(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00367R000201610001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 8, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP04T00367R000201610001-3
xasmngPDn.aC2O5O5
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
08 May 1984
Philippines: Outlook for the National Assembly Election
Continued political polarization and protest
demonstrations are a considerable risk, however, if Marcos
is too blatant in manipulating election results. Charges" 25X1
of election rigging are certain in any event, and because
public discontent with his rule remains widespread, Ma
will almost certainly achieve less than, he hopes for.
could claim to have achieved a popular mandate.
Summary
The stakes in the National?Assembly election on 14
May are high for President Marcos, the ruling party
(Kilusang Bagong Lipunan--KBL), and the moderate
opposition. All face a key test of their popular support
in the aftermath of the Aquino assassination. KBL and
opposition politicians, moreover, believe that a.good
showing is important to their influence in post-Marcos 25X1
politics. '
The KBL's financial and organizational advantages,
combined with. electoral machihery.beholden to Marcos,
suggest the party will win an overwhelming majority.
Depending on the extent of the KBL's heavy-handedness in
falsifying election returns, however, the opposition could
win a larger minority share of the Assembly than it .
retains at present. Such an outcome, nonetheless, would
allow Marcos to retain control over the Assembly and--if 25X1.
This memorandum was prepared byl Islands
Branch, Southeast Asia.Divi'sion, Office of East Asian Analysis.
Information available as of 7 May was used in.its preparation., 25X1
Comments are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Southeast
Asia Division,~ 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP04T00367R000201610001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP04T00367R000201610001-3
The Stakes
'Marcos'.alrhost certainly believes an impressive victory by
his party will reassert his authority as the country's preeminent
political force. Since the assassination of Benigno Aquino last
August, he has been increasingly criticized by businessmen, the,
church, and the opposition for failing to deal forthrightly with
the assassination investigation. The ruling party has been taken
to task on economic issues as'the country's financial crisis has
continued unabated, and the government's talks with the IMF over
the conditions of a new balance-of-payments loan have remained at
an impasse. 25X1
Marcos, in our judgment, is counting on a sizable KBL
victory to defuse the assassination as an issue and assuage the
fears of international creditors, who hope the election will be a
step toward political stability: With.a strong showing by the
KBL, Marcos also can claim'that he rules by popular mandate, thus
support.
the chart for a profile.of the major contenders). ~ 25X1
The election will provide most of the members. for. a
permanent,-democratic national legislature. At stake are 183
elective seats; Marcos will appoint another 17 assemblymen, who
will represent different sectoral organizations. in Philippine
society, such as labor, education, and agriculture. The current
Interim National Assembly--elected in 1978 in a contest widely
perceived to be fraudulent--contains only 12 opposition members,
a number widely believed to understate the' opposition's popular
to the opposition during the last four months in order to gain
their participation and,make the election appear credible (see
Background .
Since martial law'ended in January 1981, international and
domestic observers have looked to the National Assembly election
next Monday as a critical step toward long-term political
normalization and-stability in the Philippines. President Marcos
also has been pressed during the past- several years to strengthen
democratic institutions in order to ensure a smooth transition to
a popular, centrist government when he steps down. The National
Assembly election represents the first, formal test of his
willingness to allow the development of a more competitive.
political system. Accordingly,.he has made several concessions
The politi l careers of man 'old-line KBL stalwarts are
also?at stake. they
believe they. can no. longer count on a popular a mute
opposition to allow them to retain the power they have acquired
.as members,of the ruling party. As a result, we believe local
 KBL kingpins will use any means necessary, to seize the largest
possible share of the votes, even in those areas where Marcos has ?SX1
privately conceded an opposition victory.
For members of the moderate opposition, the election
represents an opportunity.not only to revive their political
careers, but to position themselves for the succession struggle
they believe is inevitable in the next few years. For this
reason, groups such as the United Nationalist Democratic
Organization (UNIDO),?the Pilipino Democratic Party-Lakas ng
Bayan.(PDP-Laban).and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) have, 25X1
unwillingness to concede to all of.their demands.
In an attempt to tap anti-regime sentiment, the opposition
has threatened to begin impeachment proceedings against Marcos
after the election. Although it would need a two-thirds majority
in the Assembly to succeed, it only needs to control 40 seats to
introduce an impeachment resolution. This threat will. force
Marcos to limit' opposition numbers in the new National Assembly.
The Campaign Trail
Under the most favorable circumstances, the Philippines
would be hard pressed to hold a "fair" election. Popular
elections have traditionally served to legitimize the influence
of local families in.the patron-client system that dominates
Philippine economic and political life. Before martial law,
personality politics dominated elections, and party switching,
vote buying; and election fraud we're common. Election victory
depended on who could .deliver the goods, and thus the vote. 25X1
Little has changed in recent years.'
The KBL's strategy depends on the ability of its regional 25X1
kingpins to carry the election in the countryside, through
25X1
superior financing and local influence. ~ 11 wealthy hy party members such as Eduardo Cojuangco and-Roberto
Benedicto will play key roles and that Cojuangco himself is 25X1
planning to spend $13.3 million to finance candidates.*
lucrative government. contracts are being 25X1
awarded to those ami ies providing support for KBL candidates in 25X1
their regions. .
* Cojuangco is covering his bets.by supporting candidates
from the opposition as well--a move that suggests he is, lannin
make a bid for the presidency in 1987.
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP04T00367R000201610001-3 -
The KBL has ensured that it will win in certain key
areas. In Tarlac Province--a political.base for both Aquino
and Cojuangco--7000 M-16 rifles were distributed to civilian
defense forces prior to registration drives in March,
ostensibly to maintain peace and order.in'the region.
According to the US Embassy, the weapons are probably-
intended to influence voting on election day and discourage
opposition efforts to promote a boycott. Such heavy handed
formation of special "task forces" that will be charged with
manipulating ballots.during the elections if the ruling
party appears to be losing. In addition, the commission has
decided to allow private companies to print ballots which 25X1
will make ballot fraud easier.
COMELEC also has the power to accredit official
citizen's watchdog groups, which will be responsible for
monitoring polling places nationwide. The National
Citizen's Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), an
independent civic organization, was accredited to monitor
new voter registration drives in early spring and it exposed
blatant KBL attempts to pad registration lists; particularly
The KBL will resort to fraud if it proves necessary.
Marcos has bolstered his party's chances by allowing
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to lay groundwork
the
that
25X1
Ilia ,,.... ~~ ... .... ......... ...... r. ,........,...
25X1
COMELEC has ordered the-
in Manila. In apparent anticipation of NAMFREL's
discoveries., C'OMELEC moved in March to accredit another
watchdog group--The Movement of Organized Volunteers, for
Enlightenment and Reform (MOVER). According' to the US
Embassy,,MOVER's leadership, has close ties to the Marcos
administration and is planning to concentrate its poll
watching in urban areas where.support for Marcos is weakest.
Marcos has further muddied the political waters by aiding a
false opposition group which may draw votes away from UNIDO and
*Marcos has given COMELEC's nine members the authority to
regulate the National Assembly elections. Among COMELEC's
responsibilities is the power to inter ret~ection code and
monitor the results of the election. 25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP04T00367R000201610001-3
PDP-Laban candidates--the Roy wing of the Nacionalista Party.*
COMELEC has accredited the,group as the "dominant" opposition
party in one or two key provinces where the KBL is weak. In
these regions, Marcos can manipulate returns to ensure that a
sympathetic Roy Nacionalista wins the election or. orchestrate a
KBL victory by splitting the vote between moderate opposition and
the Roy Nacionalista candidates. 25X1
Opposition Strategy
Since the Aquino-assassination, opposition strategy has
focused on an ongoing battle with Marcos over the election
rules. In addition to voting according to provincial boundaries-.
-which wild presumably help the opposition achieve at least some
representation in regions where the KBL will win an overall
.majority--the moderate opposition has demandedthe reinstitution
of the vice presidency, repeal of the constitutional amendment
that allows Marcos to legislate by-decree, and.the nationwide
reregistration of voters. Marcos has conceded on the issues of'the
vice presidency and.voter.registration, and most of the opposition 25X1
has decided to participate in the election.
The opposition campaign effort has remained ineffective because
of chronic?r?ifts. In many areas,' opposition groups are running
competing'` candidate slates because they are unable to agree on a
unified ticket. According to the US Embassy, many wealthy ,
opposition members have been reluctant to commit money to candidates
until they are sure that opposition members will'participate in the
elections. Two weeks prior to the voting, COMELEC still had not
compiled a list of opposition candidates. In sum, opposition groups25X1
have little or no integrated national campaign effort and are
counting on popular anti-government:sentiment.to win seats..
25X1
in-house KBL election
assessments predict that at least 30 percent of the ruling party's
candidates would be.defeated in fair elections. In any event,
Marcos's recent moves to stack election odds heavily in the KBL's
favor suggest he is willing to sacrifice the'appearan a 25X1
credible election in order-to ensure a KBL landslide
e sp i in the Nacionalista Party occurred just prior to
the presidential elections in 1981 when the'faction of. the
Nacionalista Party led by,Jose Laurel decided. to boycott the
elections. The'Roy faction, under former Senator Jose Roy, was
the only opposition party accredited in the 1981 elections and is
widely perceived by many Filipinos to be a dummy opposition party
.for the ruling KBL party.
 Of the outcomes-possible on 14 May, we think these are the ones
to watch for:
The most likely outcome, in our view, is an overwhelming victory for
the KBL in the provinces, with small opposition gains in urban areas.
in patently fraudulent elections.
In this case, the ruling party would win.80 to 85 percent of
the vote. The opposition would wind up with no more than 20 seats,
some of which would go to the Roy wing of the Nacionalista Party.
Most opposition, gains would come from the Western Visayas, Northern
Mindanao, and Crtr-a-L Luzon (see map). The o osit'ion is strongest,
in urban areas- KBL insiders. believe 25X1
th
i
t
ng
o
e
that the opposition could sweep Manila. However, accord
Defense Attache's office in Manila, the KBL will probably allow the
opposition to take no more than two seats out of the 21 at stake in
the capital. Marcos will probably be willing to concede greater
gains in other opposition strongholds such as Cebu.(two seats) or
Davao (two seats) where there are a smaller number of seats at.stake
and the prestige of the capital city is not an issue.
Although we do not know how the-public would react to blatant 25X1
cheating by the KBL, we believe large demonstrations are a
considerable risk. In any case, such an outcome would contribute to
continuing;political polarization.' The moderate opposition, indeed,
would be faced with the dilemma of deciding whether to. serve in the
new National Assembly.
25X1
A less likely election, outcome is a larger opposition minority
representation`in the new'. Assembly with the KBL winning key cities
We believe that many moderate opponents of the regime would be
satisfied with the results if the "true" opposition garnered at.
least 50 seats. Indeed, some moderates have cited this level as
their benchmark for victory. This would help create the impression
that the new National Assembly was more democratic. At the same
time, the.ruling party would retain a.65-to 75-percent majority,
enabling Marcos to control the new National Assembly while
continuing to pay lip service to pressures from the-church; business.
community, and international creditors to allow reater"opposition
representation in the Assembly. 25X1
In the-unlikely event. of a small KBL majority, we would expect to
see the KBL remain in control of many of the provinces and take a
majority of the seats in Manila.
 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP04T00367R000201610001-3
In this case, we would expect to see a KBL majority of 55 to 60
percent. .This outcome is possi?ble.only?if COMELEC?:allows,vigorous
oversight at polling places andabides, bymost-'ofthe...election code
rules. The-opposition would almost certainly take most of the seats
in Central Luzon,! Nor.thern,Mindanao and the Western Visayas. In any-
case, Marcos would find,his,.authority; particularly within the
ruling party, critically undermined after the election, diminishing
his ability either to deal with the new Assembly or control the KBL
After the Votes Are Counted
Confidence in Marcos's regime can be restored only if he allows
the opposition parties to win a minority share of the electorate
larger than they hold in the Interim Assembly and if the elections
are perceived to be fair by Philippine standards. Charges of
election rigging are certain in any event and, because public
discontent with his rule remains widespread, Marcos will almost
certainly achieve far less than he hopes for. On balance, we
believe the election is unlikely to enhance the prospects for long-
term political stability in the Philippines. 25X1
Assuming our most likely scenario--a massive KBL win--we do not
believethat the role of the National Assembly in Philippine
politics will change in a major way. Even with a more independent
KBL, the Assembly will remain under presidential control as long as
Marcos retains his legislative powers. A KBL majority will ensure
that most legislative horsetrading will continue to take place at
ruling party caucuses. This. would allow Marcos--as head of the
ruling party--to direct policy and would prevent the opposition from
building coalitions or forcing the resolution of issues through
vigorous debate on the assembly's floor. If the opposition wound up
with as many as 50 seats., however, its ability to call for
impeachment proceedines would probably act as a constraint on
A somewhat more independent KBL may emerge from the
elections. The shift from regional to provincial voting districts
forced Marcos to select more candidates belonging to influential
local families, who would be able to finance their own campaigns,
and fewer personal or party loyalists. As a.result, we believe that
some newly elected KBL assemblymen will be less subservient to
Marcos. This will open the way for more divergent views within the
25X1
Once the election is over, the succession will again become the
single most important issue in Philippine politics. Under a new
succession arrangement approved in a national plebiscite earlier
this year, the Speaker of the National Assembly will oversee a
transition to new leadership if Marcos dies or,becomes incapacitated
before a Vice President is elected in 1987. The first task of the
new Assembly will be the election of a new Speaker from within its
ranks. The KBL and the opposition both view the selection of a new
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP04T00367R000201610001-3 -
Speaker as an important step in determining the outcome of.a post-
Marcos succession struggle. An overwhelming KBL victory will allow
Marcos to choose the new Speaker from the ranks of KBL loyalists,
thus ensuring his control over the'succession process until the
presidential elections in 1987.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP04T00367R000201610001-3
 MA" QNIIImkF.S
Key Players
Strong party organization
in provinces and cities .
well financed and still enjoys
the benefits of being Marcos's
ruling party in some rural
areas . . Marcos co-opted the
best of both the Nacionalista
and Liberal Parties when he
formed the KBL.
Kilusang Bagong Ruling Party . ...,composed of
Lipunan (KBL) elements from the old Liberal
and Nacionalista Parties...
created by Marcos for the.
Interim National Assembly
Elections 'in 1978.
President Marcos
(Chairman)
Imelda Marcos
Eduardo Cojuangco
Cesar Virata
Benjamin Ronualdez
Arturo Tolentino
United Nationalist
12-party opposition coalition.
Salvador Laurel (Pres)(NP)
Derocratic
represents the traditional
Eve Estrada Kalaw (LP)
Organization
(UNIDO)
political parties in Philippine
politics . . Includes the
Jose Laurel (NP)
remnants of:
Nacionalista Party
Liberal Party
Mindanao Alliance
Pilipion Democratic Ideologically oriented party
Party-LAB AN with collegial leadership . . .
(PUP-Laban) tends to be slightly left of
center on the political
spectrun and represents the
newer "issue-oriented" parties
formed in the past fax years.
Roy Wing Nacionalista No clear ideology or goal
Party except to win seats In the
election . formed to contests
the I{BL in the 1981 elections.
Aquilino PhnenteF
(Chairman)
Jose Coj uangco
Ramon Mitre
Soc Rodrigo
Jose Roy (President)
Organized nationwide . . . hopes
to capitalize on widespread
anti-government sentiment.
Strongest organization is in the
Visayas, on Mindanao; and in Manila
. the party is concentrating
its campaign and financing efforts
in the regions where it is best
organized . Laban is Benigno
Aquino's old party.
Many party members have close ties
to the KBL and Marcos personally
. . will probably receive strong
financing from KBL supporters who are
unhappy with local ruling party
candidates.
The party has been
tainted by the Aquino
assassination : .
unpopular in the cities
and in many of the
agricultural provinces
. . . many KBL incurbents
owe their seats directly
to Marcos's influence and
will lose without his
continued support.
Poor organization .
serious rifts among the
parties . lacks a
unified national, ,
campaign effort and
adequate. financing . . .
is identified by many
Filipinos with old-style
politics and with being
ineffective against
Marcos.
Collegial leadership is
making decisiomeking
difficult . party,
leaders have been unable
to form unified slates
with UNIDO and are filing
rival opposition slates
in key areas such as
Manila . this will
weaken the opposition's
chances . boycott
issue has also taken its
toll on leadership.
Widely preceived to be a
"dumy" opposition group
by many Filipinos .
thus they will suffer
their association with
Marcos's government.
 South
Sea Province
Strong support
Moderately vulnerable to
opposition
Q Very vulnerable to
opposition
Regional boundary
0 50 100 150 Kilometers
l
0 50 100 150Milea
Nb
Sulu Sea Mi anao
Central
Mindanao
Indonesia
 Typescript: EA M-84-10106
Original -- Branch Files
1 -- OEA/SE/ITM
1 -- OEA/SEAD
3 -- D/OEA
2 -- C Production OEA
1 -
1 -
1 -- NIO/EA (7E62)
S -- CPAS/IMD/CB (7G07)
1 -- C/PES/DDI 7F24
1 -
1 --
1 -- Honorable Paul Wolfowitz
1 -- John Monjo
1 -- John Maisto
1 -- Ulrich A. Strauss
1 -- RDAM Jonathan T. Howe
1 -- Rod Huff
1 -- Weaver Gim
1 -- Allen Kitchens
1 Bob Carroll
1 -- Corazon Foley
1 = Hugh Montgomery
1 -- Anthony C. Albrecht
Treasury:
1 -- Douglas P. Mulholland
1 -- Bill McFadden
1 -- Bill, Quinn
1 -- Gaston Sigur
1 -- Richard Childress
1 -- Richard, Armitage
1 -- James Kelly
IPAC
1 -- Tim Wright
Commerce:
1 -- Eugene K. Lawson,
1 --, David Peterson
1 -- William. Brown
1 --.Don Greee
1 Robert Emery
1 -- David Laux
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20 : CIA-RDP04T00367R000201610001-3
Office of East Asian Analysis
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
AD'IE lOt: Richard Childress
National Security Council
Old BOB Building
Dick,.
Attached is our typescript mamrandean,
AL h2 Phili ines: Outlook for the National
serrbly Election. Although it forecasts a?
ruling party victory, it also argues that
the risk of overkill by Marcos is fairly
high. All considered, we think that Marcos
will achieve less'than,he hopes for.
Paul Wolfowitz
Gaston Sigur
'David Laux ?
Richard Armitage
James Kelly
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP04T00367R000201610001-3