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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86S00588R000200150001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Scirett
Intelligence
Local Elections
Italy: Implications of the
EUR 85-10082
April 1985
Copy 3 5 5
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Local Elections
Italy: Implications of the
Directorate of Operations.
This paper was prepared by I Office of
European Analysis. It was coordinated with the
-
directed to the Chief, West European Division,F
~ 25X1
Secret
EUR 85-10082
April 1985
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Italy: Implications of the
Local Elections 25X1
Key Judgments Nearly 90 percent of Italy's voters will go to the polls on 12 May to select
Information available new regional, provincial, and city administrators. Because of the large
as of 5 April 1985 number of voters involved, these local elections are traditionally seen as an
was used in this report.
important referendum on the national government. This year, the elections
could have a strong impact on the political system if the Communist Party
(PCI) can equal or better its performance in last year's Europarliament
election, when it emerged for the first time with a narrow plurality. We be-
lieve that it has a fair chance of doing so.
Although the 12 May elections will not change parliamentary arithmetic,
they could profoundly alter the parties' views about which domestic
political alliances best serve their interests. More immediately, the elec-
tions could strongly influence Parliament in June when it selects a
successor to President Pertini. A strong Communist showing could give the
PCI enough leverage to insist on a new president who would be less
resistant to bringing them into the government.
Although we do not believe that the PCI will be in a position any time soon
to dictate government policy, we suspect that over the longer term a strong
showing would make the party more attractive as a prospective coalition
partner. This would inject new uncertainties into the political equation that
could be harmful to US interests:
? Day-to-day bilateral relations-particularly in the military area-could
become more cumbersome as Italian bureaucrats begin "looking over
their shoulders" in anticipation of eventual PCI entry into the govern-
ment and insist on "going by the book to protect their careers."
? Italian foreign policy would probably revert to something less ambitious
and less supportive of US initiatives, for example in the Middle East.
? Rome would continue to meet its existing NATO obligations but would
be reluctant to take on new ones.
? If the Communists moved closer to power, the United States might even
find Italy taking a harder look at requests for landing and overflight
rights for NATO out-of-area contingencies.
On the other hand, we believe that, if the Communists come closer to
entering the government, they will have to modify their more contentious
positions, especially on defense issues like INF basing. Whatever the
coalition arrangements, the Communists would have to rely on either the
Socialists or the Christian Democrats for a legislative majority.
Secret
EUR 85-10082
April 1985
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Although the Christian Democrats (DC) are campaigning more aggressive-
ly than last year, with anti-Communism as their central theme,
there is little evidence of progress toward rebuilding the
party's battered organization, which after nearly 40 years in power appears
to be running out of steam. We rate the DC's chances of arresting its grad-
ual decline only about even-at best.
A clear Christian Democratic victory would, of course, help protect US
interests in Italy. Whatever problems the United States might experience
as a result of the DC's indecisiveness and factionalism are balanced, in our
view, by its basic commitment to NATO and the West. But even though a
DC victory would push the Communists back into Pandora's box, at least
for a while, it would not alleviate all concerns about long-term US
interests:
? A resurgent DC would probably heighten the tension that already strains
the governing coalition as the small parties struggled to retain power
wrested from the Christian Democrats when they were weak.
? The resulting governments, weakened by this. interparty wrangling, most
likely would be short lived and would probably find it difficult to reach
consensus on supporting specific US initiatives.
? Their short tenure and. extensive squabbling would make them even less
effective than recent governments in dealing with Italy's social and
economic problems.
? The impetus behind Italy's recent helpful foreign policy initiatives, which
we attribute largely to activism by the smaller coalition parties, would
probably diminish.
A rerun of last year's scores in the Europarliament election-a status quo
outcome-might reduce tension within the governing coalition for the time
being, but we expect the truce would be short lived. The small parties, who
have become increasingly unhappy with government policies on taxes and
spending, would probably insist on renegotiating the government program
once President Pertini's successor has been chosen. Even if Socialist Prime
Minister Craxi could stitch together a new agreement that satisfied all of
his allies, we believe that he would find himself increasingly vulnerable to
unanticipated maneuvers by his coalition partners during key parliamenta-
ry tests.
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Secret
These elections will also help determine whether Craxi will continue to
exert predominant influence within his party. We believe an electoral
breakthrough by the Socialists-who have been stuck at about 11 percent
for the last decade-would suggest that Italy's moderate left is at last
demonstrating a potential to compete effectively with the Communists. But
if the Socialists fail to reach at least 12 to 13 percent this spring, we think
it would strengthen those party members who are unhappy with Craxi's
moderation and who would prefer a more ideologically compatible alliance
with the Communists to staying in a coalition with the Christian Demo-
crats.
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Key Judgments
The Christian Democrats: On a Slippery Slope?
1
The Communists: Will the "Sorpassino" Become the "Sorpasso"?
3
The Socialists: Life at the Top of a Rickety Coalition
5
Implications of the May Elections
8
A PCI Plurality
8
A Christian Democratic Resurgence
9
Maintaining the Status Quo
9
Impact on the United States -
10
DC Stops the Rot
11
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Figure 1
Italian Christian Democratic-Communist-Socialist Vote Shares:
National (N)-Regional (R)-European Parliament Elections (EP)
3.00IIt 0.30'
- + i
1948
53
58
63
68
70
72
75
76
79
79
80
83
84
N
N
N
N
N
Re
N
Rd
N
N
El'
Re
N
EP
1948
53 58 63 68 70 72 75 76 79 79 80 83 84
N
N N N N Re N Rd N N EP Re N EP
^ Democratic Popular Front for Liberty, Peace, and Works PCI/PSI coalition.
b Pbrtito Socialista Unificato, PSI/PSDI coalition.
1970 regional figures are aggregates of all regional elections 1968-70.
d 1975 regional figures are aggregates of all regional elections 1971-75.
1980 regional figures are aggregates of all regional elections 1976-80.
' PCI/Democratic Proletarian Unity Party coalition.
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Italy: Implications of the
Local Elections
Local elections on 12 May will call nearly 90 percent
of Italian voters to the polls to select new regional,
provincial, and city administrators. Because of the
large number of voters, these elections are by tradi-
tion seen as important tests of public confidence in the
national government. For example, the Communist
Party's jump from about 27 percent in the 1972
national election to 31 percent in the 1975 local
elections brought it to within a hairbreadth of over-
taking the long-dominant Christian Democrats and
opened a period of uncertainty in Italian politics that
continues to this day. The Christian Democrats have
foundered in their attempts to regain momentum over
the last decade, and the key question this year is
whether the Communists will finally pull ahead of
them to become Italy's largest party. (The Commu-
nists emerged a fraction ahead of the Christian
Democrats in the Europarliament election last year,
but many Italian observers doubt that contest was an
accurate gauge of the national mood) (see figure 1).
Political observers both in Italy and abroad are
hesitant to predict the outcome of the May elections.
Opinion polling in the last several elections has been
substantially off the mark.' The pollsters' task has
been complicated by the growth in recent years in
issue-oriented voting, with a concomitant increase in
the swing vote from 4 percent to approximately 10
percent of the electorate.
In the face of these uncertainties, Italian political
leaders are preoccupied by a series of questions
centering on the three major parties.
The Christian Democrats: On a Slippery Slope?
The central question in Italian politics today is wheth-
er the Christian Democratic Party, after 40 years in
power, has begun an irreversible decline. The answer
will largely determine how much say the Communists
will have in running the country and, indeed, whether
the Communists will enter the government. On bal-
ance, we believe that chances are only even that the
The May elections hold further meaning:
? They will be an informal referendum on the future
of Socialist Prime Minister Craxi's government and
on the five-party governing formula. After 20
months in office, Craxi's coalition has exceeded the
life expectancy of most postwar Italian governments
by a considerable margin, and the Christian Demo-
crats (DC), Social Democrats, Republicans, and
Liberals have begun to chafe under his leadership.
? They could profoundly influence the psychological
climate of politics and reopen the debate on Com-
munist (PCI) membership in the government.
? The vote could also influence political bargaining in
June when Parliament sets about selecting a succes-
sor to President Pertini.
DC will manage to arrest the decline.
After dropping more than 5 percentage points in the
1983 national election as compared to the 1977
national election, the second-worse electoral setback
ever suffered by the DC, the Christian Democrats
were edged out by the Communists for the first time
in the Europarliament election last year. Although
party leader Ciriaco DeMita insisted that the DC's
0.1-percent improvement over the 1983 national elec-
tion showed that the slide had been checked, this
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statistical improvement owed much to a smaller turn-
out; although the DC got a slightly larger piece of the
pie, it actually drew 500,000 fewer votes in 1984.
More ominously, the DC score fell by a million votes
compared with the count in the 1979 Europarliament
election. A close look at the 1983 national and 1984
European election returns shows that the DC is losing
votes in virtually every region, but especially in its old
strongholds in Sicily and the south 2 (see table).
DeMita faces a near-impossible task: he must come
up with a game plan for the local elections that fits his
own notions about reform and is still acceptable to
constituencies such as the dynamic Christian funda-
mentalist groups in the northwest and center, the
traditional patronage-oriented politicians of the south,
and those groups in the northeast that want a modern,
conservative, Thatcher-style party.
Return to Confrontation
Recent speeches by DC leaders and campaign adver-
tising suggest that DeMita hopes to unify his party
and rally voters by returning to the tactic, abandoned
in 1983 and 1984, of playing on fears of Communist
advances. To underline the dangers of a Communist
victory, DeMita has stressed in his campaign address-
es that a plurality for the PCI might allow it entry
into the national government. The message to voters is
clear: "If you don't support the DC, you may boost
the PCI into power." The Communists, however, have
made great strides toward shedding their image as an
antisystem party in recent years, and it is not at all
clear that DeMita's scare tactics will have the same
galvanizing impact on DC voters today as they did in
the 1950s and 1960s.
Italy: Election Results for
Christian Democrats and the
Communist Party, by Region
Percentage-
point difference
in votes
National/ Europarliament b
Europarliament a
DC PCI DC PCI
Total
0.1
3.4
-3.4
3.7
Piemonte
1.8
4.0
-1.9
5.2
Aosta
1.4
6.7
3.3
3.9
Lombardia
1.7
1.6
-2.1
2.3
Liguria
0.2
3.0
-1.7
4.8
Trentino-Alto Adige
1.4
0.6
-1.8
2.0
Veneto
2.3
2.1
-4.1
2.5
Friuli-Venezia
2.1
2.7
-0.1
2.5
Emilia Romagna
0.4
1.9
-2.4
2.7
0.1
2.8
-2.7
4.9
Umbria
-0.3
2.9
-1.8
4.4
Marche
0.6
2.4
-2.9
4.2
Lazio
0.1
5.0
-2.6
5.8
Abruzzi
-0.7
3.0
-4.3
3.2
Molise
-6.1
4.0
-3.2
4.3
Campania
-0.9
5.0
-4.7
4.8
Puglia
-0.2
5.0
-5.6
4.2
Basilicata
-4.9
2.8
-6.5
4.8
Calabria
-2.5
5.4
--6.2
5.0
Sicily
-4.2
5.3
-7.4
4.7
Sardinia
-0.5
3.6
-8.2
0.3
a 1984 Europarliament election as compared to the 1983
national election.
b 1984 Europarliament election as compared to the 1979
Europarliament election.
The DC's more confrontational approach runs the as Turin and Rome in the mid-1970s, the party has
gamut of issues, but the party has hit the Communists had considerable success in creating an image of
especially hard on ethics, focusing on recent scandals incorruptibility in a corrupt system. This may make
involving Communist officials in Bologna and Naples. the Communists more vulnerable to scandal charges
Although voters may smile a bit at such a dark pot in this election than the Christian Democrats.
calling the kettle black, this gambit may be telling.
Since the PCI gained control of some key cities such The Christian Democrats have also hardened their
position toward their Socialist (PSI) allies in recent
weeks. In particular, DeMita has insisted repeatedly
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Decline of the Christian Democrats a
In our view, the downward trend of the Christian
Democrats is due, at least in part, to their sheer
longevity in office; after 40 years in power, they have
inevitably become identified with the failure to solve
pressing social and economic problems. The DC has
also been seriously weakened by the persistence of
highly organized and sharply divergent party fac-
tions. Moreover, DC luminaries are constantly being
dragged through the press, charged with everything
from corruption and cooperation with the Mafia to
gross mismanagement.
The Christian Democrats have also been undermined
by changes taking place in Italian society:
? Socioeconomic changes, like the decline of agricul-
ture, have thinned the ranks of groups who tradi-
tionally voted for them. Improvements in education
have produced a more sophisticated electorate, and
more women are escaping from the confines of home
by going to work; we believe both of these factors
have weakened the party's appeal.
? Church attendance and participation in church-
sponsored activities have been on the wane, and
until very recently the church had all but with-
drawn from Italian politics.
? The voting public is no longer as scared of the
Communists as it once was. The PCI generally has
established itself as an honest and efficient force in
local politics; it has worked with the DC govern-
ment from time to time; and it has openly and
strongly criticized Soviet policies in Czechoslova-
kia, Afghanistan, and Poland.
during public appearances that the Socialists should
abandon their local alliances with the Communists
wherever governments without the Communists are
mathematically possible. Socialists currently govern
jointly with Communists in 1,763 towns and cities,
according to the press. Ironically, the Christian Dem-
ocrats are themselves aligned with the Communists in
418 towns and cities.
A Coverup Tactic
DC leaders probably hope that a pugnacious offense
will obscure the party's fundamental weaknesses.
Internal bickering, corruption, scandals, and misman-
agement have all dented the DC image over the past
several years. Moreover, US officials report that,
while the DC leadership seems to be doing a better
job of working together than anticipated, there is only
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organization, especially in the large cities where the
DC machine has virtually ceased to exist.
DeMita may now be counting on the church to take
the place of a healthy party organization.
average Italian clergyman tends to be more conserva-
tive than the average voter, we believe that significant
numbers of local priests lean to the left in some parts
of the country. Moreover, there is no guarantee that a
tougher stand by the church will have the desired
effect. An appeal launched by the Italian bishops in
the spring of 1983 in support of the DC apparently
fell on deaf ears. In fact, extensive interference by the
church could have just the opposite effect, reopening
the issue of church-state relations and driving votes
away from the Christian Democrats.
The Communists: Will the "Sorpassino" Become the
"Sorpasso"? 3
Another key question-in a sense the flip side of the
question about the DC's decline-is whether the
Communists can show that their narrow victory in the
Europarliament election last summer was more than a
fluke, a mere outpouring of sympathy for former
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party leader Berlinguer who died only days before the
election. Our analysis of that vote suggests that, even
allowing a generous 2-percent sympathy vote in each
region, the Communists still made significant gains by
Italian standards. Berlinguer's death, however, did
enable the Communists to mobilize their entire poten-
tial electorate for the first time since the national
election of June 1976. In our view, the PCI's fortunes
this spring will turn on whether the party can keep
these supporters mobilized.
Threads That Could Unravel
The PCI faces an unusually large number of un-
knowns as the May elections approach. The fledgling
Italian Greens movement will run lists for the first
time in five regions-Piemonte, Liguria, Veneto, To-
scana, and Marche-and 50 cities. We suspect that a
significant portion of any gains by the Greens would
come from voters who normally support the Commu-
nists. Our analysis of recent voting trends suggests
that the Communists are especially vulnerable to
defections by young voters, who are becoming increas-
ingly disenchanted with the party's more moderate
line.
Its growing image as part of the "establishment" has
also hurt the PCI in other ways. The performance of
the party, after 10 years of holding office in most of
the country's largest cities, is being scrutinized more
closely by the media and by its opponents. The
Communists must be worried how voters will react to
the DC tactic of focusing public attention on recent
scandals involving PCI officials in Bologna and Na-
ples. We expect they will try to minimize damage by
quickly ousting party members convicted of corrup-
tion and stressing the contrast with the handling of
scandals by the DC, which frequently tries to protect
its own.
PCI leaders are also uncertain, according to
press reports, about the impact of their hardline
support for a national referendum to restore the 4
percentage points cut from the national wage indexa-
tion quotient last year. A close reading of the press
suggests that, although most Communists seem confi-
dent that the measure will appeal to voters-who
would get an immediate boost in pay-some are
concerned that the party would be branded economi-
cally irresponsible by an increasingly sophisticated
electorate.
The PCI's Achilles' Heel
Even if the PCI does achieve a definitive sorpasso of
the DC and the psychological climate shifts to the
Communists' advantage, they still cannot come to
power without striking a deal with either the Social-
ists or the Christian Democrats (see figures 2 and 3).
But the Communists' choice of allies is complicated
by increasing divisions in the party over which issues
to pursue and how hard to push them, according to
the press. Hardliners advocate a tougher line against
the government to satisfy the party's traditional elec-
torate. Party moderates, however, believe the PCI
must attract new middle- and upper-class voters and
worry about the party becoming isolated and
irrelevant.
The party's choice of allies is also complicated
by the personal predilections of PCI leaders. For
Berlinguer, with his Catholic intellectual mindset, the
Christian Democrats were the logical choice
despite Berlinguer's disap-
pointment that the -79 National Solidarity ex-
periment failed to win a cabinet role for the
Communists,' in the weeks just prior to his death he
was talking again indirectly to Foreign Minister
Andreotti about renewed collaboration]
By all accounts, Alessandro Natta, Berlinguer's suc-
cessor, would rather deal with the Socialists. Natta,
who comes from a more secular background, is less
comfortable among Catholic politicians, according to
the press. In fact, one of his first acts on assuming
office was to align his party with those in Parliament
who called for Foreign Minister Andreotti's resigna-
tion over corruption allegations, a move that generat-
ed the most heated disputes with the Christian Demo-
crats in years. Although Natta has won favor with
leftwing Socialist leaders like lower chamber floor
leader Rino Formica and Labor Minister Gianni
DeMichelis, he has not gained ground with Craxi,
who remains firmly anti-Communist
We believe that, as the election campaign gathers
steam, Natta will attempt to follow a two-track
policy. He will concentrate his attacks on both the
' During this period, the Communists supported numerous bills in
Parliament in exchange for closer collaboration with the governing
Christian Democrats on a range of issues
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Secret
Figure 2
Italy: Chamber of Deputies After the National Elections
Key
Christian Democrats (DC)
Communists (PCI)
Socialists (PSI)
Italian Social Movement (MSI)
Republicans (PRI)
Social Democrats (PSDI)
Liberals (PLI)
Radicals (RAD)
Others
Distribution of seats
Total number of seats=630
PRI 1.9
MSI 4.1
Party strength
Share of vote received
PLI 1.9
PSDI 3.8
PRI 3.0
DCT r) Q
Christian Democratic and Socialist Party leadership, The Socialists: Life at the Top of a Rickety Coalition
with an eye-to bringing as many of the Communist
faithful as possible to the polls.. At the same time, we For Craxi, of course, the key question is whether his
expect he will try to avoid isolating the PCI after the party will do well enough to vindicate his change of
election by emphasizing willingness to work with direction and confirm him in power. Since wresting
either party to administer local jurisdictions and to the premiership from the Christian Democrats after
negotiate policies and programs that both sides can
support
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Figure 3
Italy: Senate After the National Elections
Distribution of seats
Total number of seats=315
1979 RAD 2.9 1983
Key Others 1.6
Christian Democrats (DC) PLI 1.7 PLI 2.5
Socialists (PSI) PRI 2.5 PRI 4.6
Italian Social Movement (MSI) MS14.8 N MS1 6.7
Republicans (PRI)
Social Democrats (PSDI)
Liberals (PLI)
Radicals (RAD)
Others
Party strength
Share of vote received
the 1983 national election, Craxi has divided his At first glance, the Socialists appeared to occupy a
attention between shoring up his rickety coalition and good position as the election campaign got under way.
searching for a formula that will enable the Socialists The Radical Party will not be presenting local lists,
to score an electoral breakthrough. Most observers and, according, to the press, Socialist leaders expect
agree that, after a tentative start, he has generally that many Radical voters will support the Socialist
coped well with the vicissitudes of coalition politics.
One recent opinion poll gave him a 34-percent approv-
al rating, the second highest of any postwar prime
minister.
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slate. Moreover, according to the press, the Socialists
also calculate that their potential electorate grows by
approximately 1 million votes for nationwide local
elections.
But, like the Christian Democrats and the Commu-
nists, the Socialists are plagued by a number of
important unknowns. Political observers believe, for
example, that Socialist voters are the most volatile of
an increasingly volatile voting public. One academic
study concluded that the typical Socialist voter has
begun to change from year to year rather than from
election to election. In addition, although public at-
tention recently has fastened on scandals involving
Communists, the Socialists are bracing themselves for
a major construction kickback scandal of their own
that could cost them a substantial number of votes.
election ICraxi sees 33.7
percent as a significant victory or the Communists
and believes that this outcome would completely
disrupt the already precarious balance within the five-
party government coalition. Craxi also reportedly
worries that if the PCI does well in the local elections
it will gain enough leverage to insist on a president
who would be amenable to Communist participation
in the government
Craxi has worked hard to move
his party away from traditional leftist stands on issues
like INF. To date, however, he has been unable to
translate these changes into substantial numbers of
new voters. The Socialist score increased only margin-
ally in the 1983 national election as compared to the
1979 national election, for example
We believe that, if the Socialists fail to top 12 to 13
percent in May, it will strengthen the position of
Craxi's rivals within the party who oppose his moder-
ate line and favor an alliance with the PCI. He has
already faced several instances of serious insubordina-
tion from powerful left-leaning challengers like For-
mica and DeMichelis. For example, Formica's impli-
cation last November that US intelligence was
connected to a terrorist train bombing was clearly
aimed, in the view of the US officials in Rome, at
weakening both the government coalition and Craxi's
position within the party.
any significant gains in the coming elections,
His concern is reportedly linked
to a recent public opinion poll that showed the
Socialists winning only 11.9 percent of the vote; the
poll projected that the Christian Democrats would
pick up 0.1 percentage point-to 33.1 percent-and
the Communists would expand 0.4 percentage point-
to 33.7 percent as compared to the 1983 national
The outcome of the local elections will not change the
composition of Parliament and therefore has no direct
bearing on the election of a new president. At a
minimum, however, the results will have a strong
impact on the psychological climate in which that 25X1
decision is made. We agree with Craxi, for example,
that a strong Communist performance would encour-
age them to insist on a president who would be more
open to a government role for the Communists, such
as Constitutional Court President Leopoldo Elia or
Senate President Francesco Cossiga~
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the premiership until the next scheduled national
election in 1988. To this end, he reportedly is pre-
pared to support a Christian Democrat when Parlia-
ment meets to choose President Pertini's successor.
Most Italian commentators assume that, if the Chris-
tian Democrats fail to win the presidency, they will
insist upon the premiership as compensation.
We believe Pertini could probably retain the presiden-
cy if he wanted to, but the US Embassy reports that
several Christian Democrats and a number of Social-
ists close to Craxi are concerned that this would
create serious tension within the governing coalition.
now 88 years old, has already decided not to run.
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agreed to support Deputy Prime Minister Forlani, a
Christian Democrat, in return for a promise that he
can remain Prime Minister for at least one more year.
Press, suggest that,
if Pertini does not run, Forlani is probably the
strongest candidate. Other prominent contenders in-
clude Christian Democrat Leopoldo Elia; Tina An-
selmi, a former Christian Democratic Minister of
Health; Christian Democrat Francesco Cossiga; Os-
car Scalfaro, Christian Democratic Minister of the
Interior; Nilde Jotti, Communist Speaker of the Low-
er Chamber; and Giovanni Spadolini, Republican
Minister of Defense. The election of a new president
usually requires multiple ballots and more often than
not produces surprises.
Implications of the May Elections
The complexity of the Italian political system makes
any number of outcomes to the May elections possi-
ble. But, out of the welter of possibilities, we can pick
out three broad scenarios that seem to hold more
promise than others and that would have important
implications for the United States: a PCI plurality, a
DC resurgence, and a continuation of the status quo.
On balance, we believe the Communists have a fair
chance of winning a plurality-thereby eventually
forcing a new look at the current governing formula
and, more generally, leading Italian politicians to
reexamine their basic assumptions about how the
political system should work. But neither a resurgent
DC nor a continuation of the status quo would
necessarily ensure stability for very long.
A PCI Plurality
Over the short term, we believe that the effects on the
political system of the PCI's emerging as the clear
plurality party would be limited. This improved status
would be another important step in the PCI's search
for full legitimacy, but would not substantially
strengthen its position in Parliament. A Communist
victory might even temporarily force the Christian
Democrats and their allies to close ranks in an
attempt to safeguard their hold on power
Over the longer term, however, we suspect that the
Communists' new status would not only make them
more attractive as a prospective coalition partner, but
would also enable them to increase their influence
over the policymaking process. As things stand now,
we believe that the leaders of the individual governing
parties would insist that the Communist plurality be
tested in a national election before considering the
PCI as a government partner. The next national
election is not scheduled to take place for three years,
but Natta has already vowed that his party will press
for an early national election if its plurality is con-
firmed. A new election could be held as early as this
fall, although, traditionally, balloting in Italy takes
place in the spring.'
In our view, the PCI's chances of entering a coalition
more rapidly might grow significantly, however, if a
Communist plurality were accompanied by:
? Serious Socialist losses. Although Craxi has moved
the party steadily away from its traditional ideolo-
gy, Socialist hearts still beat to the left. A signifi-
cant loss in May would strengthen the hand of those
party leaders who oppose Craxi and tout the ideo-
logical virtues of a leftist coalition with the
Communists.
? Strong neo-Fascist (MSI) gains. With 6.8 percent of
the vote in the lower chamber during the last
national election, the MSI (Italian Social Move-
ment) is Italy's fourth-largest party. Public opinion
data suggesting that the far right could advance
significantly in these local elections have already
aroused concern among numerous left-leaning and
centrist politicians, according to the press.' We
believe these politicians worry that Communist and
MSI gains would reinforce the trend toward polar-
ization of the political system, with unforeseeable
' By law, national elections must be preceded by a 45-day
campaign. Italian leaders have been reluctant to agree to a fall
election out of concern that it might not be possible to fulfill the
campaign requirements before winter weather discourages some
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consequences for stability. Even now, the parliamen-
tary balance is close enough that the government
has occasionally had to rely informally on MSI
support to muster a quorum or win key votes. If the
MSI scored well enough to make its support neces-
sary on a more regular basis, we suspect that
moderates might be tempted to make peace with the
Communists. They would probably reason that this
would alienate fewer voters than coming to terms
with the MSI, which most Italian voters still consid-
er beyond the pale. We also believe, moreover, that
the Communists, who fear political isolation above
all, would modify their positions on more controver-
sial issues in order to simplify negotiations and avert
a coalition of the right.
? A precipitous drop by the DC-with the bulk of lost
DC votes going to other members of the coalition-
could also boost Communist chances for a cabinet
role. The rivalry among the governing parties has
intensified considerably since the DC's poor show-
ing in the 1983 national election emboldened the
Socialists and the smaller parties. DeMita has con-
ceded publicly that a serious DC drop, coming in
the wake of the party's disastrous performance in
the 1983 national election, would probably signal
the end of his tenure as party leader. The political
turmoil surrounding the replacement of the party
leader could, in turn, lead to a retreat from the DC's
tougher line on the Communists as Christian Demo-
crats maneuver to preserve as much of their power
as possible.
A Christian Democratic Resurgence
A clear-cut Christian Democratic victory over the
Communists would be a welcome development for US
interests in Italy. To be sure, the DC's factionalism
and indecisiveness have often been exasperating to US
officials seeking Italian cooperation on controversial
bilateral issues. But this is balanced by the party's
strong basic commitment to NATO and by the fact
that in a crunch it can generally be counted on to side
with the United States-something that still cannot
be said about the PCI, despite its impressive progress
toward democratic legitimacy and independence from
Moscow.
A new lease on life for the DC could also raise
problems, however, if it were achieved at the expense
of the Socialists and the small parties. At a minimum,
such an outcome would be likely to intensify the
already difficult situation within the governing coali-
tion, as the small parties struggle to safeguard the
power and patronage wrested from the Christian
Democrats. Small-party truculence would probably
usher in another era of short-lived governments
Even though US interests would be generally safer if
the Christian Democrats regained dominance, there
would still be a strong possibility of increased friction
between Rome and Washington. After nearly 40
years in power, the Christian Democrats find deci-
sionmaking an increasingly complicated process.' For-
eign policy, for example, has become a more conten-
tious issue for the party. Despite the broad agreement
that still exists among Christian Democrats on core
questions like NATO and the EC, we also perceive a
greater willingness within the DC to question US
policy in areas like the Middle East and Latin
America. For example, there were indications at the
height of last year's crisis in Lebanon that Foreign
Minister Andreotti was less resolute about retaining
Italy's Multinational Force (MNF) contingent in Bei-
rut than Prime Minister Craxi or Defense Minister
Spadolini, a Republican
Perhaps the most promising variation of this scenario
would be one in which the DC improved gradually
over several elections, allowing the governing coalition
time to adjust and find a new equilibrium. The
transition to a more robust DC might prove considera-
bly easier for the governing coalitions to adjust to if
the smaller parties, especially the Socialists and Re-
publicans, were improving slightly along with the
Christian Democrats. Significant Socialist gains in
May would be a particularly hopeful sign for both
Italy and the United States, because this would hold
the potential for giving Italy something it has never
had-a moderate left capable of competing effectively
against the Communists. We believe that, under these
circumstances, with the governing partners sharing
gains earned at the Communists' expense, they might
be less inclined, at least in the short term, to strike a
deal with the PCI. It might also ease the way toward
' The DC comprises at least a dozen well-defined factions-in
effect "miniparties"-that sometimes have diametrically opposed
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reaching agreement on an effective program to
counter some of the country's pressing social and
economic.problems.8
Maintaining the Status Quo . -
A rerun of last year's scores in the Europarliament
election might reduce tension within the governing
coalition for the time being, as the governing partners
reassess the situation,.but we would expect the truce
to be short lived. The parties' first order of business
would be to select President Pertini's successor, and
we suspect that the Socialists would back a Christian
Democrat in the hope of strengthening their own grip
on the premiership. Once the new president is in-
stalled, however, we would expect the smaller coali-
tion partners, who have become increasingly unhappy
with government policies on taxes and spending, to
insist on renegotiating the government's program.
Even assuming that Craxi could stitch together a
package that satisfies all of his allies, we believe that
he would find himself increasingly vulnerable to
unanticipated maneuvers by his coalition partners and
individual defections during important parliamentary
tests.
We suspect that, in the end, a status quo outcome
would feed the notion that Italy's political system has
run out of workable coalition formulas. Attention
would probably focus once again on the pros and cons
of a new national election, a government composed of
"independent technicians," or a government of "na-
tional unity." The latter two options could allow
Communists, or "independents" who are nevertheless
close to the Communists, to join the government.
PCI Ascendant
Any of the scenarios involving a PCI win in the May
elections or closer ties between the PCI and the center
parties would inject new uncertainties that could
damage US interests over the medium and long term.
At the very least, we suspect that a solid Communist
8 A gradual DC decline that allowed time for the governing
coalition to readjust might, in similar fashion, dampen the partners'
enthusiasm for exploring other kinds of governing arrangements.
plurality would cause Italians to begin "looking over
their shoulders" and guarding against the-day when
the PCI might join the government. This could begin
a gradual process wherein day-to-day bilateral rela-
tion would slow-
ly become more cumbersome as Italian bureaucrats
reacted to the changing political winds and began to
go by the book
We also believe that Italian foreign policy, which
recently has included participation in various Middle
Eastern peacekeeping efforts and active promotion of
a more extensive role in international affairs for the
EC, would revert to something less ambitious. Rome
would continue to fulfill its current NATO obliga-
tions, but probably would be more reluctant to take on
new ones.' Italy probably also would hesitate, for
example, to participate in future peacekeeping efforts
that required a military presence. If it appeared that
the Communists were actually moving closer to enter-
ing government, the United States might even find
Rome. more reluctant to grant landing and overflight
rights for NATO out-of-area contingencies.
It is unlikely, however, under any of these scenarios
that the PCI would be in a position to dictate
government policy. We believe, in fact, that if the PCI
moves closer to power it will have to modify its
position on some of the more contentious issues like
INF. The Communists' potential partners presumably
would extract concessions beforehand on sensitive
questions like foreign and defense policy and would
almost certainly insist on retaining the Foreign Af-
fairs, Defense, and Interior portfolios.
In any case, a government that includes the PCI
would be a marriage of convenience no less subject
than its predecessors to all of the pitfalls of Italian
coalition politics. We suspect that the small parties
' PCI foreign policy spokesman Pajetta recently reiterated the
party's commitment-first made in 1976-to accept Italy's existing
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would view such an agreement as a short-term ar-
rangement and would try to use the opportunity to
strengthen their hands in preparation for the next
coalition with the DC-a course hardly conducive to
smooth government.
DC Stops the Rot
Although those scenarios that point to the DC's
gaining ground or holding firm would serve US
interests best, pushing the Communists back into
Pandora's box would still leave a number of questions
important to US interests unanswered. Barring an
outcome in which the DC and smaller parties found a
new sense of purpose as a result of shared gains scored
at Communist expense, the governments suggested by
these scenarios would probably continue to live day by
day. We believe that, preoccupied as they are likely to
be with interparty squabbling, such governments
would find it even more difficult to cope with the
enormous social and economic problems found in
areas like Naples, Genoa, and Palermo. In fact, we
suspect that these problems at home would leave
Rome little time or inclination for foreign policy."
It would be possible to argue, of course, that
revolving-door governments offer advantages to the
United States. A government too distracted by domes-
tic affairs to concentrate on foreign policy might be
more amenable to following a strong US lead. But this
potential advantage must be weighed against the
uncertainties generated by shaky governments. We
believe, for example, that in a situation of domestic
turmoil it would become increasingly difficult to
predict whether Rome could muster the consensus,
the will, and the wherewithal to join and carry out
projects like INF basing. The United States has, in
fact, profited from Italy's recent willingness to carry a
share of the weight in trouble spots like Lebanon and
the Sinai.
10 We believe that the DC's recent weakness has encouraged foreign
policy activism by Republican- and Socialist-led governments. Both
of the smaller coalition partners have seen foreign policy as an area
where they can win their spurs with Italy's allies while improving
their own stature with the voters. In our view, this rivalry has
prodded the Christian Democrats into supporting projects that
otherwise might not have attracted them. We suspect that, if the
DC finds itself firmly back in the driver's seat, the impetus
provided by the smaller parties in foreign policy will diminish.
Finally, a return to revolving-door governments would
contribute to the Italian public's well-established cyn-
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increase in voter disenchantment would, at a mini-
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small regional parties and special interest groups such
as the Pensioners, the Venetian League, and the
Sardinian Action Party, which have sprung up during
the past five years. Such a development would come
at a time when most political observers have conclud-
ed that limiting the numbers of parties in Parliament
would do much to improve government efficiency.
And this further splintering of political loyalties
would be yet another factor limiting Italy's ability to
act decisively on controversial issues like INF.
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