(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00587R000300410004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: September 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of vex
Intelligence
Iraqi Foreign Policy:
Will Moderation Last?
NESA 85-10181
September 1985
Copy 370
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Iraqi Foreign Policy:
Will Moderation Last?
NESA
This paper was prepared by I Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division,
Secret
NESA 85-10181
September 1985
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Secret
Iraqi Foreign Policy:
Key Judgments The trend toward moderation in Iraqi foreign policy that has been evident
Information available over the last decade is likely to continue even after the war with Iran ends,
as of 23 July 1985 asssuming the present Iraqi regime remains in power. The principal factors
was used in this report.
behind this moderating trend will be:
? Continued threats from Iran and Syria that will require Baghdad to
maintain good relations with the moderate Arab states for economic and
logistic support.
? Construction of the Iraqi oil pipelines through Saudi Arabia and Turkey,
which will further intertwine their economic and political fortunes.
? Need for Western technology and expertise to carry out Baghdad's
ambitious economic development plans.
? Baghdad's aspirations to leadership in the Arab world and in the
Nonaligned Movement. Iraq will try, for example, to forge a moderate
Arab coalition to counter Syrian policies.
Nevertheless, Baghdad's attempts to attain a regional leadership role, once
hostilities with Iran end, will bring it into conflict with the moderate Arab
states on some issues. A principal source of friction will be Iraq's desire to
participate in and perhaps dominate the Gulf Cooperation Council.
Iraq is not likely to resort to terrorism or subversion in the Gulf as it did in
the 1960s and 1970s. Baghdad realizes that trying to subvert the Gulf
Arabs would play into the hands of Iran, which is working through Gulf
Shias to destabilize those regimes.
Iraq is likely to continue to sponsor terrorism against Syria and Libya
because of their support for Iran. Iraqi hatred of Israel and its desire to
counter Syrian policies could also prompt it to resume sponsoring terrorism
against Israel by Arafat's wing of the PLO after the war.
Baghdad will seek to reduce its military dependence on the Soviets once it
has sufficient funds to purchase additional equipment from the West. The
USSR, however, will remain Iraq's major arms supplier into the 1990s.
Iraq realizes that, in the event of another war with Iran, only Moscow can
supply arms in the quantities Iraq would need.
Iraq's interest in improved ties to the United States is likely to outlast the
war. Baghdad is eager to acquire US technology to aid its agricultural and
oil sectors and is also interested in getting US military equipment.
Secret
NESA 85-10181
September 1985
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Nevertheless, Iraq's ambitions for regional leadership will lead it to oppose
US efforts to strengthen military ties to the Arab Gulf states. Baghdad will
be suspicious of US moves to improve ties to Iran and probably would
respond by seeking stronger ties to the USSR. A warming between
Washington and Tehran probably would not significantly damage US-
Iraqi relations, however, unless Washington offered to sell Tehran signifi-
cant quantities of weapons.
Should Iraqi President Saddam Husayn fall to an assassination or coup, a
successor regime-most likely a coalition of civilian and military leaders-
probably would not make major changes in Iraqi foreign policy while the
war lasted. After the war, the new regime-less sure of its internal support
than Saddam-would pursue a less moderate policy, but it would be
constrained from a return to radicalism by continued Iranian hostility.
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Key Judgments
Evolving Moderation
Factors Encouraging Continued Moderation
3
Syria
4
Reducing Dependence on the USSR
11
Potential Problems Between Iraq and the United States
12
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Mediterranean Sea Lebanon
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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25X1
25X1
Iraqi Foreign Policy:
Will Moderation Last?
In the mid-1970s Iraq was the most radical state in
the Middle East. Baghdad was involved in efforts to
subvert the Arab Gulf states, was a haven for radical
Palestinian terrorist groups, supported their efforts to
assassinate PLO moderates, and adopted the hardest
line toward Israel of any Arab state. The regime
refused to renew ties to the United States, broken in
1967, and turned to the USSR and its allies for
almost all military purchases and substantial econom-
ic trade.)
Turkey to the Mediterranean. In the late 1970s, Iraq
also began improving ties to Jordan in hope of
securing an economic lifeline through the port of Al
Aqabah. Before the outbreak of Iraq's war with Iran
in 1980, Baghdad loaned Amman several hundred
million dollars to improve the port and the road
system connecting Jordan to Iraq, according to the
US Embassy in Amman. The Iraqis also stepped up
efforts to expand ties to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf
Arabs.
Over the last decade, a gradual moderation has taken
place in Iraqi foreign policy. Three factors have
contributed to the Iraqi regime's shift from its earlier
radicalism.
Strategic Vulnerability
Iraq became increasingly concerned over the vulnera-
bility of its oil and supply routes to interdiction by its
frequently hostile rivals, Iran and Syria. In 1975
Baghdad publicly threatened military action to pre-
vent a Syrian plan to divert water from the Euphrates
River, on which many Iraqi farmers depend. In 1976
Damascus closed the Iraqi oil pipeline through Syria
in a dispute over transit fees. The pipeline did not
reopen until 1979 and was shut down again in 1982.
The emergence in Iran in 1978 of a regime hostile to
Iraq's President Saddam Husayn and his secular
Ba'thist government greatly heightened Baghdad's
sense of vulnerability.F_~
Iraq responded to these threats by gradually improv-
ing economic and political ties to its moderate neigh-
bors. Press reports indicate that Baghdad initiated
talks with Saudi Arabia in 1975 to resolve the dispute
over the neutral zone on their common border. Iraq
also began to reduce its assistance to opposition
movements in the Arab Gulf states
key completed a pipeline to carry Iraqi oil through
In 1977, Iraq and Tur-
The need to ensure moderate Arab support in its
protracted struggle with Iran accelerated this moder-
ate trend and forced Iraq to abandon key elements of
its policy. Iraq has resumed good relations with
Egypt, after orchestrating Arab ostracism of Cairo in
1978 for its signing of the Camp David accords with
Israel. A major factor behind this dramatic Iraqi shift
was Baghdad's need for large quantities of Egyptian
military supplies during a critical juncture in the war
with Iran. Baghdad has become a major supporter of
the moderate wing of the PLO, publicly backing a
Jordanian-PLO agreement on negotiations with Israel
Iraq also has made a major bid for US support, 25X1
largely in recognition of US efforts to establish an
embargo on Western arms sales to Iran, which has 25X1
played a key role in reducing Tehran's ability to
prosecute the war.
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Figure 1. Iraqi President Sad-
dam Husayn, Egyptian Presi-
dent Mubarak, and King Hus-
sein of Jordan meeting in
Increased Oil Revenues
Beginning in the mid-1970s, burgeoning revenues
from rising oil prices gave Iraq political and economic
options not previously available. Annual revenues
soared from $600 million in 1972 to about $9.5 billion
in 1977. As a result, Iraq undertook an ambitious
economic development program and began to expand
economic ties to the West, whose superior technology
it could afford to purchase. By 1980 the regime was
importing three-fourths of its civilian goods from the
West, a significant shift from the early 1970s when
we estimate that about half came from the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe. Baghdad also began to
reduce what we believe it regarded was a potentially
dangerous dependence on the Soviet Union for arms.
We estimate that, by 1980, Iraq was purchasing one-
third of its arms and materiel from non-Communist
countries, up from about 5 percent in 1974.F___1
Leadership Goals
Saddam's ambition to establish Iraq as a leader in the
Arab world also has encouraged Baghdad to reduce
its isolation in the region and improve ties to Arab
moderates. Saddam's first major opportunity to play a
leadership role came in 1978 when Egypt signed the
Camp David accords with Israel. Iraq organized two
Arab summits on the issue, and, to forge a united
Arab opposition to Cairo's move, it restored relations
with Arafat and the mainstream PLO and moderated
its rhetoric on the Palestine question. Saddam also
worked hard behind the scenes with moderates such
as Jordan's King Hussein and then Saudi Crown
Prince Fahd to develop an Arab consensus on policy
toward Egypt, according to the US Embassy in
Baghdad. We believe this cooperation helped lay the
foundation for the development of closer ties between
Baghdad, Amman, and Riyadh.
We believe the factors that stimulated Iraq's turn
toward more moderate policies will continue to influ-
ence Baghdad even after the war with Iran ends. The
major constraint Iraq is likely to confront is long-term
Iranian and Syrian hostility. This will require Bagh-
dad to maintain good ties to its moderate Arab allies
and the United States. Iraq's leadership aspirations
and plans for economic development are major goals
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Should Saddam fall in an assassination or a coup, a
coalition of Ba'thist civilian and military leaders is
likely to take power. Deputy Prime Minister Rama-
dan probably would play a major role. 7_1
A Ba'thist successor regime probably would not make
major changes in Iraqi foreign policy while the war
lasted. The regime would continue to need moderate
Arab financial and logistic support, as well as US
efforts to curtail Western arms sales to Iran. A new
regime might seek improved ties to Syria to reduce
the latter's support for Iran, but it is unlikely to move
far in this direction while President Assad is in
power. Relations with the Soviets probably would
improve if the reputedly pro-Soviet Ramadan became
President. Ramadan, however, is also a strong na-
tionalist and is likely to maintain most of Iraq's
independent policies. F__1
After the war, a successor regime probably would
pursue a less moderate policy than Saddam, but it
would' be constrained from a return to radicalism by
continued Iranian hostility and the need to concen-
trate on rebuilding the economy. Saddam's firm grip
on power has made moderation possible. A less
secure collegial regime probably would put distance
that also will encourage Iraq to project a responsible
image and seek moderate Arab and Western support.
Moreover, in our judgment, senior and middle-level
Bath Party and military personnel will not favor
postwar adventurism after the sacrifices made fight-
ing Iran. Although these people are not policymakers,
the regime must take their opinions into account. We
estimate Iraq has suffered some 300,000 casualties in
the war, which means that virtually every family in
this country of 15.5 million has experienced the death
or injury of a relative. The war has brought signifi-
cant economic hardship as well; Iraq has slashed
civilian imports by almost half in the last two years.
between itself and the United States and Egypt to
avoid criticism from hardline Iraqi Ba'thists. The
leadership probably also would be more aggressive in
supporting Ba'thist organizations in the Arab Gulf
states. F__1
Should Iran install afundamentalist regime in Bagh-
dad, Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim, leader of Iraq's
Shia dissidents, probably would be named Acting
President. He would rule in conjunction with various
Iraqi dissident organizations and Iranian clerics.
Such a government would pursue a radically anti-US
foreign policy and probably would assist Iran in
subverting the regimes in the Arab Gulf states and in
Jordan. Syria might improve ties to Jordan and
Saudi Arabia to counter the fundamentalist threat.
Syrian President Assad opposes a fundamentalist
regime in Baghdad, believing it would support efforts
by the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria to topple him.
Relations with the USSR would deteriorate as Iraqi
policy began to reflect Iranian enmity toward the
Soviets, though Baghdad might be constrained by its
dependence on Moscow for arms. The new regime
probably would reduce the number o Soviet military
and economic advisers in Iraq. 25X1
Hostile Rivals
Iran. The continuing threat from Iran will be a
considerable drain on Iraq's financial resources and
will limit Baghdad's ability to commit significant
ground forces in a war with Israel or in adventures
against the Arab Gulf states through the rest of this
decade. After the war with Iran, Iraq will demobilize
sizable numbers of troops from its 750,000-man
Army, but we believe it will maintain a standing army
of at least 450,000, approximately 30 percent larger
than before the war. Baghdad will keep a sizable .
portion of its forces at the Iranian frontier to guard
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against the possibility of renewed fighting. Iraq also is
engaged in a major expansion of its Air Force, and,
even after the war ends, most of its airpower will be
deployed at 12 airbases it is building near the Iranian
25X1 border.F---]
Syria. Syrian support for Iran during the war makes
postwar reconciliation between Baghdad and Damas-
cus unlikely so long as the current regimes remain in
power. In 1981 Syria allowed Iran to use Syrian
airspace to stage an air raid on an Iraqi airbase in
which a few Iraqi military personnel were killed. The
following spring Damascus closed the Iraqi oil pipe-
line through its territory, costing Baghdad about $6
billion a year in revenues and dealing a sharp blow to
its economy.
In our judgment, a major Iraqi aim after the war will
be to counter Syrian policies and undermine the
Assad regime. The deep hostility between these Arab
and Ba'thist rivals is reinforced by the personal hatred
between Saddam and Syrian President Assad, accord-
ing to the US Embassy in Damascus. Saddam has
publicly stated that, after defeating Iran, Iraq will
confront those Arabs whose "grudges and sick minds"
have led them to support Tehran. Baghdad will use its
Implications of Improvement in Ties
to Iran or Syria
Ba`thist organizations in the Gulf.
A more moderate regime in Tehran willing to im-
prove ties to Baghdad would allow Iraq to reduce the
military and economic resources it would otherwise
devote to defending against an Iranian threat. Bagh-
dad could then turn more of its attention to under-
mining Syria and to Arab-Israeli and Palestinian
issues. Iraqi concern over the Iranian threat to the
Gulf Arab regimes probably also would ease, encour-
aging Baghdad to increase support for its own
Iraq.
Nonetheless, Iraq's rivalry with Iran is longstanding,
and the Iraqi leadership would expect contention for
leadership in the Gulf to continue. Moreover, a more
moderate Iran would be a more serious rival to Iraq
for Gulf leadership, since the Gulf Arab regimes
probably would find it an attractive counterweight to
An improvement in ties to a post-Assad regime in
Syria would not produce a dramatic change in Iraqi
policy in the short term. Iraq would remain extreme-
ly wary of the motives of its longtime Arab and
Ba`thist rival. Both countries exploited their last
period of improved ties-10 months in 1978 and
1979 primarily to score propaganda points against
the other. Their rapprochement fell apart when Sad-
dam accused Assad of conspiring with members of
the Iraqi Government to mount a coup. Nevertheless,
an improvement in ties probably would bring a
cooling in Iraqi relations with Arafat, Egypt, and the
United States. Baghdad probably also would step up
hostile rhetoric toward Israel and would give the
obligatory pledge of support to Syria in the event of a
war between Damascus and Tel Aviv. Syria might
reopen part of the Iraqi-Syrian pipeline, lessening
Baghdad's dependence on its moderate neighbors for
oil export routes and financial aid.
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r
25X1
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backing for Arafat to thwart Syrian efforts to domi-
nate the Palestinian movement and to isolate and
weaken Syria. Iraq, in our judgment, will also renew
its support to Syrian opposition groups such as the
Muslim Brotherhood and dissident Syrian Ba'thists.
In our judgment, Iraq will give only token support to
the Assad regime in the event of another Arab-Israeli
war, even if it is largely freed from the Iranian threat.
Economic Ties to the Moderate Arabs and the West
The oil pipeline Iraq is building through Saudi Arabia
to offset the closure of its Syrian and Gulf oil export
routes and the expansion of the existing pipeline
through Turkey will link Baghdad's interests more
closely with these regional moderates and increase
Baghdad's interest in their stability. The first Iraqi-
Saudi pipeline, which probably will be carrying oil by
the end of this year, will expand Iraq's export capacity
by 500,000 barrels per day (b/d) by March 1986. A
500,000-b/d expansion of the pipeline through Tur-
key is scheduled for completion in early 1987, and the
second phase of the Iraqi-Saudi line, which will allow
Iraq to export an additional 1.1 million b/d, is
planned for 1987. These lines, which will give Iraq a
potential export capacity of 3 million b/d even with-
out its now closed Gulf export terminals, also will
greatly reduce Baghdad's susceptibility to future Syri-
an blackmail.)
Iraq will seek to maintain its supply line through
Jordan's port of Al A abah.
Baghdad's need for the
port will diminish once the war ends, but Iraq is
Developments That Could Undermine
Iraq's Relations With the United States
or Arab Moderates
An Israeli attack against Iraqi territory-such as
occurred when Israel destroyed Iraq's nuclear reactor
in 1981-would severely damage US-Iraqi relations,
since Baghdad tends to view Israel as a stalking horse
for US policy in the region. Iraq probably would at a
minimum recall its ambassador to the United States.
Baghdad also would retaliate against Israel by sup-
porting terrorist attacks against Israeli territory or
Jewish targets in Europe as it did following the 1981
incident.
Should the Arab Gulf states rebuff Iraqi efforts to
serve as their protector or begin improving ties signifi-
cantly to a more moderate regime in Iran, Baghdad
probably would signal its displeasure by stepping up
support for opposition movements and Ba `thist orga-
nizations in the Gulf states. F_~
Any improvement in ties between the United States
and Iran would arouse Iraqi suspicions. Baghdad
might respond by seeking stronger ties to the USSR.
Warmer US-Iranian ties probably would not cause
major damage to US relations with Iraq, however,
unless Washington offered to sell Tehran significant
quantities of arms.F_~
acutely aware that in a future conflict Iran could shut
off Iraqi imports through the Gulf.
An Iraqi oil pipeline to Al Aqabah also remains a
possibility, although Baghdad is reluctant to proceed,
fearing that Israel would try to destroy the line,
according to US diplomats in Baghdad. This pipeline,
which the Jordanians are eager to build, would expand
Baghdad's export capacity by 1 million b/d and inter-
twine Iraq's economic and political fortunes even more
closely with those of its moderate neighbors.F_~
Iraq also is seeking expanded economic ties to Egypt.
Iraqi officials have told US diplomats that Baghdad is
exploring joint industrial ventures with Cairo, begin-
ning with fertilizer and cement plants. Iraq is heavily
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Ceyhan
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Leb
Mediterranean BEIRU
Sea Sidon
Egypt
(Al 'Agabah
Existing oil pipeline
0.7 Pipeline capacity (million b/d)
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Kuwait Mina' at Bakr
(CLOSED)
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Israel
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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dependent on Egyptian labor-about 1 million Egyp-
tian workers are in Iraq-to offset the shortage of
industrial manpower created by the war, according to
US diplomats in Baghdad. We estimate that Iraqi
manpower shortages are likely to persist well into the
next decade. F_
In addition to developing long-term economic ties to
its moderate Arab neighbors and Turkey, Baghdad is
likely to turn primarily to Western companies for the
technology and expertise it will need to rebuild its
economy. The Iraqis have a strong preference for the
sophisticated technology only the West can supply.
During the war Iraq has continued its prewar trend of
importing most civilian goods from Western coun-
tries. We believe Baghdad also will be turning to the
West for more arms as it continues efforts to diversify
its sources of military equipment. We estimate that
Iraq has purchased over half of its arms from Western
suppliers since the war began, up from 33 percent just
before the war.
Leadership Aspirations
Iraq's desire to gain a regional leadership role will
encourage Baghdad to maintain good ties to Arab
moderates. Iraq wants to play the role of protector of
the Gulf and realizes that efforts to destabilize the
Gulf states would encourage them to put distance
between themselves and Iraq and draw closer to the
West or to Iran-should a more moderate regime
take power there-and could leave them vulnerable to
a takeover by radical Shias. For their part, Gulf Arab
officials have indicated to US diplomats that they fear
Iraqi intentions almost as much as they do those of
Iran, and the Gulf Arab regimes have traditionally
regarded a balance of power between their large
neighbors to be in their interest.F_~
Baghdad also sees an
Iraqi-Jordanian-Egyptian axis as crucial to its goal of
countering Syrian policies. Iraq probably hopes im-
proved ties to Cairo and Amman will increase its
opportunities for influencing the Middle East peace
process.F_~
Baghdad almost certainly will exploit its relationship
with Arafat's wing of the PLO to further its leader-
ship ambitions. Iraq has become a major sponsor of
Arafat's Fatah loyalists, having taken in an estimated
2,000 of his men since they were evacuated from
Lebanon in late 1983. Moreover, Baghdad is one of 25X1
the few countries that permits the PLO to conduct
military training
On Arab-Israeli issues Iraq probably will try to forge
a moderate coalition to counter Syrian policies. Iraq
may adopt a harder line than it is now taking on
conditions for Jordanian-PLO negotiations with Isra-
el, but it will try to avoid alienating the moderate
Arabs with whom it must cooperate on the more
important issue of policy toward Iran. Iraqi officials
have told US diplomats they prefer an international
conference on the Arab-Israeli dispute. Iraq probably
views such a conference as enhancing its abilit to
influence the Arab-Israeli peace process.
Another key postwar Iraqi goal will be to gain
leadership of the Nonaligned Movement. Before the
war Baghdad loaned hundreds of millions of dollars to
Third World regimes to help secure the chairmanship
of the movement and the nomination as host to the
1982 Nonaligned Summit Conference. The war pre-
vented Iraq from assuming the chairmanship and
serving as host, and Baghdad has recently announced
it is withdrawing its bid to be host of next year's
conference. The regime's aspiration to head the move-
ment is strong, however, according to US diplomats in
Baghdad, and Iraq will probably insist that it be first
in line to act as host to the 1989 summit.)
Potential Sources of Conflict
With the Moderate Arabs
Iraq's pursuit of its leadership ambitions is likely to
create significant frictions in relations with the Gulf
Arabs on some issues. According to US diplomats and
other experienced observers, the Iraqis display great
arrogance toward the Gulf Arabs and believe they can
exploit the fact that the Arab Gulf states fear Bagh-
dad almost as much as they do Iran. The Iraqis regard
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their civilization and political system as superior and
consider the Gulf Arabs to be cowards. Saddam
reflected the Iraqi attitude in a speech in 1983
claiming that only Iraqi bravery was preventing Gulf
women from being raped by the Iranians. Saddam's
25X1 interpreter and personal adviser recently told US
diplomats the Gulf Arabs are cowardly for continuing
their economic subsidies to Syria. F_~
We believe Kuwait will bear the brunt of Iraqi
ambitions. Once the war with Iran is over, we expect
Baghdad to press Kuwait to resolve their longstanding
border dispute and to lease the Kuwaiti islands of
Bubiyan and Warbah to Iraq. Iraq's refusal to settle
the border dispute even during the darkest days of the
war suggests the importance Baghdad attaches to the
issue. We believe Iraq wants to gain territorial
changes to strengthen the security of its developing
naval and commercial port at Umm Qasr, opposite
the islands. Iraq is significantly expanding its naval
base, and, following the war, it will berth its 10
25X1 warships virtually its entire
Navy-there. We also believe Iraq intends Umm
Qasr to serve as a partial alternative to its major port
of Al Basrah, which is more vulnerable to Iran. It has
built a shipping canal connecting the ports, which will
allow small cargo ships to bypass the Shatt al-Arab.
Baghdad will also want to participate in the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC), an economic, political,
and military grouping of the six Arab Gulf states.
According to US diplomats in Baghdad, the Iraqis
resent the fact that the Arab Gulf states took advan-
tage of the war to form the Council and exclude Iraq.
The Gulf Arabs almost certainly will resist full Iraqi
participation, fearing that linking themselves militari-
ly to Iraq would anger Iran or prompt it to seek
Baghdad's pursuit of regional leadership is likely to
rekindle its longstanding rivalry with Cairo. Egypt,
which has long seen itself as the protector of the Arab
Gulf states, probably will be critical of Iraqi efforts to
dominate them. Iraqi-Egyptian rivalry for influence in
Jordan also may cause friction. Baghdad is not likely
to allow frictions with Egypt to grow into open
disagreement, however, as long as Iraq is working to
isolate Syria.F__1
Friction with Saudi Arabia is likely as Iraq's oil
export capacity increases. Baghdad is currently ex-
porting 1 million b/d, but its Deputy Oil Minister
recently stated that his country intends to export 2
million b/d as soon as possible whether OPEC likes it
or not. Additional Iraqi exports over the next few
years could place strong downward pressure on oil
prices in what is likely to remain a soft oil market.
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab oil producers
probably will face the problem of making room for
increases by Baghdad, since other OPEC members
are unlikely to cut back production to support prices.
Terrorism
Despite our belief that Iraq will continue to moderate
its foreign policy after the war ends, Baghdad almost
certainly will continue to utilize terrorism to under-
mine its Arab enemies-Syria and Libya-and to
eliminate Iraqi exiles.
Iraq also may back terrorism against Israel after the
war. Animosity toward Israel is deeply rooted in the
Iraqi leadership and populace. The Iraqis still refer to
Israel as the "Zionist entity," despite abandoning
their earlier rejection of Arab negotiations with Tel
Aviv. Moreover, Israel's attack on Iraq's nuclear
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reactor in 1981 and its refusal to rule out a future
strike humiliated and infuriated the Iraqis, according
to US diplomats in Baghdad.
Iraq probably would only provide indirect support for
terrorist acts against Israel, however-most likely
operations conducted from Lebanon by Arafat's wing
of the PLO-and only if it believed them crucial to
bolster Arafat's standing and undercut Syria and the
radical PLO groups that Damascus backs. Moreover,
Iraq would carefully weigh the gains from such
terrorism against the damage it could do to Baghdad's
ties to the United States. Baghdad also would not
want to risk provoking a direct Israeli attack on Iraqi
territory. Iraq is unlikely to resume support for the
radical Palestinian terrorist group 15 May-with
which it currently maintains ties-unless Baghdad's
relations with Arafat or the United States collapse or
Israel attacks Iraqi territory. F_~
We believe Iraq's need to retain its ties to Arab
moderates, the United States, and the West will keep
it from supporting terrorism against them even after
the war ends. Iraqi leaders are concerned about the
fragility of the Gulf Arab regimes. Baghdad probably
realizes that efforts to subvert them would be likely to
play into the hands of Iran, which is working through
the large communities of Gulf Arab Shias to destabi-
lize those same regimes.
Support for Ba'thist Organizations
We believe Iraq will step up its support for Ba'thist
organizations in some Middle Eastern countries after
the war. Ba'thist ideology continues to influence
policy; the decision to normalize relations with the
United States was delayed in part because Saddam
was concerned about the reaction of Ba'thist ideo-
logues
Iraqi Ba'thist organizations in Jordan, Sudan, and
some of the Arab Gulf states remain active but are
under fairly sharp constraints from Baghdad. The
leadership seems to be trying to accommodate both
the desires of hardliners and the need to avoid
According to US diplomats in Baghdad, Iraq
has limited its recent support to pro-Iraqi Ba'thists in
Sudan to avoid jeopardizing its ties to the govern-
ment, which has complained to Baghdad about such
support. Iraq does not want to encourage Sudanese
Ba'thists to engage in activities that might provide an
Baghdad.
Nevertheless, Sudan and possibly North Yemen may
become targets for Iraqi-sponsored Ba'thist influence
building or subversion once Baghdad is no longer
preoccupied by the war.
ists were active in North Yemen before the war, and
the presence of North Yemeni troops in Iraq to fight
Iran has provided an excellent opportunity for Ba'th-
ist indoctrination.
Baghdad probably hopes well-organized Ba'thist or-
ganizations will allow it to exploit the situation should
one of the Gulf Arab regimes fall. Such organizations
serve as a form of pressure on Arab Gulf states by
reminding them of Iraqi capabilities should relations
take a downturn.F___1
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Implications for the Superpowers
UN resolution criticizing the Soviet invasion of Af-
ghanistan, and the official Bath press tried to shift
blame for the downing of the Korean airliner to the
United States.
Seeking Better Ties to the United States
We believe Iraq's interest in improved relations with
the United States will persist after the war. Iraq's
decision to normalize ties last year reflects a basic
tenet of Saddam's foreign policy: a balanced relation-
ship between the superpowers. According to US diplo-
mats in Baghdad, the Iraqis will try to exploit Soviet 25X1
concern over improving Iraqi-US ties to increase their
Reducing Dependence on the USSR
The USSR will continue to be Iraq's principal arms
supplier but probably will not be able to extract
significant political concessions in return. Even at the
height of Iraqi dependence on Soviet arms in the mid-
1970s, Baghdad granted only token representation in
the government to the Iraqi Communist Party (CPI).
According to US diplomats in Baghdad, Iraq forced
the CPI out of the cabinet and into exile in 1979 in
part to signal its displeasure with Soviet support for
Marxist coups in South Yemen and Ethiopia in the
We believe Moscow's arms embargo early in the war
and the poor performance of some Soviet equipment
have persuaded many Iraqi leaders to further reduce
Baghdad's dependence on Soviet weapons after the
war. Since the war began, Iraq has continued its
prewar efforts to diversify its sources of arms supply.
Non-Communist countries have accounted for about
half the value of Iraq's arms contracts since the war
Iraq nevertheless will continue to count on the Soviet
Union as an important ally. Only the USSR can
supply arms in the quantities Iraq would need in the
event of another war with Iran. Baghdad also does not
want to give Moscow added incentive to improve ties
to Iran, according to US diplomats in Baghdad.
Moreover, Saddam appears to believe good ties to
Moscow will enhance Iraq's standing with many
Third World regimes and increase its leverage with
25X1 the United States.F__1
Iraq's continuing dependence on the USSR probably
will be reflected in its support on most issues impor-
tant to Moscow in the United Nations and other
international forums. Iraq did not support last year's
leverage with Moscow.
Iraq wants to expand trade and commercial ties to the
United States, especially in agriculture and oil. Depu-
ty Prime Minister Ramadan last year told US busi-
nessmen that Iraq is particularly interested in acquir-
ing US agrobusiness technology. Largely because its
land reform program was mismanaged, Iraq has gone
from agricultural self-sufficiency in the 1960s to net
food importer today. F__1
nuclear research programs.
We believe that Iraq will try to exploit improved ties
to purchase US military equipment. Iraqi officers
have been impressed with the performance of some
US weapons during the war. Iraq wants to obtain
sophisticated electronic equipment and aircraft. It is
also seeking technology that would help develop Iraq's
arms industries and aid its chemical warfare and
Saddam probably believes improved ties to the United
States will aid his aspirations to regional leadership
by encouraging Arab moderates to cooperate with
Iraq. The Arab Gulf states in particular have long
viewed stronger Iraqi-US ties as a means to reduce
Soviet influence over Baghdad and curb Iraq's radi-
calism. For several years before Baghdad's restoration
of ties to the United States, Saudi Arabia, Jordan,
and Egypt worked to reduce Iraqi suspicions of
Washington, according to US diplomats in the Middle
East.
25X1
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Figure 2. Iraqi Foreign Minis-
ter Tariq Aziz and UN Perma-
nent Representative Ismat Kit-
tani meeting President Reagan
on the occasion of resumption
of normal ties between Iraq and
the United States.)
25X1'
Potential Problems Between Iraq
and the United States
Iraq's animosity toward Israel will complicate US
dealings with Iraq. Once the war ends and Iraq's need
for US support lessens, we believe Baghdad will feel
freer to criticize US policy toward Israel and encour-
age Arafat and Jordan to take a harder line on
negotiations with Tel Aviv.
over, Baghdad tends to see Israel as a stalking horse
for US policy in the region. Stories in US newspapers
in early 1984 that the United States and Israel were
planning a strike on Iraqi chemical weapons facilities
produced a sharp downturn in US-Iraqi relations for
several months, according to US diplomats in Bagh-
dad. Nevertheless, because of Baghdad's desire for
expanded ties, it probably will not allow differences
over Israel to affect the overall relationship unless
Israel strikes directly at Iraq. Should Israel retaliate
against Iraq for its support of terrorism against Israel,
this would hurt not only US-Iraqi relations but also
US relations with all the Arab states.)
Baghdad will be suspicious of postwar US efforts to
improve ties to Tehran. An improvement in US-
Iranian ties probably would not cause major damage
to US relations with Iraq, however, unless Washing-
ton offered to sell Tehran significant quantities of
weapons. The Iraqis have indicated to US diplomats
in Baghdad that they believe both superpowers regard
Iran as having greater strategic value. Moreover, Iraq
is still experiencing the consequences of US arms sales
to the Shah. Baghdad probably would seek to limit
such a US move by offering increased economic
cooperation with Washington and by seeking stronger
ties to the USSR.I
Iraq may have unrealistic expectations of its relation-
ship with the United States, and Iraqi disappointment
could complicate relations. Baghdad is seeking trade
credits and sophisticated technology and views the US
response as an important test of the relationship,
according to US diplomats in Baghdad. If the United
States refuses Iraq's requests, Baghdad is likely to
stifle its anger because of its need for Washington's
support in the war. The longer term effect, however,
probably would be to convince Baghdad to turn
increasingly to Western Europe and Japan for its
economic needs.
25X1
25X1
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25X1
hand, they will encourage Iraq to seek closer ties to
the United States to balance Baghdad's relations with
the USSR. On the other hand, Baghdad is likely to
support nonaligned positions critical of Washington.
the
A US decision to put Iraq back on the list of countries
supporting international terrorism would have a chill-
ing effect on US-Iraqi relations. Iraq would consider
such a move proof of its fears about US unreliability,
according to US diplomats in Baghdad. We believe
Baghdad would still seek to maintain correct political
relations, but it would be much less willing to lend
support to US initiatives in the region. Iraq would
retreat from its policy of seeking expanded economic
25X1 and military ties, sharply reducing the potential for
increased US leverage.F__1
overall improvement in US-Iraqi relations has not
been reflected in Iraqi behavior there, where Baghdad
continues to side with Nonaligned Movement attack25X1
on alleged US imperialism.
Iraq's aspiration to leadership in the region probably
will lead it to oppose US efforts to strengthen military
ties to the Arab Gulf states. Iraq also believes a large
US presence in the Gulf would promote a superpower
rivalry in the region, according to US diplomats in
Baghdad.F_~
Baghdad's nonaligned aspirations probably will have
a mixed impact on US-Iraqi relations. On the one
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Secret
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