(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001301950001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 14, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301950001-4
Iq
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301950001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301950001-4
Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
14 August 1984
SUCCESSION TO KHOMEINI: IMPLICATIONS FOR IRANIAN POLICY
Summary
Ayatollah Khomeini's health is declining, although he
does not now appear to be dying. The incapacitation or
death of the Islamic Republic's charismatic leader would not
lead to a quick unraveling of Iran's clerical regime. After
nearly six years in power, the clerical network of
institutions and instruments of r~~'~~~ on are too well
entrenched to whither away soon.
Ayatollah Montazeri is the most likely immediate
successor to Khomeini. As long as the clerics remain in
control, we expect Tehran to emphasize Islamic ideology and
to be wary of close relations with either superpower. With
Khomeini gone, however, Tehran would probably move gradually
to disengage from the war with Iraq. Still, tension between
the two historical rivals would remain high.
This paper was prepared byl Office of Near 25X1
Eastern and South Asian Analysis, Persian Gulf Division, at the request of the
Director of Central Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division, 25X1
NESA M 84 10247C
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP85TOO287ROO1301950001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301950001-4
All leading clerical contenders for power support the
export of the revolution and some terrorist activity. As a
result, we would expect Iran to continue subversive
activities in the Persian Gulf and to sustain efforts to
undermine US interests in the Middle East even after
Khomeini's death. Eventually, however, violent export of
the revolution is likely to becomes issue between
moderate and radical factions.
Over the longer term, there is a significant chance
that competition for power among the clerics will threaten
the regime's stability. There are currently no obvious
alternatives to a clerical regime. A Revolutionary Guard
leader who could obtain some clerical support and claim
continuity with the Islamic Revolution might be able to
seize power during a prolonged period of instability.
Ideological hostility in the Guard makes it unlikely that
such a successor regime would be pro-West. The regular
military is even more closely controlled than the Guard and
even less likely to take power. Neither the Shah's son nor
any other Iranian exile leader possesses the necessary
domestic assets to shape Iran's political future.
If Iran experienced prolonged upheaval, the Soviets
would enjoy expanded opportunities for exploitation,
particularly among Iran's ethnic minorities. We continue to
doubt, however, that Moscow would be able to control events
in Iran. Its best hope probably lies in the chance that a
weakened central government in Tehran, particularly a
Revolutionary Guard government, would look to Moscow for
support and assistance.
Khomeini's Deteriorating Health
reporting from US embassies indicate that
Khomeini has Suffered at least two minor heart attacks and/or strokes since
the middle of June, but these apparently have caused no permanent damage.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301950001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301950001-4
Succession Mechanics
The Islamic Republic's constitution mandates that the succession to
Khomeini's post as supreme political-religious authority be formally decided
by a cleric-dominated, 60-man Assembly of Experts in religious law. The
constitution allows a choice between a single heir or a leadership council of-
three or five top level clerics. Since Khomeini's recent illnesses, leading "
Iranian clerics have intensified efforts to prepare for Khomeini's succession
while trying to avoid any public signs of urgency. In late July, for example,
a subcommittee of clerics from the Assembly of Experts was named to define in
detail the succession process.
If Khomeini were to die suddenly, a quick decision to tap Ayatollah
Hosein Montazeri is likely. He has long been considered Khomeini's preferred
choice as heir, and such a move would provide a visible sign of continuity.
Majles Speaker Rafsanjani, second only to Khomeini in political power,
endorsed Montazeri last month, and the government-controlled press now refers
to Montazeri as a "Grand Ayatollah" in an effort to raise his religious
standing. There are only around half dozen other such senior clerics in
Iran, including Khomeini.
Montazeri, who for years has acted as Khomeini's de facto deputy on a
variety of important matters, has a reputation as a hardliner on the war and
on the strict observance of Islamic law. In recent weeks, however, he has
softened his public positions on such issues as the war and social policy,
suggesting that he is trying to broaden his political base. Montazeri is
about 60 years old. He was tortured while in jail under the Shah, weakening
_
his health, but he is not known to have any life-threatening illnesses. F
25X1
25X1
The Struggle for Power
Clerical infighting would not end with Montazeri's succession to
Khomeini's position. Montazeri lacks Khomeini's religious stature and
charisma.
25X1
25X1
We expect that clerics who now control competing governmental, religious,
and revolutionary organizations will continue to fight for political power,
even though Montazeri will have titular authority. Clerical politics in Iran
are best understood by viewing the clergy as roughly divided into three groups
along an ideological continuum. At one extreme are activists who advocate
strict clerical supervision of society under the leadership of one supreme
religious jurisprudent. In the middle are clerical moderates who argue for
only generalized clerical supervision, with less direct intervention in the
government. At the other extreme are quietists who oppose any clerical
involvement in politics--and, hence, the whole structure of Khomeini's Islamic 25X1
Republic. Although this group represents the traditional Shia view and,
may have the largest number of adherents in Iran, 25X1
its philosophy has kept it largely on the sidelines under Khomeini. FJ 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301950001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301950001-4
Among the key players maneuvering against this ideological backdrop will
-- Majles Speaker Rafsanjani, a junior cleric in his 40s who is skillful
at maneuvering among the various clerical factions. Pragmatic on many
issues, he is a firm believer in tight clerical control. He is often
reported to be a rival of President Khamenei.
-- President Khamenei, another relatively young cleric who reportedly is
a less adroit politician than Rafsanjani, but is a charismatic
speaker. Khamenei also supports tight clerical supervision.
-- Ayatollah Meshkini, a slightly older cleric, teaches in Qom. He
shares some of the powers Khomeini delegated to Montazeri. A clerical
activist, he also falls at the extreme end of the continuum. He is
anti-Soviet, a hawk on the war, and favors land reform.
-- Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani, a cleric in his fifties, is a former Prime
Minister who now heads the Tehran Militant Clerics' Association. He
has been identified with clerical moderates on most issues and falls
in the middle of the continuum.
-- Ayatollah Musavi-Ardabili, also in his fifties, is head of the Iranian
judiciary. He has emerged over the past year as an advocate of
political and economic reform, probably placing him toward the center
of the continuum.
-- The half-dozen other "Grand" Ayatollahs, such as Ayatollah Shariat-
Madari, spiritual leader of Iran's Turkic speaking minority. All of
these senior clerics are in their eighties or nineties and all are
theoretically Khomeini's religious equals. Their opposition to
Khomeini's ideas and programs place them and their an su porters at
the opposite end of the continuum from Khomeini. ~ 25X1
Short-Term Policy Implications
We expect competition among these individuals and their allies to
increase as each attempts to impose his writ on Iranian politics. This
struggle will affect both Iran's domestic and foreign policies as they are
used as weapons for and against individuals vying for pow 25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301950001-4
 Figure 1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301950001-4
Iranian Leaders
Khomeini, Ruhollah
Leader of the Islamic Republic; outranks all
other officials; commander in chief of the armed
forces.
Montazeri Hussein AN
(Cleric) about 60
Former Friday prayer leader of Tehran and
Qom; delegated by Khomeini the authority to
select candidates for the Supreme Judicial
Council and to name Revolutionary Court
judges; supervises Revolutionary Guard ideologi-
cal training; close ties to radical Arab states,
especially Libya; in poor health; leading candi-
date to succeed Khomeini.
Hashemi-Rafsanjani, All Akbar
(Cleric) 40s
Speaker of the Majles (Assembly) and a founder
of and deputy head of the Islamic Republic
Party (IRP); spokesman of the Supreme Defense
Council; has ties to the Revolutionary Guard;
often disagrees with President Khamenei.
Musavi-Ardabili, Abdol Karim
(Cleric) 50s
Head of Supreme Judicial Council and a
founder of the IRP; appears strongly antilcftist
may have a special interest in economic issues;
shares with Prime Minister responsibility for
implementation of Khomeini's December 1982
"liberalization" decrees; prefers to avoid public
involvement in controversial matters.
Khamenei, All
(Cleric) 40s
President; a founder of and secretary general of
the IRP; chairman of the Supreme Defense
Council; Friday prayer leader of Tehran, but has
spoken rarely since being seriously wounded in
June 1981; has ties to the Revolutionary Guard;
often disagrees with Speaker Rafsanjani.
Musavl-Khamenei, Mir Hussein
(Layman) about 40
Prince Minister and former member of IRP
central committee; former editor of IRP newspa-
per; may be related to President Khamenei;
shares with Ardabili responsibility for imple-
mentation of Khomeini's December 1982 "liber-
alization" decrees.
Mabdani-Kant, Mobammad
(Cleric) 50s
Head of the Tehran militant clerics society;
member of the Council of Guardians; acting
prime minister in fall 1981; Interior Minister
1980 to 1981; has ties to the Revolutionary
Guard, Komiteh system, and Revolutionary
Courts, and has been critical of radical
proposals.
Meshkini, All
(Cleric) 40s or 50s
Friday prayer leader of Qom and head of Qom
militant clerics society; shares with Montazeri
authority from Khomeini to name Revolutionary
Court jud?es; a drafter of land reform legisla-
tion; supervises selection of weekly sermon topics
for nationwide use.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301950001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301950001-4
Still, the path toward an end to the war is likely to be lengthy and
tortuous. Khomeini's clear identification with its continuation and with the
demand to oust Iraqi President Saddam Husayn probably will require his heirs
to allow some time to pass before they feel able to maneuver. His death,
moreover, would deprive them of the one person with the stature to bless a
compromise solution. Although concerned about war weariness, the regime would
also fear that ending the war short of victor would call into question
Tehran's claim of religious invincibility. Y - 25X1
Whatever the eventual outcome, the long term geopolitical struggle
between Iran and Iraq will continue. Moreover, should the Iranian succession
degenerate into open factional fighting, Baghdad is likely to provide
clandestine support to one of the factions in the effort to mold the outcome
in its favor. I 25X1
The Superpowers. Relations with both superpowers are unlikely to improve
anytime soon. Political rivals will seek to discredit proponents of such
moves, and the image of the US "satan" will be too important a symbol of
continuity with Khomeini's legacy to allow any quick improvement in
relations. Moscow also will be unable to make rapid political gains--most
clerics are deeply suspicious of the USSR and hostile to Communist ideology.
Moscow's military support to Bayhdad, moreover, represents another serious
constraint. On the other hand, there appears to be a consensus for continuing
to improve relations with other industrialized countries, such as West Germany
and Japan, whose products and expertise are essential to the sustaining of the
Iranian economy.
Terrorism. There is also a wide clerical consensus on the "export of the
revolution." Most prominent clerics--particularly Ayatollah Montazeri--have
been associated with some terrorist activity. Montazeri also has been an
advocate of close Iranian ties with Libya. If the struggle for power
coalesces around moderate and radical factions, Iranian support for subversion
and terrorism are likely to be key issues of dispute.
Economy. Clerical infighting probably will cause Iran's already serious
economic problems to worsen. Disputes between activists pushing for strong
central control, and conservatives who favor decentralization and private
enterprise, have so far hampered implementation of any coherent economic
development strategy. We doubt either group soon will become strong enough to
impose its views on the other, and Iran's economy will continue to stagnate,
leading to additional social unrest.
The Longer Term
Over the longer term, Iran's political future remains clouded. At a
minimum, however, it is clear that without Khomeini, no one will have the
stature to cap clerical infighting. If this competition does get out of hand,
clerics with close ties to various elements within the regular military and
the Revolutionary Guard may seek their aid, raising the prospects for civil
war, anarchy, and the disintegration of Iran.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301950001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301950001-4
Appointed to post in 1982...
often clashes with Army
commander Shirazi over conduct
of the war... conflicts with
Guard Minister Rafiqdust and
Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani...
considered pro-Soviet.. .may
have been wounded in early
1984.
Commander
of the
Revolutionary Guard
General Qasim All Zahirnejad
Chief
Joint Armed Forces Staff
In his late 50s...retired by
the Shah but reappointed by
clerics... crushed Kurdish
rebellion before the war...
helped rally Iranian troops in
Khuzestan after Iraqi
invasion... former commander of
the ground forces... opposes
Ground Forces Commander
Shirazi on continuing large
scale attacks into Iraq.
Colonel Sayyed Shirazi
Mohsen Rafiqdust
In his
street
clever
Minister
of the
Revolution Guards
mid 40s... former
tough... described as
but brash... involved
the execution of officers
loyal to the Shah... appointed
as Minister in October 1982...
Commander
Iranian Ground Forces
In his mid 30s...very reli-
gious. . .served as an artillery
officer under Shah...
ruthlessly crushed Kurdish
rebellion in early 1980...
succeeded Zahirnejad as ground
forces commander in late
1981... supports merging of the
uneven rela*,*-n< Qo.,o, regular forces with the
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301950001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301950001-4
If a post-Khomeini Islamic regime does fall, we believe the most likely
successor would eventually emerge from the military, with some clerical
backing. Either or both the Army and the Revolutionary Guard could be
involved, but the Guard is more likely to play a decisive role. Given the
purges within the regular military and the ideological hostility to the West
in the Guard, we doubt that any such coalition would he pro-West. It would
more likely espouse nonalignment and for a be inward looking,
attempting to consolidate firm control 25X1
A prolonged period of upheaval would provide the Soviets with greatly
expanded opportunities in Iran, especially among Iran's ethnic minorities
along their common border. We believe, however, that the Soviets' ability to
influence events in Iran would be limited--many of their assets were wrapped
up following crackdowns on the Tudeh party and the Mujahedin, and their
willingness to act boldly will be restrained by their experience in
Afghanistan and by the possibility of superpower confrontation.
The Soviets are likely to court the new regime while covertly building
their assets. They probably will hope that a weakened government in Tehran
would seek Moscow's support and assistance, providing the USSR with direct
access. This most likely would occur if a Revolutionary Guard leader assumed
control with the assistance of left-leaning lay Islamic technocrats. Such a
regime might be tempted to look to the Soviets for both military and economic
assistance. Alternatively, Iranian leaders in a weakened post-Khomeini regime
might fear that the Soviets would take actions along their common border or in
Iraq or Afghanistan that would threaten Iran, and as a result could be
accomodatiny to Moscow. F 25X1
6 25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301950001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301950001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301950001-4