(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00587R000200140003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Oman:
Domestic Forces and
the Succession F-I
NESA 85-10052
March 1985
278
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Oman:
Domestic Forces and
the Succession F-1
This paper was prepared by I Office
of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with
contributions byDOffice of Central
Reference, and NESA. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. (u)
on
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division, NESA,
Secret
NESA 85-10052
March 1985
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Oman:
Domestic Forces and
the Succession F-1
Secret
Key Judgments If Oman's Sultan Qaboos is removed from power-either by death,
Information available incapacitation, or coup-we judge that a member of his family, the Al
as of 22 February 1985 Said, will become the next Sultan, especially if the succession takes place
was used in this report.
within the next five years. Real power, however, Will rest with a handful of
Omani officials many of whom already control
significant aspects of decisionmaking.
Prospects for the stability of a successor regime appear good, although
potential trouble spots bear watching. The US Embassy reports no
organized opposition or significant popular discontent, but US officials do
not have access to all levels of Omani society or government. We believe
that the process of working out power-sharing arrangements among
competing senior officials will prove more difficult over the long run than
the selection of a successor to Qaboos. Omani nationalists will focus on
reducing corruption, eliminating the vestiges of British influence, and
spreading the benefits of Oman's oil wealth in order to control the
centrifugal forces in Omani society. The nationalists are conscious of the
need to forge links with the tribes in the interior and to satisfy new social
groups being created by the modernization process. Their efforts to
institute reforms, however, are certain to impinge on the preserves of
traditional elites and could eventually bring them into conflict with the new
Sultan.
The coming to power of a nationalist-dominated government probably will
affect the tone of Oman's relations with the United States. Nationalist-
minded leaders like Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Yousef bin Alawi
and President of the Palace Office Ali Majid al-Maamari-who are likely
to dominate the foreign policy of the new regime-r--both favor close
strategic cooperation with the United States. They will press, however, for
more financial aid and explicit security commitments to help offset what
they regard as the high political costs of developing close military ties to
the United States. They will also be more critical of US policies in the
Middle East. The nationalists are eager to reduce Oman's traditional
isolation in the Arab world and to gain broader financial and political
support from their oil-rich Arab neighbors. They are also sensitive to
growing support for Arab causes among Oman's small but expanding
educated urban elite.
Secret
NESA 85-10052
March 1985
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The rise to power of nationalist leaders like Alawi and Maamari will
ultimately benefit US interests in the region, even if they prove cantanker-
ous on military cooperation in the short term. By pursuing policies more at-
tuned to internal and regional concerns, they will make Oman more stable
internally, more accepted internationally, and, thereby, a more reliable
long-term friend and security ally of the United States and the West. The
greatest danger to US interests in Oman would come in the unlikely event
that the nationalists failed to govern effectively because of conflict among
senior officials. Such conflict could provide opportunities for currently
quiescent elements-leftist, tribal, or fundamentalist-to coalesce against
the government and its ties to the West and bring about a more radical
change of regime.
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Secret
Key Judgments
The Muscat Mafia: Out of Sight But Not Out of Power
Oman's Ruling Family: Looking for a Candidate
Prospects for Political Stability After Qaboos
Young Omanis and Young Turks: Prospects for a Coup
Implications for the United States
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Cperet
h yeOeshm
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Oman
International boundary
Administrative line
Oil pipeline
POO oilfield
Elf oilfield
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Oman:
Domestic Forces and
the Succession F7
Sultan Qaboos, 44, is in relatively good health. Bar-
ring accident, assassination, or, more unlikely, a coup,
we expect him to rule Oman for the next several
decades. Still, there are potential problems that could
complicate the succession, whenever it occurs, and
affect Oman's stability and relations with the United
States. Qaboos has no natural heir, and we believe he
will make no provision for the succession. New politi-
cal advisers are also coming to power who share a
different perspective on how the country should be
governed than did Qaboos's advisers in the early days
of his rule. Social and economic conditions in the
country are changing as well and could presage
serious problems for stability if Qaboos were to die
suddenly or be removed from office.=
Sultan Qaboos bin Said
seized power in Oman in July 1970 by deposing his
father, Sultan Said bin Taimur, in a nearly bloodless
coup. Qaboos's father, a reclusive and ultraconserva-
tive monarch, had kept Oman isolated from the
outside world and undeveloped despite the discovery
of oil in the early 1960s. When Qaboos assumed
control, Oman had no political institutions, a medieval
economy, and only minimal contact with its Arab
neighbors.)
Qaboos has done much to bring Oman into the 20th
century, albeit at a pace that does not threaten his
absolute control. He has used Oman's oil wealth to
build one of the most effective military forces in the
Gulf region and raise the standard of living of most
Omanis. With help from Iran, the United Kingdom,
and Jordan, he ended a 10-year rebellion against Al
Said rule in the southern province of Dhofar. He
moved Oman closer to its Arab neighbors by joining
the Gulf Cooperation Council and urging support of
moderate Arab causes. He has taken stands unpopu-
lar with his new friends, including his staunch support
for the deposed Shah of Iran and for Egyptian
President Sadat following his signing of the Camp
David accords and his refusal to recognize the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization, but most Omanis ap-
prove his actions. F__-]
Since 1975 and the end of the Dhofar rebellion, there
have been no signs of overt opposition to the Sultan.
Qaboos rules much as his father did-autocratically,
without the mechanisms! for consultation and consen-
sus that are customary in other Gulf monarchies-but
most Omanis have not complained. His occasional
forays to "meet the people" and his appointment of a
State Consultative Council have been welcome diver-
sions, even though the trips are staged events and the
Council has no powers to recommend legislation.
Omanis apparently have) not blamed their ruler for the
slow pace of Omanizatidn (replacing foreign advisers
and workers with natives) or for the reduced invest-
ment opportunities cause d by the soft oil market and
lower oil revenues.
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Political Instability and the Economy
Over the past decade, Muscat's development expendi-
tures have improved the living standards of most
Omanis and increased Qaboos's popularity. Impres-
sive gains have been made in health, education,
housing, and development of infrastructure. In 1970
Oman had three public schools, 19 health care
facilities, and 10 kilometers of paved roads. Since
then, Qaboos's government has built more than 500
schools, 100 medical facilities, and 3,200 kilometers
of paved roads. In addition, it has built more than
2,700 low-cost housing units, installed 21,000 tele-
phone lines, and increased electricity production from
8 million kWh to 1.4 billion kWh. Port facilities were
improved, enabling growth in external trade, and two
international airports were built.F_~
Despite the enormous growth of the last decade,
however, the Omani economy faces major problems
that Qaboos or his successors will have to tackle.
Almost two-thirds of the labor force still works in
subsistence agriculture. Life expectancy and literacy
rates are low, and infant mortality and the death rate
are among the highest in the world. Oman is depen-
dent on oil revenues for virtually all of its export
earnings and about 85 percent of government
revenues. F__1
Qaboos recognizes the need to diversify Oman's econ-
omy, both geographically and by sector. Living condi-
tions are generally worse in the villages than in the
cities. The result is rural population flight that has
added to urban unemployment and crowding.
Although the US Embassy reports no evidence of
increased dissatisfaction in the cities, Muscat has
earmarked funds for the development of infrastruc-
ture and social services in towns and villages in
remote regions of Oman in hope of stemming migra-
tion to the cities. The government has developed long-
term strategies for sectoral diversification in light
industry, minerals, agriculture, fisheries, and ser-
vices. Muscat will make some progress toward meet-
ing these goals, but we believe that implementation
will be limited by Oman's budget problems and the
small size of the Omani market. Muscat had to
borrow $400 million in 1985 to meet its current
budget, and the Embassy projects recurring deficits if
the Sultan commits Oman to new and expensive
military purchases. Diversification programs will
also be thwarted by the lack of skilled native
manpower.
If the price of oil were to plummet, export earnings
would decline sharply, and Qaboos would be hard
pressed to fund military purchases and satisfy de-
mands for infrastructure development and social
welfare programs. Over the longer term, Qaboos or
his successor will face similar problems in satisfying
the rising expectations of the population as Oman's
oil is depleted. Proved reserves probably will last
only another 25 years. Declining government revenue
would increase competition among political and eco-
nomic interest groups for scarce resources and fan
discontent in the military and the general populace
that could contribute to political instability. F___]
Historically, succession in Oman has been determined
by civil war, fratricide and only
rarely has a successor been designated by the previous
ruler. If Qaboos dies of natural causes and there is
neither the threat of war nor a designated heir, we
believe the Sultan's closest advisers will use the form
of a family council to select a successor to Qaboos.
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Qaboos's family, the Al Said, will not play a major
role in this process, in our judgment. Over the years
Qaboos has carefully restricted their participation in
government to ceremonial, nonsubstantive posts, and
they have a history of fratricide and obstreperousness.
We believe the transition will be smooth, with deci-
sionmaking after Qaboos controlled for the most part
by the Sultan's nationalist advisers-even though a
family member will reign. The post-Qaboos power
coalition will also include members of Oman's influ-
ential merchant families-several of whom played key
roles in the early days of Qaboos's rule-and, at least
in the near term, British military advisers, who will
continue to re resent both Oman's and Whitehall's
interests
US officials, derives not only from their official
position but also from their influence with Sultan
Qaboos. F--]
These nationalists share common experiences and,
unlike other political groupings in Oman, a vision of
what Oman should become. Most are native-born
Omanis, either from the northern areas near `Ibri or
the southern Dhofar Province, and most are Ibadhi
Muslims. Some, like Alawi and Ghazali, were educat-
ed abroad in Nasir's Egypt, Ba'thist Iraq, or even
China, participated in the Dhofar rebellion in the
1960s, but returned to Muscat following Qaboos's
overthrow of his father.
Our analysis
indicates the nationalists have the
following goals:
The Nationalists: Oman First
In our judgment, the nationalists are becoming the
most important powerbrokers in Oman and will domi-
nate the government after Qaboos's departure. They
represent a new generation of leaders and have been
gaining in influence since early 1982. Labeled
"Omani Firsters" by some Western observers, they
are led by Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Yousef bin Alawi and Maj. Gen. Ali Majid al-
Maamari, the President of the Palace Office. During
the two years Alawi has been de facto Foreign
Minister, he has slowly gained overall control-sec-
ond only to Qaboos-of Oman's national security
affairs and foreign policy. He is the principal Omani
contact with US officials. Maamari, a career military
officer, holds an equally powerful position. His Palace
Office supervises and coordinates the executive func-
tions of the Omani Government, has a major role in
determining access to the Sultan, and oversees
Oman's intelligence services. F__1
Alawi and Maamari are close friends and together are
creating-and promoting to leadership positions-a
loose alliance of like-minded colleagues in the mili-
tary, government, and intelligence and police services.
Other prominent nationalists include Minister of
Commerce and Industry Salim al-Ghazali, Undersec-
retary of the Palace Office Col. Malik Sulayman al-
Maamari, Khamis bin Hamad al-Battashi (also in the
Palace Office), and the head of the Royal Oman
Police, Rashid al-Kilbani. Their power, according to
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? To curtail and gradually eliminate the influence of
the Sultan's original circle of advisers, known as the
Muscat Mafia.
? To replace as many British expatriates in the gov-
ernment and military as possible with skilled
Omanis without weakening the military establish-
ment or seeming to threaten the Sultan.
? To reform the government, reduce corruption, de-
velop the tribal areas, and perhaps encourage the
Sultan to broaden the political process by permitting
a consultative assembly.
? To move Oman publicly toward the Arab main-
stream by urging support for moderate Arab causes.
In private the nationalists will probably continue to
hold parochial views of the world, but they will pay
more public attention tb issues of importance to
their friends, such as the Palestinian problem and
US relations.
? To improve the terms of military and economic
agreements with the United States by making it pay
more "rent" for its presence in Oman.
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We believe the nationalists are loyal to Qaboos, but
they also are intent on implementing their political
program for Oman. They have no timetable and are
not wedded to establishing either a constitutional
monarchy or a republic. They are pragmatic and
flexible, willing to adjust their goals so as not to alarm
Qaboos . They are willing to
work with these advisers, whom they view as neces-
sary if Oman is to continue to modernize its economy
and military and defend itself.
The nationalists have been successful thus far in
implementing many of their agenda items. Several of
the more venal members of the Sultan's Muscat
Mafia have been removed from office, and younger
Omanis who share the nationalists' world view are
being appointed in greater numbers to posts in the
government and in the military. Foreign and domestic
policies are being redirected or redefined, with an eye
to Arab consensus and Omani self-interest (see appen-
dix). F__]
The Muscat Mafia: Out of Sight
But Not Out of Power
When Qaboos came to power, he relied on a small
circle of advisers. Western observ-
ers dubbed the Omanis, who came from a dozen of the
most powerful merchant families, the "Muscat Ma-
fia." They held posts in the Cabinet, the Sultan's
household (the Palace Office), and on the special
councils Qaboos established to advise him on oil,
defense, finance, and development policies. All viewed
their portfolios as personal fiefdoms and used them, as
well as their close relationship with the Sultan, to
enrich themselves. Omani law requires foreign firms
to have an Omani commercial company as a local
agent, and virtually all the lucrative dealerships for
foreign companies came into the hands of these few
merchant families. An academic study indicates that
these families are centered in the capital area, where
they dominate the nonoil sectors of the economy
through quasi-monopolistic franchises. These enable
the families to control the supply of goods and services
to the government, the petroleum industry, and local
contractors. F I
The most prominent members of the Muscat Mafia
include Qais Abdul-Munim al-Zawawi, once Minister
of State for Foreign Affairs and now Deputy Prime
Minister for Financial and Economic Affairs; Umar
al-Zawawi, brother of Qais and a personal adviser to
Qaboos; and Muhammad al-Zubayr, Special Adviser
for Economic Planning Affairs who was Minister of
Commerce and Industry until December 1983. Their
removal from the Cabinet-allegedly for personal
reasons and not for corruption-has probably restrict-
ed their ability to influence the awarding of govern-
ment contracts, but they continue to act as the
Sultan's representatives in international financial
negotiations and as his personal envoys. Unlike the
Omani nationalists, most members of the Muscat
Mafia are not Ibadhi Muslims.
hey represent diverse backgrounds; some are
Baluch, while others are Zanzibari or even Indian
Hyderabadi, ethnic minority groups that have domi-
nated Oman's trade and commerce for centuries.
most were childhood friends
or financial sponsors of the Sultan before he came to
power or played a role in the 1970 coup. All have
profited handsomely from their connections with the
Palace.
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Leading Omani Nationalists
Yousef bin Alawi bin Abdullah
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs since February 1982 ... de facto Foreign
Minister (Qaboos holds portfolio) and one of most influential Omanis in the
government ... enjoys confidence of Sultan ... described by US officials as a
careful and ambitious diplomat with a reputation for: getting things done ... also
described as aloof, calculating, arrogant, but honest allegedly disliked by
many of his subordinates ... supports 1980 Access Accord and favors institution-
alized, periodic consultations with the United States, . critical of US policies in
Lebanon and toward Palestinians ... born in Salalab, Dhofar ... in 1960s
represented the Dhofar Liberation Movement in Cairo ... returned to Oman in
1970... about 40 years old.F__-]
Ali Majid al-Maamari
President of the Palace Office and First Aide-de-camp to the Sultan ... has rank
of Major General ... responsible for overall direction of the government ... power
derives from his control of access to Qaboos, involvement in security issues as
head of the National Security Committee, connections in military and among
younger generation of Omani nationalists ... described by US official as a man of
strong character who is favorably disposed toward the United States ...
gradually asserting his control over Palace Office and internal security since
taking overfrom Landon in 1981 ... was a career military officer in Land Forces
... has served Qaboos personally since 1976 ... vigorously opposes corruption
among government officials ... about 37 years old. FI
Salim Abdullah al-Ghazali
Minister of Commerce and Industry since December 1983 ... was influential
member of the Sultan's inner circle in late 1970s as Undersecretary in the Defense
Ministry and de facto Defense Minister ... fell from grace in 1981 following
appointment of General Creasey as Chief of Defense Staff because of unabashed
public criticism of Creasey
studied guerrilla warfare and Communist doctrine in China, attended Algerian
Military Academy, and served in the Omani contingent of the Iraqi Army from
1966 to 1970... China experience allegedly turned him into a staunch anti-
Communist ... US Embassy officials claimed he was then a member of the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman ... returned to Oman after coup in
1970... served as Sultan's liaison officer with the armed forces 1973 to 1979.. .
described by Embassy officers as intelligent, loyal, dynamic, and ambitious ... 37
years old.FI
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Qais Abdul-Munim al-Zawawi
Deputy Prime Minister for Financial and Economic Affairs since February 1982
... longtime friend of the Sultan ... acts as de facto Finance Minister ... also
Deputy Chairman of the Councils on Development and Financial Affairs (autho-
rize projects and expenditures in the civilian sector of the government) ...
described by US officials as intelligent, urbane, and articulate but also has
reputation for being corrupt ... member of one of Oman's oldest and wealthiest
business families ... 49 years old.
Umar Abdul-Munim al-Zawawi
Personal adviser and longtime friend of the Sultan ... brother of Qais and one of
first Omani medical doctors ... manages Qaboos's personal finances and arranges
Oman's international loans, according to the US Embassy ... frequently serves as
the Sultan's personal envoy ... member of Financial Affairs Council ...
wealthiest man in Oman and,
one of the
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Muhammad al-Zubayr
Special Adviser to the Sultan for Economic Planning Affairs ... had served as
Minister of Commerce and Industry from 1974 to December 1983 ... as Minister
was responsible for initiation and supervision oJ'all industrial projects and foreign
firms wishing to do business in Oman ... according to Embassy, had little interest
in his Ministerial job, which "conflicted" with his extensive business interests ...
a Dhofari and childhood friend of Qaboos ... 44 years old.
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The Al Said family has ruled Oman for more than
200 years. Unlike the ruling families of Saudi Arabia
and the other Gulf states, where family councils are
important in determining the succession, establishing
consensus on policy issues, and ensuring family mem-
bers a dominant role in government, the Al Said do
not act as an effective political group and play only a
marginal role in the government. Those few Al Said
who hold senior positions in the government, including
three Deputy Prime Minister posts, do not exercise
real power, in our view.~
The 2,000-member Al Said family is small by Gulf
standards. Only 50 are direct descendants of the main
branch of the family, and the Embassy believes that
only 20 are considered eligible to succeed the Sultan.
The remainder are ineligible because of their Zanzi-
bari origins.' Many Western observers agree that
native-born Omanis in general resent the better edu-
cated, more talented Zan' zibaris who reside in Oman.
This resentment appears, to be shared by the Sultan
and other senior officials and is reflected in their
attitude toward the ruling family's Zanzibari branch.
' Omani traders and slavers first colonized East Africa in the 17th
century. The Zanzibari side of! the Al Said family is descended
from the 19th century ruler Said bin Sultan al-Said, whose empire
included most of the Indian O4ean littoral from the Strait of
Hormuz to Zanzibar. A member of the Al Said family held power
in Zanzibar until 1964. Many IOmanis, including family members,
returned to Oman from the late 1960s through the mid-1970s,
when Oman restricted immigration of Omanis from East Africa. (c)
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The royal family has been characterized by Western
observers and diplomatic sources as lackluster and
unambitious. As a group, they have a reputation for
shyness and diffidence, evading responsibility, reclusi-
veness, and laziness-characteristics that are often
attributed to the Sultan. Accord-
ing to the Embassy, most hold minor government
sinecures or are silent partners in companies run by
others. Quite a few live on allowances from the
Palace.F___1
The Al Said are probably closer to the Sultan's older
Muscat advisers in background and outlook than they
are to the nationalist faction. They are not enamored
of Arabism and, according to the Embassy, often
prefer non-Arab-and non-Omani-company. They
are cosmopolitan in outlook, have been educated
abroad (usually in India or Europe), and many have
foreign wives. Many speak better English than Ara-
bic. In their businesses and government jobs, they rely
heavily on foreign advisers.
The family has no mechanism for selecting a succes-
sor to the Sultan and in the past often opposed the
ruler. Intrafamily feuding-the Al Said have a long
history of fratricide-has frequently determined who
ruled Oman. As in other Middle Eastern societies, the
preferred pattern of succession is to the next oldest
male heir-father to son or brother to brother. Be-
cause Qaboos has no son or brother and is unlikely to
name his successor, we believe a council of senior
family members would choose one with the concur-
rence of senior Omani officials
(seniority
within the family would not be an important factor in
the selection.)
In our judgment, the likeliest successors to Qaboos
from within the Al Said are his uncle, Shabib bin
Taimur, who was appointed Minister of Environment
in May 1984; Thuwainy bin Shihab, a cousin who was
promoted in April 1984 to be Deputy Prime Minister
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for the Governance of the Capital and His Majesty's
Personal Envoy; and Fahad bin Mahmoud, another
cousin who is Deputy Prime Minister for Legal
Affairs.)
Shabib bin Taimur, the youngest uncle of the Sultan,
is considered a succession candidate primarily be-
cause of his close family tie to the ruler
He served in the Foreign Ministry
and was Ambassador to Pakistan and Morocco before
being appointed Minister of State and Special Envoy
for the Sultan in 1981. In the Embassy's view, the 41-
year-old Shabib is being groomed as a potential leader
in the government, but other generally reliable
sources describe him as a playboy and claim Qaboos
dislikes and mistrusts him.
Thuwainy bin Shihab probably is the most senior
royal family member in the government after the
Sultan. He presides over ceremonial functions in place
of the Sultan, receives foreign dignitaries, and serves
as regent when Qaboos is abroad. Embassy officials
describe Thuwainy-who may be in his late sixties-
as a loyal lieutenant who shuns policy and decision-
making responsibilities. We concur
that this apparent lack of ambition is the
reason for Thuwainy's enhanced status with Qaboos.
however, he also is
connected to merchants and technocrats in the capi-
tal, and they probably would support his candidacy
for the succession. If he were to succeed Qaboos, he
probably would not wield significant power, and his
sons would not automatically become heirs to the
throne.F_~
A third possibility for the succession is Fahad bin
Mahmoud, a second cousin of Qaboos's who has
served as Deputy Prime Minister for Legal Affairs
since 1979. the
most capable of the current generation of the Al Said
and claims he was active in drafting the anticorrup-
tion law and the decree establishing the State Consul-
tative Council. This could make him an acceptable
candidate for the Omani nationalists who supported
these efforts.
many Omani officials would prefer Fahad
The Next Generation
Since Qaboos at 44 is relatively young, he may outlive
those uncles and cousins who currently are potential
successors and are his age or older. Among the
younger members of the Al Said family, the most
likely candidate to replace him, in our judgment,
would be one of the five sons of Qaboos's late uncle
Tariq. Tariq, who died in '980, served as Prime
Minister for a short time after the coup. One son,
Haitham, serves in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as
Chief of European and American Affairs, and the
Embassy has speculated he could replace Alawi some-
day. The other sons of Tariq are in business or the
military. According to the Embassy, Tariq's adult
sons have all shown considerable potential and some
ambition. Little is known about other members of the
younger generation. F_~
Qaboos's legitimacy is based on inheritance and cus-
tom, . It does not rely on 25X1
religion, although the Sul~an maintains the appear-
ance of being a devout Ib4dhi Muslim and has been
carefully promoting Islamic concerns since he came to
power. Under Qaboos, the government has supported
a wide variety of religious )activities, including mosque
construction, publication of Ibadhi religious works,
to Thuwainy or Shabib, who are seen as less experi-
enced. Still, the Embassy Judges that Fahad has not
distinguished himself in any of the posts he has held.
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Shabib bin Taimur Al Said
Minister of Environment since May 1984 ... youngest uncle of Sultan ... born in
India ... graduate of Oxford University ... married to Swiss woman ...
described by Embassy officials as foppish and superficial ... stridently pro-West.
Thuwainy bin Shihab Al Said
His Majesty's Personal Envoy and Deputy Prime Minister for the Governance of
the Capital since April 1984 ... second cousin of Sultan ... probably highest
ranking family member in government and leading member of Al Said family ...
educated in Iraq in late 1930s ... served Qaboos's father as Deputy Governor of
Muscat ... appointed by Qaboos in 1970 as Governor and a special adviser ...
member of Financial Affairs Council and Chairman of the Oman Tender Board
... described by Embassy as pleasant, polite, mild mannered.n
Fahad bin Mahmoud Al Said
Deputy Prime Minister for Legal Affairs since May 1979... has an undergradu-
ate degree from Cairo University and a graduate degree from the University of
Paris ... married to a French woman ... Embassy officials have described him as
one of the most impressive and indolent of ruling family ... 43 years old.F_~
censorship of books deemed un-Islamic, and adher-
ence to Ibadhi personal law in the legal system. He
has not, however, claimed any special religious role
for himself. There is no sign of a religious-based
challenge to Qaboos similar to the revolts against his
father inspired by the Imam of Oman in the 1950s
and 1960s. According to the Embassy, the current
Imam (religious leader) of Oman lives in exile in
Saudi Arabia, and we have no reporting indicating
that Omanis support his cause or show fervor for
fundamentalism.
Ibadhism, however, could again become a potent force
in Omani politics, particularly in a succession crisis.
Ibadhism's political traditions do not allow for a
hereditary monarchy or absolutist rule. Ibadhism is
an offshoot of early doctrinal tensions within Islam
over leadership of the Islamic community. While
Sunnis argued that the leader of Islam should be
selected from the family of the Prophet Muhammad
and Shias claimed that the succession could only be
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from among the descendents of the Prophet's son-in-
law Ali, Ibadhis believed that the best man available
should be nominated by tribal and religious notables
and elected by the community. If a suitable candidate
were not available, then the office should remain
vacant.n
More important, Ibadhism has historically served as
the vehicle through which Omani nationalism is ex-
pressed. It has given Omanis a rallying point against
external threats as well as against Al Said tyranny.
Ibadhism remains
the political ideal for the majority of Omani citizens,
who see it as a democratic system with elaborate
checks on absolute authority. Those checks include
the traditions of limiting military power, consulting
the "people," electing the imam (religious leader) or
ruler, and constitutional restrictions based on shari'a,
or religious law. Ibadhism could serve as a rallying
point for opponents of the Al Said among both the
conservative religious elites and the new middle class-
es because it is in keeping with both traditional
Omani values and more liberal democratic trends
Tribes are an important source of power in Oman.
Historically, tribal leaders exercised considerable au-
tonomy. Until the British intervened on behalf of the
Al Said rulers in the 19th century, the tribes restrict-
ed the family's authority to the capital. Western
observers believe that the tribal groups, with few
exceptions, support Qaboos because his mother is
from an important tribal family in Salalah, the capital
of Dhofar Province where Qaboos spends most of the
year, and he has promoted tribal concerns and indi-
viduals in his government
Although the tribes remain the basis of social organi-
zation in Oman, especially outside the capital, and
their leaders still wield considerable political power,
Qaboos's regime has weakened the influence of many
tribal elites. Mus-
cat has intervened in-and in at least one case
prevented-the selection of tribal leaders. The gov-
ernment also circumscribes the traditional role of the
tribal leader by dispensing financial aid and other
benefits directly to the people rather than through the
tribal leader. F-1
Ghalib bin Ali bin Hilal al-Hingwi, the Imam of
Oman
72-rear-old spiritual and political leader of
Oman's Ibadhi Muslim community.. . governed
interior of Oman until 1955 when Sultan Said
regained control of country ... two years later
began rebellion against Sultan as head of Omani
Revolutionary Movement ... ha4s lived in exile,
primarily in Saudi Arabia, since 1959... de-
clined offer from Qaboos in 1976 to return to
Oman as either a private citizen', or a religious
figure ... in
contact with senior officials of the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Oman in the 1970s ...
described as harsh, irascible,
and cantankerous ...
as little support in Oman but could
serve as popular symbol for opposition senti-
Still, Muscat has not attempted to eliminate the
traditional tribal elites asp separate power bloc.
Qaboos continues to seek tribal support for his policies
by appointing representatives of important tribal fam-
ilies to high-level government posts and encouraging
investment in Dhofar, MWsandam, and other remote
tribal areas. tribalism is still
a potent factor in Omani politics and claim that tribal
leaders still resolve local conflicts and act as interme-
diaries with the government. If a political crisis were
to develop in Muscat over! the succession, or if local
subsidies were drastically cut because of a decline in
oil revenues, local tribal elites could assume a much
more active role as powerbrokers in Muscat.0
In our judgment, the tribes probably share the inter-
ests and prejudices of the Omani nationalists. Like the
nationalists, they are personally loyal to Qaboos but
less enthusiastic about the Al Said family. They may
be sympathetic with the nationalists' attempts to
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restrict Zanzibari Omanis from ministerial and mili-
tary posts, hoping thereby to expand their own role in
the government. We believe tribal leaders probably
would favor Thuwainy or Faisal (a cousin of Qaboos's
who is Minister of National Heritage) as compromise
candidates for the succession-both apparently have
longstanding ties to the tribes-but would also hope to
see some widening of the political process to allow
them a greater role in the government.F_~
We believe it unlikely that Qaboos will be overthrown
by an externally supported insurgency. The major
antiregime faction with a foreign base is the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Oman, a Marxist group
that replaced the Omani Revolutionary Movement in
the 1970s as the leading force in the rebellion against
Sultan Qaboos's father. The PFLO receives limited
financial aid, safehaven, and training support from
South Yemen, Syria, Libya, and the USSR. Since its
defeat in 1975, however, its ranks have been seriously
weakened by defections, disagreements over tactics,
forced inactivity, and cutbacks in aid from its spon-
sors. Its recent efforts aimed at recruitment and
25X1 reorganization appear unsuccessful.
the PFLO currently has fewer than 500
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members, most of whom are in exile in Syria or South
Yemen. We believe the organization enjoys little
popular support inside Oman and has only a limited
capacity to undertake guerrilla operations in Dhofar
or urban terrorism. In our judgment, the PFLO will
not return to the prominent role it played in spear-
heading resistance to Muscat in the late 1960s and
early 1970s.F_~
Iran has established an
Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oman-similar to
other dissident groups it has set up against Iraq and
Bahrain-and may be training Omani Shias for oper-
ations against Muscat.
several IFLO members had returned to Oman in 1982
and had established a safehouse in the United Arab
Emirates. We believe, however, that Oman's Shia
community has little interest in supporting Iranian
propaganda or subversive activities. The Shia popula-
tion is small-less than 5,000-and primarily of
Indian rather than Persian stock. It is closely moni-
tored by Omani security]
for signs of dissident activity.
Prospects for Political Stability After Qaboos
Reporting I has been reassuring in noting
the absence of opposition to Qaboos, the lack of
dissatisfaction with his policies, and the absence of
significant underlying discontent that might confound
his potential successors. A number of nongovernmen-
tal experts generally share this optimistic view of
Oman's stability. For example, two noted scholars
judged that Oman would be among the most stable of
these states following the death of its ruler. The
scholars based their view in part on Oman's lack of
political and social institutions-no political parties
and no labor unions-around which opposition could
coalesce.F__~
Nonetheless, we agree with those observers who are
uneasy about Omani
society and politics below the Palace level. We believe
several issues could produce serious instability in the
country, although none currently appear threatening.
These include resistance to the British presence in
Oman, strained tribal relations with the central gov-
ernment in Muscat, the emergence of a professionally
trained middle class with new aspirations, the return
to Oman for the first time of a significant number of
students educated in the West, and prospects for a
resurgence of religious fundamentalism.
The nationalists, who are likely to dominate a succes-
sor regime, will seek to reduce corruption, eliminate
the last vestiges of British influence, and spread the
benefits of Oman's oil wealth to keep centrifugal
forces in Omani society under control. They are
conscious of the need to forge links with the tribes in
the interior and to satisfy new social groups being
created by the modernization process. Their efforts to
institute reforms are certain to impinge on the pre-
serves of the more traditional elites, however, and
could eventually bring them into conflict with the new
Sultan.
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In addition to the general concerns about Oman's
stability already noted, we believe the following
developments, if they occur, would indicate that
serious political problems were beginning to emerge:
? Criticism of Qaboos or his successor for misman-
agement of the government or the economy, favorit-
ism, ineffectiveness as a leader, or cooperation with
the United States.
? Reports of growing frustration over the lack of
political process, the ineffectiveness of the State
Consultative Council, or the lack of local represen-
tantive government bodies.
? Frequent complaints about unfair land distribution
and misallocation of resources, or the emergence of
charges that the new generation of Omani officials
appointed by the nationalists were unfairly enrich-
ing themselves.
? Grumbling about pervasive police efforts to monitor
Omani urban and village areas.
? Reports that the government's budget for police and
security units and prisons was increasing
substantially.
? Resignations of senior and middle-level political
leaders.
? Resignations of Omanis from the military, in par-
ticular from the Air Force.
? Reports of clandestine printing presses being uncov-
ered and antiregime leaflets appearing, particularly
in Muscat.
? Substantial disaffection among Oman's student
population.
? Increased urban unemployment or underemploy-
ment of skilled technicians and professionals lead-
ing to more complaints about the number of expa-
triates working in Oman.
? Complaints that too much of Oman's budget is
being spent on defense and too little on services or
regional development.
? Complaints about income disparities, in particular
if they focus on Omanis receiving less than expatri-
ates for comparable work.
? The appearance of white banners, particularly in
the more remote provincial areas, which could
signal a resurgence of support for the exiled Imam
of Oman.F---]
the dissatisfaction of Omajni youth.
Young Omanis and Young Turks:
Prospects for a Coup
The current generation of nationalists is conscious of
Omani officials are concerned that stu-
dents educated abroad could become a disruptive
force if frustrated by a lack of meaningful careers.
there are young Omanis in
officer cadet school who do not remember the "bad
old days" before Qaboos. `these young men have only
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known an affluent Oman and already are outspoken
in their criticism of what they perceive to be short-
comings in their government and their ruler. Their
complaints could increase if they believe they are
denied their just promotions in the military, the
government, or private industry-areas dominated by
expatriates and Omanis from the traditional mer-
chant families, some of whom hold prestigious posi-
tions more because of their connections than merit. A
downturn in the economy brought about by declining
oil revenues could also lead to pressures for change
from these groups.
The Omani nationalists are closely identified with
Qaboos, but, if he begins to come under intense
popular criticism, the nationalists could attempt to
stage a preemptive coup and remove him rather than
risk losing the gains they have made or their positions
in the government. Similarly, the nationalists might
move against a successor if he strongly opposed the
nationalists' policy goals. Although we believe the
possibility of a coup is small, several of the national-
ists came of age politically in the heady environment
of Cairo and Baghdad in the 1950s and 1960s when
palace coups were not uncommon. The nationalists
control enough key positions in the government and
the military to have reasonable prospects for a suc-
cessful coup if they were to act together.
Four years ago we judged that the military's influence
in determining the succession would increase over
time and make a military ruler more likely.' We judge
now, however, that the military as an institution is
unlikely to play a major role in political decision
making over the next few years. Oman's military
traditionally has been apolitical, to a great extent
because of the large number of expatriates who
control it. We see no indication that Omanis in the
military aspire to active political roles. If young
Omanis in the military-like their civilian counter-
parts-become frustrated by their inability to ad-
vance and assume responsibility for military decision
making, however, they would be more likely to sup-
port the nationalist leaders in a coup attempt.F__-]
The most likely succession in Oman-one that re-
places Qaboos with another Sultan from the Al Said
or that directly brings to power the current generation
of Omani nationalists-probably will have little im-
pact on Oman's relations with the United States.
Nationalists, like Alawi, who are likely to dominate
the new government already play the principal role in
formulating Oman's policy toward the United States
and favor strategic cooperation with Washington.
They-or almost any successor government in Mus-
cat-probably would oppose a significant upgrading
in relations, but they are also unlikely, in our judg-
ment, to abrogate current military and economic
agreements. F_~
Oman under the nationalists will remain critical of
aspects of US policy toward their country. Senior
Omani officials already claim that the 1980 Access
Accord with the United States poses a real-and an
unappreciated-danger for Oman. They complain
that US military projects have grown too quickly, are
too complex, and threaten to "overwhelm" the small
country. They worry that US efforts to implement the
access agreement-on issues ranging from P-3 air
surveillance operations to control of pre-positioned
military equipment-will in effect create "bases,"
whereas the Omanis agreed only to provide the Unit-
ed States with access to facilities. They will continue
to press for additional financial aid and will argue
that US financial compensation-approximately $300
million since 1981-for the facilities Oman offers and
for the political risks Muscat is taking is niggardly
compared with the billions of dollars provided annual-
ly to Israel and Egypt.F_~
We believe that a successor regime dominated by the
nationalists will also be more vocal in echoing the
frustration with US policy in the Middle East that is
commonly heard in moderate Arab capitals such as
Amman, Cairo, and Riyadh. The nationalists already
have expressed the view to US officials that the US
withdrawal from Lebanon in 1982 was abandonment
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When Oman and the United States signed the Access
Accord in 1980, Muscat's primary concern was secu-
rity. The agreement gave the United States access to
Omani military facilities under certain conditions
and allowed pre-positioning of some US military
equipment. The Shah of Iran, Qaboos's closest re-
gional ally and protector, had just fallen. South
Yemen was still supporting insurgent efforts to fo-
ment a rebellion in Dhofar. The Soviet Union ap-
peared to be attempting to encircle the Arabian
Peninsula with its invasion of Afghanistan and its
military support for the Marxist regime in Ethiopia.
The Sultan's decision to turn to the United States
came at the same time Washington was looking for
regional allies to work against Soviet expansionism
in Southwest Asia and to protect Western access to
Persian Gulf oil. Negotiation of the accord was made
easier by the parochialism of Oman's leaders.
Zawawi, for example, took only a token interest in
Oman's relations with its neighbors and the impact
expanded military and security ties with the United
States would have in the Gul1:F---]
of an ally in distress, raising questions about US
steadfastness in the Gulf. The nationalists will contin-
ue to view revolutionary Iran as a major threat to
their security and, like other Gulf Arabs, to fear that
the US presence in Oman may attract rather than
deflect Iranian hostility. F_~
If the nationalists come to power through a coup, we
believe the effect on relations with the United States
will be more dramatic. Nationalist leaders governing
on their own, in our view, would depend more on
traditional elites in Omani society-the tribes, reli-
gious factions, even perhaps the Imam of Oman-as
well as on newer, more radical groupings, such as
foreign-educated students, young professionals,
Omanis in the military, or religious fundamentalists.
We believe the nationalists would tailor relations with
Conditions in Oman and the Gulf and Omani percep-
tions of the threats to their security have changed
since the accord was negotiated in 1980. The leaders
who negotiated the accord have been replaced by
Omani nationalists. The ~!latter, and Alawi in particu-
lar, still value their country's special relationship
with the United Kingdom as well as its close ties to
the United States. But they take a more hardheaded,
"Oman-first" view of Oman's national interests than
did the Muscat Mafia. The USSR, now bogged down
in Afghanistan, no longer appears so menacing to
Muscat. In South Yemen, a pragmatic Marxist, Ali
Muhammad al-Hasani, seized power in April 1980
and appears to be moderating Aden's policies toward
Oman. FI
Under Alawi's direction, Muscat has expanded ties
with its neighbors in the Gulf and drawn closer to
other like-minded Arab moderates. Oman has played
a prominent role in the deliberations of the four-year-
old Gulf Cooperation Council-it will act as host to
this year's summit-anal the Council in turn has
influenced Omani foreign policy. GCC deliberations
have brought Oman into ,sustained contact with the
other monarchical regimes on the Arabian Peninsula
and exposed Omani poli?ymakers to inter-Arab and
Arab-Israeli issues.)
the United States to suit these groups to consolidate
their hold over the government. The result would be a
weakened central government and a more vulnerable
relationship with the United States.)
The greatest danger to US interests in Oman would
come in the unlikely event that the nationalists could
not govern effectively becCause of conflict among elites
or with the emerging generation of potentially dissat-
isfied Omanis. Such confict could provide opportuni-
ties for currently quiescent elements to coalesce
against the government and its ties to the West.
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Appendix
The Nationalists' Agenda
In the past three years the nationalists have assumed
control of most leadership posts in the government
and begun to play a decisive role in policymaking. We
believe the progress they have made thus far in
curtailing corruption, promoting like-minded Omanis
to responsible posts, and initiating reforms has been
significant and indicates the direction Omani politics
will take after Qaboos.F--]
The nationalists have made considerable progress in
appointing like-minded Omanis to positions in the
Cabinet, the influential Palace Office, and, to a lesser
extent, the intelligence an security services. The
changes include the rehabilitation of Salim al-
Ghazali, who was once Unj 1ersecretary in the Defense
Ministry, as Minister of COmerce and Industry and
the appointment of Saif Muhammad al-Battashi to be
The nationalists have had some success in containing
the Muscat Mafia. Since 1982 several of the more
notorious members of the old guard have been re-
moved from the Cabinet, including Minister of State
for Foreign Affairs Qais al-Zawawi and Minister of
Commerce and Industry Muhammad al-Zubayr.
Both men, who have longstanding reputations for
avarice and conflict of interest, were subsequently
appointed special advisers to the Sultan for economic
development, a largely honorific post. In addition,
Deputy President of the Palace Office Ahmad Suwai-
25X1 dan al-Baluch was demoted to Minister of Posts,
Telegraphs, and Telephones in January 1984. F__1
Undersecretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Battashi had no experience in foreign affairs but was
appointed because he was an "Omani Omani" who
had worked in the Palace Office, according to Embas-
sy sources. F_~
Although the nationalists may have restricted the
official activities of the Muscat Mafia, they have not
been able to alter the Sultan's continuing reliance on
them, in our view. Zubayr and the Zawawi brothers
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they have been removed from the Cabinet.
must take control of policymaking with expatriates
remaining only in advisory, roles. They also realize
that they must proceed slowly in order not to antago-
nize Qaboos, who is still an Anglophile. F___]
In pursuit of Omanization in the military and security
services, Qaboos has replaced several British officers
with Omanis in the last two years.
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? In November 1984, Sultan Qaboos issued a decree
giving control of intelligence and security to the
Palace Office-staffed predominant) b Omanis;
this included military intelligence,
? In December 1983, Qaboos appointed Abdullah
Salih al-Habsi as Deputy Director General of Intel-
ligence in the Internal Security Department (for-
merly called the Oman Research Department) -the
country's principal intelligence organization; Habsi
became the highest ranking Omani in the service.
? Maj. Gen. Nasib Hamad al-Ruwayhi became the
first Omani to head the Land Forces in November
1984,
? The same month, Group Capt. Muhammad Mu-
barak al-Amri was appointed Chief of Operations
for the Air Force, the most senior Omani in the .
service. Qaboos also intends to appoint an Omani
as Commander of
the Air Force in 1986, according to a senior Omani
official. (S NF NC OC)
in some of the more recent appointments.
the Sultan appointed Omanis to
some staff posts, particularly in the military and
intelligence, to ease criticism from Arab counterparts
and to enable Oman to participate in regional military
meetings and exercises
ble for his personal security.
to head either the Internal Security Department or
the Royal Guard Brigade, both of which are responsi-
cord with the United States and political/military
The nationalists are making slow but steady inroads
in other areas of policymaking. We believe they have
extended the authority of the Palace Office and
Cabinet to include some aspects of military and
security decision making. Alawi and Ali Majid suc-
cessfully argued that negotiations on the Access Ac-
discussions be channeled first through them
Since 1982, Alawi
has convinced a reluctant Sultan to reestablish rela-
tions with South Yemen, major backer of the Marxist
Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman, and
aligned Muscat closer to other Gulf Arab states in
supporting moderate Arab and regional causes. Mus-
cat has become more outspoken on Palestinian issues
as well, although we believe that Alawi, like the
Sultan, will not recognize the Palestine Liberation
Organization. In our judgment, Alawi may also sup-
port the initiation of contacts with the USSR, al-
though he probably would not push the Sultan on this
issue.
We believe the nationalists are able to advance their
views, interests, and supporters because they are
compatible with those of other influential Omanis
having access to Qaboos
Their efforts also have coincided with
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