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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00553R000300070006-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2011
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: August 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Intelligence
Thailand: Prospects for
the Coalition Government
--Sm-ret-
EA 83-10148
August 1983
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 Thailand: Prospects for
the Coalition Government
This paper was prepared byl
contra ution
Reference. P
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Southeast Asia Division, OEA,
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Secret
EA 83-10148
August 1983
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the Coalition Government) 25X1
Thailand: Prospects for
Key Judgments Thailand's three-month-old coalition government has shown surprising
Information available strength, but contentious issues on the horizon could cause problems:
as of 10 August 1983
was used in this report.
? Army Commander in Chief Athit's moves to restore the military's former
dominant position in the legislature could be the most volatile issue.
Athit-who wants the prime-ministership-has been operating behind
the scenes to consolidate his control over the military apparatus and is
likely to have one of the smaller, military-backed parties reintroduce
controversial constitutional amendments aimed at restoring the military's
lost position.
? Unpopular fiscal austerity measures such as reduced subsidies to state
enterprises and increased public utility prices could provoke mass protests
and demonstrations.
? The opposition Thai Nation Party intends to make things difficult for the
new administration by introducing contentious legislation, including its
own constitutional amendments aimed at further reducing the military's
influence, and by attempting to split the coalition over economic issues.
? Interparty rivalry within the coalition, only just below the surface, could
flare over both the military and economic questions.
Despite these looming difficulties, we believe Prime Minister Prem will
remain in office but may be forced to shuffle his Cabinet to include the op-
position party. Prem retains considerable military and popular support and
could head any foreseeable coalition. A nascent economic recovery should
ameliorate some of the coalition's vulnerabilities over economic issues by
reducing opportunities for the Thai Nation to orchestrate demonstrations
by farmers, organized labor, and students. Moreover, we believe that any
attempt by Athit to reintroduce his amendments is likely to succeed the
second time around, thus ensuring continued strong military support for
the Prem government.
iii Secret
EA 83-10148
August 1983
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The Military's Constitutional Amendments-Round
One
Army Commander in Chief'Athit's demands for
constitutional amendments to ensure the armed
forces dominance of the political process in Thailand
plunged the country into a constitutional crisis. Intro-
duced in Parliament in January by a small, military-
backed party, the amendments would have:
? Retained the crucial power of the Senate to support
the government by maintaining the right of the
upper house to vote on a wide range of matters,
particularly motions of no condence.
? Reversed the new constitutional provision allowing
the party winning the majority of votes in a province
to take all the House seats for the province-a
procedure that favors the larger, established politi-
cal parties and creates the possibility that one party
may win enough votes to form a government on its
own.
? Allowed professional civil servants-military offi-
cers in particular-to hold Cabinet positions while
on active duty.
Parliament in mid-March rejected the military's
amendments. The bill had earlier passed two read-
ings in the National Assembly with overwhelming
majorities each time. In the final reading, the com-
bined House and Senate cast 254 votes for passage-
10 short of the required majority. Ironically, Athit
and 11 other senior military officers had earlier
resigned from the Senate. Leaders of the Social
Action, Thai Nation, and Democrat Parties-Thai-
land's largest-ordered nearly 170 members of Par-
liament to abstain from voting, defeating the bill.
They probably backed down from supporting the
amendments because they had not been allowed to
introduce compromise language during the second
reading. In addition, party leaders may have come to
believe Athit was going to renege on promises to
obtain political favors for them in return for votes.
Armed Forces Supreme Commander Saiyut Koet-
phon-a rival of Athit who is known to have political
aspirations-also led an estimated 30 Senate votes
against the amendments.
Athit eventually backed down but forced
Prem to dissolve the House of Representatives and
call early national elections in mid-April on the
military's terms-before preexisting provisions of the
Constitution expired. Under these provisions, none of
the civilian parties were able to gain a majority of
seats in the House. The early election date thus
insured continued civilian political fragmentation.
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Thailand: Prospects for
the Coalition Government
Although Thailand's coalition government has shown
surprising strength since its formation three months
ago, the going will get tougher over the next few
months. The Army's powerful Commander in Chief,
Gen. Athit Kamlang-ek-who is scheduled to visit the
United States in late August-is determined to rein-
state the military's recently expired dominant position
in the legislature, a goal opposed by civilian politi-
cians. The opposition party plans to introduce provoc-
ative legislation that would further dilute the power of
the military, and it is likely to continue its attempts to
unseat the coalition by focusing on li ' ly sensitive
economic issues.
New Ground Rules
Although the coalition is the fourth consecutive one
under Prime Minister Prem since 1980, this govern-
ment is operating under markedly different condi-
tions. Constitutional provisions giving effective
control of the government to the appointed Senate-
made up largely of senior military officers-lapsed in
April. In the past the Senate has kept the elected
lower house under control and has ensured a conser-
vative, military-sanctioned approach to foreign rela-
tions, economic policy, and domestic issues.
Senior Army officers-spearheaded by General
Athit-unsuccessfully attempted early this year to
have the constitution amended to preserve the mili-
tary's power. The proposed amendments were defeat-
ed by only 10 votes in the National Assembly because
of the opposition of major civilian political parties. As
a result, Thailand is operating under an elected, fully
functioning parliamentary system for only the second
time in its history.
The opposition-the Thai Nation Party, a member of
the previous Prem government-is now the largest
single party in Thailand. Thai Nation leader Praman
Adireksan hopes to force a cabinet shuffle and gain
his party's inclusion in the present government, ac-
cording to the US Embassy.
The Thai Nation may succeed in part because the
coalition could split between civilian and military
interests that are intensified by personal rivalries. The
Social Action Party and the Democrat Party continue
to oppose promilitary constitutional amendments
championed by the smaller Thai Citizens Party and
National Democratic Party. In addition, the heads of
the Democrat and Thai Citizens Parties are long-
standing enemies.
Other factors, however, have at least temporarily
offset these potentially destabilizing changes. The
new coalition is strikingly similar to the previous one,
which the military supported. Prem stayed on as
Prime Minister, and two of the three parties in the
last coalition are in the new one. In the Cabinet, half
of the 44 ministers and deputies are carryovers from
the previous Cabinet, and most of the top positions are
unchanged. Prem has continued as Defense Minister,
for example, and Sitthi Sawetsila as Foreign Minister.
In important security and economic posts, Interior
Minister Sitthi Chirarot and Finance Minister
Sommai Huntrakun also stayed on.
The military, moreover, still wields considerable influ-
ence, primarily through Athit's regular consultations
with Prime Minister Prem. In addition, two promili-
tary parties gained entry into the coalition govern-
ment. Finally, the military-dominated Senate retains
the power to vote on constitutional amendments and
matters pertaining to the monarchy.
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Coalition Survives Initial Tests
A concerted effort by Prem to ensure coalition unity
has paid off thus far. The government used its 25X1
overwhelming majority in Parliament and single-
party control of most ministries to ease interparty
rivalry in the Cabinet.' In addition, civilian politicians
' In previous Prem administrations, the posts of minister and deputy
minister were divided among the parties, which led to constant
bickering y of major economic development
projects. 25X1
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Table 1
The New Thai Government
National Democratic (NDP) 15
Civilian-backed; largest party prior
to April elections; claims economic,
rural development expertise.
Civilian-backed; made strong gains
in elections; leader is bitter enemy
of TCP head.
Samak Sunthorawet Promilitary; monarchist, populist
rhetoric; palace backing alleged.
Kriangsak Chamanan Nominally promilitary; opportunis-
tic; party serves mainly as vehicle
for former Prime Minister Kriang-
sak's return to politics.
Formerly associated with military-
industrial establishment; party lost
military support when it opposed
promilitary constitutional amend-
ments; further offended military by
postelection attempt to set up coali-
tion government headed by
Praman.
a Number of TNP affiliates swelled after elections as independents
and splinter parties joined to comply with new political parties law.
Party control over these new members uncertain.
are probably trying to avoid actions that might
prompt military intervention. And Prem is skillfully
developing new administrative devices to keep House
members in line. The new Parliamentary Coordinat-
ing Committee, for example, develops strategy for
moving government legislation through the House.
Despite the fact that Prem can no longer count on
Senate voting to pass key legislation or support the
government in no-confidence votes, the coalition
passed its first two parliamentary tests with impres-
sive strength. The government moved the budget
bill-traditionally contentious-through the elected
House of Representatives in late June on its first
reading with surprisingly little trouble. Despite at-
tempts to focus debate on a secret, anti-insurgency
fund in the defense budget, the opposition failed in its
principal goal of inducing disunity in the governing
coalition's ranks, according to the US Embassy
In mid-June Prem's coalition easily derailed the Thai
Nation Party's no-confidence motion against Commu-
nications Minister Samak, head of one of the four
coalition parties. The ostensible reason for the vote
was Samak's mismanagement of state enterprises
under his control, especially the railway system, which
raised passenger fares by 7 percent in June. Because
transportation fares are politically sensitive, Thai
Nation leader Praman hoped for some break in the
unity of the governing parties on this issue, according
to the US Embassy. The. Parliamentary Coordinating
Committee kept the no-confidence motion from com-
ing to a vote, however.
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Table 2
Thailand: Ministerial Positions
Politically unaffiliated Prime Minister and Defense Minister a
Deputy Prime Minister
Ministers attached to the Prime Minister's
office (4)
Finance
Interior
Social Action Party Deputy Prime Minister
Ministers attached to the Prime Minister's
office (2)
Foreign Affairs
Agriculture and Cooperatives
Commerce
State University Bureau
Democratic Party Deputy Prime Minister
Minister attached to the Prime Minister's
office
Science, Technology, and Energy
Education
Public Health
Thai Citizens Party Deputy Prime Minister
Communications
Justice
National Democractic Industry
Party
Future Challenges
Over the next year the new government will face more
serious problems, such as the likely reintroduction of
amendments to reinstate the power of the Senate and
In recent weeks Athit has also moved to refurbish his
public image, tarnished in the defeat of the amend-
ments. His offer to mediate a still unsettled dockwork-
ers' strike was his first reentry into the Thai political
arena. Last fall Athit similarly used his position as
head of the Bangkok Peacekeeping Force to involve
himself successfully in a number of political and
economic disputes, such as protests over bus fare
increases, labor strikes, student protests, and farmer
unrest over the government's rice policies. According
continuing attacks by the opposition party.
The Military: Athit's moves to restore the military's
power could be the most volatile of these challenges.
We believe that Athit wants the prime-ministership.
To gain that position, he must move before his
mandatory retirement from the Army-his principal
power base-in 1985. Since the defeat of the Army's
proposed constitutional amendments last spring-a
stunning setback to Athit, who had argued that the
preservation of Senate power was essential to national
stability-Athit has been operating quietly behind the
scenes to consolidate his control over the military
apparatus
to the US Embassy, Athit established himself in the 25X1
public mind as an effective and fair mediator
In late July Athit seized the opportunity of the joint
US-Thai Navy amphibious landing exercise Cobra
Gold to stage Army exercises on the Thai-Kampu-
chean border. According to the US Embassy, Athit
did not want to attend the Cobra Gold landings
because he would have been nominally subordinate to
Saiyut. By staging the Army's own media event, Athit
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The son of a Thai Army lieutenant colonel, Athit has
risen through the ranks at an unprecedented rate
since graduating from Thailand's military academy
in 1948. Athit came to prominence in 1977 with
increased concerns about the Communist insurgency.
His anti-Communist sympathies and family ties to
the monarchy brought him to the attention of his
commanding officer, Gen. Prem Tinsulanon. Prem
promoted Athit to major general and, after Prem's
own elevation to Commander in Chief in 1979, placed
Athit in charge of Bangkok's 1st Division-a pivotal
unit in determining the fate of the government in coup
attempts
Prem promoted Athit to lieutenant general and ap-
pointed him 1st Army Region commander, a position
considered by all observers of Thai military politics
to be essential to building a personal power base,
after Athit supported the government in the unsuc-
cessful April 1981 coup attempt by the "Young
Turks" military faction. Athit became Assistant
CINC in October 1981-the only assistant CINC
who did not have to relinquish his troop command-
and was promoted to full general shortly thereafter.
With both troops and a prestigious position he be-
came the Army's single most powerful officer and was
promoted to CINC in September 1982. Since October
1982 Athit has headed the Internal Security Opera-
tions Command, which gives him the power to declare
a threat to national security and assume direct
control over any military or police unit in the coun-
try. In addition, as director of the Bangkok Peace-
keeping Command since April 1981, he has invigorat-
ed that formerly weak organization and has used it to
involve himself in social and political issues.
As Army CINC, Athit moved quickly to build a
strong staff and expand his support base. His estab-
lished role in the military decisionmaking process
ensured that he had considerable influence in draw-
ing up last year's annual promotion list even before
becoming CINC. Important staff slots thus went to
Although the Supreme Commander theoretically
outranks the heads of the Army, Navy, and Air
Force, he has in the past-with no troops to com-
mand-exercised little power. We expect Athit, while
retaining control of the Army, to use the Supreme
Command to consolidate his control of the military
apparatus. Even without the position of Supreme
Commander, moreover, Athit is in a strong position
to become Prime Minister. Six out of 14 individuals
who have commanded the Army since the 1932 coup
ending absolute monarchy have parlayed a military
power base into full control of the government.
US Embassy officials report that Athit is also culti-
vating a public image as a man who cares about not
only the military but the welfare of all. In his
interviews and speeches he tries to portray himself as
the protector of traditional values. He has intervened
to settle labor disputes, promoted slum renewal,
visited fire victims, and traveled throughout the
country to familiarize himself with national
problems.
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After the election last April Athit was instrumental
informing the new government after bickering politi-
cians had reached an impasse on cooperation. Athit
induced the legislature to acquiesce to a coalition
under Prem in which both military and civilian
interests were represented by placing the troops in
Bangkok on alert-the accepted signal for impending
Athit's US counterparts have described him as an
ambitious, "street smart" soldier who prefers to
command singlehandedly. They characterize him as
capable, tough, and businesslike but say that he does
not think well on his feet, is not particularly good
with words, and tends to get in over his head on
foreign affairs and economic matters. Athit is a
controversial figure in Thailand. US Embassy offi-
cials in Bangkok report that some of his former
superior officers resent him because they believe that
his influence and rank are not commensurate with
either his seniority or his ability. They claim that
Athit's promotions constitute inordinate rewards for
his role in suppressing an April 1981 coup attempt
and that his rapid rise is largely due to his connec-
was able to detract from the successful performance
of his rivals while simultaneously boosting his own
public image
in restoring the provision allowing military officers to
serve in the Cabinet. He could then add Defense
Minister to his list of positions and be only a step
away from the prime-ministership; in fact, he would
be able to serve concurrently as Army head and Prime
We believe that Athit, once he has the positions of
both Army CINC and Supreme Commander, will
move to restore some of the military's lost control over
the civilian government. He probably will have the
military's amendments reintroduced by one of the
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Minister, as did Prem.
tions with Prem and the palace.
The Opposition: The opposition Thai Nation Party
clearly intends to make things difficult for the new
administration. Formerly promilitary, the Thai Na-
tion Party lost the military's favor when it abstained
from the vote on Athit's amendments. After the
elections in April, the party tried to form its own
government but failed primarily because it could not
get the backing of the military, which preferred to
return Prem as Prime Minister and not gamble on the
tenuous coalition of many splinter parties Thai Nation
was proposing. Thai Nation to 25X1
introduce their own provocative constitutional amend-
ments, aimed at further reducing the military's
influence.
Their amendments would:
? Require that future prime ministers be elected
members of Parliament.
? Designate the speaker of the House instead of the
president of the Senate-usually a military offi-
cer-as president of the National Assembly.
? Require parliamentary approval-in effect a no-
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by the constitution of any new government.
Economic Issues: Large budget deficits over the past
three years have brought unpopular fiscal austerity
measures tailormade for the Thai Nation Party's
attempts to embarrass and possibly dismantle Prem's
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coalition. In return for IMF and World Bank finan-
cial assistance, the Prem government committed itself
to a program of fiscal reform that includes limiting
the growth of government spending, increasing taxes,
and placing the many unprofitable state enterprises on
a sound financial footing. The fiscal 1984 budget,
which takes effect on 1 October, slashes subsidies to
state enterprises by 75 percent. Prices charged by
these agencies, as well as the Bangkok bus system, are
volatile issues in Bangkok:
? Public protests against higher bus fares late last
year forced Prem to rescind the increase.
? The no-confidence vote against Samak was inspired
by his approval of an increase in passenger train
fares.
? This summer's dock strike was initiated because the
Port Authority cut wages in response to its reduced
government subsidy.
Reduced state enterprise subsidies are also likely to
produce further labor activism because the largest
and strongest unions in Thailand are in the public
sector. Although Bangkok's technocrats and Fi-
nance Minister Sommai are committed to reducing
the losses of public-sector enterprises, others in the
coalition-especially Samak's populist, Bangkok-
based Thai Citizens Party-are likely to oppose
them. Portfolios pertaining to economic matters are
divided among the coalition parties, moreover, mak-
ing consensus difficult.
The depressed state of the rural economy may also
generate public protests. Despite some improve-
ments since the beginning of the year, the continu-
ing low prices of rice, sugar, tin, and corn are
depressing rural incomes. Budget austerity allows
Prem little or no room to increase prices paid to
farmers. Nonetheless, large demonstrations in cen-
tral Thailand in late November over low govern-
ment rice support prices led to a commitment to a
higher price, a move the government may regret. L
The Thai Nation Party is likely to support or possibly
instigate such demonstrations to achieve its goals. The
local press reported that the party was involved in
fomenting last winter's farmers' protests in order to
embarrass its then coalition partner the Social Action
Party, which promotes itself as a champion of rural
issues. US Embassy sources report that the striking
dockworkers had substantially more money than
would be normal and attribute this to Thai Nation
backing.
Outlook
There is a danger that the opposition party's attempts
to bring down the government will succeed. If eco-
nomic recovery is slower than expected, especially in
the rural areas, the US Embassy believes farmers
could be more easily mobilized over such issues as the
continuing low prices of sugar and rice. Student
protesters-whose demonstrations toppled the mili-
tary government in 1973-might also join the fray.
senior Army officers
remain committed to restoring the military's former
powers; a failure to do so could lead to pressure within
the armed forces to take control. Athit might seize
any of these opportunities to restrict the operation of
parliamentary government-by abrogating the consti-
tution, dismissing the National Assembly, or declar-
ing martial law-in order to save the country from
what he would describe as "democratic excesses." At
least for the near term, such a move would probably
be in support of Prem rather than a personal coup.
On balance, we believe that Prem will remain in
office-although he may be forced to shuffle his
Cabinet to include the opposition Thai Nation Par-
ty-because no party is likely to gain a majority in
Parliament and propose its own candidate for Prime
Minister. Moreover, Prem retains considerable mili-
tary and popular support because of his military
background, his strong support for the monarchy, and
his reputation for honesty. Furthermore, a nascent
economic recovery should ameliorate some economic
problems, reducing the opportunity to attack the
government.
The US Embassy in Bangkok
also recently noted that the current state of Thai
politics is marked by an atmosphere of compromise
and a search for ways to minimize differences be-
tween the parties constituting the ruling coalition.
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JOCI GI
Crucial for near-term stability is continued support
for Prem by the military. This would be assured by
the passage of constitutional amendments favoring
the military, which we believe will meet with less
opposition than last spring. The civilian parties that
successfully opposed the amendments-the Social Ac-
tion, Democrat, and Thai Nation Parties-no longer
have a close working relationship, for example. More-
over, the bloc of votes in the Senate against the
amendments has been eroded.
Prem packed the Senate-which
would vote on any constitutional issue-with Athit's
supporters.
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