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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00587R000100050002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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North Yemen:
Troubled Relations
With Saudi Arabia
NESA 85-10005
January 1985
Copy 372
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
North Yemen:
Troubled Relations
With Saudi Arabia
This paper was prepared by I of the
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations. F-]
on
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division, NESA,
Secret
NESA 85-10005
January 1985
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North Yemen:
Troubled Relations
With Saudi Arabia
Key Judgments Relations between Saudi Arabia and North Yemen, long troubled, are
Information available likely to continue unsettled for some time. As one of the world's poorest
as of 3 December 1984 countries, North Yemen has been forced to accept a client relationship
was used in this report.
with its wealthy neighbor. Yemenis resent this status as well as Riyadh's
persistent interference. Riyadh's repeated calls for a settlement of disputed
border issues and for a reduction in the Soviet presence in North Yemen,
both longstanding goals on its Yemeni agenda, help to sustain frictions.
The recent oil discovery in North Yemen by a US firm has added a new
complication to the North Yemeni-Saudi relationship. The oil find is the
brightest spot in North Yemen's troubled economy. Significant returns are
unlikely before 1990, but any lessening of Sanaa's need for Saudi financial
aid is likely to erode Riyadh's influence on North Yemeni policies. A
financially secure Yemen probably would attempt to expand its control
over the independent-minded northern tribes that live along the border
with Saudi Arabia. Riyadh has long provided subsidies to these tribes both
to maintain its influence in the border area and to limit Sanaa's authority
over them.F___1
Saudi aid will be vital to the regime of President Ali Abdallah Salih,
however, at least until oil earnings begin. We believe Riyadh will maintain
its present levels of assistance to ensure its influence in Sanaa, although it
will slow aid flows periodically, as it has in the past, to press Salih on spe-
cific issues.
Although some high-level Saudis, including King Fahd, profess to be
pleased with Sanaa's oil discovery, we doubt the Saudis will officially
abandon claims to the territory around the oil concession. We do not
believe, however, that they will interfere directly with operations at the
drilling site. They know that the stakes for Sanaa are high and that the Ye-
menis can be expected to fight hard to hold the oil-concession area.
Nonetheless, the Saudis might encourage local tribes to interfere with
operations, particularly if new wells are drilled farther east. F_~
The oil discovery has sparked a slight upturn in traditionally cool but
correct US-North Yemeni relations. President Salih and other high
Yemeni officials have renewed calls for the United States to deal with
North Yemen independently of the Saudis. Sanaa would like stronger ties
with the United States to balance its links with Riyadh and Moscow.F_
Secret
NESA 85-10005
January 1985
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The new Soviet-North Yemeni friendship and cooperation treaty signed in
October 1984 in Moscow does not signal a decisive shift in North Yemeni
foreign policy toward the Soviet camp. Salih is maneuvering to defer
payment on North Yemen's $1.2 billion military debt to the Soviet Union
and probably views the treaty as a useful gesture to Moscow. It is also cal-
culated to signal the Saudis that he can call on powerful support if they in-
crease pressure on border issues or seek other political concessions. F--]
Secret iv
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North Yemen's Tribes-Available to the Highest Bidder
4
Border Clash at Buq'ah
The North Yemen Oil Discovery
6
The US-Saudi-North Yemeni Triangle
7
The Troubled Borderlands-The Legacy of the Treaty of Taif 11
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North Yemen:
Troubled Relations
With Saudi Arabia
North Yemen has traditionally sought to maintain its
independence by balancing relations among compet-
ing foreign powers. By cultivating ties to both Riyadh
and Moscow, Sanaa has stimulated aid flows from
each. Saudi Arabia's influence as the largest donor of
economic aid is balanced against Moscow's as the
provider of most North Yemeni arms.)
Maintaining such a balance is essential for Sanaa.
President Salih routinely signals that he is contem-
plating even closer ties with the Soviets when relations
with Saudi Arabia become strained. He has been
careful, however, not to permit Soviet influence to
increase dramatically, knowing that the Saudis almost
certainly would react by cutting back economic aid
and might even attempt to subvert the regime. Riyadh
not only provides critical financial support to the
government but also has close ties to key Yemeni
constituencies, particularly the northern tribal
leaders.
In March 1970, after several years of conflict, the
Saudis supported a compact between the royalists and
the republicans under which the Imam was exiled and
some royalists were absorbed into the republican
government. This agreement continues to shape
North Yemen's politics. The Sanaa government main-
tains its leftist rhetoric but pursues domestic policies
that are generally acceptable to Riyadh.F---]
Since 1970, the Saudis have followed a strategy
designed to maintain a moderate and friendly regime
in Sanaa. In part, this was intended to create a buffer
against the Marxist-dominated and Soviet-backed
regime that took power in Aden when the British left
in 1967. Although Riyadh cannot dictate terms to
Sanaa because the Yemenis are strongly nationalistic
and tend to close ranks when threatened from abroad,
no Yemeni leader in the past decade has come to
power or maintained his position without Saudi
support.F_~
The Troubled Relationship
North Yemeni-Saudi relations historically have been
strongly adversarial, a product of wide cultural differ-
ences, conflicting territorial claims, and past armed
conflicts. Yemenis base their national identity on
state traditions that date back more than three
millenniums and view the Saudis as newcomers to
power in the Peninsula. They continue to nurse griev-
ances over territorial losses resulting from their mili-
tary defeat by the Saudis in 1934. The Saudis, for
their part, see Yemenis as fractious and aggressive
tribesmen who, given their population advantage, pose
a long-term threat to their neighbors.)
The overthrow of the Imam of Yemen in September
1962 by Nasirist-inspired military officers alarmed
Riyadh, which saw itself being encircled by Arab
nationalist regimes hostile to the Peninsula monar-
chies. To counter the threat from North Yemen,
Riyadh provided arms, bases, and financial aid to
royalist Yemeni tribesmen who took the field against
the Egyptian-supported republican government in
Sanaa to restore the Imam to power.
The Saudi Economic Weapon
Riyadh's greatest influence over Sanaa comes from
North Yemen's economic dependence. Saudi Arabia
is North Yemen's largest single donor of economic aid
and its leading trading partner. Saudi currency circu-
lates freely and is the currency of choice in northern
areas that are closely tied to the Saudi economy.
Approximately 600,000 Yemenis work in Saudi Ara-
bia and another 150,000 in the Gulf emirates. North
Yemen's economy depends on remittances from these
workers to fund consumer imports. Remittances
dropped from a high of $1.2 billion in 1978 to $900
million in 1982 but were back up to $1.1 billion in
1983.
We estimate that Saudi subventions have averaged
between $400-600 million annually in recent years.
Although these amounts are large from the North
Yemeni perspective, they are, for example, far less
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arriving in Jiddah.
than Saudi aid to Iraq. Lower oil earnings have made
Riyadh a more careful aid donor, but we do not
believe that reduced earnings would ever limit the
Saudis' use of aid to protect their interests in North
Yemen.F - - - I
We believe project aid has decreased sharply in the
last two years because of lower Saudi oil earnings.
Disbursements clearly identified as project aid
amounted to just under $30 million in 1983. Only
about $10 million was disbursed in 1984.F--]
Saudi Arabia's Fund for Development administers
such aid for a variety of projects, including hospitals,
schools, mosques, and highways. Most of the projects
are in border areas where Riyadh wields strong
influence. A high official in the Saudi Ministry of
Foreign Affairs noted in a conversation in 1982 with a
US Embassy official that Riyadh was giving highest
priority to projects in the Wadi Jawf region and
acknowledged that the Saudis eventually hope to
convert the Jawf from a "zone of anarchy on their
southern border" into a buffer zone under Saudi
influence.
Military assistance has varied according to Riyadh's
perception of the threat Sanaa faces from South
Yemen or from leftist insurgents. We believe military
aid has been substantially reduced since the highpoint
in 1981 of the South Yemeni-backed National Demo-
cratic Front insurgency. Most official Saudi military
aid has been in the form of grants that have funded
the purchase of more than $300 million worth of US
weapons and munitions by North Yemen since 1979.
The Saudis also make unofficial contributions to help
the North Yemenis pay military salaries and meet
costs for training and equipment maintenance.
The Saudis set official aid levels at the annual
meeting of the Saudi-North Yemeni Joint Coordina-
tion Commission. The Commission-now in its eighth
year-provides a forum for both sides to review
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North Yemen is among the poorest nations in the
world, with a per capita income of only $550 per year:
? Most of the population is rural and lives at a
subsistence level.
? With the exception of the oil strike near Ma'rib in
July, few exploitable minerals have been found.
? The exodus of roughly 750,000 Yemenis-half the
domestic work force-to Saudi Arabia and the
Gulf emirates has contributed to a deterioration of
the country's agriculture.
? A narrow resource base results in a heavy depend-
ence on imports. Sanaa has the worst trade imbal-
ance in the world, with export earnings covering less
than 1 percent of imports.
? Rising current account deficits-in part because of
a slowing in worker remittances-resulted in a
drawdown in official foreign exchange from a peak
of $1.4 billion in 1979 to $313 million at the end of
1983.
In the fall of 1983, Sanaafinally began to take some
of the politically difficult steps needed to improve
economic performance, including cutbacks in govern-
ment spending. By May 1984, US Embassy officials
had noted improvements. Salary freezes, budget cuts,
and a temporary halt in government spending on
construction and development projects helped stem
the outflow of hard currency.
Raising import duties, however, has spurred inflation
and smuggling. The value of smuggled imports, in the
view of some Western observers in Sanaa, is estimat-
ed to be as much as half the value of officially
recorded imports. Much of the privately held foreign
exchange-which by some estimates is at least as
large as that within the banking system-finances
illegal imports. Devaluations of the Yemeni riyal in
February, May, and November 1984 were attempts to
bring the official rate in line with street rates and to
attract "mattress dollars" into official channels.
problems in the relationship. At the annual sessions,
Riyadh invariably cites its concern about the Soviet
presence in North Yemen. The Saudis also have
raised border issues and pressed Sanaa to redress
grievances of Saudi clients in North Yemen. The
Yemenis routinely seek additional funds while avoid-
ing commitments to the Saudis.
When North Yemen's economic woes mounted in
early 1983, we believe Riyadh perceived it had its best
opportunity in years to gain significant concessions
from Sanaa on the Soviet presence and the disputed
border. North Yemen's pleas throughout the spring
and summer of 1983 to convene the Joint Coordina-
tion Commission so the annual stipend could be
provided and Sanaa could ask for more aid were
The Saudis finally convened the Commission in late
October in Riyadh but agreed only to provide budget-
ary and project aid at 1982 levels.
he Saudis also offered to cover unfund-
ed portions of North Yemen's second five-year devel-
opment plan and lobby for North Yemen's entry into
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 the Gulf Cooperation Council as an associate member
in return for an extension of the 1934 Saudi-North
Yemeni Treaty of Taif (see the appendix and the
map). This treaty confirmed Saudi possession of the
Yemeni-claimed territories of Najran, `Asir, and Ji-
zan. Sanaa parried with a demand for a 30-percent
share of all revenues derived from exploitation of
mineral resources in the three provinces. For its part,
Riyadh made the usual demand that the Soviet
25X1 presence in North Yemen be greatly reduced or
eliminated and voiced concern about the growing
rapprochement between the two Yemens.
Despite its disappointment with the results of the
meeting, Sanaa continued to press for additional
Saudi funding. Salih's decision in November 1983 to
proceed with a long-rumored Cabinet shuffle-the
first major government shift since 1980-was primar-
ily intended to reassure the Yemeni public and the
Saudis that the government was serious about dealing
with the economic crisis. The increase in the number
of conservatives in the Cabinet-at least two had links
to Saudi-supported Muslim Brotherhood groups-
probably also was a sop to the Saudis. US Embassy
officials reported that the head of the Saudi military
training mission in Sanaa "almost gloated" over the
dismissal of Deputy Prime Minister for Economic
Affairs Hassan Makki and Foreign Minister Lutf al-
25X1 Thawr. Both were considered by Riyadh to be leftists.
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North Yemen's Tribes-Available to the Highest
Bidder
Riyadh easily outbids Sanaa in currying favor with
the northern tribesmen. The Salih regime objects to
its citizens' having private channels to Saudi Arabia,
but there is little it can do about it. Leading Yemeni
tribal shaykhs frequently attend the majlis (audience)
of Saudi Defense Minister Sultan and other senior
Saudi princes, and some Yemeni shaykhs hold both
Saudi and North Yemeni passports. US Embassy
officials in Sanaa estimate that as many as 1,000
shaykhs are on the Saudi dole with monthly stipends
ranging from $400 to $1,600 for a minor shaykh to as
much as $20,000 for the head shaykh of a powerful
tribe.
In addition to direct subsidies, the Saudis allow the
tribesmen a relatively free hand in smuggling. This is
an important source of income for tribes close to the
border. With the Saudis turning a blind eye and
Sanaa's authority restricted to major towns and cross-
ing points, the border has become a sieve. Truck
caravans under the protection of tribesmen armed
with machineguns and 75-mm recoilless rifles regu-
larly ply desert routes between Najran in Saudi
Arabia and the Ma'rib area, more than 250 kilome-
ters to the southeast.7--]
Despite Riyadh's heavy subventions, the tribesmen
remain an uncertain instrument of Saudi political
influence. Their loyalties to Riyadh-as well as to the
central government in Sanaa and even their own
shaykhs-are always subject to negotiation. Most
tribesmen share the Yemeni antipathy for Saudis and
either will not accept or will evade Saudi dictates.
Tribal and personal rivalries prevent the shaykhs from
presenting a united front against Sanaa, and Presi-
dent Salih has adeptly played the shaykhs against one
another. Over the years, moreover, tribal leaders have
lost some of their political influence. Salih has
resisted pressure to return the shaykhs to the com-
manding position they held in the early 1970s, when
shaykhly families controlled six of the 10 provincial
governorships. F__]
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Oil Concession and Boundary Disputes
Najran (oasis)
1,.Buqah
\ -'I-
DHUVIUHAMMAD
`` YAM
~Al\Hazm
^3~dd"awi i
BAN
AL HAR/TH
* M. rih t
AH.IDAH
Ash Sharawrah. '\ I
People's Democratic
Republic of Yemen
(South Yemen)
1 Oil sites
--- Modified Riyadh Line
--- Maximum Saudi Arabian border
claim (approximate)
Saudi Arabian province boundary
ABiDAH Major tribe of Bakil Confederacy
SANHAN Major tribe of Rashid Confederacy
0 50 100 Kilometers
0 50 100 Miles
Jazirat
Jabal ZugarQ
(Y A.R.)
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Border terrain south of Najran
oasis, Saudi Arabia. F-1
Border Clash at Buq'ah
Relations between Sanaa and Riyadh took a turn for
the worse during December 1983 and January 1984,
when Saudi and North Yemeni troops clashed near
Buq'ah in the north. This was the largest military
engagement fought by the Saudis since the border
fighting with South Yemen in November 1969. The
Saudis drove the Yemenis back in two major clashes
and continue to hold positions won in the fighting.
an attempt by North Yemeni troops to intercept
smugglers sparked the fighting. The Saudi military
buildup that followed the incident, however, was
unprecedented. By late January, Riyadh had deployed
more than 4,000 troops and several hundred armored
vehicles to the Najran area, including troops from
Riyadh's two most effective ground force units, the
National Guard's 1st Combined-Arms Battalion and
the Army's Airborne Brigade. Sanaa moved rein-
forcements to Buq'ah and Sa'dah but did not attempt
to match the Saudi buildup.F_-]
King Fahd and President Salih agreed to a mutual
pullback of troops during talks in January in Moroc-
co, where both were attending a meeting of the
Islamic Conference Organization.
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There
have been reports of occasional skirmishing since
January, although both sides have sought to avoid a
major confrontation. In April, Riyadh began reducing
its forces, and Saudi troop strength in the Najran area
is now near precrisis levels.
The North Yemen Oil Discovery
The discovery of oil in the disputed border area of
eastern North Yemen by Hunt Oil has added a major
new issue to relations with Saudi Arabia. US Embas-
sy officials reported last summer that the first test
well produced at a rate of about 10,000 barrels per
day (b/d). A second well in September was also
successful. President Salih has asked Hunt officials
not to discuss the results publicly because this would
arouse popular expectations. Hunt will drill additional
test wells to delineate the field and test at least seven
potentially oil-bearing structures in the 10,000-
square-kilometer concession. An additional drilling
rig was expected to arrive in December 1984.1
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Although Riyadh fears an economically and militarily
secure North Yemen, we do not expect the Saudis to
harass the drilling site directly. The Saudis realize
that North Yemen's stakes in the oil-concession area
are high and that, in contrast to the fighting at
Buq'ah, Riyadh could expect a determined North
Yemeni defense. In the Buq'ah fighting, moreover,
the Saudis operated from nearby bases at Najran and
Khamis Mushayt; they have no comparable advan-
tage farther south. Although the Saudi Air Force is
more than a match for the Yemenis, Saudi ground
troops would have to operate across roadless and
waterless desert terrain from their base at Ash Shar-
awrah, more than 250 kilometers from the oil wells.
In our opinion, the recently reinforced North Yemeni
garrisons at Al Hazm in the Wadi Jawf and at Ma'rib
are adequate to defend against a Saudi thrust.
Relations between the Saudis and Yemen's northern
tribes generally are successful when both sides per-
ceive direct advantages from cooperation. The Saudis
in 1981 and again in 1982, for example, encouraged
some of the tribes to respond to Sanaa's appeals to
raise a militia-known as the Popular Army-to join
North Yemeni Government troops infighting the
South Yemeni-based National Democratic Front.
Riyadh finances the militia, but payment is dispensed
by the North Yemeni Government to the tribal
shaykhs, who then distribute the money among their
followers. By 1983, according to US Embassy offi-
cials, theforce numbered some 40,000 tribesmen. The
size of the force probably has declined since then, but
several thousand continue on active service and are
stationed near the border with South Yemen. F___]
We believe Riyadh views the militia both as a counter
to North Yemeni Government forces and an institu-
tion that is susceptible to Saudi influence. For their
part; the tribal shaykhs see the militia as a source of
patronage to ensure the loyalty of tribal followers. At
the same time, they enhance their martial reputa-
tions-necessary in maintaining authority in the
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with, rather than in subordination to, the central
government.)
Hunt Oil officials initially reported that they believed
they had discovered a field that ultimately could
produce 100,000 b/d. This rate would exceed North
Yemen's current domestic consumption of 15,000 b/d
and is the minimum production considered necessary
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drilling is successful, field development and construc-
tion of a pipeline to the coast are expected to take at
least five years. F__1
Yemeni leaders have been alert to signs that Riyadh
might try to interfere with oil-exploration activities.
US Embassy officials note that the boundaries of the
concession area were carefully drawn well within
territory claimed by North Yemen. Nevertheless, at
least half of the concession is in areas that have been
claimed by the Saudis in the past. F__1
If the Yemenis push oil-exploration activities much
farther east of the present sites, this will risk a Saudi
reaction. Although the Saudis are unlikely to inter-
vene directly, Riyadh could encourage local tribesmen
to harass the drilling parties. Many members of the
`Abidah tribe, who dominate the Ma'rib area, have
traditionally considered themselves to be a "Saudi"
tribe and could disrupt exploration activities. F__]
The US-Saudi-North Yemeni Triangle
US-North Yemeni relations have been stormy and
frequently entwined with each country's relations
with Saudi Arabia. Sanaa severed ties with Washing-
ton over US support for Israel in the 1967 Arab-
Israeli war and resumed them in 1972 only after a
visit to Sanaa by a high-level US delegation. North
Yemenis periodically indicate an interest in warmer
ties but insist that Washington must deal with Sanaa
independently of Riyadh.)
Although the United States has provided modest
amounts of economic aid to North Yemen, the US
military assistance program has had greater promi-
nence. Major deliveries of military equipment began
in 1979, when the United States, at Saudi urging,
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members of his entourage.
rushed to support North Yemen against attacks by
South Yemeni forces in February. Since then, the
United States has provided more than $300 million in
military equipment, munitions, and training pro-
grams, most of it financed by Saudi grants.)
The Saudis are ambivalent about these US programs.
Riyadh views US assistance as necessary to maintain
a North Yemen strong enough to provide a secure
buffer against South Yemen, but it does not want
Sanaa strengthened to the point where it presents a
threat to Saudi Arabia. Changing perceptions in
Riyadh of North Yemen's strength have led the
Saudis periodically to urge greater US assistance and
then to interfere later .with US programs. F__1
The Yemenis constantly complain to US officials that
Washington's programs are subject to a Saudi veto.
They claimed, for example, that the delivery of vitally
needed ammunition during the National Democratic
Front insurgency was impeded in 1982 by Saudi
Arabia to weaken the North Yemeni regime.F__1
The oil strike in July 1984 by the Hunt Oil Company,
however, has changed Yemeni perceptions of the
United States. US Embassy officials in Sanaa note
that many Yemenis had expected Washington to
defer to the Saudis and press Hunt to limit its
activities or even break off its search for oil. In the
euphoria that followed the strike, Washington is
credited with having facilitated the operation. F_
The Impact of the Soviet Presence
North Yemen's ties with the Soviet Union are a major
topic in Sanaa's relations with Riyadh because these
ties have long irritated the Saudis. In the late stages
of the civil war in the mid-1960s, the Soviets came to
the aid of the Yemeni republicans who were fighting
the Saudi-backed royalists. Most important, the Sovi-
ets mounted an airlift to help break the royalist siege
of Sanaa. After the civil war, North Yemeni-Soviet
relations cooled as Sanaa increasingly relied on Saudi
aid, the government moved away from strongly leftist
positions, and the Soviets stepped up aid to the leftist
regime in Aden. In 1979, however, President Salih
concluded a $700 million arms deal with Moscow
after failing to secure Saudi financing for the addi-
tional arms Sanaa believed necessary to counter the
South Yemeni military threat. Subsequent arms deals
have pushed North Yemen's military debt to the
USSR to nearly $1.2 billion.
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We estimate that there are 500 to 700 Soviet and East
European military advisers and technicians in North
Yemen. About 300 Soviets and East Europeans are
employed in civilian projects, such as the Soviet-
funded Bajil cement plant. At any one time approxi-
mately 500 North Yemeni officers and enlisted men
are enrolled in training programs in the USSR, and
an additional 2,000 civilians attend Soviet universi-
ties. Nonetheless, Sanaa sets clear bounds on the
activity of the Soviet Mission in Yemen. According to
US Embassy officials, Soviet military advisers have
only limited access to military units, even at the
brigade level, unless there is a specific requirement for
technical assistance.
Moreover, Soviet officials fear hostile
tribesmen and are reluctant to travel beyond the
environs of Sanaa, Al Hudaydah, and Ta'izz. F_
We believe that North Yemen's recently updated
friendship and cooperation treaty with Moscow is in
part intended as a warning that Sanaa would not
hesitate to turn to the Soviets for major support if the
Saudi military were to threaten the Hunt Oil opera-
tions. In addition, the relationship with the USSR
probably is viewed in Sanaa as a means of encourag-
ing Moscow to restrain South Yemen and limit Soviet
and South Yemeni aid to Salih's opponents.F__1
In the unlikely event that Sanaa shifted decisively
toward Riyadh and Washington, we believe the Sovi-
ets would react by mobilizing their sympathizers in
the military to bring pressure on the regime to reverse
its course. Moscow might also urge Aden to renew
support to NDF insurgents. At a minimum, the
Soviets would threaten to curtail their military pro-
grams. Sanaa probably realizes this and cannot be
sure that either the United States or Saudi Arabia
would provide the quantity of military equipment the
Soviets have offered. Other potential Western suppli-
ers are likely to charge higher prices, and their
weaponry would not be compatible with Sanaa's
present inventory. This gives Sanaa strong incentives
to keep the North Yemeni-Soviet military link intact.
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Outlook for North Yemeni-Saudi Relations
Saudi-North Yemeni relations will continue to come
under recurrent strains. Saudi pressure for political
accommodations by Sanaa in return for vitally needed
economic aid will persist. Moreover, we believe that
Riyadh is apprehensive that its longstanding patron-
client relationship with Sanaa will be eroded if North
Yemen develops a significant oil export capability.
Although Riyadh is prepared, in our opinion, to allow
North Yemen to exploit the oil discovery, we do not
believe it will formally renounce claims to the territo-
ry east of Ma'rib and in the Wadi Jawf unless Sanaa
is willing to negotiate a substantial quid pro quo-
perhaps a settlement of outstanding border issues in
the north. The Saudis will, in any case, continue to
press Sanaa for negotiations on the northern border,
anticipating that, if North Yemen's economy im-
proves, the chances of obtaining a settlement on
favorable terms would be lessened. President Salih,
however, will attempt to defer border talks indefinite-
ly, knowing that he or any other Yemeni leader would
run great personal risk if perceived by Yemeni nation-
alists to be overly accommodating to Riyadh.F--]
The Saudis also may expect that Sanaa-anticipating
early returns from the oil strikes-will overcommit
itself on development plans and require periodic and
costly financial bailouts by Riyadh. While seeking to
limit such outlays, we believe the Saudis would
welcome the continuation of their present patron-
client relationship with North Yemen to retain lever-
age in Sanaa.l
Implications for the United States
Salih will continue to use his Soviet ties carefully to
influence the United States as well as Saudi Arabia.
Salih views the Soviet presence as an essential counter
to Saudi pressure, and we see little prospect that he
will reduce it significantly. We believe that further
gestures of friendship toward Moscow can be expect-
ed as Salih attempts to avoid repayment of Sanaa's
massive military debt to the USSR.F__1
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The Hunt Oil discovery that has sparked a slight
upturn in US-North Yemeni relations has provided
the Yemenis with a strong reason for developing
closer ties to the United States. The oil discovery is
the one bright spot in the economy, and the fact that a
US firm made the find is a major plus for Washing-
ton. Moreover, we believe Salih will press for expand-
ed relations with the United States as a useful check
on the Saudis and a counter to the Soviets. He
perceives Washington, however, as reluctant to irri-
tate the Saudis by seeking an expanded role in North
Yemen. He probably sees little prospect of an early
dramatic improvement in relations, and he will re-
main sensitive to signs of Saudi influence on US
actions.)
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Appendix
The Troubled Borderlands-
The Legacy of the Treaty of Taif
Much of North Yemen's frontier with Saudi Arabia
has never been fully defined. The northern border
follows the crests of mountain ridges for approximate-
ly 320 kilometers inland from the Red Sea to the
vicinity of Najran. Established by the Treaty of Taif
following the Saudi defeat of North Yemen in 1934, it
is the only part of the border between the two
countries that has been accepted as an internationally
recognized boundary. Nonetheless, Yemenis remain
unreconciled to the northern boundary, and many
assert a national claim to the Najran oasis, the Jizan
area, and the "lost" province of `Asir. Some Yemenis
even claim the Ash Sharawrah area in the eastern
desert, now a major Saudi frontier military base.
Although the inhabitants of southwestern Saudi Ara-
bia culturally and linguistically are closer to Yemenis
than they are to other Saudis, there is little historical
substance to the Yemeni claims. Past Yemeni dynas-
ties only briefly held hegemony over `Asir. The terri-
torial union between North Yemen and `Asir under
19th- century Ottoman rule was imposed from the
outside and was only partly effective. In recent years,
Riyadh has funded investments in the region to
cement local loyalties to the House of Saud.F___1
From Najran to the east, the frontier crosses the still
largely unsurveyed western reaches of the Rub' al
Khali (Empty Quarter). Saudi and Yemeni claims in
the area overlap as much as 160 kilometers. The
Yemenis base their claim on the line declared unilat-
erally by the British in 1955 to be Saudi Arabia's
border and commonly called the "Modified Riyadh
Line." Saudi Arabia has never officially accepted the
"Modified Riyadh Line." Saudis repeatedly assert
title to all of the interior desert while conceding to the
Yemenis the mountains to the west and south.
President Salih is particularly sensitive to the border
issue and Yemeni claims to `Asir, Jizan, and Najran.
In May 1983,
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March, he acknowledged to the US Ambassador that
the Saudi demand for a definitive boundary agree-
ment "would pose extremely difficult political issues
for Yemenis." Salih has threatened to put the matter
to a national plebiscite, a move that is intended as a
signal that Sanaa will not give in on the dispute. P
In our view, Riyadh wants to remove any basis for
Yemeni claims that the border forced on the Imamate
government at Taif in 1934 is not binding on the
present regime. Riyadh also wants formal boundaries
to facilitate tightening of security on its side of the
generally lawless frontier. Brigandage by North Ye-
meni and even South Yemeni tribesmen is common-
place in the border region. F__1
We believe the Saudis are primarily concerned with
the area south and east of Najran, where the border
has not been demarcated. Saudi and Yemeni troops
have clashed repeatedly in this region in recent years.
Reported Saudi attempts to shift border markers to
take advantage of a change in affiliation by a Yemeni
tribe to Saudi nationality may have sparked the
upsurge of fighting that took place in October 1983.
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capital of the northern tribes.
The Saudis have generally refused to cooperate with
Sanaa's efforts to control cross-border smuggling,
since open frontiers facilitate Riyadh's economic role
in the northern tribal region of North Yemen. More-
over, powerful Saudi officials in Najran are widely
believed to have major interests in smuggling and
probably lobby Riyadh to ignore the issue.F__1
We suspect that Riyadh is concerned by the proximity
to the border of an airfield the Yemenis began
building near Buq'ah in 1982. Although the location
is south of the so-called "Modified Riyadh Line,"
according to some maps published in Riyadh it lies
within Saudi-claimed territory. The Yemenis claim
that the airfield is intended to support the antismug-
gling drive, but we believe that it can accommodate
military aircraft. Riyadh probably objects to what it
sees as Sanaa's attempt to "create facts" on the
ground before a final settlement of the frontier is
negotiated.F__1
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