frequently in discussions among both senior members of the
as of 15 August 1985 government and outsiders. Although President Soeharto, who is 64 years
was used in this report.
old, has publicly mentioned his intention to turn power over to a younger
generation and has begun the process of generational change within the
active military leadership, he has done nothing to designate or groom a
successor and, in our view, will not do so to avoid becoming a lameduck be-
fore his term ends in 1988.
The leading contenders to succeed Soeharto are a group of less than a half
dozen key aides, all of whom are longtime Soeharto loyalists and members
of Indonesia's ruling military-bureaucratic elite. If Soeharto were to die or
become incapacitated unexpectedly, a gathering of senior generals would
probably select his successor from this group in order to ensure continuity
of the current political system, protect the interests of the ruling elite, and
maintain Indonesia's nonaligned, but basically pro-Western stance in
foreign affairs.
If Soeharto should remain in office for another five-year term after 1988,
as we expect, the current top contenders probably would be out of the
running, and a younger generation of military leaders would replace them.
We have no evidence that the younger leaders differ at all from their
seniors in political outlook-they share an anti-Communist, nationalist
outlook, and have a strong distrust of radical Islam. There are occasional
reports of dissatisfaction with the venality of some of their seniors, but we
would expect no basic change in Indonesia's political and economic
arrangements.
Even over the longer term, we see little chance that a successor would come
from outside the ruling elite if the transition takes place under relatively
tranquil political circumstances. On the other hand, if Soeharto's departure
from office should coincide with a period of domestic economic and
political unrest-an increasing likelihood later in the decade-there would
be a greater probability of a reformist taking office or, under extreme
circumstances, a successor opposed to the Soeharto government's policies.
During such a period, there would certainly be pressure to eliminate the
most blatant forms of corruption (which would probably include a crack-
down on the extensive financial dealings of the Soeharto family), and
possibly pressure for shifts in foreign policy.
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Indonesia: The Cloudy
Presidential Succession
Components of the Succession
Twenty years after the end of the Sukarno era,
expectations of another regime change are emerging
in Indonesia.' Generational change in the military is
already under way as younger officers advance to
senior command positions. Soeharto, however, has not
yet made plans for a presidential transition despite his
repeated references to a transfer of power since the
1977 and 1982 elections. As in the past, he continues
to remove any subordinates whose influence threatens
to overshadow him and is careful to choose vice
presidents who-though acceptable to the military
leadership and the public in that office-lack the
political muscle to challenge him. Most observers
believe the current vice president, Umar Wirahadiku-
sumah, would be only a figurehead president with no
real political influence if he were to succeed Soeharto.
Traditional Javanese patron-client relationships with-
in the military leadership will be the key determinant
in any succession. If Soeharto should die or become
incapacitated soon, we believe the selection process
would involve a gathering of the senior Javanese
generals, including retirees, to choose a consensus
candidate-most probably from within their own
ranks. This could result in an extended transition with
a figurehead leader until a firm consensus evolves
within the military leadership. In such a case, the
presidency would remain in the hands of the ruling
elite and we would expect no basic shift in Indonesia's
political system. Under present circumstances, a cohe-
sive military and a divided opposition virtually assure
that Soeharto will be succeeded by another member of
the current elite. As long as the succession decision
remains in the hands of Soeharto or his followers, a
peaceful transition also is assured.
' Sukarno's fall was precipitated by an attempted coup by the
Indonesian Communist Party against the military leadership on 30
September 1965. General Soeharto, who was then head of the
Army's Strategic Command, led a counterstrike and effectively
wrested control from Sukarno, who was discredited by his links to
the Communists. In the period that followed, Soeharto gradually
stripped Sukarno of his powers and formally assumed the presiden-
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Current Contenders
We believe five prominent individuals would be front-
runners if the succession were to occur in the near
future-Armed Forces Commander Murdani, State
Secretary Sudharmono, Home Affairs Minister
Soepardjo Roestam, Coordinating Minister for Politi-
cal and Security Affairs Surono, and the constitution-
ally designated acting successor, Vice President Umar
Wirahadikusumah. All but Murdani meet the criteria
most Indonesian political observers consider necessary
for a successor: that he be a nominal Muslim Javanese
general. All, however, have close ties to Soeharto and
have sufficient influence within the military-bureau-
cratic hierarchy to be contenders.
How any of these individuals would act on specific
issues once in office is not predictable, but they most
probably would maintain Indonesia's quietly pro-
Western international stance. Some differences on
North-South issues probably would arise, but we
expect no reversal of current positions. The current
top military leaders all are strongly anti-Communist
and consider China the chief security threat to South-
east Asia. Consequently, they support close ties to the
West, which offer security advantages and, in their
view, far more economic benefits to Indonesia than
the Communist countries.
Although both of Soeharto's two top aides, General
Murdani and State Secretary Sudharmono, are well
positioned, we believe neither is assured the presiden-
cy unless Soeharto should designate one of them in
advance-a prospect many observers consider doubt-
ful. Murdani's Catholicism, according to most observ-
ers, rules him out as a presidential candidate in a
country whose population is more than 85 percent
Muslim. In addition, his rise to power through the
ranks of the intelligence apparatus has not endeared
him to more senior field commanders who consider
major command experience the primary prerequisite
for the presidency. Since becoming Armed Forces
Commander in 1983, he has further alienated large
numbers of junior officers by sharply reducing their
promotion prospects in a major reorganization of the
military command structure. Furthermore, although
there is strong support (undoubtedly including the
tacit approval of President Soeharto) for Murdani's
Succession Scenarios:
The Range of Possibilities
Soeharto's Status
Key Succession
Political/ Economic
Medium term
through 1990
Remains in office
Soeharto '
No change
Sudden death
Military leadership
Elite retains power
Incapacity
Soeharto and military Elite retains power
Voluntary retirement Soeharto and military Elite retains power
Assassination Military leadership Elite retains-power,
Post 1990
Sudden death Military leadership Elite retains power
Prolonged incapacity
Soeharto and military Elite retains power
Voluntary retirement
Soeharto and military Elite retains power
Assassination
Military faction
Uncertain
Deposed in palace
coup
Military faction
Uncertain
"mysterious shooting"' campaign against known or
suspected criminals, we believe his succession pros-pects probably will be weakened by his reputation for
ruthlessness and willingness to circumvent judicial
processes. This predilection could be threatening to
potential opponents and establishes an image that
many would not consider fitting for Indonesia's na- 25X1
tional leader.
Sudharmono is a military lawyer who also lacks the
troop command experience considered necessary by
the senior generals. He wields enormous political and
financial influence through his position as head of
Golkar (the government's political party) and as State
Secretary with the power to award all major state
contracts and to determine who has access to the
President, but he lacks critical command support.
2 The "mysterious shooting" campaign began in 1983 as the
military tried to curb a growing crime problem by arbitrarily
shooting known or suspected criminals without judicial process.
25X1
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Both Murdani and Sudharmono have sought to
strengthen their political power bases by placing
loyalists in key positions in the military and the
bureaucracy, but their influence still depends wholly
on Soeharto. None of the other three contenders
wields as much influence within the regime as Mur-
dani and Sudharmono, but each has a strong chance
at the presidency in the post-Soeharto era, given the
importance of informal ties and personal relationships
among Indonesia's military leaders.
If Soeharto wishes to be succeeded by a contemporary
from his inner circle or one of his "Generation of 45"
Army comrades, the time for an easy transfer of
power is nearing an end. Most of those who have not
yet reached retirement age are no longer personally
close to the President or soon will be too old to be
contenders for national leadership. Death has already
removed some of Soeharto's longtime associates, such
as Ali Murtopo, from the scene, and advancing age
and deteriorating health are diminishing the prospects
of remaining members of the inner circle.
Looking Further Ahead
The passage of time will introduce new faces into
Jakarta's leadership, increasing the uncertainty of the
succession outcome. Furthermore, the lack of a suit-
able precedent clouds the issue. The extent to which
Soeharto might take an active personal role in the
process is unclear. Many observers believe Soeharto
might rely on fate to determine his successor, reflect-
ing his acceptance of Javanese mystical belief in the
mandate of heaven. In addition, a number of develop-
ments now under way-the reorganization of the
military, generational rivalry, economic austerity, and
Islamic social and political dissent-complicate ef-
forts at forecasting a successor. For example, the
military leadership has streamlined the command
structure, reducing the number of officer billets, and
dampening career prospects of junior and midlevel
officers. It is nevertheless possible to speculate on the
prospects of the younger military leadership and to
identify several leading candidates.
The Younger Military Leadership. If Soeharto should
remain in office until the 1990s, younger military
leaders will become the front-runners for succession.
Their performances in command positions over the
next several years and their ties to influential patrons
will be the major determinants of their prospects,
assuming Indonesia manages to avoid widespread
domestic unrest. There seems only a small possibility
that the military would not be able to maintain its
complete control over Indonesian political life. The
leadership has frequently demonstrated its willingness
and ability to control opposition through a mix of
force and co-optation. Despite occasional complaints
against the regime's tolerance of high-level corruption
or the financial ties between the elite and Chinese
businessmen, most observers see no evidence that
junior officers selected for leadership desire to break
with the current system.
A Future Darkhorse. If Soeharto should remain in
office beyond the early 1990s, even younger leaders
will come to the fore. Although none of Soeharto's
children shows an inclination toward government or
military affairs, his 32-year-old son-in-law, Capt.
Subianto Sumitro Djojohadikusumo Prabowo, exem-
plifies the type of officer who could rise to national
leadership. Because of his age, he represents no
current threat to the President, but he has all the
requisite qualifications: he is a Javanese Muslim
military officer with combat experience in Timor and
has a good reputation for leadership. Furthermore, he
comes from an old and respected family, and is the
son of former Finance Minister Sumitro Djojohadiku-
sumo who, despite a long period of antagonism to the
Soeharto regime, has again become one of the Presi-
dent's trusted advisers. Indonesian 25X1
military officers believe Prabowo will rise to the
highest levels of the military on his own merits. His
marriage to one of President Soeharto's daughters in
1983 further advanced his career along an already
promising path. We believe that President Soeharto
may eventually look to his son-in-law to succeed him
both as national leader and as guardian of the Soe-
harto family fortunes.
Forces Favoring Continuity Over the Long Term
Whatever form Soeharto's departure from office
takes, we believe a variety of institutional interests-
the military leadership, the office of the presidency,
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the bureaucracy, and the commercial interests of
Soeharto's family and supporters-will work in favor
of policy continuity in a successor government.
The Military Leadership. As the primary source of
the nation's political leadership, the military has a
strong vested interest in the status quo. Soeharto and
the military have effectively eliminated any other
institution from emerging as an independent political
force. Of the three major factions contending for
power during the Sukarno era (the Communist Party
[PKI], Sukarnoists, and the conservative military
leadership) the Army has emerged as the dominant
institution in Indonesian political life. Military offi-
cers have gained status as the country's leading elite
and will not willingly surrender it to any potential
challengers. Not only do they consider themselves
guardians of the state, but senior officers also gain
considerable financial benefits in their positions.
The Dominant Presidency. Soeharto also has created
a powerful presidency ruling the highly centralized
state which he dominates. Although he initially had to
use persuasion with his military peers in consolidating
his power in the mid-1960s, he has steadily enhanced
the power of the presidency since then, making mili-
tary officers and all other officeholders dependent on
him for their positions. Although Soeharto has dele-
gated great power to Armed Forces Commander
Murdani and State Secretary Sudharmono, he care-
fully retains ultimate authority for himself. Conse-
quently, any successor will inherit a powerful office
with considerable patronage to award loyal followers.
At the same time, Soeharto has made appointments to
key posts that will increase the chance that the
presidency will fall to one of his supporters. He has
appointed loyal officers to head not only the military,
but also throughout the civil bureaucracy and state-
owned businesses such as the national oil, steel, and
tin companies and other major industrial firms. More
important, he has always placed his most trusted
associates in charge of internal security, intelligence,
and key military units. He has also encouraged the
alliance of the military and bureaucratic elite with
wealthy private businessmen, predominantly ethnic
Chinese entrepreneurs who have benefited financially
from his regime and are important both for financial
and political support. A successor almost certainly 25X1
would be able to count on the support of all these
elements because their favored positions depend on
. their continuing influence within the system
Golkar. With the backing of the Army, the Soeharto
government has created its own political machine,
Golkar, to mobilize its political support. As the go-
vernment's political party, Golkar is the vehicle for
managing the regime's legislative program in the
parliament (the People's Legislative Assembly), where
it controls over 60 percent of the seats. Golkar is also
a key means of providing patronage for the regime's
supporters through its influence on government con- 25X1
tracts, jobs, and promotions.
Soeharto's Personal Interests. Concerned with his
place in history, Soeharto has followed a political and
economic strategy aimed at bequeathing the nation a
legacy of political stability and rising living standards
and gaining for himself the title of Indonesia's "Fa-
ther of Development." To ensure the continuity of the
system he has built, Soeharto has firmly established
the role of the military in civilian affairs in addition to 25X1
its national security responsibilities
Soeharto also has a strong personal interest in protect-
ing his family and close associates after he leaves
office. Several of his children are becoming increas-
ingly visible in business, not always in a favorable
light. Soeharto's longtime cronies also have benefited
financially from their ability to translate political
influence into financial gains. We believe Soeharto is
counting on the military-bureaucratic system he has
built not only to continue governing the country after
his departure, but also to protect the interests of his
family and longtime associates
The Forces for Change
We cannot discount the possibility that Indonesia's
political environment will be considerably different
later in the decade. Discontent reflecting Islamic
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grievances, political opposition, or human rights issues
already is aggravating social strains arising from
economic hardship. Jakarta has responded vigorously
to antigovernment activity and shows no sign of
relaxing its efforts. This stance may stifle outbursts,
but it will not relieve the underlying tensions. With a
fairly austere economic environment and severe re-
strictions on political expression likely to persist for at
least the next few years, any transition in national
leadership poses risks for defenders of the status quo.
The risks would increase if economic, political, and
social problems were deteriorating at the time of
Soeharto's departure from office. In such an atmo-
sphere, a challenger from outside the current elite
could establish his legitimacy by calling for reform.
Such a challenger would threaten the interests of the
Soeharto family and other members of the elite.
Although the level of domestic dissent will fluctuate
with the changing intensity of the Soeharto govern-
ment's anti-Islamic policies, we believe political Islam
is likely to become a more turbulent force in the late
1980s. Local mosques are playing a more active role
and there have been signs of an Islamic revival in
mosque youth and study groups, which are the only
outlets for Muslim discontent at this time. Some of
the better known ones-the Salman Mosque in Ban-
dung and the Sudirman Mosque in Yogyakarta-
have already gained prominence as centers of political
and religious activism. Although the number of active
participants is still small, they have expanded their
influence far beyond their membership through pam-
phlets and audio cassettes. Furthermore, government
actions to implement its secular ideology, Pancasila,'
have antagonized Muslims and increased the possibil-
ity of a backlash.
In addition, alienated young people in Indonesia's
increasingly urban society seem likely to spur grass-
roots political dissent which the government will find
difficult to control. With television and radiobroad-
casts raising the aspirations of the populace, growing
' Pancasila is the government's essentially secular, nebulous ideolo-
gy encompassing five principles: belief in one god, humanitarian-
ism, national unity, democracy, and social justice. The first princi-
ple, belief in one god, is intended to accommodate Muslims,
Christians, Javanese mystics, and any other adherents of a belief in
numbers of unemployed urban youths can see evi-'
dence of a widening disparity between themselves and
the elite. This volatile element will make it harder for
the government to maintain the existing order. Al-
though the government has cracked down hard on
campus activism since the major student protests of
1974-78, antipathy toward the Soeharto family's busi-
ness interests remains a strong undercurrent in Indo-
nesian political life and surfaces periodically. Anti-
Soeharto sentiment, for example, was a major feature
of the 1980 anti-Chinese riots on Java and reappeared
in September 1984, when rioting erupted in Tanjung
Priok, Jakarta's port district.
We cannot discount the possibility that the country's
economic environment will be very different in the
years ahead. Static or declining real incomes in
Indonesia caused by lower earnings from oil and
nonoil exports are inhibiting job creation, thus intensi-
fying social problems. Exports of Indonesia's primary
commodities offer some hope for cyclical recovery,
but face stiff competition from other producers and
from synthetic substitutes. Indonesian manufactured
exports also face tough competition, particularly from
other Asian producers. We see little prospect that
Indonesia will enjoy a repeat of the financial windfall
it gained from oil exports in the 1970s.
The growth of population and labor force in the next
few years will increase pressure on the government to
boost spending on job creation and education just
when Jakarta needs to continue austerity to avert a
financial crisis. Foreign investment would ease the
financial squeeze, but Jakarta has been unable to
convince private investors that its efforts to improve
the investment climate will achieve its goals or that
Indonesia is no longer ambivalent toward foreign
investment
A Reformist Successor? The longer Soeharto remains
in office, the stronger the undercurrents of opposition
and forces for change will become. Although we
believe Soeharto and the military will remain firmly
in control for the near future, the absence of a
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Road Signs for Alternative Outcomes
Because most evidence suggests that Soeharto proba-
bly will not depart from office for several years and
because no successor has been designated, the transi-
tion process is still fluid. Different series of events
would indicate how the situation is evolving and
would suggest which of various scenarios is likely to
occur.
If Soeharto plans a voluntary retirement he would:
? Choose a vice-presidential candidate in 1988 who is
of presidential caliber and can gain the support of
the military leadership, or appoint an armed forces
commander with attributes similar to Murdani's,
or both.
? Openly groom a potential successor and turn over
increasing responsibility to him.
If Soeharto has no intention of resigning soon, it is
likely he will:
? Choose a new vice president who probably would be
unable to garner the support of the military
leadership.
? Continue his past practice of eliminating any subor-
dinate who threatens to overshadow him in
popularity.
? Refuse to take any action against blatant corrup-
tion by members of his family.
The succession would be relatively untroubled and
the current ruling elite would remain in power if-
? The military retains control of key government
ministries and keeps internal bickering within man-
ageable levels.
? Junior military officers remain loyal to their se-
niors in the traditional patron-client relationship.
? Anti-Chinese riots occur only sporadically and any
disturbances are quickly suppressed by security
forces.
? Islamic activists are unable to generate more than
sporadic outbursts of violence and cannot establish
a sustained antigovernment campaign.
? Students and other youths passively continue to
accept the government's restrictions on campus 25X1
political activity.
? The economy continues to perform well enough
(that is, achieves 3- to 5- percent annual growth in
GDP) to avert a sharp rise in unemployment.
The following events would indicate a troubled tran-
sition process, but probably would not presage the
emergence of an opposition candidate, except under
the most extreme circumstances involving a loss of
confidence by the military leadership in the present
structure:
? Opposition to the regime erupts into major, sus-
tained demonstrations.
? The military is unable to contain opposition
activity.
? The economy deteriorates badly as a result of a
collapse of oil prices or a major world depression or
debt crisis and a charismatic opposition leader
emerges who is able to successfully blame the
Soeharto government for the country's economic
woes.
? Human rights activists. and Islamic opponents of
the Soeharto government substantially increase
their following at a time of economic difficulty.
25X1
? Soeharto is debilitated by illness, but remains in -25X1
office.
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political voice for opponents of the regime or for
critics of corruption will increase the pressure for
reform. US Embassy officers already report that there
is growing criticism of the greed exhibited by the
Soeharto children in their business activities, but the
President has made no effort to rein them in.
The highly visible financial maneuvering of the family
members increases the odds that any successor would
come under strong public pressure to correct family
excesses. A reformist almost certainly would sharply
reduce, if not put an end to, their business empires.
Such an outcome does not appear probable in the near
future, but Indonesia's dimmer economic prospects
caused by the soft oil market will increase the possi-
bility of such an outcome over time. Furthermore,
sentiment in favor of reform will probably increase
within the ranks of junior officers-the most likely
source of future leadership.
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