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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86S00588R000200230002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate oft_
Intelligence
Hungary: Growing Nationalism
-S -
EUR 85-10121
July 1985
COPY 2 9 7
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Hungary: Growing Nationalism
This paper was prepared by
Office of European Analysis. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, East
European Division, EUR
Secret
EUR 85-10121
July 1985
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Hungary: Growing Nationalism
Key Judgments In the last five years or so, the Kadar regime has allowed, and even
Information available contributed to, a revival of Hungarian nationalist feeling. It has done so in
as of 10 June 1985 part to win back some of the popular approval it lost when it imposed aus-
was used in this report.
terity measures to cope with the economic setbacks of the 1980s.
Senior party officials, also deeply concerned about the growing cynicism,
alienation, and rejection of official ideology among the young, may view
the careful cultivation of national pride as a way to instill confidence in the
party as a defender of national interests. In addition, there are signs that
party General Secretary Kadar, while still a committed Marxist-Leninist,
is concerned that history should see him as more than just the man who
subjugated Hungary to the USSR in 1956.
Whatever the reasons, Budapest has taken a number of steps in recent
years to play to the genuinely popular sense of Hungarian nationalism. It
has:
? Stepped up criticism of Romanian and Czechoslovak treatment of their
large Hungarian minorities.
? Attempted-and in several cases succeeded-to secure the release of
ethnic Hungarian activists from jails in Prague and Bucharest-initia-
tives unprecedented in Warsaw Pact relations.
? Launched a campaign to glorify history and draw flattering camparisons
between present-day Hungary and its past glories.
? Advocated a larger role for Hungary in bridging differences between the
superpowers and even, in a January 1984 statement by the party's top
foreign policy official, called for the primacy of national interests over
Soviet Bloc solidarity.
? Continued to pursue-despite Soviet grumbling-high-level contacts
with the West since NATO began INF deployments in 1983.
The growth of nationalism entails serious risks for Hungary. Emphasis on
glorifying "the good old days," after all, comes close to acknowledging that
today's society leaves much to be desired. In addition, some of the
territorial issues associated with Hungarian nationalism, if allowed to
flower, would seriously disrupt Warsaw Pact unity. The nationalist revival
has already led to an exchange of polemics, for example, at the highest lev-
els of the Romanian and Hungarian Governments over the Hungarian
minority in Romania, and has spawned Czechoslovak criticism of Hunga-
ry. Moscow, moreover, has weighed in by printing the Czechoslovak
criticism but not the Hungarian rebuttal, and by warning Budapest in the
Soviet media earlier this year against "bourgeois nationalism."
Secret
EUR 85-10121
July 1985
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The risks are potentially greater in the future. The nationalist samizdat,
which already has caused the regime concern by gravitating toward the
minority issue in Romania and Czechoslovakia, may begin to examine
Soviet policies toward the Hungarian minority in the Ukraine. The USSR
also may grow increasingly concerned about the impact of the squabbling
between Hungary and Romania and Czechoslovakia. Soviet displeasure
could prove costly because Hungary's relatively liberal political and
economic policies ultimately rest on Soviet toleration. Nationalism also
could raise domestic expectations that the regime is unable to meet, which,
in turn, could undermine popular perceptions of the regime and drive a
wedge between the leadership and the population.
The Kadar regime, in our view, is likely to try to remain on its current
course, cautiously responding to public pressure on the minority issue,
carefully cultivating national feeling as a source of popularity, and
periodically cracking down when the nationalist movement threatens to
gather too much momentum on a delicate issue. We believe the leadership
probably will keep nationalism under control during the next few years-in
large part because of Kadar's skill at manipulating public opinion.
Nationalism might prove more difficult to manage in the event of a serious
escalation of ethnic tension in neighboring states, a major economic
downturn, or after Kadar's departure from the leadership. None of his
potential successors appears to share his talents, and a less capable leader
could be hard pressed to keep nationalist passions in check.
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Contents
Key Judgments
Signs of Growing Nationalism
The Regime's Play to Nationalism
5
Glorifying History
6
Foreign Policy and National Interest
7
A Balancing Act
9
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Hungary: Growing Nationalism
tttroduction
;u igii riah nationalism, dormant for many years after
,the.sbattering events of 1956, has begun to reawaken.
The Kadar"regime, which in the past decried this
`sentiment; has been responding .to and even cau-
tiously exploiting-reviving national feeling in order
.toiolster its own legitimacy and divert public atten-
;tion from the current economic slowdown. Such a
policy is risky because Hungarian nationalism is a
potentially dangerous mix of ethnocentrism and anti-
Russian sentiment that could quickly become a major
irritant to its Warsaw Pact._allies. The alleged abuse
of large Hungarian minorities in.neighboring East
European' countries is currently the most emotional
nationalist issue facing Hungarian leaders. This paper
examines the nationalist revival and assesses its for-
eign and domestic implications.
Nationalism has historically stirred strong passions in
Hungary. It has repeatedly inspired heroic, if futile,
rebellions against foreign domination and more than
once has drawn Hungary into armed conflict with its
neighbors. The ethnocentrism inherent in most na-
tionalisms, moreover, is particularly acute in the
Hungarian case. Surrounded by a sea of Slavic, Latin,
and Germanic peoples, Hungarians have always har-
bored a strong sense of cultural uniqueness as well as
a fear that their small nation will be swallowed by its
larger neighbors. Hungarian nationalism also has
traditionally had a strong anti-Russian flavor based
on unhappy historical experience.
While we cannot point to any. particular causal event,
in our judgment several factors combined to produce a
nationalist revival as the 1970s drew to a close. Before
then, the 20th century had not been especially kind to
the Hungarians, who suffered through defeat and
territorial dismemberment in two World Wars, recur-
rent periods of severe social and economic dislocation,
and the bloody suppression of the 1956 uprising. In
the late 1970s, however, the foundations for a resur-
gence of national pride and self-confidence had been
laid by a general economic dynamism, political stabil-
ity under a government benevolent by historical stan-
dards, and living standards that compared favorably
with most neighbors' for the first time since World
War I. Growing concern over the worsening condi-
tions of the large Hungarian minorities in Romania
and Czechoslovakia also stimulated national feeling.
Perhaps equally important is that the Hungarians
enjoy a degree of freedom of expression unmatched
anywhere in the Soviet Bloc, save possibly Poland,
which permits them to discuss-and cautiously pro-
mote-nationalist causes.
stands.
The Hungarian population for several years has been
in the grips of a wave of nostalgia for pre-Communist
periods, especially for the immediate post-World War
II era and the last decades of the old Austro-
Hungarian monarchy. Films, books, records, and oth-
er memorabilia that recall these periods all appear to
reflect this fascination. The most openly nationalistic
example probably has been the enthusiastic popular
response to the 1983 rock opera Stephen the King
commemorating the nation's patron saint (see inset).
Another example is the striking success of the maga-
zine Historia since it appeared in 1979. Geared for a
mass audience rather than the academic specialist,
Historia's issues are devoted to such topics as the
alleged injustices of the World War I peace treaties,
the revanchist foreign policy of the Horthy regime
(1920-44), Hungary's role in the Habsburg monarchy,
and the Communist takeover in 1947-48. Issues have
often sold out within hours of appearing on news-
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Stephen the King
One of the most remarkable recent expressions of
popular nationalism has been the enthusiastic public
response to the rock opera Stephen the King (Istvan a
Kiraly). The opera, which premiered in Budapest on
20 August 1983 (Hungary's national day), is based on
the career of Stephen I (997-1038), founder of the
Hungarian state and Hungary's patron saint. Origi-
nally scheduled for a single performance, it was
extended by popular demand to a seven-night run,
ultimately playing to an audience of more than
100,000. It has since become a popular movie and
spawned a hit record. Although the opera represents
an impressive artistic achievement by its composers,
Janos Brody and Levente Szorenyi, the real source of
its appeal appears to be its nationalistic message,
which inspired audiences to wave Hungarian flags
and burst into the national anthem at the close of
each performance.
The nationalist symbolism of the opera appears to
operate on two levels. On the one hand, Stephen is one
of Hungary's foremost traditional heroes, whose
achievements represent a stirring moment of national
glory. Western observers have noted, however, that
the opera's portrayal of Stephen's kingdom appears
to be a transparent allegory for contemporary Hunga-
ry.. Stephen is depicted as a man who ruled at a
crucial juncture, when national survival demanded a
leader able to preserve Hungary's autonomous identi-
ty while maintaining good relations with a far more
powerful neighbor (Germany) and assimilating a new
and alien philosophy (Christianity). Stephen prudent-
ly forges an alliance with the German emperor and,
with the help of German missionaries, establishes
Christianity as the new state religion. Faced with a
pagan revolt, which espouses freedom from foreign
thrall but promises only national destruction, Ste-
phen enlists the aid of German troops, triumphs over
Both US Embassy and Western media reporting also
indicate rising popular concern during the last few
years over the situation of the Hungarian minorities
in Romania and Czechoslovakia (see inset and map).
Several prominent intellectuals have recently indicat-
ed to US Embassy officers that Hungary is experienc-
ing a groundswell of popular interest in this issue that,
his adversaries, and inaugurates a long period of
peace, progress, and happiness. It requires little
imagination to substitute Kadarfor Stephen, the
USSR for Germany, and Marxism-Leninism for
Christianity in order to arrive at a story that seeks to
cloak the current regime in a mantle of historically
rooted national legitimacy.
in turn, has been reflected in a flood of literature
examining the background and current-state of minor-
ity life. While treatment of this subject in officially
sanctioned publications has been relatively restrained,
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Living Conditions for Hungarian Minorities in
Neighboring States
The conditions of minority life vary widely from
country to country. Hungarians fare relatively well in
Yugoslavia, where they enjoy an important voice in
local government, considerable cultural autonomy,
and easy access to Hungary. Soviet Hungarians are
less fortunate. Although the Soviet authorities pro-
vide Hungarian schools and sponsor certain Hungar-
ian cultural activities, the minority lives in one of the
least developed regions of the European USSR and
has only limited contact with conationals in other
countries.
The most acute problems, however, prevail in Roma-
nia and Czechoslovakia, where conflicting national-
isms, mutual ethnic prejudices, and official policy all
work to poison relations between Hungarians and the
majority populations. Some of the difficulties faced
by Hungarians in Romania and Czechoslovakia do
not result from official policies of discrimination.
The hardline regimes in Bucharest and Prague are
wary of all forms of intellectual and cultural diversi-
ty, and Hungarians generally face the same strictures
25X1 as members of the ethnic majorities.
Minority Hungarians, however, are prone to draw
highly unfavorable comparisons between the repres-
sive political systems in the host countries and the
relatively relaxed climate that prevails in Hungary.
Similarly, the Ceausescu regime's mismanagement of
the Romanian economy contrasts poorly with Buda-
pest's innovative and more successful economic poli-
cies. Sensitive to these negative comparisons and
afraid of ideological contamination from their more
liberal neighbor, both the Romanians and Czechoslo-
vaks further aggravate minority relations by restrict-
ing cultural interchange with Hungary and by imped-
ing personal contacts between citizens of their
countries and residents of Hungary. Another source
of minority discontent, especially in Romania, is
economic and demographic change that threatens the
dominant position historically enjoyed by Hungar-
ians in regional society. Such change has occurred in
Transylvania as a result of Bucharest's efforts to
bring in new workers to modernize and industrialize
the region, prompting local Hungarians to suspect
that the regime's policy is designed to dilute their
numerical superiority. F__1
Hungarians in Romania and Czechoslovakia also
suffer certain disabilities flowing directly from their
minority status. Both countries guarantee their mi-
norities equal rights, administer Hungarian-language
educational systems, and underwrite Hungarian cul-
tural life. Reality, however, often falls short of
official promises. In both countries, Hungarian
schools have declined dramatically in number, quali-
ty, and variety since the 1950s, and both host govern-
ments have gerrymandered local concentrations of
Hungarians. Moreover, anti-Hungarian prejudices
are relatively widespread among Romanians and
Slovaks. Both peoples are inclined to perceive them-
selves as victims of centuries-long Hungarian rule in
Slovakia and Transylvania. Consequently, Hungar-
ians often encounter petty harassment from local
Slovak and Romanian officials and reportedly also
suffer job and housing discrimination. At the same
time, the Romanian regime helps to fuel Hungarian
minority discontent by pursuing nationalistic policies
that offend Hungarians by denigrating their histori-
cal role in Transylvanian life.
Some of the blame for ethnic tension in Romania and
Czechoslovakia, however, lies with the Hungarians
themselves. Many of them appear to place loyalty to
their ethnic community above loyalty to their country
of citizenship. Moreover, Hungarians seem fully to
reciprocate Slovak and Romanian ethnic prejudices.
Minority Hungarians in Bratislava, which has been
the Slovak capital for more than 65 years and has
had a Slovak majority for a century, recently told a
French reporter, for example, that the unsophisticat-
ed Slovaks were destroying the city because they
"lacked urban traditions.'
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Europe's Largest Minority
G.D.R.`' $ad
F,driat
Sea
Balaton
Nagykanizsa
Major Hungarian concentrations
-- Pre-1920 Hungarian boundary
0 200
Pecs
More than 3 million Hungarians, representing Europe's largest
national minority, live in the East European states that neighbor
Hungary. Romania's Hungarian population, which exceeds 2
million, is concentrated in Transylvania. Czechoslovakia's minor-
ity, clustered along the Hungarian border in southern Slovakia,
numbers 630,000. Northeastern Yugoslavia is home to 435,000
more Hungarians, and 171,000 remain in western Ukrainian
territory annexed by the Soviets from Czechoslovakia after World
War II.F
0'
Szeged
T
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Deebbrecen'
l .
Tmi;oara Hunedoara
\r\ J Petro;ani,, (.~' 1~"f?t
~Mokachevo -~
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samizdat literature, written in some cases by respect-
ed establishment literary figures, has often been
harshly critical of Romanian and Czechoslovak mi-
nority policy
Since 1982, sympathy for the plight of conationals in
economically troubled Romania has repeatedly
prompted Hungarians to organize the collection of
food parcels. The Hungarian authorities, meanwhile,
have come under public pressure to pursue a more
assertive policy, and, on a number of occasions,
leading intellectuals have petitioned the party and
government to intervene on behalf of minority leaders
imprisoned or allegedly maltreated by the Czechoslo-
vaks and Romanians. In 1982, for example, 80 lead-
ing academic and literary personalities publicly en-
dorsed a protest against Romanian minority policies
sent by Transylvanian Hungarian dissidents to the
CSCE Conference in Madrid.)
The minority issue also has spilled over into a contro-
versy surrounding the potential environmental impact
of a joint Hungarian-Czechoslovak hydroelectric pro-
ject on the Danube. After considerable monetary
outlay, the Czechoslovaks have nearly completed their
part of the project. Budapest, which has barely begun
its portion, has encountered widespread public opposi-
tion. Last summer, for example, almost 7,000 people
signed a petition asking the government to break its
agreement with Prague. Not since 1956 have so many
Hungarians publicly declared their disapproval of any
official policy. the
opposition is motivated, in addition to concerns about
water pollution, by the fact that the project will flood
areas in southern Slovakia populated almost exclu-
sively by ethnic Hungarians.
Although the Hungarians have refrained from openly
demonstrating their traditional antipathy for Rus-
sians, this sentiment never lies far beneath the sur-
face. Last year, for example, according to an Embassy
officer, a well-publicized wreath-laying ceremony in
Budapest by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko failed
to draw a crowd, and an embarrassed Gromyko ended
the event by smiling and waving to the largest group
of spectators-a handful of US consular employees
watching from Embassy windows. Extensive Embassy
reporting generally indicates that, while Hungarians
avoid open hostility toward Russians, they frequently
voice distaste and mild contempt for Soviet people,
culture, and products.
Thus far the intelligentsia has taken the leading role
in the nationalist revival, but evidence 25X1
suggests that nationalism strikes a respon-
sive chord at virtually all levels of society. For exam.25X1
ple, a series of confidential public opinion surveys
conducted by the Hungarian Mass Media Research
Center reveals the strength-and growth-of national
feeling among the population. In one poll taken in
1971, only 43 percent of workers and 70 percent of
university students responded accurately to questions
about the Hungarian minorities in Eastern Europe.
By 1979, however, a similar poll saw the accurate
responses climb to nearly 100 percent for both groups.
Another confidential Hungarian study in 1982 of
national consciousness among children 10 to 14 years
old suggested that ethnocentrism, awareness of the
minority issue, and antipathy toward some of
Hungary's neighbors, especially the Romanians and
Soviets, are all widespread at this age:2F I
The Minority Question
Official Hungarian criticism of treatment given mi-
nority Hungarians has had a long history, but it
entered its present, more dramatic phase in 1977,
when a summit designed to ease ethnic tension failed
to have satisfactory results. A few months after the
meeting, the official Hungarian press carried two
Z When asked, for example, to rank a list of 26 political expressions,
a sample of children from all social backgrounds responded most
positively to those with the clearest national content-"Hungarian
Anthem" and "red-white-green flag." Among the expressions that
fared more poorly were "socialism" (seventh most positive), "mon-
ey" (eighth), "Party" (ninth), and "God" (16th). The study also
provides some indirect evidence that the children are aware of the
situation of Hungarians in Romania. Only 28 percent of respon-
dents answered affirmatively to the question, "Would you change
places for a year with a Hungarian child in Romania?" The
affirmative answers rose to 50 percent for Czechoslovakia and 60
percent for Yugoslavia 25X1
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articles by the fiery nationalist poet Gyula Illyes,'
who, while avoiding specific reference to Romania,
likened the fate of minority Hungarians to that of
South African blacks under apartheid. These articles
were followed by thinly veiled media attacks on
Bucharest's minority policies and the "injustices" of
Trianon.' The tone has occasionally become quite
shrill, as in 1982 when the leading party daily pub-
lished a satire that cruelly caricatured Ceausescu,
implicitly ridiculed Romania's policies toward nation-
alism, and indirectly attacked Romanian treatment of
the Hungarian minority.
The minority issue has heated up since August 1984,
when Hungary's criticism of Romanian minority poli-
cies escalated to the level of party-to-party communi-
cations. In November, for example, the Hungarian
leadership's official greeting to the Romanian party
congress indirectly criticized Romanian minority poli-
cies. About the same time, the guidelines for the
Hungarian congress issued by the Party Central
Committee bluntly asserted that Hungary could "jus-
tifiably demand" that minority Hungarians be able to
foster their language and culture. At the March party
congress, several speakers spoke about the plight of
the minorities, and Imre Pozsgay, leader of the Peo-
ple's Patriotic Front, devoted most of his speech to the
subject, stating that maltreatment of minorities was
unworthy of civilized nations.
Budapest, in a
move unprecedented in relations among East Europe-
an Communist states, also has quietly sought the
release of ethnic Hungarian leaders from Czechoslo-
vak and Romanian jails. Hungarian intercession has
had some success in both cases. Romanian authorities
released ethnic Hungarian samizdat editor Attila
' Illyes (1902-83), whose artistic achievements have won popular
acclaim and frequent official recognition, is a major figure in 20th-
century Hungarian literature. An impassioned nationalist, he began
during the 1970s to speak out boldly on the minority issue,
occasionally earning official censure for granting controversial
interviews to Western journalists on the subject.0
'The Treaty of Trianon (1920), which marked Hungary's defeat in
World War I, cost Budapest nearly three-fourths of its prewar
territory and left millions of ethnic Hungarians in surrounding
states. Among Hungary's losses were Transylvania (to Romania),
Croatia and the Vojvodina (to Yugoslavia), and Slovakia and the
Trans-Carpathian Ukraine (to Czechoslovakia). F__-]
Ara-Kovacs and allowed him to emigrate to Hunga-
ry,- while the Czechoslovaks amended the charges
against ethnic Hungarian Charter 77 dissident Miklos
Duray in order to release him under the V-E Day
amnesty. F_~
Glorifying History
The Kadar regime's efforts to encourage pride in the
nation's past constitute a policy shift. Recent Hungar-
ian history conjures up many unsettling memories-
the revanchist interwar foreign policies of the right-
wing Horthy regime, Hungary's wartime alliance
with Nazi Germany, the brutal Stalinism of the early
1950s, and the 1956 revolution. Consequently, a
leadership wary of offending its allies or stirring up
.domestic political controversy chose until the 1970s
simply to play down the past and to concentrate
instead on advertising the economic achievements of
the present.
The authorities now appear to have concluded that
the benefits of cultivating pride in Hungary's past
outweigh potential risks. The leadership, in our judg-
ment, apparently believes that such a campaign will
bolster its popularity at a time when faltering eco-
nomic performance and stagnating living standards
are increasing alienation and pessimism about the
future among the population. Consequently, the re-
gime has taken a number of steps designed, in our
view, to highlight Hungary's national heritage. The
regime scored a major coup in 1978 by negotiating the
return of St. Stephen's crown, Hungary's most trea-
sured national symbol, from its 34-year American
exile. The increase in historical literature since the
late 1970s and the staging of Stephen the King almost
certainly have enjoyed high-level sanction. Moreover,
in 1982 the Party Central Committee's Agitprop
Department hosted a conference that studied ways of
enhancing public awareness of the nation's past.
During the last 18 months, the regime appears to have
redoubled its efforts to promote history as a source of
national pride. Government and party officials have
' Embassy sources report that the Hungarian authorities have not
prevented Ara-Kovacs from publishing an underground newsletter
7FX1
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repeatedly urged the public to take more interest in
the Hungarian past. For example, at the beginning of
this year, the state television network began closing its
broadcasting day by playing the national anthem and
showing scenes recalling Hungary's historic splen-
dor-a move applauded by the Communist Youth
League newspaper as a good way to familiarize young
people with their national heritage. Moreover, in
sharp contrast to the past, the regime celebrated with
great fanfare the 15 March anniversary of Hungary's
1848-49 uprising against Austria, an undertaking that
ended in defeat after Russian intervention on the
Austrian side.
Foreign Policy and National Interest
The regime also has been subtly shifting Hungarian
foreign policy toward greater assertiveness of national
interests. In an article published in January 1984,
party secretary for international affairs Matyas
Szuros stressed the importance of national interest in
the formulation of foreign policy. Tracing the devel-
opment of the international Communist movement, he
asserted that the interests' of ruling Communist par-
ties no longer necessarily mirror those of the USSR as
they did in the days of the Comintern and Comin-
form. In today's world, he wrote, Communist states
may collaborate closely with each other through
mechanisms like CEMA and the Warsaw Pact, but
each party must assign first priority to national
interests, which can be subordinated to international
ones only in "extraordinary circumstances."
Public
statements by other senior Hungarian officials-in-
cluding party chief Kadar-also have stressed the
special role that Hungary and other small and middle-
sized states in both blocs can play in bridging differ-
25X1 ences between the superpowers.
The desire to protect their vital economic links with
the West also has led the Hungarians to promote their
own interests more vigorously on the international
scene. During late 1983 and 1984, when Moscow
pressed its allies to adopt a harder line toward the
West in response to NATO INF deployment, Buda-
pest continued to espouse East-West dialogue and to
maintain cordial relations with Western governments.
the Hungarians
also attempted-with some success-to soften anti-
Western Soviet rhetoric in communiques following
several high-level Warsaw Pact meetings in 1983-84.
Despite Soviet grumbling, moreover, Budapest last
year played host to the leaders of three of the West
European governments that had agreed to accept INF
basing-British Prime Minister Thatcher, Italian
Premier Craxi, and West German Chancellor Kohl.
Budapest has backed away from further dramatic
statements of foreign policy autonomy since last
autumn, when the agreement to resume the Geneva
arms talks improved the atmosphere of East-West
relations. This has led the Soviets, in our judgment, to
ease pressure on the East Europeans to curtail con-
tacts with the West, thus removing the incentive and
need for Budapest to chafe at Moscow's tether.
Should East-West tensions increase again, however,
we believe the Hungarians would try to preserve their
Western contacts but, in the final analysis, would
yield to very strong Soviet pressure.
The regime's efforts to court nationalism, in our
judgment, stem in large part from its perceived need
to respond to popular pressure. Some of the issues
raised by the nationalist revival, especially the Hun-
garian minority question, are laden with emotion, and
the authorities probably are concerned that ignoring
them would undermine what popularity'the regime
enjoys. Careful manipulation of the issue, meanwhile,
offers substantial advantages. By actively cultivating
its image as an advocate of national interests abroad,
encouraging positive comparisons between present
achievements and past glory, and posing as a defender
and patron of the Hungarian minorities in neighbor-
ing countries, Hungary's rulers can enhance their
popularity and solidify their national legitimacy.
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Current trends in the economy and in the economic
reform program also may make a play to popular
nationalism attractive now that living standards are
not improving rapidly as they did in the 1970s. The
Kadar regime, long wary of the potentially explosive
character of nationalism and committed to a Marxist-
Leninist ideology that scorns ethnocentrism in favor
of proletarian internationalism, traditionally preferred
to seek popular acceptance by providing increasing
material abundance. In the 1980s, however, economic
performance has faltered and Budapest has been
obliged to introduce austerity measures and hold
down living standards in order to service its foreign
debt.
The regime's economic decision makers apparently
believe that sustained recovery lies in reforms involv-
ing greater enterprise autonomy, more wage differen-
tiation, and an expanded official role for the private
sector. These reforms have been welcomed by entre-
preneurs, skilled workers in service occupations, some
of the bolder enterprise managers, and others who can
successfully exploit new economic opportunities. Party
leaders have admitted-most recently at the March
party congress-that reform is not universally popu-
lar, however. It also brings inflation, lower relative
wages, and the possibility of unemployment for many
blue-collar workers, favored by the old system.
these workers-
especially those in heavy industry whose skills are not
readily adaptable to changing circumstances-
The greater national assertiveness in foreign policy
also has, in our judgment, largely an economic basis.
Budapest is deeply
concerned that any strains in superpower relations
will seriously threaten its vital economic links to the
West. During the last few years, Budapest has made a
sustained effort to develop export markets in Western
`A classified public opinion survey taken in 1981 by the Party
Central Committee indicates striking differences between the elites
and the working class over the desirability of economic reform. The
survey, which broke down its sample by education and party
affiliation rather than social class, showed that individuals with a
university education-regardless of party membership-tended to
favor economic liberalization and to take a more positive view of
the future. Those with less education expressed greater concern for
their future material well-being and were far less enthusiastic about
the reform program
Europe and the United States and to secure financial
assistance from Western banks. Last February, for
example, economic reform czar Ferenc Havasi made a
lengthy visit to the United States to promote econom-
ic ties. The regime apparently believes-and we
agree-that its innovative economic reform program
depends heavily on the availability of Western credit,
technology, and markets
We also believe that the Hungarian leadership may
perceive an appeal to national sentiment as an anti-
dote to the cynicism and alienation that appear to be
widespread among Hungarian youth. Many young
people, skeptical about the regime's promises for a
better future and frustrated by low salaries, limited
job mobility, and severe housing shortages, seem
disillusioned with official ideology. A study published
last year in Budapest, for example, openly admitted
that many young people have simply rejected Marx-
ism-Leninism.' Increasing rates of divorce, abortion,
suicide, drug abuse, and alcoholism also appear linked
to the difficulties faced by young people. At the same
time, Hungary's youth lack the historical perspective
of older generations who are able to contrast the
relatively prosperous and politically relaxed present
with the austere and repressive 1950s and early 1960s.
party officials are
deeply worried about this trend and many view the
careful cultivation of national pride among young
people as a means to combat cynicism and instill
confidence in the party as a defender of national
interests. Last autumn, the Party Central Committee
devoted nearly an entire plenary session to youth
issues, and policy toward the young figured promi-
nently at the March party congress. Unable to allevi-
ate the material shortages faced by many young
people, speakers at the congress exhorted the schools,
'The study, entitled "Hungarian Youth in the 1980s," was pub-
lished with the apparent blessing of the Party Central Committee.
Its principal conclusion is that young people are ideologically and
spiritually adrift and generally favor individualism and personal
independence over the collective values emphasized by Marxism-
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the Communist Youth League, and the military to
redouble their efforts to instill ideologically correct
values in their young charges. Since 1982, Hungary's
rulers have even turned to the churches for help in
filling the spiritual vacuum in which so many young
men and women seem to find themselves.
Finally, the regime's actions may be based in part on
their genuine emotional appeal to the Hungarian
leadership. While we believe that Kadar is a commit-
ted Marxist-Leninist and that he rejects ethnocentric
nationalist values and beliefs, he nonetheless has
devoted nearly 30 years to forging a uniquely Hungar-
ian approach to political and economic life under
Communism. Moreover, US Embassy reports based
on firsthand interviews with Kadar suggest that he
may be taking greater interest in his place in Hungar-
ian history as his long career enters its twilight. It is
unlikely that any other East European leader would
echo Kadar's sentiment voiced at the party congress
that he hoped "people of Hungarian nationality"
throughout the world will be able to "hold their head
high" when they hear about Hungary. Kadar aside,
several other senior
initially supporting East German party chief Honeck-
er's proposed visit to Bonn, they joined a Moscow-
sponsored media campaign against the trip. The
Hungarians have also denounced Western efforts to
differentiate between Hungary and some of its more
ideologically orthodox allies.
The authorities also have reined in the nationalist
movement when it threatened to develop its own
momentum. US Embassy reporting suggests that the
authorities are particularly apprehensive about links
between the nationalist movement and the dissident
community. Hungary's dissidents, virtually all of
whom are intellectuals dissatisfied with regime re-
straints on civil liberties, are few in number and
relatively isolated from the mainstream of Hungarian
life. Since the beginning of the 1980s, however, they
have begun to turn their attention increasingly toward
human rights violations by neighboring states against
ethnic Hungarians. This represents an issue that the
dissidents could use to arouse broad public support. A
senior party journalist informed the US Embassy that
a tightening up by police on the underground press in
late 1982 and early 1983 was aimed at curbing a
dissident campaign to drum up public support for
incarcerated Hungarian minority activists in Roma-
nia and Czechoslovakia. Shortly thereafter, the Kadar
regime disciplined prominent nationalist poet Sandor
Csoori by banning him from writing prose for a year
after his samizdat attack on Czechoslovak minority
policy was published in the United States. The party
has taken other steps to dampen nationalist emotions,
including the admonition of a Party Central Commit-
tee plenum in April 1983 against the dangers of
"bourgeois nationalism," and reported warnings to
the media to tone down nationalist content.)
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officials, including People's Patriotic Front leader
Pozsgay and the Transylvanian-born Culture Minis-
ter Bela Kopeczi, are sympathetic to the nationalist
cause.F___1
The play to nationalism has, however, been cautious
and marked by efforts to keep the sentiment from
getting out of hand. Statements touting foreign policy
autonomy have been balanced by promises of un-
shakeable loyalty to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw
Pact, and Hungarian foreign policy has generally
differed more in tone than in substance from the
Moscow line. Moreover, Budapest has been careful to
yield to firm Soviet pressure on East-West issues. Last
summer, for example, the Hungarians grudgingly
acquiesced in the Soviet Olympic boycott, and, after
' The official media have repeatedly encouraged the churches to
assume a more active role in youth and social policy, and senior
party officials have even conceded the positive moral impact of
religious values on young people. At the same time, the regime has
taken steps to facilitate religious education and the dissemination of
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revival has, indeed, damaged Hungarian-Romanian
relations. Since the late 1970s, Romanian officials,
journalists, and scholars have frequently traded po-
lemics with their Hungarian counterparts over past
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and present ethnic relations in Transylvania and
Hungary's historical role in that region. Last Decem-
ber, moreover, Ceausescu gave a televised speech that
indirectly accused the Hungarians of spreading "na-
tionalist and chauvinist disinformation," implied that
the specter of irredentism has yet to be exorcised from
Budapest, and warned that some of Romania's citi-
zens had fallen prey to hostile foreign propaganda. A
few weeks after the Ceausescu speech, the Romanians
closed their only Consulate in Hungary. Although a
senior Hungarian official claimed that the closing was
based on financial reasons, the Romanians, in our
judgment, also intended it as a warning to Hungary to
tone down its attacks on Romanian minority policy.9
Romanian sensitivity probably springs from a number
of sources. The Ceausescu regime, which seems in-
creasingly worried about potential minority unrest as
living standards in Romania worsen, must be appre-
hensive about the impact of the Hungarian nationalist
revival in Transylvania and reportedly fear
hat Budapest might
have a hand in sowing se ition there. The Romanians
may also worry that their sovereignty in Transylvania
might reemerge as a live issue for the first time since
World War II. Budapest has repudiated any claims to
Romanian territory, and we believe it unlikely that
many Hungarians take the prospect of frontier revi-
sion seriously. But painful historical memories die
hard," and several sources indicate that Bucharest
'The Consulate was opened in 1980 as part of the deal agreed upon
at the 1977 Kadar-Ceausescu summit designed to ease ethnic
tension between Hungary and Romania. At the same time, Buda-
pest was granted a consulate in the heart of the Hungarian minority
area in Transylvania. The closing of the Romanian Consulate
consequently has important symbolic significance for Hungarian-
Romanian relations and may be a signal that further criticism of
Romanian minorit lic could cost the Kadar regime its Transyl-
vanian Consulate.
10 The central purpose of Hungarian foreign policy between the two
World Wars was revision of the Treaty of Trianon, and in 1921-22
a worried Romania felt compelled to conclude an alliance (the
Little Entente) with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia for protection
against Hungarian revanchism. Hungary's territorial aspirations
were at least partially fulfilled, however, through alliance with Nazi
Germany. Participation in Hitler's dismemberment of Czechoslova-
kia (1938-39) won Budapest southern Slovakia and the Transcar-
pathian Ukraine. A year later Hitler oversaw the transfer of
northern Transylvania to Hungary from Romania, and in 1941,
when Yugoslavia fell victim to Nazi invasion, Hungary seized the
Vojvodina. Following her defeat in World War II, Hungary was
fears that Moscow might subtly encourage Hungarian
irredentism in an effort to constrain Romania's
maverick foreign and Warsaw Pact policies.F_~
Hungarian-Czechoslovak relations have also been af-
fected. Although Czechoslovakia's relatively small
Hungarian minority poses fewer problems for the host
regime than Transylvania's larger Hungarian commu-
nity, Prague is highly sensitive to developments in
Hungary that encourage nationalist dissidence in
Slovakia. At the same time, there are other irritants
in mutual relations that could be aggravated by
friction over the minority issue.
Although there is no evidence of serious differences
between the Kremlin and the Hungarians, Moscow
twice in the last year has indirectly warned Budapest
about nationalist excesses. Last April, when
Hungary's controversial policies came under fire from
Prague, the Soviet media reprinted some of the
Czechoslovak criticism and not the Hungarian rebut-
tal. The Soviet press also followed with a number of
articles calling for greater Bloc solidarity and unifor-
mity. More recently, as Romanian-Hungarian differ-
ences over the minority issue began to heat up at the
beginning of this year, a leading Soviet journal implic-
itly warned against "remnants of chauvinism" and
"bourgeois nationalism" in Hungary.
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Although the nationalist movement has thus far been
free of anti-Soviet manifestations, they might surface
in the future. The nationalist samizdat, for example,
has so far avoided any criticism of Soviet policies
toward the Hungarian minority in the Ukraine, but
this nonetheless is an issue with explosive potential. At
the same time, Moscow may worry about the impact
of growing Hungarian nationalism on Bloc solidarity.
In the past, the Soviets may, indeed, have periodically
encouraged Budapest to raise the Transylvanian mi-
nority issue or question the verdict of Trianon in order
to signal displeasure with Romania's maverick foreign
policy. Since the late 1970s, however, Hungarian
criticism of Romania appears to have been self-
initiated, and Moscow's patience with squabbling
between Hungary and obedient, ideologically upright
Czechoslovakia is likely to be relatively thin.
Soviet displeasure over Hungarian nationalism could
prove costly to Budapest. The Kadar regime's contin-
ued ability to pursue relatively liberal political and
economic policies ultimately depends on Soviet tolera-
tion. Budapest
worries that manifestations of nationalism disrupting
Warsaw Pact unity will lead the Soviets to reevaluate
their tolerance of Hungary's political and economic
idiosyncracies. At the same time, they add, too much
national assertiveness in foreign policy might provoke
Moscow to curtail Hungary's vital economic links
with the West.
Nationalism also has potentially disruptive domestic
repercussions. Unleashed nationalist passions could
prove hard to control, and the Kadar regime probably
is worried that it may face strong public pressures to
take actions that neither its ideological commitments
nor its Warsaw Pact responsibilities would permit.
Yet, refusal to do so could undermine popular percep-
tions of the regime and drive a wedge between rulers
and ruled in a country whose leaders now appear to
enjoy a level of popular approval unmatched in
Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe.
We expect nationalism to play an increasingly influ-
ential role in shaping Hungarian public opinion. Na-
tionalism has powerful emotional appeal in Hungary,
and the external and internal factors that have en-
couraged its revival are likely to persist. The Kadar
regime, moreover, is likely to remain on its current
course, cautiously responding to public pressure on
the minority issue, carefully cultivating national feel-
ing as a source of popularity, and periodically crack-
ing down when the nationalist movement threatens to
gather too much momentum on a delicate issue.
The authorities probably will manage to keep the
nationalist movement under control during the next
few years. Hungary's rulers may face growing public
pressure to act on behalf of the Hungarian minorities
or to allow an even greater measure of freedom to
address sensitive nationalist issues, but Kadar has
few, if any, peers among East European leaders at
skillfully manipulating public opinion. Popular na-
tionalism might, however, prove more difficult to
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downturn in Hungary. Moreover, the eventual depar-
ture of the 73-year-old Kadar, whose long career has
almost certainly entered its twilight, may also impede
the regime's ability to deal effectively with the nation-
alist movement over the long run. None of the
potential successors appears either to share Kadar's
political acumen or enjoy a comparable measure of
popular esteem. A less capable, less respected leader-
ship could find difficulty in trying to keep nationalist
passions in check without alienating a broad segment
of its own citizenry.
Hungary's relations with Romania and Czechoslova-
kia also could be further damaged by resurgent
Hungarian nationalism. Minority Hungarians are be-
coming increasingly emboldened by the nationalist
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message that, in turn, could lead to heightened ethnic
tensions in both Transylvania and Slovakia. Prague
and Bucharest are extremely sensitive to such devel-
opments and could well step up the pressure on
Hungary to curb the nationalist movement. Budapest,
however, at a time of greater ethnic tension in
neighboring states may be facing-and yielding to-
greater domestic pressure to be more assertive in
defense of minority rights.
The greatest hazard, however, lies in the inherent
threat posed by nationalism to Budapest's relations
with Moscow. While it is unlikely that Budapest will
deviate too far from Soviet positions on major interna-
tional issues, for domestic purposes Budapest will
probably be tempted to demonstrate a measure of
autonomy. Further strains in superpower relations
could again lead the Hungarians to try to distance
themselves as much as possible from hardline Soviet
positions on East-West issues. Moreover, US diplo-
mats speculate that the younger generation of Hun-
garian leaders may be somewhat more inclined than
their elders to strain at the Soviet tether. More serious
difficulties would arise if the Hungarian nationalist
movement began to show signs of anti-Sovietism or if
Hungarian squabbling with Czechoslovakia and Ro-
mania over the minority issue appeared in Soviet eyes
to seriously threaten Warsaw Pact unity. Should
either development come to pass-and neither can be
ruled out if the strength of nationalism in Hungary
continues to grow-the Kremlin could decide to crack
down on a regime whose relatively liberal policies
have helped to spawn national pride.
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