(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00555R000100100004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
of the Military as
a Political Instrument
Poland: Jaruzelski's Use
-rao-se%:jr%r-
EUR 83-10069C
March 1989
COPY / t
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Intelligence
Poland: Jaruzelski's Use
of the Military as
a Political Instrument
An Intelligence Assessment
European Division,
Office of European Analysis. It was coordinated with
the Directorate of Operations and the National
Intelligence Council. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, East
This paper was prepared by
This assessment is the first in a series of planned
research papers analyzing key aspects of the Polish
situation. Other assessments will examine the
prospects for Solidarity, the status of the economy,
and the standing of the Communist party in its
quest to recover political primacy.
Top Secret
EUR 83-10069C
March 1983
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Poland: Jaruzelski's Use
of the Military as
a Political Instrument F
Key Judgments Despite the "suspension" of martial law in Poland on 30 December 1982,
Information available the military's involvement in civilian political, and administrative matters
as of 21 January 1983 has not, in our view, diminished significantly. Even the Military Council of
was used in report.
National Salvation, the country's highest authority under martial law, will
oversee the return "normalcy." Many military commissars continue to
oversee key factories and government offices, and most of the military
officers Jaruzelski appointed to government and party posts remain in
place.
The political role of the armed forces predates martial law. As then
Defense Minister Jaruzelski took over first as Premier and then as party
First Secretary, he began appointing trusted military colleagues to key
positions in the civilian bureaucracy. The imposition of martial law in
December 1981 gave Jaruzelski even more extensive powers, which he
subsequently used to place military commissars throughout the country's
administrative and economic structures, give local defense committees
more power, and create an armed forces inspection commission for civilian
provincial officials. he believes that he alone 25X1
can pull the country out of its economic and political malaise, that Poland's
civilian bureaucracies must become more responsive and effective, and that
the military establishment should be a model and instrument for such
reform. 25X1
After a year of military rule, we conclude Jaruzelski probably is satisfied
with his success at throttling Solidarity and maintaining order. But he may
be disappointed that his extensive efforts have failed to significantly
improve government efficiency. The general must still rely heavily on
civilian bureaucrats-many of whom are strongly entrenched and opposed
to change-to help run the country, and this has stymied his efforts at ad-
ministrative reform.
The military's continuing political involvement, meanwhile, has created
problems that we believe Jaruzelski may not have fully expected. Because
of the repression associated with military rule, public respect for the Polish
People's Army has, we believe, declined. This probably has further
weakened the morale of soldiers already affected by the political and social
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upheaval of the last two years.) there has
been increasing friction between Communist party officials, who have lost
authority and perquisites, and many military officers, who have become
disgusted with the incompetence and corruption in government and party
offices
If Poland remains calm, we believe Jaruzelski will lift martial law officially
this summer, but will try to preserve much of the military's political role to
pursue his unfinished agenda. We expect that he will try to deflect
mounting pressure from party hardliners and from Moscow to restore the
party's political supremacy, but also will have trouble trying to reform
Polish civilian institutions. The longer the military remains involved in
running the country, moreover, the more likely it is to be drawn into the
traditional methods of Polish Communist bureaucracies, which twice since
the'war have thwarted reform drives
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Poland: Jaruzelski's Use
of the Military as
a Political Instrument P
The imposition of martial law in Poland was a
desperate move by a Communist regime to maintain
its power, and it deviated from a central ideological
precept of military subordination to the Communist
party.' The party leadership, judging from its actions,
recognized that because of Solidarity's considerable
popularity, political strength, and ability to disrupt
the economy, any move to throttle the union required
a massive, well-coordinated plan involving all the
regime's instruments of control. Under strong Soviet
pressure to take action and with the party and
government in disarray and disrepute, the party lead-
ers concluded, we believe, that the armed forces were
the only institution with enough power, prestige,
organization, and discipline to impose such a plan.F-
We believe the option of martial law attracted wide-
spread support within the top political leadership.
Party hardliners had all along argued publicly for a
forceful move against Solidarity, apparently calculat-
ing that such action would quickly lead to their
assumption of power. Soviet pressure long had been
directed at moves to squelch Solidarity and to reassert
regime control. By the fall of 1981, in the face of
escalating demands by Solidarity, the moderates
seemed finally to reconcile themselves to martial law
as preferable to Soviet military intervention. Immedi-
ately before the declaration, liberal Politburo member
Kubiak told a US Embassy officer that if Solidarity
did not retract its political demands the resultant
chaos would necessitate emergency measures.
Deputy Premier
Rakowski, a moderate tasked with handling govern-
ment relations with Solidarity, grew increasingly em-
bittered by what he considered Solidarity's failure to
keep its promises and became convinced by December
1981 that it was impossible to reach a compromise
with the union
The Military Tradition
In our view, many of the civilian (and military) leaders
clearly hoped that respect for the armed forces would
mitigate popular opposition to martial law. Poles have
traditionally considered their military, along with the
Church, a guarantor of nationhood and a repository of
Polish nationalism. This esteem dates especially from
1918, when Polish armed forces brought the country
its independence after 150 years of foreign occupa-
tion. Marshal Jozef Pilsudski, whose military exploits
made him the virtual embodiment of Polish patriotism
and statehood, drew the Army into a political role by
ruling the country essentially as a dictatorship with
military participation and support
The Communist officer corps, which emerged after
World War II under tight party control and with
Soviets installed in top-level command positions, had
to work hard to restore a measure of the respect its
predecessors had enjoyed. Its prestige began to re-
bound in the mid-1950s, largely because of former
party leader Gomulka's removal of Soviet officers
from the ranks and the new stress on professionalism
and operational expertise. The armed services recov-
ered even more during the next two decades as pay
and educational levels improved and pre-Communist
military music, insignia, and other symbols were
revived. In mid-May 1981, a countrywide poll by the
semiofficial newspaper Kultura listed the military as
the most respected national institution after the Cath-
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olic Church and Solidarity. 25X1 25X1
Soviet influence in the Polish armed forces, we be-
lieve, has gradually diminished over the last genera-
tion. Many of the senior officers who began their
careers in the Soviet Army or Soviet-organized Polish
units and received their early training from Soviet
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MOCR
(EPUB
Zielona
Gdra
Hradec
Kralove
Stupsk f
i k
Koszalin : J,
Jf
albrzy
Kielce
Nowy
Spcz
Provinces have the same names
as their capitals, except:
Province Capital
Bielsko Bielsko-Biata
Gorzdw Gorzow Wielkopolski
Piotrkow Piotrkow Trybunalski
am brzeg .,
Rze zow
Lvov
i rzemysl
Krosno?
Poland
International boundary
WojewodztNO (province) boundary
* National capital
O Wojewodztwo (province) capital
'-?- Railroad
- Road
0 25 50 75 100 Kilometers
almd
SWEDEN
The United States Government has not recognized
the ,corporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representation
is not necessarily authoritative.
officers probably continue to look to the Soviet lead. officers annually to the Soviet General Staff Acade-
But, in our view, the more junior officers, who have my, and in recent years it has sent about half that
received most of their professional training at Polish number. Many graduates,
military schools, are much less Soviet-influenced.
Poland usually sends. no more than about two dozen
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regard such schooling primarily as a necessi-
worthwhile experience. Some
Pre-Martial Law Involvement
In the months immediately preceding martial law, the
military became increasingly involved in civilian ad-
ministration, largely because of Jaruzelski's assump-
tion of the top government and party positions. Upon
becoming Premier in February 1981, Jaruzelski ap-
pointed Gen. Michal Janiszewski to head his staff and
subsequently selected three proteges for key ministeri-
al posts-Gen. Czeslaw Kiszczak as Minister of Inter-
nal Affairs, Gen. Czeslaw Piotrowski as Minister of
Mines, and Gen. Tadeusz Hupalowski as Minister of
Administration. After becoming Communist party
First Secretary in October 1981, he selected Brig.
Gen. Tadeusz Dziekan and Col. Jerzy Wojcik to
direct the Central Committee's personnel office.
The armed forces also took on some unusual roles in
developing and testing contingencies for declaring a
"state of war."
military plannin for martial law began as early as
December 1980.
the military's deployment of "special operations
groups" throughout the country in the fall of 1981-
ostensibly to alleviate serious food and energy short-
ages and to aid local officials in maintaining order-
was primarily to test popular reaction to its increased
involvement in trying to solve the country's problems.
Popular reaction to the military's expanding role in
these months apparently was favorable, especially in
rural areas, judging by the recollections of an Army'
major who headed one of these groups. In an October
1982 issue of the party weekly Polityka, the officer
said that initially the populace eagerly expected the
military groups to solve local problems and satisfy
personal grievances. The major added, however, that
the enthusiasm waned when it became apparent the
military could not bring about many quick or basic
solutions
Martial Law Functions
The martial law decree of 13 December 1981 drew
the armed forces much further into the political
arena. The provisional Military Council for National
Salvation, a group of high-ranking officers primarily
from the General Staff and major commands, became
on paper the nation's supreme policymaking body.
The National Defense Committee, an existing govern-
ment organization responsible for national security
policy, was designated the Council's executive arm,
and an extensive hierarchy of military commissars
was established to carry out its orders.' Military
officers were assigned to oversee the administration of
each of Poland's 49 provinces and most large cities
and towns. More than 500 commissars were subse-
quently given responsibility for monitoring over 800
enterprises.
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The martial law decree gave military courts consider-
latitude with most serious violations of civil law,
able I
including treason, illegal use of firearms, and crimes 25X1
against public order. The courts also enforced a
decree "militarizing" more than 200 large industrial
plants-requiring workers to comply with orders as in
I
wartime. The original list of militarized enterprises 25X1
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2 The National Defense Committee, an organ of the Council of
Ministers, is Poland's highest authority for national security mat-
ters both in times of peace and war. The prime minister is the ex of-
ficio chairman of the committee, while the minister of defense, the
party secretary for ideological affairs, and the chairman of the
State Planning Commission are the ex officio deputy chairmen.
Other members include key ministers (for example, foreign affairs,
foreign trade, and maritime economy) and the chief of the General
Staff. The General Staff of the Armed Forces plays the predomi-
nant role in the committee's work because it generally initiates and
formulates its resolutions.
Under a 1967 law, the
National Defense Committee heads a nationwide hierarchy of
subordinate defense committees and has the right to place special
representatives in "state administration" and the economy. The
Military Council used this provision to create the system of military
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Table 1
Military Officers in Key Party Posts and Provincial
Governorships
Director of Personnel, Brig. Gen. Tadeusz Dziekan
Central Committee
Deputy Director of Col. Jerzy Wojcik
Personnel, Central
Committee
Chief of the Chancery, Col. Boguslaw Kolodziejczak
Central Committee
Secretariat
Poznan First Secretary Brig. Gen. Edward Lukasik
Bydgoszcz Col. Jozef Musial (Deputy)
Elblag Col. Ryszard Urlinski
Gdansk Maj. Gen. Mieczyslaw Cygan
Kalisz Col. Kazimierz Buczma
Katowice Maj. Gen. Roman Paszkowski
Koszalin Col. Zdzislaw Mazurkiewski
Lodz City Maj. Gen. Jozef Kowalski
Radom Col. Alojzy Wojciechowski
Tarnobrzeg Col. Boguslaw Jazwiec
Warsaw City Maj. Gen. Mieczyslaw Debicki
Wloclawek Brig. Gen. Tadeusz Gembicki
Zielona Gora Col. Walerian Mikolajczak
included all transportation and communication facili-
ties, and some port complexes and military arma-
ments factories; the decree allowed for the addition of
other factories.
The armed forces' subsequent involvement in admin-
istering the country, in our view, became considerably
more pervasive than the martial law decree required:
positions at all levels.
senior officers were brought in to oversee every
governmental ministry and agency-even every de-
partment within the ministry that directs local
governments. Almost a dozen senior officers were
appointed governors of provinces, including Gdansk,
Katowice, Radom, and the city of Warsaw. And
active, retired, and reserve officers, according to the
Table 2
Selected List of Provincial Military Commissars
Elblag
Gdansk
Konin
Warsaw City
Krakow
Tarnow
Przemysl
Katowice
Bialystok
Pruszkow
Olstyn
Poznan
Czestochowa
Koszalin
Gorzow
Col. Jozef Caputa
Col. Zenon Molczyk
Col. Tadeusz Ryba
Maj. Gen. Wladislaw Mroz
Brig. Gen. Leon Sulima
Brig. Gen. Tadeusz Belczewski
Col. Stanislaw Jedrzejec
Col. Czeslaw Piekart
Col. Leon Siemionczyk
Capt. Lechoslaw Zapart
Col. Jan Turkan
Brig. Gen. Piotr Przybyszewski
Col. Rusonia
Brig. Gen. Witold Niedek
Maj. Gen. Jan Sosnicki
Polish press, played important roles in staffing the
nationwide Citizens' Committees for National Sal-
vation, regime-created mass organizations intended
to generate support for the martial law regime.
? Jaruzelski appointed Col. Boguslaw Kolodziejczak
as staff chief of the party Central Committee, a
move which we believe has allowed him to oversee
that body's day-to-day activities and
reflected Jaruze saki s 'con-
tinuing practice of placing reasonably competent,
but malleable, subordinates in key positions.
? The activities of several military bodies clearly
became very wide ranging. Some provincial defense
committees (the local arms of the National Defense
Committee) organized "worker inspection teams" to
investigate the efficiency of local governmental of-
fices and the distribution of agricultural products.
And the number of special operations groups estab-
lished in the fall of 1981 increased. According to the
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Polish press, more than 2,000 groups, each com-
posed of four to five soldiers, were charged with
making detailed inspections of farms and factories.
They were redispatched temporarily in late Novem-
ber 1982, largely, we believe, to reassure Jaruzelski
that local political, economic, and security condi-
tions were conducive to an easing of martial law
restrictions.
? A new military inspection commission, created in
March 1982, emerged as a powerful instrument for
checking on provincial administrative activities and
removing ineffective party and governmental offi-
cials. Directed by the Armed Forces Inspectorate
and, according to the Polish press, operating under
the close supervision of Jaruzelski, the commission
eventually comprised some 130 "examiners," in-
cluding officials from the government's ministry for
local affairs and the party's Central Auditing Com-
mission. By the end of November 1982, the commis-
sion had investigated 10 provinces, handing out
fines and reprimands to numerous officials and
recommending the dismissal of others. In most
cases, the inspectors presented provincial officials
with lists of problems and demanded that the
officials work out timetables for dealing with the
issues. We know that in two provinces, for example,
the failure of officials to act on commission recom-
mendations prompted Jaruzelski to dismiss both
governors and their key deputies, one of the provin-
cial party leaders, and some senior administrative
employees and factory managers.
Shared Power
Despite its substantial political role, the military in
our view was not able to use its expanded powers to
dominate totally the civilian institutions. Rather, it
became an additional participant in the chaotic Polish
political process-usurping some party and govern-
ment powers, but often
arbitrating between strongly entrenched local bureau-
cracies.
The Military Council, despite its supreme decision-
making power under martial law, seems to have
focused its attention on short-term, internal security
issues. Polish press reporting indicates that most of its
deliberations during the martial law period concerned
internees, curfews, and other issues related to emer-
gency restrictions. The Council has rarely dealt with
economic policy, although it has often "discussed" the
country's economic situation.
The Council's apparent reluctance to become involved
in political and economic issues probably reflects its
lack of expertise in these areas. Most members are
senior professional military men who have long held
command and staff positions in the Ministry of
Defense or the operational forces. Although all are
party members and a few belong to the Central
Committee, they, like other senior officers, have not
been actively involved in internal party politics or
government administration. Several officers may have
worked with factories producing military equipment,
but even they probably never faced the range of issues
that routinely confront civilian economic managers.
We believe that the party's Politburo` and Secretariat
have continued to be involved in decisionmaking to
varying degrees, with the Secretariat perhaps retain-
ing more of its influence because of its day-to-day
involvement in the execution of policy. The Politbu-
ro's influence on decisionmaking, in our view, may
have been much less than usual, if only because
divisions between hardliners and moderates over
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Table 3
Military Council of National Salvation
General of the Army Wojciech Jaruzelski, Chairman
Lt. Gen. Florian Siwicki
Lt. Gen. Jozef Urbanowicz
Lt. Gen. Eugeniesz Molczyk
Lt. Gen. Tadeusz Tuczapski
Lt. Gen. Czeslaw Kiszczak
Lt. Gen. Zygmunt Zielinski
Lt. Gen. Tadeusz Hupalowski
Lt. Gen. Czeslaw Piotrowski
Maj. Gen. Michal Janiszewski
Maj. Gen. Tadeusz Krepski
Maj. Gen. Longin Lozowicki
Vice Adm. Ludwik Janczyszyn
Maj. Gen. Wlodzimierz Oliwa
Maj. Gen. Jozef Uzycki
Maj. Gen. Henryk Rapacewicz
Brig. -Gen. Jerzy Jarosz
Brig. Gen. Edward Poradko
Col. Miroslaw Hermaszewski
First Secretary, Polish United Workers' Party; Chairman, Council of Ministers
Director, Office of the Minister of National Defense; Acting Minister of
National Defense; Chief of the General Staff
Deputy Minister of National Defense for General Affairs
Deputy Minister of National Defense; Chief, Main Inspectorate of Training
Deputy Minister of National Defense; Chief, Inspectorate of Territorial
Defense
Deputy Minister of National Defense; Chief, Main Political Administration,
Ministry of National Defense; recently named next Prosecutor General of
the Armed Forces
Minister of Internal Affairs
Chief, Main Cadre Directorate, Ministry of National Defense
Minister of Administration, Local Economy, and Environmental Protection
Minister of Mining and Power
Chief, Office of the Council of Ministers
Commander, Air Forces
Commander, Air Defense Forces
Commander, Naval Forces
Commander, Warsaw Military District
Commander, Pomeranian Military District
Commander, Silesian Military District
Commander, 1st Mechanized Division
Chief, Military Security Service
Cosmonaut .
many political and economic issues-but not on the
imperative of maintaining control-have prevented it
from reaching agreement. In addition, several key
government officials and bodies may have acquired
increased influence on top-level policymaking, espe-
cially in the economic sphere. Deputy Premier
Obodowski, for example,.has added to his responsibili-
ties for short-term economic planning the long-term
planning portfolio and the chairmanship of the Eco-
nomic Planning Commission.
The influence of the Internal Affairs Ministry, in our
view, expanded considerably under martial law, both
because Jaruzelski relied on it heavily to maintain
control and because it was successful. Jaruzelski
avoided extensive use of the armed forces to quash
strikes and demonstrations, primarily we believe out
of concern for the reliability of its lower ranks and the
preservation of its reputation. Instead, he allowed the
Ministry significant latitude in squelching dissent and
disorders with its secret police and internal security
forces. A party official told the US Embassy last fall
that police officials often played an important role in
local-level decisionmaking, and sometimes-as in the
case of Gdansk and its governor (an army general)-
provincial authorities and local police officials came
into direct conflict over policy issues. To ensure that
the Ministry remained under his control, Jaruzelski
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selected as its director General Kiszczak, a man with
considerable experience in military security matters.
The military's arrogation of power at the local level
seems to have varied considerably from locality to
locality, with the party, government, and police bu-
reaucracies wielding differing degrees of influence. In
some regions, provincial military commissars aggres-
sively asserted their control over the local party and
government bureaucracies. Col. Tadeusz Ryba, for
example, said in an interview with a Polish newspaper
that he fired nearly 30 factory and government office
managers in Konin Province in his first three months
as provincial commissar. On the other hand, some
officers, like a former commissar in a small town in
Silesia, apparently had little influence over the local
administration, either because of bureaucratic resis-
tance or apathy. This officer candidly told a Polish
journalist in October 1982 that as a commissar he had
no appreciable effect on the "business as usual"
attitude of local bureaucrats. In general, however, all
commissars asserted their full authority in the area of
greatest immediate concern to the martial law re-
gime-order in the factories and the streets.
Jaruzelski's Personal Power
Although the armed services as an institution have not
wielded absolute power in the governance of Poland,
Jaruzelski as its leader has had no serious rival.
Having held the top party, government, and military
positions since before 13 December 1981, in our view
he clearly used the military's expanded role under
martial law and the disruption of traditional power
relationships to consolidate his personal political posi-
tion.
We believe Jaruzelski's accumulation of power was
facilitated by his firm control over the top levels of the
armed forces. He acquired that control, following his
appointment as Minister of Defense in 1968, by
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gradually placing a number of loyal associates in key
positions. Most notable of these
are the Acting Defense Minister,
General Siwicki; Deputy Defense Minister General
Baryla; two Military District Commanders, Generals
Uzycki and Oliwa; former Defense Ministry staff
chief (and now staff director for the Premier) General
Janiszewski; and Defense Ministry personnel chief
General Zielinski. He also eased out of positions of
authority some senior officers-like Generals
Sawczuk and Urbanowicz-who
says, posed potential threats to his positioi
while Jaruzelski was Min-
ister of Defense he was criticized by some senior
officers both for his occasional indecisiveness and for
specific decisions, but his overall leadership of the
military was never seriously challenged
Because of his control over the Ministry of Defense
and the General Staff, Jaruzelski in our view has
dominated the Military Council, despite
a few-most notably
Generals Molczyk and Urbanowicz-owe their posi-
tions to their relationships with Soviet officials, a
majority of the Council members are beholden to
Jaruzelski. enerals
Siwicki, Hupalowski, and Oliwa-recognize the need
to take Soviet concerns seriously, but nonetheless
place Polish national interests ahead of Moscow's
predilections. At least one member-Deputy Defense
Minister Tuczapski-has been vocally anti-Soviet.
After the imposition of martial law, Jaruzelski further
centralized power in himself.
he made many decisions only after debat-
ing the options with a small group of close advisers
drawn from the party, government, and armed
forces-a practice he no doubt still follows.
this informal irec
probably has comprised eight people who repre-
sent a cross section of political attitudes and bureau-
cratic interests.
Jaruzelski has deliberately included people ex-
pressing a range of opinions, but that moderates
predominate. The directorate has included, among
others, Generals Siwicki, Kiszczak, and Janiszewski,
old colleagues whose attitudes no doubt complement
and reinforce Jaruzelski's own basically cautious ap-
proach. It also has included three civilians whom we
regard as political moderates: Deputy Premiers
Rakowski and Obodowski, and party Politburo mem-
ber Barcikowski-reportedly a close personal friend.
Results of Military Rule
The martial law authorities did a good job of fulfilling
their main goal-throttling Solidarity. The union,
which once claimed almost 10 million members, could
do little to oppose the imposition of martial law and
was unable to mount significant protests in response
to its legal abolition in October. We believe the
military regime's success reflects the priority that the
authorities gave to suppressing strikes and demonstra-
tions. They intimidated most would-be strikers in the
factories by firing those who participated in job
actions and by arresting union activists who tried to
organize protests. They stifled demonstrations with
overwhelming force and effective crowd-control tac-
tics. According to the US Embassy, the internal
security services infiltrated Solidarity so thoroughly
that they thwarted its communications and sowed
considerable confusion. The arrest of a leading under-
ground union leader just days before scheduled dem-
onstrations in October, for instance, significantly dis-
rupted union preparations.
The military regime, however, made little progress in
finding long-term solutions to Poland's economic
problems. Although it was able to stem the decline in
industrial production and impose substantial price
increases without significant popular reaction, the
economy is stagnant and seems unlikely to rebound
any time soon. Western economic sanctions made the
regime's tasks more difficult, further reducing im-
ports of already scarce raw materials and spare parts.
Jaruzelski has withheld full implementation of some
much-heralded economic reforms, in part, we believe,
because the economic situation remains poor and
because the reforms have encountered stiff bureau-
cratic resistance.
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Jaruzelski encountered obstacles and delays in the
political arena as well. Even with the military's wide-
ranging involvement, especially in the state adminis-
tration, he was not in our view able to impose
discipline on the government or party bureaucracies
or significantly improve their efficiency-particularly
below the national level.
the
considerable power many mTttary commissars at first
exercised over government administrators waned after
a few months, and many local bureaucrats eventually
returned to their old ways of doing business. Jaru-
zelski, moreover, was unable or unwilling to devote
much attention to revamping party organs. Just one
provincial party chief-in Poznan-was replaced by a
military officer, and that appointment,
was essentially an effort to dampen local
bureaucratic infighting. Furthermore, Polish media
reports indicate that the personnel replacements
brought about by the military inspections did not
include many local party officials
The regime probably underestimated the difficulties
or time involved in trying to clean out provincial party
and government offices. We believe the military
inspections, although seemingly comprehensive, were
slower than planned. In press interviews, some mem-
bers of the commission expressed astonishment at the
extent of the corruption and inefficiency they encoun-
tered. We believe that the unforeseen scale of the
problem is probably the primary reason why, accord-
ing to the Polish press, only 10 of the 49 provinces
were inspected before the "suspension" of martial
law. Jaruzelski, moreover, may have concluded that
tackling the party and state bureaucracies concurrent-
ly was too much, so he tried to concentrate on the
latter-which he probably regarded as an easier
target and one of far greater, short-term importance.
He may also have calculated that, for the near term,
circumventing local party authorities through military
operations groups and commissars would be easier
and more effective than trying to manipulate or purge
them.
Jaruzelski's attempts to drum up popular support for
Polish media have
admitted openly that the movement has experienced
problems in developing credibility among the popu-
lace
The limited success of the military regime in coping
with Poland's political and economic difficulties has
made it sensitive to criticism about the qualifications
of some of its officers. An article in a military
periodical in September 1982 took great pains to
discount "rumors" and leaflets depicting military
commissars as rural and poorly educated. Polish
media have tried to portray commissars and officers
appointed to civilian posts as ombudsmen and profes-
sional managers making the system work. Many
officers have realized their shortcomings.' Reports
from the US Embassy and the Polish press indicate
that some have expressed surprise at the complexities
of managing a province or town. One local commissar
complained that the job was impossible because of the
need to deal with so many centers of power and
policymaking-the party, the Military Council, the
Army, and ministries of the national government.
Other Effects of Military Rule
We believe that public respect for the armed serv-
ices-something Jaruzelski counted on to mitigate
reaction to martial law-diminished under military
rule, particularly among the youth.
many Poles initially favored military
intervention, apparently expecting some real abate-
ment of Poland's problems. Jaruzelski's continued use
of force to maintain order and his delegalization of
Solidarity, however, encouraged the public to view
martial law (and the armed forces) as another instru-
ment for repression.
' Maj. Gen. Roman Paszkowski-governor of Katowice Province-
had been the Polish Ambassador to Angola and Sao Tome, and Col.
Alojzy Wojciechowski-governor of Radom Province-had been
deputy chief of the Defense Ministry's Motor-Tank Services.F_
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his policies, especially through his much-heralded
Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth, have been
no more successful.
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The erosion of popular respect for the armed forces as
a national institution has no doubt been vexing for
many officers. Some have probably considered it a
serious setback in their efforts over the last two
decades to overcome the stigma of being an append-
age of the Soviet army. Others, particularly the young
officers in units that directly supported martial law
and who, by many accounts, were already uncomfort-
able with their "backup" role to the police, probably
have become even more perplexed that many of their
civilian peers now regard them as protectors of and
accomplices to an increasingly repressive regime.
This concern, in our view, has only compounded the
uneasiness within an officer corps already disturbed
by the realization that Solidarity had made some
early inroads at influencing the attitudes of draftees.
Polish military
leaders were concerned about morale and discipline
months before the imposition of martial law, and
terms of service for conscripts were subsequently
extended last fall, we believe, to avoid an influx at
that time of even more politically sensitized recruits.
Though traditionally, and we think still, one of the
more conservative institutions in Communist Poland,
the officer corps itself was not immune to. the political
and social upheaval of the last two years.
We believe that age, experience,
education, and social pressures largely explain these
perceptions.
some senior and even gener-
al officers-such as Gdansk Province Governor Maj.
Gen. Mieczyslaw Cygan-have also shown sympathy
for Solidarity's ideals. This mixture of diverse politi-
cal attitudes in the officer ranks, however, did not
affect the military's loyalty to the regime or its
performance under martial law-though the armed
forces were not seriously tested as a domestic security
Martial law also produced growing friction between
the military and the increasingly frustrated Commu-
nist party functionaries. The military's opinion of the
party declined markedly as its increased involvement
in running the country brought home the flaws of
party rule.
at least some mili-
tary officers, such as Warsaw city military commissar
and chief of the military inspection commission Gen-
eral Mroz, wanted more extensive purges of the party.
Within the party, members from both ends of the
political spectrum came to believe that the military
increasingly was overstepping its bounds. F
Martial Law "Suspended"
The laws passed by parliament in December 1982
"suspending," but not abolishing, martial law re-
moved some of its more obvious trappings while
leaving intact many aspects of the military's political
involvement. The State Council has taken over the so-
called administrative functions of the Military Coun-
cil-including the power to reimpose martial law
selectively or nationwide-but the Military Council
remains to serve as the "guarantor" of a safe transi-
tion to "normalcy." The authority of the military
courts over civilians has been significantly circum-
scribed, but military prosecutors still have purview
over certain serious economic and political crimes.
The number of military commissars overseeing fac-
tories is shrinking as
plants are emi itarize but this appears to be a
slow process, judging by the regime's elaborate proce-
dures for removing special controls, and by its an-
nouncement that commissars would remain in enter-
prises and agencies deemed "critical" to national
interests. Moreover, most military officers in high-
level government and party posts-including minis-
ters, provincial governors, and Central Committee
force.
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staffers-have stayed in place. And the National
Defense Committee and its hierarchy of subordinate
committees remain active in civilian matters, particu-
larly in helping to ensure law and order
Furthermore, we believe that Jaruzelski may use the
next several months of transition to place even more
of his military people in the government and party
bureaucracies. An article in the daily military news-
paper in October 1982, for example, raised the possi-
bility of assigning reserve officers to provincial party
organizations. In late January 1983 he appointed
Maj. Gen. Tadeusz Gembicki as governor of Wlocla-
wek Province, by our count the 12th officer placed in
such a civilian post. And the "special training" in
economic reform that the government newspaper re-
cently announced is to be given to officers of the
Army's Quartermaster Service may be a precursor,
we believe, to involving the military even more in the
civilian economy, especially in the provinces.
Jaruzelski's efforts to keep the military significantly
involved in running the country reflect, in our judg-
ment, his concern for domestic order, his distrust of
the civilian bureaucracies, and a desire to bolster his
personal power.
he believes that he alone can lead his country out of
its crisis and he wants to continue using the military
to build a power base strong enough to accomplish his
goal. In our view, he appreciates the persisting
strengths of the various party and government bu-
reaucracies and believes that an important element of
the long-term solution to Poland's problem of recur-
ring economic crises is making these institutions more
efficient and responsive. He will continue trying to use
his authority-and the armed forces as a model and
instrument-to effect such administrative reform dur-
ing this period of transition and beyond.
The general, in our judgment, believes that bureau-
cratic reform and economic recovery cannot be
achieved by looking to the political extremes
his actions strongly indicate an intent to
establish the image of a centrist. Judging by several
significant personnel changes over the last year, he
has effectively pared away the extreme wings of the
party's leadership and outmaneuvered some promi-
nent party figures, including his most serious rival
hardliner Stefan Olszowski.
he has fought off attempts by Politbu-
ro hardliners to block completely his more moderate
policies on economic reform.
Jaruzelski's apparent attachment to middle-of-the-
road domestic politics is paralleled, in our view, by his
treatment of Polish-Soviet ties.
enigmatic image has helped him build and maintain
power both in the military and in the party. Whatever
the depth of his nationalism and the nature of his
relationship with Moscow, his actions, as the US
Embassy in Warsaw points out, are those of a "cool
realist."
Jaruzelski doubtless recognizes the need for close ties
with the Soviet Union, and his priorities often coin-
cide with or are influenced by Moscow's. In our
estimation, however, the general believes he has some
latitude for independent action. While Minister of
Defense he consistently treated Poland's armed forces
in public as an integral part of the Warsaw P4ct, but
he was equally consistent behind
the scenes in resisting Moscow's attempts to place
Soviet advisers in Polish military units.
We believe his current handling
of Soviet-Polish relations is largely responsible for the
comparatively tepid reception Jaruzelski received in
Moscow last December when newly elected Soviet
party chief Andropov met with all the Bloc leaders.
Outlook
We judge that Jaruzelski, as he has indicated, proba-
bly will lift martial law completely this summer if the
country remains calm, but we believe such a move will
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not lead to an immediate, significant decline in the
military's political involvement. Some of the special
bodies set up by martial law, including the Military
Council and its local "Citizens' Committees for Na-
tional Salvation," presumably will be dissolved.'
Jaruzelski hopes to use the
many retired and active members of the'military who
figured prominently in staffing those citizen groups as
his local "eyes and ears" within the new "Patriotic
Movement." The regime's cautious retirement of mili-
tary commissars strongly suggests that some will
remain even after the formal dissolution of martial
law. We believe that the military inspection commis-
sion will need much more time to streamline the
bureaucracy. Although the commission may turn over
its work to a civilian counterpart once military rule is
totally lifted, experts from the armed services most
likely will be given a close advisory role.
For the more distant future, as long as Jaruzelski
remains in a position of political power, he will, in our
view, continue to look to the military establishment
for support. A midlevel party functionary has told the
US Embassy he expects that most of the officers
occupying civilian jobs will keep those positions indef-
initely. Indeed, Warsaw Mayor Major General
Debicki in an interview with a popular Warsaw daily
newspaper on 12 December subtly rejected the idea
that his civilian duties might end any time soon. The
same party source has, in fact, declared that the
military's future role in Poland is both "bright and
durable," particularly in local government adminis-
Some officers who may not be willing to relinquish
their political powers too quickly probably will not
have much trouble convincing Jaruzeiski to keep them
on for some time. By all appearances at least a few,
such as Koszalin Province Governor Col. Zdzislaw
Mazurkiewski, truly believe they can contribute sub-
stantially to civil administration and have said so
publicly. Others may feel they would be leaving a job
unfinished. Their sensitivity to criticism, unhappiness
with the Communist party's shortcomings, and failure
to substantially improve economic performance and
government efficiency probably have prompted many
to renew their commitment to current roles. Admit-
ting failure would be a bitter pill for many officers,
especially if military rule would be remembered pri-
marily for its suppression of Solidarity.
We believe that pressure will continue to mount on
Jaruzelski to take concrete steps toward revitalizing
the party and restoring its preeminence. The very
lifting of martial law restrictions seems likely to raise
expectations of a return to Communist party domi-
nance, and party hardliners who disagree with
Jaruzelski's policies and who want to weaken him will
try to exploit these hopes. Other party officials who
resent the military's intrusion or have lost their jobs
may rally behind calls for an early restoration of the
party to its traditional role. Soviet political leaders,
anxious for a return to orthodox Communist rule, may
put additional pressure on Jaruzeiski.
Jaruzelski may make some gestures toward expanding
the party's involvement in decisionmaking, but we
think he probably would move slowly and make
changes only when confident of his control. Mean-
while, the friction between frustrated and disenfran-
chised party functionaries and military officers who
are becoming ensconced in the civilian bureaucracy is
likely to increase.
Because Jaruzelski has made only a beginning on the
agenda he set forth in his first speech after imposing
martial law, we doubt he plans to relinquish his party
position any time soon. Indeed, rumors persist in
Warsaw that he may eventually assume the title of
state president-while relinquishing the premier-
ship-and have the president's authority considerably
strengthened, possibly by expanding it to include. the
duties of "commander in chief of the armed forces."
Some, moreover, may not be able to return easily to their previous
jobs because the military has a
glut of midlevel officers, many o w om have been promoted to fill
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For all Jaruzelski's efforts to gather tighter the reins
of power, however, we believe there are limits to the
exercise of that power. His attacks on corruption and
inefficiency, although the most extensive ever under-
taken in Communist Poland, seem not, in our view, to
stand a much better chance than those launched by
former party leaders Gomulka and Gierek. He, like
his predecessors, still will have to rely heavily on the
party and governmental bureaucracies-which his-
torically have been extremely resistant to change-to
help administer Poland. His proposed economic re-
forms will continue to provoke foot-dragging and
obstructiveness from those same bureaucrats whose
privileges they threaten. And, finally, the longer the
military is involved in administering the government
and the economy, the more likely it, too, will be drawn
into the traditional ways of Polish Communist bu-
reaucracies and become even more discredited in the
eyes of the public.
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