(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00587R000100070002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Iran: The Growing Role of the
Consultative Assembly
Secret
NESA 85-10008
Janus J A
Cony A
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Iran: The Growing Role of the
Consultative Assembly
A Research Paper
This paper was prepared b Office
of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with a
contribution from the Office of
Central Reference. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations.
Questions and comments are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division, NESA,
Secret
NESA 85-10008
January 1985
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Iran: The Growing Role of the
Consultative Assembly 25X1
Key Judgments The Consultative Assembly has become one of the most influential political
Information available institutions in Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini. As Khomeini's health
as of 3 January 1985 deteriorates, an increasing number of policy questions are likely to be sent
was used in this report.
to the Assembly for resolution.
During the past four years the Assembly has passed much important
legislation, strengthened its control over parts of the executive branch, and
helped tighten regime control over independent revolutionary organizations
and paramilitary forces. Effective leadership of the Assembly by Speaker
Hojat ol-Eslam Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani has helped it acquire more
institutional power at the expense of the presidency and judiciary. The only
effective political check on Assembly decisions-aside from.Khomeini-
comes from the conservative Council of Guardians, which must approve all
legislation before it can become law.
A conservative coalition strong enough to block proposals by Islamic
radicals is emerging in the recently elected second Consultative Assembly.
If the coalition continues to gain adherents, it will increase pressure on the
government to chart a more conservative course. The new coalition also
will help ease the strained relations between the Assembly and the Council
of Guardians.
The conservatives face stiff resistance from the radicals in defining the
Islamic Republic. Both radical and conservative leaders sense that Kho-
meini's time may be short, and they are likely to press hard during 1985 to
impose their views on land reform, the economy, and the division of power
among regime factions and organizations.
Highly placed Iranians believe the Assembly will become even more
important in the power vacuum that will follow Khomeini's death. Limited
information about members of the emerging conservative coalition in the
Assembly suggests its leaders are interested in making it the centerpiece of
a parliamentary theocracy after Khomeini. Radicals also favor a more
powerful Assembly because it offers the best opportunity to achieve at least
some of their goals in restructuring Iranian society.
Secret
NESA 85-10008
January 1985
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The emergence and survival of a conservative majority in the Consultative
Assembly would benefit Western interests and reduce Soviet opportunities
to bring to power a leftist government in Tehran. An Assembly led by such
a coalition would continue to impose Islamic values in Iran and remain
critical of Western policies affecting the Third World, but it would also be
likely to give primary importance to strengthening the economy and
establishing a stable social structure. Conservatives would encourage
working relationships with the West-eventually including the United
States-and with the non-Communist Third World, especially Iran's
Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani is well placed to encourage and exploit any
increase in the Assembly's authority. Skilled at maneuvering among Iran's
diverse political factions, Rafsanjani is second only to Khomeini in power.
Once Khomeini dies, he could become the most influential political figure
in the country, although he is too young and too junior a cleric to succeed
Khomeini directly.
neighbors.
Dominance of the Assembly by the radicals would allow it to override
legislative review by the conservative Council of Guardians, enact extreme
social and economic programs, and press for a hardline foreign policy. Such
a regime is more likely to look to the USSR for assistance.
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Secret
Contents
Page
Key Judgments
Growing Power and Constraints
Constraint-The Council of Guardians
6
A New Conservative Coalition
8
The Radical-Conservative Power Balance
9
Four More Years
11
Continued Controversy
13
Prospects
13
Majles Vulnerabilities
14
Implications for the United States
15
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Radical and Conservative Views
on Selected Issues a
Radical and conservative disagreements are most
clearly defined on economic issues such as land
reform, management of trade and industry, and the
tax structure. Radicals favor redistributing private
property to benefit the lower classes, strong central
control and planning over the economy, and increas-
ing taxes through higher rates and a broadening of
the tax base. Conservatives want no limitations
placed on amassing private property, a wider role for
the private sector, and no increased tax burden. They
charge that radicals in the regime do not properly
manage the assets they now control.
Divisions between the factions blur on many other
matters. Most radicals, however, are hawkish on the
war with Iraq and are suspicious of the loyalty of the
regular armed forces. Most conservatives, on the
other hand, want to end the conflict and to improve
Iran's economy. They oppose strengthening the para-
military Revolutionary Guard at the expense of the
regular forces. Conservatives believe that the Guard
is controlled by trigger-happy radicals willing to
eliminate rival interest groups by force.
Radicals favor a hardline foreign policy in associa-
tion with other regimes and organizations opposed to
"imperialism'-that is, the United States-and seem
less hostile to the USSR.
linked both radical and conservative leaders
to terrorism and planning to export the revolution to
other Muslim communities. Many conservatives are
as concerned as radicals about the Western cultural
impact on Islamic societies, but the conservatives'
economic interests contribute heavily to their interest
in continued contacts with the West and a less
aggressive foreign policy.
Conservatives and some radicals are strong support-
ers of the Islamization of Iranian society. The most
extreme proponents of Islamization are the ultracon-
servatives. Conservatives, however, do not strongly
support the political and religious domination of Iran
by a supreme jurisprudent and hope to reduce the
authority of that post after Khomeini's death. Many
radicals support a view of Islam consonant with
socialist principles and hope eventually to push the
clerics into the background. Meanwhile, however,
radicals support Khomeini's dominance, realizing
Iran's need for a strong leader at the helm and honing
that he will allow their views to prevail.
a This paper uses the terms radical, conservative, and ultraconserv-
ative to indicate general divisions in the Iranian political spectrum.
Pragmatist is used to characterize individuals like Assembly
Speaker Hashemi-Rafsanjani, whose views seem to be driven
mainly by opportunism. These terms are intended only to define
Iranian viewpoints relative to each other and not to suggest
similarities with foreign political groups. Moreover, politicalfg-
ures may fit into one part of the spectrum on some issues and other
parts of the spectrum on other issues. Iranians tend not to be
troubled by vague and shifting alliances or by simultaneous
participation in groups with opposing goals and ideologies
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Secret
Iran: The Growing Role of the
Consultative Assembly
In the four years of its existence, the Consultative
Assembly (Majles-e Shura) has grown from a fledg-
ling institution to Iran's single most important deci-
sionmaking center-aside from Ayatollah Khomeini.
It has become the main arena in which Iranian power
struggles are waged. Khomeini has made clear public-
ly that the Majles is the regime's link with the people
and the forum in which different factional views will
be melded into policy. Leaders of major political
factions responded to this mandate by competing
strongly in the 1984 election for the Assembly.
The Iranian Consultative Assembly
(Majles-e Shura)
The Iranian Constitution establishes a single-
chamber, 270-member Consultative Assembly elected
every four years. The Majles is "consultative" be-
cause, strictly speaking, it does not legislate-all law
having been revealed by God. Three seats are re-
served for representatives of Christian sects and one
each for the Jews and Zoroastrians. The Assembly:
If we look at the executive and judicial powers
in relation to the legislative, it is clear that the
Majles is at the head of affairs.
Editorial in government-controlled
Kayhan newspaper
March 1984
The increased power of the Majles results mainly
from provisions in the Constitution that weaken the
executive branch. The Constitution divides the gov-
ernment into executive, legislative, and judicial
branches-apparently with balanced powers as in
many Western countries. But it imposes on the gov-
ernment a supreme jurisprudent-Khomeini. Al-
though Khomeini has not become involved in day-to-
day policymaking, his presence has prevented the
emergence of a strong president.
This has allowed the Assembly to occupy center stage.
As the Iranian power struggle unfolds, now and after
Khomeini dies, decisions made in the Majles will be
important indicators of whether conservative or radi-
cal Islamic ideology is becoming dominant.
The 270-member Consultative Assembly has evolved
into the political institution most representative of
Iran's diverse political spectrum. With Khomeini's
blessing, the Majles has been the primary beneficiary
? Introduces "resolutions" and legislation.
? Enacts laws and ratifies treaties, contracts, and
accords negotiated by the executive branch.
? Approves appointment of the prime minister and
Cabinet and censures or removes the prime minis-
ter, Cabinet, or a single minister through votes of
no confidence. The Majles may require the presi-
dent, the prime minister, or any individual minister
to answer questions in person.
? Investigates any aspect of national affairs.
? Approves employment of foreign nationals.
The Assembly cannot:
? Authorize changes-except minor adjustments-in
national borders.
? Grant foreign concessions for commercial, agricul-
tural, or mineral "affairs or services"-a reaction
to concessions to Western interests granted by the
Shah and his predecessors.
? Impose martial law. "Restrictions" lasting 30 days
are allowed during wartime but are not known to
have been implemented during the present conflict
with Iraq.
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No Majles debate is official unless Council of Guard-
ians members are present, and no proposal is consid-
ered law until the Council has reviewed and accepted
the text-usually within 10 days after passage of a
bill. The Assembly must amend any proposal that the
Council of Guardians considers in violation of Islam-
ic or constitutional principles unless two-thirds of the
Assembly's members vote to override the Council.
The Constitution forbids the Majles from even debat-
ing an urgent item-one that must be implemented
without a 10-day review-unless Council members
participate in the debate.
Representatives who propose "bills resulting in a
reduction of public income or increase of general
expenses" must offer provisions to restore an equilib-
rium in the budget. Members cannot, transfer their
individual responsibilities to substitutes, and the
Assembly as a whole cannot delegate its powers.
Members who want to resign have 15 days to recon-
sider.
Majles members are authorized to address all do-
mestic and foreign issues-although the Majles has
had greater impact on domestic than on foreign
policy. Representatives are not liable to prosecution
or arrest for remarks made during debate or for their
votes. Khomeini has recently ruled, however, that
anyone libeled by a Majles member can exercise a
right of reply.
The Constitution provides that Assembly sessions
should be open to the public and press, except when
the prime minister, a Cabinet minister, or 10 Assem-
bly members call for a closed session. Sources of
varying reliability indicate that the Majles routinely
goes into closed session during debate on controver-
sial issues, if only to mask heated exchanges between
members. Representatives of religious minorities al-
lege that they have been excluded from closed de-
bates on defense issues. Three-fourths of the mem-
bers must approve measures adopted in closed
session, two-thirds in open session.
The Assembly elects officers-a speaker, two depu-
ties, six secretaries, and three "supply" officers, who
apparently arrange for all the equipment needed by
the Majles and its members-and divides itself by lot
into about 10 equal "branches" twice a year. Heads
of the branches, in consultation with the other Majles
officers, determine committee assignments of mem-
bers. Special committees are often set up to consider
special issues, for example, how to deal with the US
hostages and the qualifications of prime-ministerial
candidates. The Defense Committee has a "news and
information" subcommittee that tries to obtain for
Majles members `correct and accurate" reports on
the war with Iraq.
The Majles meets Sunday, Tuesday, and Thursday
for debate, according to Speaker Rafsanjani, and
other days for committee work. Friday is a religious
holiday. A typical Majles session opens with an-
nouncements and speeches that raise parochial issues
or allow members to endorse the regime's position on
an issue not under debate. It continues with readings
from the Qoran, remarks by the Speaker, and the
items scheduled for debate.
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Figure 1
Majles Organization
First Deputy Three Supply
r Speaker r Officers
L Security
L Second Deputy
Speaker
Public Affairs
Office a
HUD, Road and Transport 1982-83
Culture and Higher Education "s