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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00587R000300420002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
1 1411 Pakistan-United States:
Dynamics of the
Relationship
An Intelligence Assessment
Seeret-
NESA 85-10182
September 1985
Copy 375
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Pakistan-United States:
Dynamics of the
Relationship
Operations.
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
This paper was prepared by
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA, on
Secret
NESA 85-10182
September 1985
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Secret
Pakistan-United States:
Dynamics of the
Relationship
Key Judgments President Zia regards close security ties to the United States as a strategic
Information available imperative for Pakistan, and he is committed to strengthening bilateral
as of I August 1985 relations. US aid has strengthened Pakistan militarily and economically
was used in this report.
and has provided the essential underpinning to Zia's confrontational policy
toward the Soviets on Afghanistan. Zia believes China and the Islamic
countries cannot guarantee Pakistan's security against the Soviets or India,
even though most Pakistanis regard them as more reliable allies.
Many Pakistanis do not accept the strategic premises of Zia's reliance on
the US commitment to Pakistan. They believe the historical legacy of US-
Pakistani relations-including US arms embargoes in three wars with
India and the suspension of aid in 1979 over Islamabad's nuclear pro-
gram-has proved the United States an inconsistent and unreliable ally.
Critics of Zia's policy say that the United States is using Pakistan to
oppose the Soviets in Afghanistan with no guarantee of support if Pakistani
aid to the resistance results in a direct military confrontation with the
Soviets, and they expect another US arms embargo in the event of war
with India. Furthermore, most Pakistanis view US Middle East policy as
anti-Islamic. Zia must be sensitive to criticism both within the military and
by the political opposition that his policies serve US-rather than Paki-
stani-interests. With a new National Assembly, Zia's policies will be
vulnerable to public scrutiny and criticism to an unprecedented degree.
Zia's greater cooperation withhthe United States in aiding the Afghan
resistance is intended to prevent the Soviets from consolidating their hold
on Afghanistan and using it as a base from which to threaten Pakistan. Is-
lamabad, however, does not want its role in training and passing arms to
the insurgents publicized. The Pakistanis oppose direct, overt US arms aid
to the Afghans.
Pakistan's relations with the Islamic countries and the Nonaligned Move-
ment limit Zia's options for increasing cooperation with the United States
in regional security matters. Zia has indicated that US-Pakistani military
ties could evolve toward greater cooperation as political circumstances
allowed, but he will not move beyond the moderate Arab consensus on the
acceptable limits of cooperation with the United States.
Secret
NESA 85-10182
September 1985
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Zia probably calculates that Pakistan's importance to US policy in
Afghanistan has allowed him to pursue covertly the technology to support a
nuclear weapons option-which nearly all Pakistanis agree is vital to their
country's long-term security and survival-without provoking a cutoff of
US aid. The Pakistanis almost certainly will not test a nuclear device or vi-
olate safeguards to reprocess spent fuel as long as they are receiving US
aid. Pakistan, however, continues to develop the capability to enrich
uranium and has been working for years on the nonfissile components for a
nuclear device. The Pakistanis probably do not have the capability to
produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear device, but we
cannot exclude the possibility that they could do so within a year of a deci-
sion to try.
A US aid cutoff would cause Islamabad to intensify its nuclear weapons
development effort and remove the major political obstacle to a test.
Pakistan's support for the Afghan resistance probably would decrease
dramatically in the event of a US aid cutoff, opening the way to an
eventual Soviet victory in Afghanistan.
The Pakistanis will press for a sizable increase in military and economic
aid in a new multiyear program and will regard US willingness to meet
Islamabad's requirements as the key indicator of the US commitment to
Pakistan. Without additional assistance-possibly including grant military
assistance-Pakistan will have increasing difficulty meeting its repayment
obligations to the United States. Pakistan also wants to avoid politically
unpalatable reforms to deal with serious economic problems.
We believe that anti-US sentiment in Pakistan would increase if Zia's
political position were badly eroded by a severe economic slump, a growing
Afghan refugee problem, or a serious political misstep. In these circum-
stances, Pakistan's close relations with the United States-with which Zia
is identified-could become a political liability for him. A new government
in Islamabad would be less receptive to US policies and interests.
Secret iv.
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Key Judgments
Zia's Gamble
Strategic Benefits for Pakistan
1
The Historical Legacy: A Barrier to Trust
2
Perceptions of the United States
4
Afghanistan
8
Arms Technology Transfer
15
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Figure 1
S'`oiet U nion
China
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Boundary represe ation is
not necessarily aut oritative.
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Secret
Pakistan-United States:
Dynamics of the
Relationship
The growth and development in the last five years of
Pakistan's relations with the United States-includ-
ing the six-year, $3.2 billion US security assistance
program for Pakistan and cooperation in aiding the
Afghan resistance-have been a major political suc-
cess for President Zia. The Soviet invasion of Afghan-
istan fundamentally changed Islamabad's strategic
perspective and was the major impetus for Zia's
decisions in '1980 and 1981 to resurrect' Pakistan's
security ties with the United States. Pakistan for the
first time faced a serious threat from the northwest as
well as from its historic adversary to the east-India.
many of Zia's advisers
doubted the reliability of the United States and
worried that becoming dependent on US security
assistance would make Pakistan's security and foreign
policies hostage to US policy interests. Zia, however,
has been able to show that the new security relation-
ship is durable and has yielded significant strategic
benefits for Pakistan. We believe he is committed to
further strengthening the relationship-including
greater cooperation in regional security matters.
Strategic Benefits for Pakistan
Zia regards close and cooperative relations with the
United States as a strategic imperative for Pakistan to
withstand Soviet pressure for accommodation on Af-
Status of Major US-Pakistani
Arms Agreements
Order Value Remarks
(million
vs $)
F-16 Fighters 40 1,100 32 delivered
M-109A2 (155 mm) and 179 115 Delivery completed
M- l 10A2 (8-inch) self-
propelled howitzers; M-198
(155 mm) towed howitzers
M-48A5 tanks 200 151 Delivery completed
Improved TOW antitank 1,000 10 Delivery completed
missiles
AH-1S Cobra attack 20 171 10 delivered
helicopters
Harpoon submarine- 16 47 Delivery scheduled
launched antiship missiles for 1986
Harpoon surface-launched 32 45 Delivery scheduled
antiship missiles for 1988-89
AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to- 500 46.2 100 delivered
air missiles (expedited)
Stinger Basic tactical anti- 120 8.3 60 launchers and
aircraft missiles missiles plus 60
reloads .
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The $3.2 billion US security assistance program
agreed on in June 1981-of which half is foreign
military sales credits for purchasing US weapons and 25X1
half is economic aid-is the cornerstone of Pakistan's
relations with the United States.
Pakistan regards modern US weapons-such
as the 40 F-16 fighters that are the centerpiece of the
present security assistance package-as essential to
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develop a credible military capability to deter aggres-
sion from India as well as from Soviet-occupied
Afghanistan. Pakistani officials say that the security
assistance program also implies a US commitment to
Pakistan's security that might deter a Soviet or Indian
attack.
Besides strengthening Pakistan militarily, US security
assistance allows Islamabad to maintain its support
for the Afghan resistance. Islamabad's commitment
to the Afghan resistance-including sanctuary, arms,
ammunition, and training-is based on the strategic
requirement of preventing the Soviets from consoli-
dating their hold on Afghanistan and using it as a
base from which eventually to threaten and destabi-
lize Pakistan. The Pakistanis say that US security
assistance significantly reduces the risks of confront-
ing the Soviets in Afghanistan.
The security relationship with the United States also
has given Islamabad more room for diplomatic ma-
neuver with New Delhi. Senior Pakistani officials say
that US security assistance has given Pakistan the
confidence to pursue a dialogue with India on improv-
ing relations and to propose, in September 1982, that
the two countries negotiate a nonaggression pact. The
Pakistanis believe that their arms modernization-to
which US weapons are crucial-reduces Islamabad's
vulnerability to Indian pressure for concessions in
bilateral negotiations.
The Historical Legacy: A Barrier to Trust
Zia's decision to accept US security assistance is still
controversial because, in the view of most Pakistanis,
the history of bilateral relations discredits US com-
mitments to Pakistan. The US arms embargoes im-
posed during Pakistan's wars with India in 1965 and
1971 (as well as in 1948) showed that the United
States was an unreliable ally even when the two
countries were linked in the SEATO and CENTO
alliances and had signed, in 1959, an Executive
Agreement of mutual defense cooperation. US-
Pakistani relations reached their low point in 1979
when US military and economic aid was suspended in
response to Pakistan's efforts to develop a nuclear
weapons capability. US policy also was seen as favor-
ing India to the detriment of Pakistani interests and
as being hostile to Zia's martial law regime.
The 1959 Executive Agreement of Cooperation be-
tween the United States and Pakistan commits the
United States, in accordance with constitutional pro-
cesses, "to take such action, including the use of
armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and
as envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote
Peace and Stability in the Middle East" in the event
of aggression against Pakistan. The Joint Resolution
to which the Executive Agreement refers is popularly
known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. Section 2 of the
Eisenhower Doctrine limits the US defense commit-
ment to assisting "nations requesting assistance
against armed aggression from any country con-
trolled by international Communism. "
The USJailure to assist Pakistan in its wars with
India in 1965 and 1971 reinforced Islamabad's
doubts about the reliability of US commitments
embodied in the Executive Agreement,
The 1971 war was fought over East
Bengal's secession from Pakistan, and India-which
had recently signed a Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation with the USSR-enjoyed Moscow's full
support. Pakistanis believed that the United States
should have considered India a country "controlled
by international Communism" because of its new
Soviet ties and intervened to preserve the national
integrity of Pakistan.
Despite reaffirmation of the Executive Agreement
and the large security assistance program, 0
most Pakistanis-including those
in government, the military, the political opposition,
and in the bazaars-still doubt US reliability. Many
officials and opinion leaders have voiced their belief
that US support for Pakistan is only a temporary
expedient to oppose the Soviets in Afghanistan and
that an improvement in US-Soviet relations-or a loss
of interest in the Afghan resistance-would leave
Islamabad alone to confront Moscow. The Pakistanis
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Secret
Figure 2
US Aid to Pakistan, 1952-87
1954: Pakistan signs ? ? 1955: Pakistan
Mutual Defense becomes charter
Assistance Agreement member of
with the United States Baghdad Pact
(later, CENTO)
1954: Pakistan ?
becomes charter
member of SEATO
1954: Turko-Pakistani ?
Mutual Defense Pact
? 1959: US-Pakistani
Executive Agreement
? 1965: US arms
embargo during
Indo-Pakistan war
0
1950 55 60 65
' Economic assistance includes Economic Support Fund (ESF) and P.L. 480 loans.
n Military assistance includes FMS financing assistance, Military Assistance
Program (MAP) grants, and International Military Education and Training (IMET).
? 1971: US arms
embargo during
Indo-Pakistan war
? 1972: Pakistan
withdraws from
SEATO
1979: Pakistan ?
withdraws from
CENTO
? 1980: Soviets
invade Afghanistan
? 1981: US-Pakistani agreement
on $3.2 billion five-year
security assistance package
? 1982: Pakistan signs
General Security of Military
Information Agreement
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also fear that US support for Pakistan will always be
hostage to changing foreign policy perspectives in
Washington and that the United States might alter its
policy to gain favor with India.
Pakistani Army officers
are ambivalent about Islamabad's close relations with
Washington. Most Pakistani officers have high regard
for US weapons and value the contribution of US
security assistance to strengthening Pakistan's de-
fenses. however, Pakistani
officers-especially at the junior and middle levels-
identify more with the Islamic world than the West.
younger officers distrust the
United States because they believe US Middle East
policy is anti-Islamic and because of past US arms
embargoes. Many Army officers including some se-
nior advisers to Zia-fear that increasing military
cooperation with the United States would subordinate
Pakistani interests to those of the United States
without enhancing Pakistan's security.
The Navy is more receptive to closer military ties to
the United States including joint naval exercises
because of its past involvement in training with the
US Navy when Pakistan was a member of the
SEATO and CENTO alliances. Senior Pakistani
naval officers have said they would welcome US Navy
port calls and use of the Karachi dockyard and repair
facilities and that they believe joint exercises would
have great benefit for the Pakistan Navy. Islamabad
is reluctant to approve such ties because of Pakistan's
The Bureaucracy
Even after four years of a strong and developing
security relationship with the United States, many
Foreign Ministry officials-but not Foreign Minister
Yaqub-remain skeptical about Zia's emphasis on
close US relations.
some senior Foreign Ministry officials believe that
Zia has entrusted Pakistan's security to an unreliable
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ally and given the United States significant leverage
over Pakistani policies. Many of these officials give
priority to cultivating Islamabad's relations with the
Islamic countries and the Nonaligned Movement.
They believe that only other Islamic countries are
concerned about Pakistan's fate and that Islamabad's
nonaligned ties are important as a deterrent to Indian
aggression.
Some senior Foreign Ministry officials argue that,
because the United States is far from the region,
Islamabad should take account of the proximity of
Soviet power and improve relations with Moscow.
Popular Attitudes
Popular opinion in Pakistan is suspicious of US
motives and perceives the United States as being anti-
Islamic. The Pakistani media-especially the Islamic
newspapers-and many intellectuals in Pakistan rou-
tinely criticize US policies in Afghanistan and the
Middle East. The media in particular have great
influence in affecting popular opinion. At the same
time, recent Pakistani polls-which we believe are
generally reliable despite problems with sampling
methodology and fieldwork techniques-indicate
widespread support for US military and economic aid.
We believe that anti-US sentiment is never far from
the surface in Pakistan.
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Threats to US interests in Pakistan are 25X1
mostly by radical Shia and other fringe groups that
have almost no popular backing. 25X1
We believe that latent anti-US sentiment in Pakistan
could be politically exploited if the opposition to Zia
grows because of a deteriorating economy, a growing
Afghan refugee burden, and increasing Soviet or
Indian political and military pressure. Increased pop-
ular and political opposition to Zia could make Pakis-
tan's close ties to the United States a major political
issue that would be a liability for Zia. In such an
event, threats and violence against US persons and
installations in Pakistan probably would increase.
US-Pakistani Relations in Political Debate
All of the major political parties in Pakistan have
criticized Zia's close ties to the United States. Pakis-
tan's largest opposition grouping, a coalition of center-
left parties called the Movement for the Restoration
of Democracy (MRD), has accused Zia of undermin-
ing Pakistan's nonaligned standing, embroiling Islam-
abad in superpower conflicts, and following the US
lead in Afghanistan. The MRD parties say that US
policy is opposed to a negotiated settlement in Af-
ghanistan and that Pakistan's interests require more
balanced relations with Moscow and direct dialogue
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Pakistan National Assembly
Session, May 1985
Most of the delegates support
Zia's Afghanistan policy, which
was forcefully defended by the
government in response to ques-
tions in May's National Assem-
with the Soviet-installed Kabul regime. The funda-
mentalist Islamic parties criticize US policies for
being anti-Islamic and warn Zia against subordinat-
ing Pakistan's interests to those of the United States.
Nonetheless, the political opposition has been unable
to exploit Pakistan's close relations with the United
States against the government because Zia has mo-
nopolized the political process and because of the
threats from Afghanistan and India. The political
parties have focused their opposition to Zia on his
control and manipulation of the political process and
on provincial political and economic grievances rather
than on substantive foreign policy issues. In any case,
Zia's deft handling of the transition to civilian rule-
in which the parties were barred from active partici-
pation in national elections-has left the political
parties with declining influence in framing issues of
public debate.
The national elections in February 1985 enhanced
Zia's political legitimacy and improved the outlook
for stability in Pakistan, but they also set the stage for
an unprecedented public debate on the premises of
Islamabad's foreign policy-including close relations
with the United States. The opposition parties almost
certainly will try to take advantage of a foreign policy
debate to gain the political initiative against Zia.
the MRD
plans to make Zia's Afghanistan policy-and, implic-
itly, his US policy-an issue to rally public opposition
to the new civilian government.
tion with the Soviets or India.
Zia, in our view, is inclined toward greater coopera-
tion with the United States on strategic issues
particularly in aiding the Afghan resistance. We
believe Zia regards policies aimed at containing the
spread of Soviet power and influence as vital to
Pakistan's security whether or not they support US
interests. In the circumstances of Pakistan's vulnera-
bility between Soviet-occupied Afghanistan and (from
the Pakistani perspective) Soviet-allied India, Zia
believes Islamabad has no alternative but to cooperate
with the United States. Zia believes China, the
Islamic countries, and the Nonaligned Movement
cannot guarantee Pakistan's security in a confronta-
Many Pakistanis do not accept Zia's strategic prem-
ises. In their view, Zia's policies inevitably will lead to
a confrontation with the Soviets, threaten political
and economic stability in the border areas where
nearly 3 million Afghan refugees are concentrated,
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President Zia at Nonaligned Summit, New Delhi, March 1983
Pakistan for now, says Zia, must be "holier than the Pope" to
maintain its credibility in the Nonaligned Movement, especially
since India has called Pakistan's relations with the United States
incompatible with adherence to nonaligned principles.
and also weaken Pakistan by diverting policy atten-
tion from Pakistan's principal adversary-India. They
believe that Zia's faith in US support-which is both
the consequence and the underpinning of his confron-
tational policy toward the Soviets in Afghanistan-is
misplaced and that Pakistan would be isolated if it
faced a crisis threatening its security and survival.
tion with US interests will jeopardize Pakistani ties to
the Islamic countries and the Nonaligned Movement.
Zia also must be sensitive to charges within the
military and by the political opposition that his poli-
cies serve US-rather than Pakistani-interests. We
believe that widespread opposition to Zia's foreign
policy or an erosion of his political position-particu-
larly within the military-not only would constrain
Zia from increasing cooperation with the United
States but might result in a divergence of Pakistani
Policy Constraints
Although the Pakistanis have provided important
support for US policy in Afghanistan and the Persian
Gulf region, they are wary that too close an identifica-
and US policies.
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Figure 3
USSR-Afghanistan-Pakistan: Trends in
Cross-Border Air Incursions, 1982-85
I 1 I I/ :!~I/ I
0 1 11 III IV I II III IV I II III IV I' 11
1982 83 84 85
Note: Most of the airstrikes occurred in Pakistani territory adjacent to
besieged Afghan border outposts and major insurgent infiltration
routes and probably were related to Soviet and Afghan army operations
in Afghanistan's border areas.
a Air violations refer to overflights of Pakistani territory and/or attacks that
did not result in casualties.
b Serious violations refer specifically to attacks that produce casualties.
Afghanistan
We believe the Pakistanis want to increase their
support for the Afghan resistance to put pressure on
the Soviets to accept a negotiated settlement in
Afghanistan that would result in the withdrawal of
crease in cross-border air attacks into Pakistani terri-
tory in the last year has not caused Zia to waver in his
support for the resistance.
Nonetheless, Islamabad wants to avoid a sharp esca-
lation of tension along the border and insists on direct
control in training and passing arms to the insurgents.
Zia and other senior government officials have said
that Pakistan must control the level of aid given the
Afghans to prevent a sudden confrontation with the
Soviets. The Pakistanis fear that a precipitate in-
crease in insurgent capabilities would provoke an
intensification of Soviet pressure that might lead to
more serious cross-border attacks and a direct mili-
tary confrontation with the Soviets or result in serious
political instability in the North-West Frontier and
Baluchistan Provinces. They may also be concerned
that a sudden improvement in insurgent military
capabilities may be seen in Moscow as a direct
challenge by the United States and result in increased
Soviet determination to crush the resistance-includ-
ing a substantial augmentation of Soviet troops in
Afghanistan as well as greater pressure on Pakistan-
rather than Soviet willingness to accept a negotiated
settlement.
Pakistan does not want to publicize its role in aiding
the Afghans and opposes direct US arms aid to the
insurgents. We believe that Islamabad places great
importance on maintaining the plausibility of its
denials that it is supporting the Afghan resistance
because of concern about both foreign and domestic
reaction:
? Zia has said that acknowledging Pakistan's aid to
the insurgents would result in greater Soviet pres-
sure and undermine Islamabad's support in the
Nonaligned Movement.
? Publicity that authoritatively linked Pakistani and
US policies would give the political opposition-
including some of the religious parties that other-
wise support aiding the Afghan resistance-a major
issue to use against Zia.
Senior Pakistani officials have said that US media
publicity about Pakistani cooperation with the United
States in providing assistance to the Afghans is
embarrassing to Pakistan.
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Secret
Afghan Refugee Camp
in Pakistan
The Afghan refugees so far
have not been the destabilizing
element in Pakistan that the
Palestinians were in Lebanon-
as many Pakistanis feared-
because they have not upset the
social and economic balance
and there is broad support for
them throughout the country.
Islamabad's skillful manage-
ment Qf the refugee problem
and signircant foreign refugee
assistance have kept the Af-
ghans from becoming an over-
A significant escalation of Soviet military pressure or
increased social and economic tension caused by the
Afghan refugees could force Zia to reevaluate Pakis-
tan's support for the resistance.
Islamabad is becoming more concerned
about growing economic competition and increasing
violence between the refugees and Pakistanis living in
the border areas. Afghan refugees are opening many
small businesses and in some cases already dominate
local industries. Refugee migration to urban areas in
Pakistan is causing sharp increases in rents and land
prices. In addition, Afghans are being held responsi-
ble for declines in wages in some areas and are likely
to be blamed for increased unemployment caused in
part by Pakistanis returning from the Middle East.
Zia, however, is unlikely to alter his Afghanistan
policy unless continued economic decline and a wors-
ening security situation in the border regions seriously
weakened his political position. US support for Paki-
stan in the event of greater Soviet military pressure
would be crucial for Zia to sustain his policy on
Afghanistan.
The UN-sponsored Geneva indirect talks on Afghani-
stan are a major element of Pakistani policy even
though Zia is pessimistic about their prospects. Islam-
abad regards these negotiations as necessary to defuse
opposition charges that Zia is more interested in
supporting US interests than he is in a political
solution that would allow the repatriation of the
Afghan refugees and reduce the Soviet threat. The
Pakistanis emphasize that a political settlement must
include explicit linkage between the cessation of
outside interference-Moscow's and Kabul's key de-
mand-and the withdrawal of Soviet troops.
Regional Security
Pakistani officials regard the security and stability of
the Persian Gulf as essential to Pakistan's'own securi-
ty, especially in the changed strategic circumstances
of the Islamic revolution in Iran. Faced with a
potentially hostile Iran on its southwestern border,
Pakistan's ties to Saudi Arabia and the other Persian
Gulf states have become strategically more important
to Islamabad. Pakistan's extensive military ties to the
Arab Gulf states-including nearly 18,000 military
personnel assigned to Arab armed forces, more than
15,000 in Saudi Arabia alone-help-to strengthen
their defenses and enhance regional stability, as well
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Figure 4
Cross-Border Air Attacks, August 1984-September 1985
Samangan
I V1
Ba hlan
fPeshghowr
K t.1- 'SAlan Konarh
(S.4n e ~~ " ~~KaplSa ~
(Saltin Pass An8a,,> ~," ?:,~ . ~: Bar!
~oN~Ba' Bagrarn'Airfield,
Gh 1 Nelrab
Parvan ~STiomali /%Caghman
Pa mangy Plain .J'
KAB
='a a\y
,arm
abo
Vardak{
.ruiaiuuuu v
?~ Nangarhar
ISLAMABI,D
ISUA'M1
0016, 1
r` +t 1 r. 1"I
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Air attack (One symbol may
represent multiple attacks over time.)
Refugee camp (One symbol may
represent multiple camps.)
Daargai
Fed: Kota Peshawar
Par' Fhiflar Admin.
A~? ,.Tribal ,\ L
JAr
A
Soviet
Union
Area'Sf
main map
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Increased Pakistani support for the Afghan resistance
that resulted in major insurgent gains or significantly
higher Soviet casualties and equipment losses in
Afghanistan almost certainly would cause Moscow to
intensify pressure on Islamabad. The Soviets, on
several occasions in the last year, have warned
Pakistan of severe consequences if Islamabad did not
end its support for the Afghans.
An escalation of military pressure against Pakistan
probably would be probing and gradual, with Moscow
continually assessing US and Pakistani reactions. A
Soviet determination of weakness or indecision in
Islamabad or the United States might cause Moscow
to believe that further escalation would pose little
additional risk. We believe, however, that the Soviets
would back down from a military confrontation in the
event of a strong Pakistani response to cross-border
attacks. The Soviets, in our judgment, would seek to
avoid an action that might cause the United States to
commit military forces to Pakistan.
We believe the Soviets will increase subversive activi-
ties in Pakistan's border regions to disrupt insurgent
infiltration of arms and men into Afghanistan and to
take advantage of tension between local Pakistanis
and the Afghan refugees. The Soviets would hope
greater instability in the frontier regions would en-
courage opposition to Zia's Afghanistan policy.
As he has in the past, Zia would press the United
States for increased arms aid in the event of greater
Soviet military pressure. Although weapons such as
Stinger antiaircraft missiles and AIM-9L air-to-air
missiles significantly improve Pakistan's capabilities
to defend against air incursions from Afghanistan,
Pakistan still would have difficulty responding to
cross-border air and artillery attacks that were con-
fined to the immediate border areas-where nearly
all of the incidents have occurred. The Pakistanis
have acted with restraint to the cross-border air
attacks because they want to assure that aircraft they
shoot down crash in Pakistani territory and because
they want to avoid a major military incident. We
believe they would vigorously defend against larger
and deeper airstrikes or a major ground incursion.
as provide'Islamabad important financial benefits.'
Islamabad also has taken several diplomatic initia-
tives to help negotiate an end to the Iran-Iraq war and
to reduce tension in the Persian Gulf, so far without
success.
The potential for strategic military cooperation in the
Persian Gulf region is limited by Islamabad's sensitiv-
ity to the attitudes of other Islamic states and the
Nonaligned Movement, as well as by popular opinion
in Pakistan. The Pakistanis are unwilling to risk
undermining Islamic support for Pakistan by moving
beyond the moderate Arab consensus on the accept-
able limits of cooperation with the United States.
Senior Pakistani officials have said that closer mili-
tary cooperation with the United States that included
joint training exercises, pre-positioning fuel and sup-
plies for US forces, routine peacetime use of ports and
airfields by US naval combatants or patrol aircraft, or
access by US combat forces to Pakistani bases for
military contingencies in the Persian Gulf would
strain Islamabad's relations with all of its neighbors-
including India and Iran.
While not wanting to be implicated in supporting US
military contingencies contrary to Islamic interests,
Pakistan regards a US military presence in the region
as comforting. Zia has told senior US officials that
Pakistan wants the United States to maintain its
naval forces in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea and
to improve its capability to project military power into
the region to deter the Soviets. Even though political
considerations deter Islamabad from greater coopera-
tion at this time, the Pakistanis want to maintain the
option of inviting US forces to help defend Pakistan in
a crisis. For this reason, the Pakistanis have consis-
tently rejected Indian demands that Islamabad agree
to prohibit foreign military bases on its territory as
the price for a nonaggression pact.
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Zia has indicated that military ties to the United
States could evolve gradually toward greater coopera-
tion as political circumstances allowed. Closer mili-
tary cooperation would greatly facilitate the coordina-
tion of US and Pakistani naval activities in a Persian
Gulf or Arabian Sea military contingency. We believe
that Islamabad would grant the United States more
significant access to Pakistani military facilities if the
Soviets began a military and logistic buildup in
Afghanistan that increased the threat to Pakistan and
the Persian Gulf. There is only a small chance that an
escalation of the Iran-Iraq war that threatened the
Persian Gulf states would cause Islamabad to agree to
closer strategic cooperation with the United States. In
either case Islamabad would try to ensure itself of
broad Islamic support.
Middle East Peace
Pakistan has encouraged Arab moderation in policies
toward Israel. According to Foreign Ministry offi-
cials, Islamabad played a major role in persuading the
moderate Arab states not to challenge Israel's creden-
tials in the United Nations and the International
Atomic Energy Agency in 1982 and 1984 and in
facilitating Egypt's reentry into the Islamic Confer-
ence. Foreign Ministry officials caution that Pakistan
cannot take the lead in supporting any US Middle
East peace initiative that does not have moderate
Arab backing. A new Arab-Israeli war almost cer-
tainly would strain US-Pakistani relations.
Islamabad will remain sensitive to shifts in US poli-
cies that hint that Pakistan's strategic importance to
the United States has decreased. Zia would be alert to
indications that the United States sought a rapproche-
ment with India or a new detente with the Soviets at
the expense of Pakistan. We do not believe Zia
considers a US-Soviet deal conceding Afghanistan to
Moscow is likely in the next three years. Especially
worrying to Islamabad would be US agreement to
limit arms to Pakistan as the price for better relations
with India.
Senior Pakistani military officers and government
officials say that US credibility-and the deterrent
potential of US security assistance-would be greatly
was committed to the defense of Pakistan.
Islamabad does not expect the
United States to send troops to defend Pakistan but
would press for new arms deals and accelerated
delivery of advanced weapons. In the event of signifi-
cantly increased Soviet military pressure, the Paki-
stanis would welcome US logistic and intelligence
support or the temporary deployment to Pakistan of a
tactical fighter squadron or AWACS early warning
aircraft. In the event of war with India, Islamabad
would regard a US commitment at least to replace
Pakistan's equipment losses as a litmus test of US
reliability.
Security Assistance
We believe that Zia calculates that Pakistan plays a
key role in US regional strategy-especially in assist-
ing the Afghan guerrillas-and that he believes this
gives Islamabad considerable leverage in its relations
with the United States. Pakistani officials emphasize
the coincidence of Pakistani and US interests in
Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf region to strength-
en their case for increased US security assistance.
Islamabad probably will press for a substantial in-
crease in military sales credits in a new multiyear
security assistance package to finance an ambitious
arms modernization program. Senior Pakistani offi-
cials have said Pakistan wants $2.4 billion in military
assistance-compared with $1.6 billion in the present
security assistance program-after 1987, although
this may be an opening bargaining position. The
Pakistanis will continue to regard US responsiveness
to their arms requests as the key indicator of the US
commitment to Pakistan. Unwillingness by the United
States to meet Pakistan's perceived defense needs
would strengthen critics of Zia's policy, especially if
weapons are denied to the Pakistanis that are given to
other US non-NATO allies.
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Implications for US-Indian Relations
New Delhi views US-Pakistani security relations as
thwarting the longstanding Indian goal of excluding
the superpowers from South Asia and the Indian
Ocean region, where India aspires to unchallenged
political and military dominance:
? The Indians believe Islamabad wants modern US
weapons to strengthen Pakistan's military capabili-
ties against India rather than for defense against a
Soviet attack from Afghanistan.
? New Delhi is concerned that the United States
eventually will obtain military bases in Pakistan,
thereby increasing US-Soviet rivalry in the region.
? Many Indians believe that Pakistan has shrewdly
exploited its relations with the United States to
avoid an aid cutoff while pursuing a nuclear weap-
ons capability, and that the United States has not
pressed Islamabad on the nuclear issue because it
desires to keep Pakistan as a strategic partner in
opposing the Soviets in Afghanistan.
? Many Indians also believe that US-Pakistani secu-
rity relations have assumed a dynamic of their own
and that, even if there were a political solution in
Afghanistan, the United States would still use
Pakistan to maintain a presence in Southwest Asia.
Even though the new government of Rajiv Gandhi is
not inclined to allow US relations with Pakistan-
including military assistance-to be a major obstacle
to better Indian relations with the United States,
substantial new arms agreements with Islamabad
will remain an irritant in US-Indian relations. India
almost certainly would try to offset new arms agree-
ments by accelerating its acquisition of modern arms
from the Soviets and from West European suppliers.
New Delhi probably would oppose an expanded US
security commitment to Pakistan in exchange for
Islamabad's terminating its nuclear program. New
Delhi would be skeptical about the proposal, and
many Indians would expect the Pakistanis to pursue
a more aggressive policy toward India under the
Our analysis indicates that Pakistan will have increas-
ing difficulty meeting its repayment obligations to the
United States even under the current package without
additional assistance. We believe that eventually Is-
lamabad will press the United States for grant mili-
tary assistance-or debt forgiveness on arms pay-
ments-to finance its arms modernization. The
Pakistanis already have asked for emergency credits
at concessional rates to help them meet their debt
repayments. Pakistan would be reluctant to temper its
arms purchase demands to help relieve its debt bur-
den, especially as long as India continues to negotiate
new arms deals with the Soviets.
We believe the Pakistanis also regard increased US
economic aid as crucial to enable Islamabad to avoid
politically unpalatable reforms to deal with serious
economic difficulties. A disastrous cotton crop, a
record trade deficit, the increased cost of foreign
imports, and a sharp decline in remittances from
protection of a US security commitment.
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Pakistan's Arms Modernization Priorities
US arms are central to Islamabad's ambitious plans
for military modernization and the key determinant
in Pakistan's relations with the United States. The
requirement to replace the obsolescent weapons that
made up most of Pakistan's military capability was
stimulated by India's large weapons purchases from
Moscow and the West and was given added impetus
by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Pakistanis
believe that modern US weapons are required to give
Pakistan a credible military capability to deter ag-
gression or to sustain an effective defense until
diplomatic efforts could stop the fighting.
The Pakistan Air Force has the highest priority in
the present US security assistance program. The
acquisition of 40 F-16fighters-32 of which had been
delivered by August 1985-and AIM-9L air-to-air
missiles significantly improves Pakistan's capability
to defend against Indian or Soviet air attacks. Equal-
ly important, from Islamabad's perspective, is that
the F-16s greatly increase the range and striking
power of the Pakistan Air Force against strategic
targets in India. US Embassy sources indicate that
Pakistan is interested in additional F-16 purchases to
replace some of the aging Chinese-built F-6 fighters
that still make up half of the Air Force. The Paki-
stanis have placed recent emphasis on acquiring
radar early warning aircraft, such as the US Navy
E-2C, to improve their inadequate aerial surveillance
Islamabad intends to give higher precedence to the
Army in its modernization efforts for the rest of the
decade. The Army hopes to improve its antiarmor
capability by acquiring Copperhead laser-guided ar-
tillery shells and purchasing additional Improved
TOW antitank missiles and Cobra helicopter gun-
ships. Pakistan has already received 10 Cobra gun-
ships under the present security assistance program.
The gunships will significantly improve the Army's
ability to respond quickly to enemy armored as-
saults. Zia also has emphasized the importance of
obtaining modern tactical man-handled antiaircraft
missiles to defend against air attacks from Afghani-
stan and has insisted on Stinger Post rather than the
older Stinger Basic.
The Pakistan Navy is focusing its modernization
efforts on enhancing its offensive capabilities and
improving ship defenses. Islamabad has ordered 16
Harpoon submarine-launched missiles, which will be
delivered next year, and wants to buy additional
Harpoon antiship missiles for three new frigates being
built by Britain for delivery in 1989 and 1990. The
Navy also wants to arm its British frigates with .
rapid-fire Vulcan/Phalanx guns to defend against the
Indian cruise missile threat and to equip its ships
with advanced electronics.
capabilities along the rugged Afghan border.
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Figure 5
Pakistan: Economic Indicators, 1981-85 a
overseas workers since 1983 have forced Pakistan to
draw significantly on its foreign exchange reserves to
meet its debt obligations. The Pakistanis claim that
economic reforms, such as those required by the
International Monetary Fund for new loans, could
cause serious political trouble for Zia and threaten
Pakistan's fledgling democracy. Islamabad wants US
aid for balance-of-payments support without reforms
that would eliminate or sharply reduce subsidies-
particularly for agriculture and food-or increase
taxes. The Pakistanis are asking for $3.6 billion in
new US economic aid after 1987.
Arms Technology Transfer
The Pakistanis, in our view, will protect modern US
weapons and arms technology transfer from unautho-
rized disclosure to other countries so long as they
perceive the security relationship with the United
States is providing tangible benefits. New strains in
relations with the United States, however, would
increase the incentive for Pakistan to compromise US
arms technology to China- which the Pakistanis
consider is their most reliable ally. Pakistan in the
past has transferred French and US weapons to China
in violation of its arms agreements with both coun-
tries. We do not believe that Pakistan has given China
access to US weapons or arms technology delivered
since the signing of a General Security of Military
Information Agreement in June 1982 even though,
Islamabad and Beijing
have agreed to share arms technology in a collabora-
tive arms development and production effort.
Narcotics
Islamabad, in response to US pressure and because of
growing drug addiction in Pakistan, has stepped up its
efforts to cut opium production and to crack down on
heroin labs in the northwest tribal areas. Although
poppy production in Pakistan has dropped sharply in
recent years, Pakistan has become a major heroin-
processing center and is increasingly dominant in the
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Southwest Asia narcotics trade. Much of the Afghan
opium that enters the international narcotics market
passes through or is processed into heroin in Pakistan.
In our view, Pakistani concern about the potential of
politically costly confrontation with drug traffickers
and poppy growers will continue to limit Islamabad's
willingness to crack down on narcotics activities in the
frontier region. Pakistani efforts to take forceful
antinarcotics measures have met stiff resistance-
sometimes resulting in violence-in tribal areas where
the government has little practical authority.
Nuclear Proliferation
Zia almost certainly calculates that Pakistan's impor-
tance to US policy in Afghanistan has allowed him
flexibility to pursue the technology to support a
nuclear weapons option surreptitiously without pro-
voking an immediate or automatic cutoff in US
security assistance.' Zia has said that he would not
"embarrass". the United States on the nuclear issue.
We believe his assurances mean that the Pakistanis
would not test a nuclear device or reprocess spent fuel
from the safeguarded reactor at Karachi as long as
Pakistan is receiving US aid. According to the Paki-
stani press, Zia has also assured the United States
that Pakistan will not enrich uranium above 5 per-
cent. In our judgment, the Pakistanis are working to
develop a nuclear weapons capability even though
they realize their program risks a cutoff of US
security assistance.
Islamabad has been working on the development of
the nonfissile components of a nuclear weapon since
the mid-1970s. We believe the Pakistanis could prob-
ably assemble a workable nuclear device within a few
months if they had enough fissile material. We do not
believe that Pakistan will be able to produce enough
plutonium for a nuclear device in the near future.
Also, we do not believe that Pakistan's uranium
enrichment facility at Kahuta is capable of producing
enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear device,
but we cannot exclude the possibility that it could do
so within a year of a decision to try.
In our view, no amount of US security assistance or
political pressure will cause Islamabad to forsake its
nuclear weapons option. As important as US aid is to
Pakistan's security, most Pakistanis are convinced
that a nuclear capability is Pakistan's only credible
long-term deterrent to Indian aggression. We do not
believe that Zia would alter his commitment to
maintain a nuclear weapons option even if the United
States explicitly guaranteed Pakistan's security
against India because of Pakistani doubts about US
reliability. We believe that Zia's political position
would become untenable if he agreed to terminate the
Pakistani nuclear program-for which there is nearly
unanimous support in Pakistan-in response to US
pressure.
The suspension of security assistance to Pakistan
would severely undermine US policies in the region:
? Suspension of US aid programs to Pakistan proba-
bly would cause Islamabad to sharply reduce its
support for the Afghan resistance. Pakistan might
be willing to provide some aid to the Afghans with
the support of China and Saudi Arabia, but it would
be unwilling to risk a confrontation with the Soviets
without US backing. The fighting probably would
continue in Afghanistan, but without major Paki-
stani support to the guerrillas-or a significant
increase in Iranian aid to compensate for the loss of
Pakistani assistance-the Soviets eventually would
crush the resistance.
? An aid cutoff would remove the major political
obstacle to Pakistani development and testing of a
nuclear device. Islamabad almost certainly would
intensify its nuclear weapons development effort. In
such an event, a Pakistani decision to test or to
stockpile nuclear weapons would depend on Islama-
bad's view of the regional security environment at
the time-including India's likely actions.
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It is even possible that a US aid cutoff would force
Zia to resign or be removed by a military coup. Zia is
personally identified with resurrecting Pakistan's se-
curity ties to the United States, and an aid cutoff
would show that Zia's US policy was based on
bankrupt premises.
Almost any new government in Islamabad would be
less receptive to US policies and interests because it
would need to establish its independence to maintain
popular credibility. We'do not believe, however, that
even a new civilian government dominated by the
center-left political opposition would necessarily be
hostile to US strategic interests.
A new military regime that came to power as a result
of Zia's assassination would be most likely to continue
the broad outlines of his policies regarding both
Afghanistan and relations with the United States. Zia
most likely would be replaced by one of the Army's
senior generals who share his strategic perspectives.
Serious and prolonged unrest in Pakistan probably
would cause the Army to replace Zia with a general
who would attempt to negotiate a return to civilian
rule on terms the military could accept. In these
circumstances, we believe the new military regime
would not continue policies that lacked popular back-
ing. The regime would be more likely to downgrade
relations with the United States and try to ease
tensions with the Soviets while it concentrated on
consolidating its rule or preparing to transfer power to
a civilian government.
A civilian government dominated by the center-left
parties of the MRD almost certainly would change
the direction of US-Pakistani relations. The MRD
coalition advocates a foreign policy that emphasizes
nonalignment, downgrading relations with the United
States, and finding a political solution to the war in 25X1
Afghanistan that allowed for the repatriation of the
Afghan refugees. But the need to maintain the Ar-
my's support to remain in power and popular attitudes
would limit MRD policy choices. Although US-Paki-
stani relations would change under an MRD govern-
ment, Islamabad's policies might not be hostile to US
interests if the Pakistani consensus on foreign threats
and defense requirements remains the same.
In our view, a Pakistani government dominated by the
Islamic parties might be the most anti-American and 25X1
provoke a break in US-Pakistani relations. An Islamic
government would remain hostile toward the Soviets,
but it might nonetheless adopt a more conciliatory
policy toward Afghanistan if there were a growing
public consensus that the refugee burden was becom-
ing too great for Pakistan. The Army probably would
have little political influence with an Islamic govern-
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if it had strong popular backing. Officers with an
Islamic outlook would be likely to dominate military
attitudes and policies.
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