(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000101120002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 9, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
9 May 1980
Summary
The Soviets will probably make a policy statement
covering the whole range of European disarmament issues at
next week's celebration of the Warsaw Pact's 25th anniversary.
On the key question of what, if anything, they will say
about Long-range European theater nuclear forces (TNF), past
Soviet adamancy suggests continued temporizing as the most
Likely Soviet course. Although some dramatic gesture Like
Brezhnev's unilateraZ.troop and. tank withdrawal offer of Last
October cannot be excluded, the Soviets are less Likely this
time--in part because of the failure of that October gambit--
to offer any militarily significant concession. They are not
likely, for example, to propose a.freeze that Limits SS-20
deployment. Rather, their focus is Likely to be on political
measures designed to preserve a security dialogue with the
West Europeans and to encourage them to distance themselves
from US military policies. Such an approach could take the
This memorandum was prepared at the request of the Bureau
of Politico-MiZitarm Affairs, Department of State, by
USSR-EE Division, Office of Political- Analysts. It
has been coordinated with the National Intelligence Officers
for. the USSR and Eastern Europe and for General Purpose
Forces and with t e Office of Strategic Research. Comments
may be directed t the Chief, Multidisciplinary Branch
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0r/l.Ls c .L
161
form of a statement of Soviet interest in talks., perhaps
related to the CSCE framework, but combined with a reiter
tion of the unacceptability of NATO's December decision.
The celebration next week of the Warsaw Pact's 25th
anniversary may be the occasion fora Soviet initiative
regarding long-range European theater nuclear forces (TNF).
The meeting in Warsaw of the highest. council within the
Pact, the'Political Consultative Committee (PCC), will be
attended by the top party and government leaders of the
member states, and its major policy declaration will address
European security issues, including TNF. At a PCC meeting
in November 1978, the Pact declared its willingness to
discuss weapons that were not currently the subject of
negotiations and specifically asserted that there was no
weapon that it would refuse to limit. At a foreign ministers
meeting in May 1979, the Pact proposed an all-European Confer-
ence on.Military Detente (CMD) and the conclusion of a
treaty among CSCE signatories that would ban the first use
of nuclear or conventional weapons.
Current Soviet Stance
Publicly and in their formal demarches to the United
States, the Soviets continue to insist that NATO's decision
in December to proceed with its TNF modernization program
has imposed "unacceptable preconditions" on the conduct of
l
negotiations, and that talks can begin-only if the decision
informally, the Soviets have attempted to persuade West
Europeans that they are eager for progress in all existing
multilateral and bilateral arms control negotiations and
wish to hold new meetings on European security measures,
while arguing that responsibility for the next move rests with
d its allies
i
and an announcement is made about this.".
on an
the West. Concerning TNF,. the Soviet Un
have hinted only vaguely and inconsistently at possible
Eastern counterproposals to NATO's negotiation offer, and
more frequently have simply reiterated their formal demand
that NATO first alter its December decision.
suggest a somewhat narrower range of reasonable possibilities.
These hints are always vague, occasionally contradictory,
and at least one can be found in support of virtually every
possible Soviet move on TNF from military moves to eventual
accommodation, but taken together and considered in the
context of recent Soviet policy on European security they do
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181
Cpl
[14
C',
Announcement of a Possible Military Response
Although much Western speculation has centered on the
possibility of an eventual conciliatory move by Moscow, the
Soviets may feel that continued intransigence is. the better
tactic at this time in order to show West Europeans that the
arms-control half of NATO's dual track policy is not working.
Last fall, Soviet press commentary alluded several times to
the possibility that NATO's TNF program would necessitate
"countermeasures," possibly "counterdeployments," on the
part of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. Similar
public assertions, albeit less bluntly put, were made at the
same time by First. Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff
Akhromeyev and Soviet Minister of Defense Ustinov. The
possibility was raised again. last week by a Soviet newspaper
editor,. who warned Western participants at a meeting of the
Political Club of Berlin that unless the mid-May session of
NATO's Defense Planning Committee resulted in a public
decision to limit implementation of the December decision,
the Soviets and their allies would be obliged to announce
unspecified but strong reaction at the Pact summit.
low-cost options as the forward deployment of Soviet nuclear-
capable SU-24 fighter-bombers presently stationed in the
Soviet Union or the deployment of new tactical missile
systems such as the SS-21 and SS-23, as well as nuclear-
capable artillery, in Eastern Europe during peacetime.
If a Pact announcement is made about a joint military
response, it probably will be vague. It could conceivably
include, however, a commitment to enhance Pact air defense
against the threat of cruise missiles or some reference to a
future "shifting of nuclear forces." Such a reference could
imply a highly demonstrative expansion or enhancement of long-
range offensive TNF systems. Or, despite the asymmetry in
systems capabilities involved and the radical departure from
past Soviet reticence it would represent, it could imply such
Announcement of a.Possible Political Response
Some Soviet officials have raised privately the possibility
of discussing TNF in the framework of a European disarmament
conference, rather than in SALT III or in separate TNF
talks. The summit communique could propose. a variant of the
current Pact CMD proposal, perhaps giving TNF prominence equal
to the emphasis currently given to confidence-building
measures (CBMs). Especially now, after the failure of their
efforts to engineer a pre-Madrid conference aimed at influencing
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[9~
161
the discussion of CSCE security issues, the Soviets are
eager to win support for a post-Madrid meeting linked with
the CSCE review process. But they may see advantage in
using it as much to create. additional pressure against
NATO's TNF modernization program. as to affect discussions of
have not brought the two proposals closer together. As a
result, Moscow, anxious to turn world attention away from
Afghanistan and conscious of the effect a disarmament proposal
could have on West Europeans seeking reassurance that detente
is not dead, may wish to.go public with a proposal that, in
effect, suggests that arms control measures considered by a
future CMD-CDE have a broader zone of application than the
200-kilometer swath of Soviet territory currently provided for
by the Helsinki Final Act in exchange for the inclusion of
nuclear weapons--including, and possibly limited to, long-range
initiative and the French proposal
Disarmament in Europe (CDE). Sovie
for a Conference on
t-French discussions over
the last two ears,
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lapparently
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Proposing that the TNF issue be introduced into a.
European disarmament conference: would be aimed at projecting
a Soviet image of reasonableness. But it could also be an*
opening gambit to move discussion of the issue into a multi-
lateral forum involving non-nuclear states-and thereby increase
political pressures against NATO's TNF plan. Such a proposal
could also--despite probable initial French opposition--contain
the seed: of a. possible compromise between the Soviet CMD
TNF--on the agenda.
A Pact declaration would probably reiterate previous
Eastern calls for guarantees. of non-first use of nuclear and
151 conventional weapons, non-expansion of alliances, and non-
increase of troops. in the territory. of other states--possibly
(163
talks.
proposing that such topics be on the agenda of a CMD follow-
on after Madrid. In this way, the Soviets might hope, in
any bilateral.and multilateral discussions held before
Madrid, to depict the United States as an increasingly out-
of-touch and isolated participant in European security
Such a strategy seems consistent with recent Soviet
diplomacy in Europe. While refusing to acknowledge the
legitimacy of a common Western response to the invasion of
Afghanistan, Moscow. now seems willing to weather bilateral
disagreements on the issue, provided it can maintain a
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SECRET
III
European dialogue on security matters. The Soviets hope, by
treating Afghanistan as a regional issue and by hinting at a
willingness to accommodate some European security concerns, to
minimize the possibility that US punitive policies. adopted in
t
h
the planned force.
Some Western observers have speculated that the Pact
summit may be an appropriate setting for an offer to freeze
SS-20 deployment in exchange for a.delay in. the implementation
of NATO's TNF program while negotiations take place. Chancellor
Schmidt's recent remarks suggesting a freeze in place could
act as a cue to which the Soviets'-and their allies may
respond. Moreover, the Pact summit will occur shortly
before probable Belgian reconsideration of the TNF issue,
and an apparent concession on the part of the Soviets may
convince uncertain parliamentarians that the TNF program is
unnecessary to achieve some progress on arms control. Finally,
if a Soviet freeze offer were pegged to actual initiation of
talks, the military cost of such a proposal may be negligible
or nonexistent, since the number of SS-20 bases operational or
under construction is nearly eighty percent of our estimate of
e fect on Soviet disarmament policies in Europe.
Is an SS-20 Freeze Likely?
e wake of Afghanistan will have a long-lasting negative
f
Although some variant of a freeze proposal involving the
SS-20 cannot be ruled out, it seems unlikely. A real halt
in the Soviet TNF program would be tantamount to implicit
acceptance of NATO's assertion that the Soviets, mainly as a
result of their SS-20 deployments, are acquiring a dangerous
level of advantage. in TNF capabilities--an assertion that
the Soviets have consistently denied. The Soviets apparently
fi$l believe that a halt in deployments is too hi
h a
ri
t
g
p
ce
o
. pay fornegotiations, in both political and military terms
V
The Soviets probably do. not view eventual'.NATO TNF de-
ployment as a foregone conclusion and believe that. options
r involving lower costs than a freeze may still be effective.
The recent Soviet-sponsored conference of European Communist
parties issued a call for a large gathering of "peace-loving
forces" in Helsinki before the November review session in
Madrid. Its principal target apparently will be NATO's
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decision on TNF modernization. Even if the Soviets have
abandoned hopes that the NATO consensus would collapse from
within, they probably will still seek to forestall or prevent
implementation by political means before turning to nego-
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SECRET
NFAC/OPA/USSR-EE/SRM, (8May80)
Distribution:
Orig - Reginald Bartholomew
Director, Politico-Military Affairs
Department of State
1 - D/NFAC
1 - DD/NFAC
1 - NFAC/AS
1 - NFAC Registry
1 - DCI/Pres. Brief. Coord.
1 - Ex. Secretary/NFAC Prod. Board
1 - NFAC/SRP
1 - C/NFAC/ACIS
1 - C/NIC
1 - AC/NIC
1 -
1 - NIC/AG/
1 - NIO/USSR-EE
1 - NIO/GPF
1 - OCO/PDB
1 - D/OSR
1 - OSR/SF
1 - OSR/TF
1 - OSR/SEC
3 - PPG
1 - D/OPA
1 - C/OPA/WE
1 - C/OPA/WE/RO
1 - C/OPA/USSR-EE/E
2 - OPA/PS
1 - OPA/USSR-EE Chrono
1 - OPA/USSR-EE/M Chrono
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