(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00589R000100050004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/22 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000100050004-8
Directorate of
Intelligence
? o Argentina:
Prospects for Terrorism
ALA 85-10013
o February 1985 0
~apy 3 5 6
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/22 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000100050004-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/22 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000100050004-8
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/22 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000100050004-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/22 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000100050004-8
Directorate of
Intelligence
Argentina:
Prospects for Terrorism
the Directorate of Operations.
biographical contributions from
This paper was prepared by
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South America Division, ALA,
25X1
25X1
25X1
Secret ~
ALA 85-10013
February 1985
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/22 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000100050004-8 ,
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/22 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000100050004-8
Secret
Argentina:
Prospects for Terrorism
Key. Judgments The growth of politically motivated violence-mostly by the extreme
Information available right-in Argentina last year has focused public. attention there on the
as of 17 January 1985 danger of a resurgence of the kind of widespread terrorism that prevailed in
was used in this report.
the 197Os. President Alfonsin's strategy in dealing with one of his greatest
-challenges-the legacy of terrorism and repression that he inherited from
previous civilian and military governments-has been to mete out measured
and evenhanded punishment to both leftist terrorists and militar officers
implicated in human rights abuses.
The main leftist terrorist groups are the Montoneros and the People's 25X1
Revolutionary Army (ERP). the leaders of 25X1
both groups are now promoting political rather than terrorist activity. The
Montoneros have infiltrated the left wing of the Peronist party-the leading
opposition political group-while the ERP has concentrated on penetrating
the small, far-left Intransigent Party. But discipline on the extreme left is
fragile, and dissident elements-especially within the Montoneros-have
threatened to resume violence. 25X1
We judge that growing cooperation between the Montoneros and the ERP
could remove some of the financial and training barriers to a resumption of
terrorism by the left. Chances of significant foreign support, however, are
slim. Cuba has contacts with both groups, but 25X1
so far has given priority to maintaining good relations with Alfonsin over
arming the radical left. 25X1
Rightist terrorists, for their part, already have carried out bombings and
.other attacks against leftist- and government targets in an effort to intimi- 25X1
date both the far left and the Alfonsin administration. In our judgment, the
ultraright fears both that the left will resume terrorism and that Alfonsin 25X1
will expand the scope, of judicial proceedings against military officers for
Nonetheless, we believe that rightist terrorism-although more
of a problem in the short term than leftist violence-so far lacks centralized 25X1
direction and the blessing of top military leaders. 25X1
Secret
ALA 85-10013
February 1985
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/22 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000100050004-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/22 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000100050004-8
The present level of violence, while disturbing to Alfonsin, does not imperil
his government, in our judgment. We believe it is unlikely that a major
terrorist threat will emerge over the next six months. Our review
indicates that both the left and the right recognize that, after the
terrorist bloodletting and the "dirty war" of the 1970s, there is wide public
opposition to political violence of any stripe. We expect the ultraleft to
continue pursuing nonviolent political activities during the near term, al-
though some dissidents may resort to sporadic terrorism. Violent attacks by
the radical right will probably continue, perhaps at a somewhat increased
level. ~~
probably step up their activities to capitalize on public discontent.
assassinated, creating a power vacuum. In either case, terrorists would
Over the next two years we judge it highly likely that the level of terrorism
will continue to increase, but not to levels that would jeopardize democratic
rule. Some possibility exists, however-we judge on the order of 1 in 5-that
economic and political pressures during this period could unleash a wave of
left-right violence that would weaken Argentine political institutions.
Alfonsin's reluctance to comply with IMF-recommended austerity measures
could bring the economy to a near standstill, or the President could die or be
or default on the nation's foreign debt.
Widespread terrorist violence could enable the armed forces to intervene
again. We believe that, because of the services' discontent with US support
to the United Kingdom during the Falklands conflict and their need to seek
allies within organized labor and the Peronist movement, any military
government coming to power under such circumstances would probably be
more nationalistic and anti-United States than past military regimes. Even
if the situation did not deteriorate to this point, a strong upsurge in terrorism
could force the civilian government to adopt positions at variance with US
interests in order to garner short-term support at home. These could include
stances detrimental to US interests in such forums as the United Nations
and the Nonaligned Movement, greater verbal belligerence regarding the
Falklands issue, increased attention to the military applications of
Argentina's nuclear program, and renewed consideration of a moratorium
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/22 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000100050004-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/22 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000100050004-8
Secret
Alfonsin and the Legacy of Violence
Growth of Rightist Terrorism 7
The Longer Term 10
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/22 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000100050004-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/22 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000100050004-8
Figure 1
~?J oSan Saivador j ~ t' tlic$
\_ de Jujuy ~_ ~""`.~
Salta" ".Salta j ~'\ormosa~~-,
~ ;~?-,~ ' -Formosa r,,,A
''T'.._.._