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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00552R000300030005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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ALA 83-10097
July 1983 ~]
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Nigeria Under Civilian Rule:
The Record and the Outlook
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Directorate of ~ Secret
Intelligence
Nigeria Under Civilian Rule:
The Record and the Outlook
This paper was prepared b Office
of African and Latin American Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations and
the National Intelligence Council
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, West-East Africa Division,
ALA,
Secret
ALA 83-10097
July 1983
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Nigeria Under Civilian Rule:
The Record and the Outlook
Key Judgments In our judgment, heightened political tensions associated with national
Iglormation available elections scheduled for August 1983 will severely test the survivability of
as 4f 1 June 1983 the Shagari government and Nigeria's still untested democratic institu-
was used in this report.
tions. Nigerian elections traditionally are violent affairs that aggravate
ethnic animosities and strain Nigeria's delicate social and political fabric.
We expect the period ahead to be turbulent, but, on balance, believe
President Shagari has a fairly good chance to muddle through and win
reelection. Even if he wins reelection, however, he still will face trouble-
some political problems and be forced to make difficult economic decisions.
Sharply reduced oil revenues over the last two years have put Nigeria in an
increasingly precarious economic position but election concerns have
deterred Shagari from implementing stringent economic measures needed
for recovery. Moreover, Lagos has had difficulty paring down now
unrealistic development projects and curbing government spending. We
expect Nigeria will reach an agreement with the IMF after the elections,
but we have serious doubts about Nigeria's ability to adjust to lower
income levels and implement longer term structural reforms because of the
government's corruption and inefficiency. While oil production has re-
bounded temporarily to well over a million barrels per day, government
revenues for 1983 are still likely to be 20 percent below last year. So far,
rising inflation, unemployment, plant closings, and shortages of imported
goods have not sparked widespread demonstrations, but we believe that
urban tempers could boil over as economic woes continue to mount.) 25X1
In our judgment, senior military officers continue to favor democratic rule
and prefer to see Nigeria's 120,000-man Army remain on the political
sidelines. Despite grumbling and rumors of plottii,t among some middle
and junior grade officers and enlisted men, we do not believe a consensus
favoring a coup has yet developed within the military. We believe, however,
that the undermanned police force is not up to the job of coping with
widespread popular disturbances, and, as a consequence, civilian authori-
ties will be forced to call on the Army to restore order or supervise the elec-
tions if violence gets out of hand. Indeed, extensive election violence and
the blatant rigging of the vote pose, in our view, the greatest short-term
threats to the continuation of civilian rule.
iii Secret
ALA 83-10097
July 1983
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If there were to be a coup, the most likely scenario, in our view, would in-
volve senior or middle-grade officers taking power. Considering the
pragmatism, level of sophistication, and generally favorable disposition
toward the West existing at this level of the military, we would expect no
dramatic changes in domestic or foreign policy under such a government.
Although we view a takeover by lower ranking military personnel as less
likely, such a government almost certainly would usher in a period of
political turmoil and foreign policy uncertainty as well as more rapid
economic decline. West African experience suggests that populist-oriented
enlisted men lack the education, experience, organizational skills and vision
to carry out their goals
Although past Soviet and Libyan efforts to gain influence in Nigeria have
met with little success, we expect both powers would try to take advantage
of any social or political breakdown that occurred. Ordinarily, Nigeria's
sheer size and diversity make it a more difficult target for meddling than
smaller West African states, and these factors tend to drown out radical
doctrines and extremist movements. In our judgment, a coup by naive and
directionless junior officers and enlisted men would offer the best opportu-
nities for expanded Soviet and Libyan influence.
We anticipate that Lagos in the near term will increase pressure on the
United States to help rescue Nigeria's flagging economy by interceding
with the IMF, providing food assistance, and persuading US banks to
agree to restructure Nigeria's increasingly burdensome debt. If Washing-
ton's response does not match Nigerian expectations, we believe civilian or
military leaders could lash out at the United States, most likely over its
southern Africa policy. We do not believe, however, that Nigeria is in a
strong enough economic position to take anti-US measures that would
jeopardize US interests regarding oil purchases, trade, investment, or
technology.
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Key Judgments
Shagari's First-Term Performance
Continuing Civilian Rule 12
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Figure 1
Nigeria: Federal States and Tribal Groups
Sokoto
NIGER
'~~ Kaduna
,-f'~. v' -, B a tb c h. i
Gulf of Gui>ea
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Lake'
Chad
The "Holy North"-75-100% Muslim
Former Northern Region boundary
State boundary
Hausa and Fulani
(intermingled)
Kanuri
Middle Belt ~ Other
0 200
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Nigeria Under Civilian Rule:
The Record and the Outlook
Introduction
Governing Nigeria-which is split between a predom-
inantly Islamic north and a largely non-Muslim south
and h'as more than 85 million people divided into 250
ethnic groups-is difficult under the best of circum-
stances. After almost four years in power, Nigeria's
civilian leaders, like their military predecessors, con-
tinue to wrestle with deep-seated ethnic, sectional,
and religious rivalries that constantly threaten Nige-
ria's political stability. Furthermore, since 1981,
Nigeria's economy has been buffeted by falling oil
production and the break in oil prices.' In our judg-
ment, the convergence of worsening economic condi-
tions and potentially turbulent national elections in
August will provide the severest test thus far of
Nigeria's still fragile democracy.
This study evaluates the ,performance of the Shagari
government, updates the economic situation, and as-
sesses the impact of the current economic crisis and
the coming elections on the prospects for continued
civilian rule. The likelihood of military intervention,
opportunities for Soviet and Libyan meddling, and
implications of potential developments for US inter-
ests also are discussed
Shagari's First-Term Performance
In our view, the administration of President Shehu
Shagari has proved more resilient and adaptive than.
many outside observers expected when the military
handed power back to an elected civilian government
in October 1979. US Embassy reporting indicates
that after almost four years in office Shagari himself
remains Nigeria's most popular and respected politi-
cian. Overall, however, we believe the political and
economic climate has deteriorated in the last year.
The Political Scorecard. We agree with the US
Embassy's estimate that Nigeria's US-modeled politi-
cal structure has helped to moderate and control
longstanding ethnic, regional, and religious rivalries
that were critical factors in bringing down the first
civilian government in 1966, provoking a bitter civil
war from 1967 to 1970 and ushering in 13 years of
military rule. Embassy and academic sources report
that, although the federal system with three branches
of national government and 19 states is cumbersome,
inefficient, and expensive, it provides for a more
balanced and widely shared distribution of ethnic
power and political patronage that has helped to
contain potentially destabilizing conflicts. The 1979
election results, for example, gave each of the five
competing parties a stake in maintaining the system
because each won at least two state governorships as
well as representation in the federal Senate and the
House of Representatives. Furthermore, in our judg-
ment, the administration merits high marks for fash-
ioning acompromise among competing ethnic, region-
al, and state interests that made possible the passage
of a new federal revenue allocation bill; this resolved a
divisive issue that had bedeviled past civilian and
military governments.
We believe Shagari's most significant political accom-
plishment to date has been his ability to project an
image as a national leader above the more rancorous
aspects of Nigerian politics. In a recently conducted
Nigerian public opinion poll that claimed to interview
members from all major tribes and political persua-
sions, over two-thirds of the respondents approved of
Shagari's handling of the country's affairs. US Em-
bassy reporting indicates that, while Shagari's empha-
sis on conciliation and compromise makes him vulner-
able to charges of weakness, his low-key style has
helped moderate potentially divisive issues such as the
calls for the creation of new states. In addition,
Shagari has carefully followed the constitutional re-
quirement that cabinet appointments and military
recruitment must reflect Nigeria's "federal charac-
ter"-a euphemism for maintaining a relative ethnic
and regional balance in government.
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Searching for a Workable Political Systemo
Since independence in 1960, Nigeria's most persistent
and complex political problem has been the search
for a lasting political framework capable of accom-
modatingthe country's tribal, regional, and religious
diversity. Two-thirds of Nigeria's more than 80 mil-
lion people belong to one of the three major ethnic
groups: the Muslim Hausa-Fulani in the north, the
mixed Christian and Muslim Yoruba in the south-
west, and the predominantly Christian Ibo in the
southeast. Nigeria's ethnic map islurther complicat-
ed by several hundred smaller tribes scattered
throughout the country.
Nigerian politics has been characterized by long
periods of political wrangling followed by sudden
and violent shifts in power-between tribal groups
over the allocation and distribution of political power
and economic spoils. The military overthrow of the
British-inspired parliamentary democracy in 1966,
for example, was preceded by six years of bitter tribal
competition and growing corruption. Successive mili-
tary governments maintained national unity at great
cost but also suffered from bureaucratic inefficiency
and a persistent inability to curb corruption. The
most serious threat to Nigeria's territorial integrity
came in 1967 when the Ibo-led eastern region seceded
toform the Republic of Bicsfra, and civil war followed
until the Ibo defeat in 1970
Despite these pluses, according to US Embassy re-
porting, Nigerian politics as a whole continues to
aggravate longstanding tribal and regional animos-
ities and remains highly personalized and prone to
violence. As a matter of general practice, politicians
prefer to engage in vituperative personal attacks
against opponents and make unrealistic promises
rather than debate issues or government policies.
Most current presidential candidates, for example,
continue to promise "free" education and vast im-
provements in social conditions, although Nigeria
clearly cannot afford to implement such programs
during the current economic crunch. Political par-~
ties-notwithstanding the constitutional prescription
that they eschew tribalism-continue to rely on and
appeal to ethnic and regional loyalties. The ruling
meter a complex and often acrimonious-but relative-
ly orderly-three-year transition, Nigeria's military
rulers handed power back to civilians in 1979. The
federal structures and legislative processes created by
the constitution closely parallel those of the United
States. In addition, the constitution attempts to
ensure that all groups have a strong stake in main-
taining the system by requiring that political parties,
the federal civil service and military, as well as
executive appointments, reflect Nigeria's ethnic diver-
sity
Despite reported military and civilian support for
continued civilian rule, many US Government and
academic commentaries note with apprehension that
tribalism remains the drivinglorce of politics, and
that the concepts of political compromise and toler-
ance are far from Tully taking hold. These same
sources further point out that many issues that
helped bring down past governments-such as ethni-
cally motivated demands for the creation of new
states-remain unresolved.
We believe that there will continue to be serious tests
of the system throughout 1983. We especially note
that, historically, Nigerian elections have aggravated
tribal tensions.
National Party and the two major opposition
groups-the Unity Party and the Nigerian People's
Party~lraw most of their support respectively from
the Hausa-Fulani north, the Yoruba west, and the Ibo
east (see figure 1). The Embassy reports that Sha-
gari's National Party, which won the most nationwide
and ethnically diverse support in the 1979 election,
has yet to shake popular perceptions in areas con-
trolled by opposition parties .that it is dominated by an
inner circle of conservative northern Muslims
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The Foreign Policy Dimension
In our view, loreign policy continues to take a
backseat to domestic political concerns under the
Shagari administration, and we concur with US
Embassy reporting that loreign policy issues will not
affect the outcome of Nigeria's elections. The recent
Nigeria-Chad border dispute, for example, has pro-
voked little public interest nor has the opposition
made Shagari's handling of the conflict an election
issue. The US Embassy also notes that Shagari is
careful to act only on those international issues over
which there is likely to be little domestic dissent. For
example, popular support in Nigeria jor the expulsion
of over a million or more West Africans earlier this
year jar outweighed the widespread international
criticism the move engendered.
The transition from military to civilian rule, in our
view, has had little impact on the substance of
Nigerian foreign policy. The centerpieces of Nigerian
policy continue to emphasize backing the Frontline
African states against white minority rule in southern
Africa, support jor the Organization of African Unity,
and opposition to outside intervention in African
rt/fairs. On larger East-West issues, Nigeria has
consistently sought to project a nonaligned position.
In practice, the Shagari administration has valued
friendly ties with the United States and the West-
Nigeria's principal trading partners and sources of
investment, aid, and technology-while maintaining
correct, but not particularly close, relations with the
Soviet Union and other Communist states.
Shagari, despite occasional criticism from opposition
parties that Lagos should play a more active leader-
ship role in Africa, has shown a reluctance to commit
Nigeria to foreign policy positions that might be
dV~cult to support, or that could endanger the
country's economic ties to the West. Asa conse-
quence, Shagari can claim few major foreign policy
successes, but he also has not been held responsible
for any major debacles. The US Embassy reports
that Nigeria agreed to participate in an OAU peace-
keepingforce in strife-torn Chad in 1981 only after
Washington agreed to underwrite a large portion of
the cost of equipping and transporting the Nigerian
contingent to N'Djamena. Shagari also has avoided
endangering Nigeria's close economic ties to the West
by not strictly enforcing decrees dating from the era
of military rule that call for an economic boycott of
firms doing business in both Nigeria and South
Africa.
Reporting by US Embassies in the region indicates
that Nigeria's often haughty behavior-as well as its
size and relatively greater wealth and military pow-
er-have at times offended, antagonized, or fright-
ened smaller neighbors and often worked against
Nigeria's leadership aspirations. Nigeria's neighbors,
for example, were caught unawares when Nigeria
suddenly announced its decision early this year that
up to 2 million undocumented African workers had to
leave Nigeria within 2 weeks. Embassy commentaries
also suggest that resentment against Nigeria is espe-
cially strong among French-speaking countries in
west and central Africa that historically have
resisted-with Paris's support-English-speaking
Nigeria's claims to regional dominance. More recent-
ly, the worldwide oil glut has reduced Nigeria's
ability to use its influence by promoting greater
bilateral and regional economic cooperation. Finally,
the clumsy and often uncoordinated loreign policy
making apparatus makes it difficult for Lagos to
implement decisions effectively once they are made.
Reporting from the US mission at the United Nations
indicates, for example, that the Nigerian delegation
played almost no role-and in eJlect worked against
Lagos's own interests-during last spring s Security
Council debate on Libyan involvement in Chad.
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The complex relationship between ethnicity and per-
sonality is typified by the government's pardon in
1982 and the subsequent return to political activity of
Ibo leader Odumegwu Ojukwu, ex-military head of
secessionist eastern Nigeria ("Biafra").2 The US Em-
bassy reports that, while Ojukwu's public declaration
of political support for the National Party has helped
Shagari in the predominantly Ibo states of Anambra
and Imo, it has cost him some support in the south-
eastern minority states of Rivers and Cross Rivers,
whose small tribes dislike the Ibo and previously had
been solidly behind the National Party. The US
Defense Attache reports that Ojukwu's return from
exile has also led to some grumbling among Army
officers who harbor bitter memories of Ojukwu's role
during the civil war.
In our view, the system of checks and balances
between various branches and levels of government
that was created by the 1979 constitution remains
largely untested. According to the US Embassy,
constant squabbling betvreen the executive and legis-
lature, the central and state governments, elected
officials and civil servants, and party leaders and
elected representatives has at times brought the legis-
lative process to a standstill and tested public toler-
ance. In our judgment, the 95-member federal Senate
and 449-member House of Representatives-with few
roots and traditions and little experience to fall back
on-have been the weakest links in the new system
and have yet to demonstrate their ability to operate as
equal partners of the executive. The Embassy reports
that federal legislators remain uncertain of their roles
and often are more concerned with protecting their
personal perquisites than coming to grips with nation-
al issues on a sustained basis. Among the more
contentious issues between legislators, for example,
have been their salaries, order of precedence, and the
quality of accommodations for legislators in Lagos.
As a consequence, Shagari has effectively increased
the powers of the president at the expense of the
legislature. US Embassy reporting indicates that
Shagari often bypasses established structures, prefer-
ring to make decisions informally after consultation
with a small coterie of advisers. Sources available to
' Ojukwu is running as a National Party candidate for the federal
Senate from his home state of Anambra. He is being challenged by
a candidate from the Ibo-dominated Nigerian People's Party. ~
the US Embassy also report that, although the Na-
tional Party lacks a legislative majority in the
National Assembly, it has been able to achieve a
voting majority when needed by frequent and exten-
sive use of bribery.
Problems between governors and state assemblies are
similar to those at the national level and frequently
have led to violent confrontations between supporters
of various individuals, parties, or party factions. The
US Embassy reports that governors have consolidated
their power against legislators by making constitu-
tionally questionable appointments to local govern-
ment councils, while some assemblies have turned to
the impeachment process to deal with politically
difficult governors. The opposition party governor of
Kaduna State, for example, was impeached in 1981
by the National Party~ominated state assembly af-
ter over a year of bickering that paralyzed the
legislative process and much of the operation of state
government. In Kano State, rivalries within the badly
divided People's Redemption Party led to the im-
peachment of the deputy governor, several violent
clashes between various factions, and numerous politi-
cally related deaths.
Economic Performance. Shagari and his key econom-
ic advisers have been tardy in responding to Nigeria's
rapid economic decline, which was unanticipated
when civilian rule was reinstated in 1979.
the new leaders assumed that
oil prices and production would climb steadily and
that increasing revenues would sustain economic
growth and allow Nigeria to finance its ambitious
development plans. This optimism was fueled by
an average annual growth in national output of
5.5 percent between 1975 and 1980, foreign exchange
reserves of well over $5 billion in 1979, and a
relatively modest official inflation rate of 11 percent.
However, even during the first two years of civilian
rule when economic indicators looked good, US
Embassy reporting indicated that economic perform-
ance quickly fell prey to corruption, mismanagement,
and inefficiency. Nor has the government made much
headway on diversifying Nigeria's oil-dependent econ-
omy. We estimate, for example, that oil still accounts
for 80 percent of government revenues and over
98 percent of exports.
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The current economic crisis stems in large part from
diminishing government revenues caused by the
worldwide drop in the demand for oil that began in
1981. Nigerian oil production in 1981 and 1982, for
example, was 30 percent and 37 percent, respectively,
below the 2.1-million-barrels-per-day average in
1980. First-quarter production in 1983 dropped to an
average of only 800,000 barrels per day, falling
during part of February to about 400,000 barrels per
day or less than one-fifth of capacity. The US Embas-
sy reports that oil revenues in 1981 were only about
two-thirds of those projected initially by the Nigerian
Government, while revenues last year were only half
those the Shagari administration was counting on.
Nigeria's price cut in February of $5.50 per barrel
and OPEC's pricing and production agreement a
month later helped boost average production back to
well over a million barrels per day, but we estimate
that oil revenues still will be down by over
20 percent in 1983, making it difficult for Nigeria to
meet its financial commitments without increased
to stem the current economic slide. For example,
mports
have been cut to about $900 million per month-from
an average of about $1.6 billion before austerity
measures were announced in 1982-it has taken the
government over a year to achieve this target. Recent
negotiations with international banks to secure new
loans and reschedule some of Nigeria's debt have
been stymied thus far by the lack of an agreement
with the IMF and mounting short-term arrearages,
while a much discussed multibillion-dollar loan from
outside assistance.'
Saudi Arabia has yet to materialize.
Nor has the goverment-despite the steady flow of
bad economic news and gloomy predictions-formally
scaled back development plans or effectively reevalu-
ated economic priorities. US Embassy reporting indi-
cates, for example, that, although the Fourth Devel-
opment Plan-initiated in 1981 and based on an
expected five-year oil income of over $125 billion-is
floundering and probably will be scrapped after the
election, both the government and opposition parties
continue to promise to implement costly social and
economic projects. The government is still publicly
committed to moving ahead with prestige projects
that could be postponed, such as the Soviet-built
Ajaokuta steelworks and the new federal capital in
Abuja. There is widespread agreement among US
Government and open sources, for example, that
Ajaokuta-now far behind schedule-will never pro-
The downward spiral of major economic indicators in
the last two years reflects Nigeria's overdependence
on oil revenues and the government's inability to
reduce spending significantly in the face of hard
economic times. We estimate that national output
contracted by 11 percent last year while the current
account deficit grew to over $3.5 billion. Nigeria'
registered a $9 billion trade surplus in 1980 but an
$800 million deficit in 1982. Foreign reserves fell
from over $10 billion to about $1.5 billion-enough to
cover only about a month's imports at traditional
rates. Finally, Nigeria's total debt has climbed from a
relatively modest $5 billion in 1979 to almost $15
billion today, including, according to banking sources
and the US Embassy, almost $6 billion in short-term
arrears.
In our judgment, the Shagari administration has
preferred to hope for economic miracles in the form of
increased demand for oil or new international bank
loans rather than make painful adjustments required
duce competitively priced steel.
The country's dwindling resources are further
strained by the mounting need for food imports and
the inability of the Shagari government to make good
on its 1979 campaign promise to move quickly toward
food self-sufficiency. The US Embassy reports that
agricultural production-badly neglected since the
outset of the oil boom in the early 1970s-recently
has been growing by about 2 percent per year, but this
is largely due to improved weather conditions and, in
any case, is far below the targeted growth of 4 percent
per year. Skyrocketing food demands in rapidly grow-
ing cities have left the government with little choice
but to import popular food staples such as rice.
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Figure 2
Nigeria: Selected Economic Indicators
Percent
9.9
5.5
1975 79
Percent 24.3
Foreign Exchange Reserves, Yearend Oil Production
Billion US $ Million b/d
Manufacturing
8.0
Construction-
13.0
Agriculture
21.0
a Estimated.
b Projected.
c Ist Quarter.
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Nigeria imported about 600,000 tons of rice in 1982,
for example, compared to less than 100,000 tons
annually in the 1960s. Last year's food imports cost
about $2 billion and this year Nigeria has been forced
by foreign exchange shortages to buy cheaper Thai
rice rather than higher quality US rice. A comparison
of projected urbanization and population growth
trends with agricultural production suggests that the
gap between food demands and local production is
likely to widen for the foreseeable future.
In our judgment, government efforts to gain control of
the economic situation are seriously impeded by
endemic corruption, bureaucratic inertia, and malad-
ministration.
almost all contracts let by the federal
government require a substantial kickback to the
National Party coffers.
markedly as this year's election campaign heats up
and parties attempt to fatten their war chests.
Extensive corruption in awarding import licenses-
one of the most lucrative forms of graft in Nigeria-
also hampers government efforts to limit import
spending and to establish a systematic priority list for
imports. US
rice costing $5.5 million has a street value of over $20
million in Nigeria. Moreover, US Embassy economic
reporting indicates that luxury items often continue to
be imported while essential commodities such as raw
materials and spare parts are in increasingly short
supply. Construction and manufacturing companies
have been particularly hard hit; both Peugeot and
Volkswagen, for example, are forced to shut down
periodically because of a lack of spare parts or foreign
exchange. Foreign firms-once bullish on investing in
Nigeria-have cut back or begun to pull out of
Nigerian operations in the face of these problems,
Civilian Rule on Trial
In our judgment, civilian leaders face a difficult
challenge in 1983 as they wrestle with the need to
take far stronger corrective economic steps without
endangering their grip on political power. Prior to the
election, we believe the Shagari administration, rather
than risk politically painful austerity measures, will
continue its band-aid approach to the economic crisis.
The US Embassy reports, for example, that the
government apparently does not want to present a new
austerity package for legislative debate in the heat of
an election campaign; preferring instead simply to
continue past policies. On the political front, US
Embassy reporting indicates that the government will
have a difficult time managing the election process
and that disgruntled losers could provoke instability
by challenging the election outcome.
Economic Challenges. We believe Shagari's closest
financial advisers now realize that there are no quick
remedies for Nigeria's economic difficulties. Al-
though recent increases in oil production, an antici-
pated rescheduling of short-term arrears, and access
to new loans from international banks may give
Nigeria more money than expected at the beginning
of the year, we believe the government's room to
maneuver its way around the current economic mess
will remain circumscribed without a significant turn-
around in the worldwide demand for oil. In our
judgment, corruption and mismanagement-coupled
with the lack of clear economic priorities and per-
ceived political constraints-will continue to work
against economic reform and undermine the impact of
austerity measures. As a result, while we believe
Nigeria will reach an agreement with the IMF after
the elections, we question whether the government has
the wherewithal or resolve to follow through consist-
ently on the politically risky economic adjustments
likely to be demanded by the Fund. If Lagos falters,
we anticipate that the economy will continue to
stagnate or decline even further as leaders attempt to
negotiate new agreements.
In any case, we do not believe the Nigerian economy
will recover quickly enough to ameliorate the econom-
ic and social dislocations in potentially volatile cities.
US Embassy reporting has documented a marked
deterioration in living standards, including increases
thus further weakening the economy.
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of over 65 percent in the price of such consumer
staples as rice, yams, chicken, and palm oil during the
first three months of this year. One senior Nigerian
official estimates that urban unemployment may now
be as high as 30 percent, double what it was a year
ago. We believe that plant closures are likely to top
last year's rate when Nigerian labor and industrial
organizations estimated that at least 45 industries laid
off employees or shut down, idling upwards of
150,000 workers. The head of the Nigerian Labor
Congress claims that over 200,000 of an estimated
3 million organized workers have lost their jobs since
the government introduced stabilization measures last
year, and he has promised to resist strongly any
proposals that call for wage freezes, strike bans, and
increased working hours.
Despite tough conditions, relatively little serious, eco-
nomically inspired protest has materialized so far. A
widespread extended family system-whereby better-
off members are obligated to aid their less fortunate
relatives-and a large underground economy have
helped cushion the impact of the current recession.
Continuing economic shocks, however, in our judg-
ment, will test the resilience and patience of urban
dwellers and could spark antigovernment protests.
The US Embassy, for example, has reported that the
government is particularly sensitive to the political
risks that could arise from any widespread food
shortages
Students and labor groups historically have borne a
disproportionate share of the hardship when the econ-
omy turns sour, and Embassy reporting suggests that
these groups once again are faring worse than recent
migrants from rural areas who can more easily return
to their villages in case of an economic collapse. In the
past, restive students and labor have provided early
warning signs of widening popular dissatisfaction with
the government.
At present, there is little reporting to suggest that
unions or students-both closely monitored by the
government and divided among themselves~ould
carry out sustained strikes or demonstrations capable
of bringing down the government. The US Embassy
also notes that these groups represent only a relatively
small percentage of the population and that thus far
strikes have been relatively isolated and short lived,
while student demonstrations have focused more on
-campus issues. Despite this, student and labor groups
tend to be more politically active and relatively better
organized and, in our judgment, have the potential to
provoke more widespread urban unrest that could tax
the government's ability to maintain order. This, in
turn, could serve as a pretext for a military attempt to
overturn the government, especially if it appeared that
the civilian leaders had lost control of the situation.
Election Threats. In our view, the ever-present threat
of uncontrollable election violence and the blatant
rigging of the outcome of the elections pose the
greatest short-term threats to the continuation of
civilian rule. Early trends are not promising for a
noncontroversial election process. The US Embassy
has reported that all political parties-for contingency
purposes-appear to be training squads of thugs that
could be used to intimidate voters, engage in violence,
and stuff ballot boxes. We believe the potential for
election violence is greatest in the western Yoruba
states where Unity Party leader Obafemi Awolowo
publicly has called on his supporters to "take the law
into their own hands" if they think the elections are
rigged.
We also believe the leadership gap
created by the death last April of Aminu Kano-
Kano State's most popular and respected political
figure-increases the possibility of political turmoil in
one of Nigeria's historically most strife-ridden and
violent states.
The conduct of the elections will be complicated by
serious logistic problems that will increase the govern-
ment's vulnerability to charges of ineptitude and
manipulation. Opposition parties already have
charged that the ostensibly neutral federal election
commission is little more than a partisan instrument
serving the interests of the ruling National Party. The
commission has been widely criticized for its clumsy
handling of such technical issues as voter registration
and the preparation of ballots, as well as for its
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Nigerian People's
Party (NPP)
Nnamdi Azikiwe a
(Ibo)/
Shettima Mustapha
(Borno) n
16
78
3
Azikiwe viewed as "rightful"
Ibo leader among most Ibos in
Southeast.
Recently picked up disaffect-
ed members of PRP and
GNPP in northern Nigeria.
Enjoys some minority tribe
support, especially strong in
Plateau State.
People's Redemp-
lion
Party (PRP)
Hassan Yussuf
(Borno) b/
Mrs. Bola Ogunbor
(Bendel)
7
49
2
Strong base of support in
Kano and Kaduna States.
Historically appealed to Hau-
sa-Fulani who oppose tradi-
tional northern elite.
Great Nigeria
People's Party
(GNPP)
Waziri Ibrahim e
(Kanuri)/
Robert Nnaji
(Imo) b
8
43
2
Strength among Kanuri in
northeast who traditionally re-
sist Hausa-Fulani domination.
Party leader Waziri Ibrahim,
one of the wealthiest business-
men in Nigeria.
Nigerian Advance
Party (NAP)
Tunji Braithwaite
(Yoruba)/
Usman Girel n
(Gongola)
Not recognized until 1983
Attempting to appeal to
young, educated Nigerians on
basis of leftist ideology.
Party nominee in 1979.
b Ethnicity unknown; home state listed.
Vulnerable to charges of eco-
nomic mismanagement.
Party hurt at state levels by
intraparty feuding.
Lost some support among mi-
nority tribes.
Little support outside Yoruba
areas.
Party has difficulty shaking
historical image of serving
only Yoruba interests.
Awolowo's often strident per-
sonality; antipathy among
non-Yoruba.
Has not proved it can appeal to
voters outside primarily non-
Ibo areas.
Weak state organizations out-
side southeast strongholds.
Probably continued residual
anti-Ibo sentiment from civil
war.
Badly factionalized.
Death of party founder and
leader Aminu Kano in April
1983 deprived party of charis-
matic leader and intellectual
driving force.
Badly divided.
Ibrahim's leadership chal-
lenged by GNPP governors
and factions.
Little appeal outside Kanuri
strongholds.
No track record; no organiza-
tional strength or widespread
support.
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decision to hold this year's presidential elections first
rather than last, as was done in 1979. Without the
inhibiting presence of the military, which supervised
elections four years ago, we believe there is a danger
that controversies over the "fairness" of the election
could spark wider protests. If the violence spreads
beyond a few cities, Nigeria's badly undermanned
and ill-prepared 80,000-man police force, according to
the US Defense Attache, will be unable to control the
situation, and the government will have little choice
but to call on the Army to assist in restoring order.
Another stumblingblock would occur if opposition
parties refuse to accept the election results. On the
basis of past voting patterns and current US Embassy
reporting, we believe President Shagari is still in the
best position to be reelected to another four-year
term." But we believe that opposition parties expect to
better their showing over the 1979 elections by pick-
ing up additional governorships, as well as state and
federal legislative seats, at the expense of the Nation-
al Party. The perception of widespread fraud and
manipulation favoring Shagari's party could, in our
view, tempt opposition parties to refuse to accept the
results or to call for a boycott or scrapping of the
elections, as occurred during some regional parlia-
mentary elections in 1965. Shagari, in turn, could feel
compelled to resort to strong-arm tactics-including a
declaration of a state of emergency-to preserve order
and enforce the election results.
The Army's Critical Role. In our judgment, the fate
of Nigeria's democratic system ultimately rests on the
willingness of the armed forces to remain subordinate
to civilian control.
' In an effort to prevent candidates from appealing to narrow tribal
or regional groups, the constitution requires that for a presidential
candidate to win on the first ballot, he must receive a plurality of
votes nationally and at least 25 percent of the vote in two-thirds of
the 19 states. If no candidate meets this requirement, the top
votegetter and the candidate who wins at least 25 percent of the
vote in the most states meet in a runoff election. In 1979, Shagari
received a plurality of the national vote and more than 25 percent
of the vote in 12 states. After considerable legal wrangling over
what constituted two-thirds of 19, the Supreme Court declared
Shagari the winner by ruling that Shagari's 20 percent of the total
vote in Kano State was the equivalent of 25 percent of the vote in
two-thirds of a state. The Nigerian Supreme Court later dismissed
a suit to overturn the decision that was brought by Unity Party
We concur with US Embassy 25X1
reporting t at t e senior officer corps remains loyal to
Shagari, but we believe that the frequent and pro-
longed use of the Army to keep order during the
election campaign or to supervise elections ultimately
would undermine civilian authority, weaken military
discipline and morale, and politicize the armed forces
in a way that could spur a military takeover by senior
or middle grade officers. Furthermore, we believe
Shagari could be forced to invite senior officers to
temporarily assume or share power if the government
is unable to maintain order or if it appears that
political power is about to shift from the present
leadership.
Although we believe junior officers and enlisted men
would have a more difficult time carrying out a
successful coup, recent
Embassy reporting por t
potentially restive factions within the military.
W~e
e ieve t ese ran s could rebel at being called on to
bail out the civilian government, especially if the
Army was used in discriminatory fashion against
Shagari's opponents.
Shagari has sought to establish close links to the
approximately 120,000-man Army in an effort to
reinforce constitutionally mandated civilian control of 25X1
the military. The President holds the defense portfo-
lio, and senior civilians meet daily to monitor the
attitudes and movements of key officers and units.
Most important)
a i as systema ica y p ace e -
low northerners in key senior command positions,
while retiring officers of suspect loyalty. Shagari has
further sought to cement ties with the military by
insulating the services from budget cuts-despite the
current recession-and ensuring that senior officers
continue to receive their share of perquisites and
graft. Recent senior officer promotions, according to
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Figure 3
Nigeria: Distribution of Political Power by State, 1979 Election Results
Party presidential candidate having received
at least 25 percent of the vote.
National Party of Nigeria
Unity Party of Nigeria
Nigerian People's Party
People's Redemption Party
Great Nigerian People's Party
State boundary
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eporting, were intended as a
visible display of the government's support for the
armed forces.
In anticipation that the government may reluctantly
have to call on the military to maintain order during
the coming election, Lagos recently purchased crowd-
control equipment and has sent high-level military
delegations overseas to study riot-control techniques.
But the military's overall skill
in crowd control, according to US Defense Attache
and Embassy reporting, remains suspect and the use
of troops could add to civil tensions rather than
control them. The Army, for example, was widely
criticized in 1980 for its heavyhanded use of force in
quelling Islamic religious rioting in the northern city
of Kano.
In our judgment, serious logistic obstacles will face
any group within the military that attempts to seize
the initiative by launching a coup. The Army today is
far larger, more ethnically diverse, and more widely
dispersed throughout the country than was the
10,000-man Army that carried out the country's first
two coups in 1966. As a consequence, we believe
conspirators would find it hard to achieve a broad
ethnic consensus in the Army favoring a coup, pre-
serve secrecy during the coup's planning stages, and
maintain essential communications and coordination
during the coup attempt. Furthermore, we concur
with the US Embassy assessment that a successful
coup would require the active support of key units-
currently commanded by Shagari loyalists-stationed
in and around Lagos. Without their backing, we
believe the conspirators could have difficulty neutral-
izing the legitimate government and gaining control
of the country's communications and logistic network.
Scenarios Through 1983
Despite Nigeria's current problems and the potential
pitfalls ahead, we believe civilian rule has a good
chance of survival between now and the elections.
Neither the country's economic problems nor latent
ethnic and regional animosities, however, are amena-
ble to short-term remedy. Moreover, although we
believe it is important that whoever governs in the
postelection period move quickly to salve bruised
political feelings and make difficult economic deci-
sions, we anticipate that bureaucratic ineptness and
continued political wrangling will continue to plague a
military or civilian government.
Continuing Civilian Rule. We are guardedly optimis-
tic that civilian leaders will be able to complete the
election process, but not without considerable difficul-
ty. If Shagari is elected to a second term, as we
presently expect, he probably would continue to pur-
sue moderate domestic and foreign policies. Although
we anticipate that Shagari's postelection government
will proclaim its intention to press ahead with efforts
to reverse the two-year economic decline, we do not
anticipate bold action on the government's part or a
rapid economic recovery. Moreover, we believe that
while discussions between Nigeria and the IMF and
Western commercial banks are proceeding, negotia-
tions still could prove difficult and drawn out as the
nationalistic Nigerians resist the conditions that the
IMF has compelled smaller and poorer countries of
West Africa to accept.
On the political front, we judge that postelection
political tensions will remain high. At the very least,
we expect a spate of lawsuits from losing parties and
candidates challenging election procedures and results
as was the case after the 1979 elections. Should
opposition parties increase their representation in the
federal legislature, we believe resulting legislative
bottlenecks caused by inevitably increased political
bickering would hinder government attempts to im-
plement economic measures required by the IMF. In
our view, the government also would quickly be faced
with the stormy issue of demands from a host of
ethnic groups for the creation of additional states.
Senior O.ff cers Assume Control. In our judgment, a
government dominated by senior or middle-grade
officers would produce few, if any, dramatic policy
changes. According to academic studies, previous
military governments represented a partnership be-
tween officers on a ruling council who set policy and
the civilian bureaucracy that implemented programs,
and we anticipate. a similar arrangement under a new
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military regime..Senior and middle- rade officers-
most of whom,
are we -educated, politically sop isticat~e ,-an
mat least some administrative experience-proba-
bly would attempt to curtail partisan politics by
banning political parties, seek to blunt ethnic and
regional rivalries with a government of national unity,
and claim to be acting as caretakers in the interest of
preserving national order. On pressing economic mat-
ters, we expect that a coup probably would delay an
agreement with the IMF, but that ultimately senior
officers would accept austerity measures in order to
gain needed economic assistance.
Lower Ranks Seize Power. In our judgment, the lack
of resources, support, and organizational skill make a
coup by junior officers and enlisted men a less likely
alternative. We cannot discount entirely, however, the
possibility of the lower ranks seizing power and
anticipate that such a coup or coup attempt would be
violent and probably would include the killing of
many civilian leaders and senior officers. Even if
successful, we anticipate that new military leaders
quickly would face a series of attempted counter-
coups, especially if the initial takeover was perceived
to be a power grab by narrow tribal interests at the
expense of other tribes. We concur with US Embassy
and Defense Attache reporting that the leaders of
such a coup initially would be likely to seek legitimacy
by inviting more senior or established figures-
including former military leaders-to join the group.
We project that a regime dominated by the lower
ranks with little education or practical administrative
experience, like those that have come to power in
recent years in Ghana and Liberia, would be.apt to
seek public support by making populist promises with
little understanding of their impact or regard for the
government's financial or administrative ability to
implement them. In particular, this regime could feel
pressed to scrap austerity measures while blaming
scapegoats-including the United States-for Nige-
ria's economic troubles. We do not believe these
policies would produce tangible economic improve-
ments, however, and as a result the government could
face growing protest from Nigerians at large, who are
used to pursuing their own economic interests without
Libyan and Soviet Meddling
Nigeria's large population, relative wealth, and prom-
inent role in regional affairs make it a tempting but
more difficult target for Libyan and Soviet meddling
than West Africa's smaller and more vulnerable
states. Historically, the Soviets and Libyans have had
limited success weaning Nigeria's civilian or military
leaders away from moderate and pro-Western stances
or making inroads among Nigeria's tribally divided
population. Indeed, even though the USSR was a
strong supporter and arms supplier of the federal
government during the 1967-70 civil war, the Nigeri-
ans kept the Soviets at a distance and cut even the
arms relationship at the end of the war. Furthermore,
the lack of either armed Nigerian exiles or an orga-
nized overseas opposition-groups particularly sus-
ceptible to foreign manipulation and control-has
hampered Moscow's and Tripoli's efforts to gain a
foothold in Nigeria. We believe, however, that there
remains a potential for outside powers to exploit
current economic difficulties and rising political ten-
sions. Should civilian rule break down, we believe a
military government dominated by naive and impres-
sionable enlisted men or junior officers would offer
the most conducive political climate for radical states
bent on increasing their influence at the expense of
Western interests.
Although suspicious of Soviet and Libyan activities
and intentions in Nigeria and West Africa, leaders in
Lagos traditionally have preferred to maintain at least
formally correct relations with Communist countries
and Libya rather than to refuse to deal with them. We
believe Nigeria has done so in large part to confirm its
nonaligned image and strengthen its claim to be an
independent regional power. The US Embassy has
reported, for example, that the Shagari administra-
tion chose to minimize publicly aLibyan-financed
coup plot it reportedly uncovered in April 1983 and to
go ahead as planned with Qadhafi's state visit to
government interference.
Lagos that month
Libya. In our judgment, Qadhafi views Nigeria's
large Muslim population~oncentrated in the north
and accounting for perhaps as much as half the
country's total population-as fertile ground for re-
ceiving his message of revolution. According to the
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US Embassy, Qadhafi sees Islamic fundamentalist
sects and radical student groups opposed to Nigeria's
secular government as most susceptible to his blan-
dishments. These groups continue to proliferate in the
north and some organizations now claim membership
in the thousands but no one individual or group has
rallied the majority of Muslims to their cause. The
government is aware of the region's volatility, how-
ever, and the US Embassy reports that Lagos denied
Qadhafi's request to visit the north during his visit in
April in part out of fear that his unpredictable
behavior could spark trouble
we concur with US Embassy reporting that
there is little firm evidence at present that the vast
majority of Nigeria's Muslims are attracted to
Qadhafi's radicalism or that his past efforts have had
much payoff.
Soviet Union. In our judgment, Soviet economic
interests in Nigeria-although moderate by Western
levels-give Moscow an incentive to work with what-
ever government is in power. The US Embassy reports
that the Soviet Union and other Communist countries
view Nigeria as a relatively lucrative market for
making hard currency sales of industrial goods and
military supplies, although the recent economic down-
turn has reduced Nigeria's attractiveness. Some 5,000
Soviet technicians are helping to construct the
$2 billion Ajaokuta steelworks project, which repre-
sents Moscow's largest economic investment in black
Africa. Militarily, the Soviets have taken advantage
in the past of Nigeria's longstanding policy of buying
equipment from diverse sources by selling Lagos
MIG-21s and T-55 tanks as well as other weapons.
US Defense Attache reporting indicates, however,
that a good bit of unhappiness exists in the military
over the quality of Soviet equipment and training.
Moreover, the vast majority of Nigerian officers are
trained at home or in the United States or the United
Kingdom
another prominent Yoruba figure
Although Nigerian politics revolve largely around
ethnic rather than ideological issues, the US Embassy
reports that the Soviets have developed clandestine
ties with and provide some funds to left-leaning
Nigerian labor and student leaders, as well as several
politicians and journalists. The leftist leader of the
Nigerian Labor Congress regularly touts a Marxist
line on international issues, and the Embassy reports
that the Yoruba-based Unity Party has asocialist-
oriented radical faction with some members who have
close ties to the Soviets and Cubans. The Embassy
suspects, for example, that the Soviets may have had
a hand in last spring's Unity Party disinformation
campaign charging a CIA plot to kill Awolowo and
Implications for the United States
In our judgment, Nigeria's economic performance at
least throughout the remainder of the year will con-
tinue to fall short of Lagos's hopes and needs. As a
consequence, we believe Nigeria's rulers will look to
Washington to take more decisive action to help bail
the country out of its current economic mess and will
expect US treatment similar to that received by
Mexico or-at least-Brazil. US Embassy reporting
indicates that Nigerians believe Washington has an
"obligation" to help preserve their American-style
political system as well as to repay Lagos for support
on numerous international issues, including its refusal
to join the 1973 Arab oil embargo against the West.
Requests are likely to include calls for Washington to
press US banks to agree to generous debt reschedul-
ing terms, possible emergency food aid, and interces-
sion with the IMF on Nigeria's behalf. Lagos, for
example, already has requested a $150 million com-
modity credit to help tide the country over 1983, and
we expect similar requests if spot food shortages
reported throughout Nigeria spread.
At the same time, however, Nigeria's strident nation-
alism and leadership ambitions in Africa make it
difficult for Lagos to appear to be too dependent on or
allied with the United States. We believe that if
Washington appears unconcerned about Nigeria's
problems or if aid packages do not meet Lagos's
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Comparison of US and Soviet Ties to Nigeria
US Ties
In our judgment, Nigeria continues to feel a close
political g1fnityfor the United States. Historically,
Nigeria has been sensitive to how it is viewed by the
United States, and, since the adoption of its US-style
constitution in 1979, has seen US prestige as en-
twined with Nigeria's domestic fortunes. Despite the
recent economic downturn, US economic interests in
Nigeria remain substantial and among the largest in
black ~Jrica:
Soviet Ties
Nigeria's relations with Communist countries, on the
whole, are outwardly polite and correct, and in line
with Nigeria's stated commitment to nonalignment.
In general, Nigerian-Soviet links have not changed
under civilian government, nor, in the judgment of the
US Embassy, has Soviet ir~luence increased appre-
ciably in the past year. Indeed, the Embassy has
noted a cooling of diplomatic and political relations
since 1981:
? US investment in Nigeria (largely in the oil indus-
try) has a total book value of $300-350 million.
? Nigeria is the fourth-largest supplier of oil to the
United States.
? Total US-Nigerian trade in 1982 was about $8.6
billion; the value of US exports was about $1.3
billion and the value of US imports about $7.3
billion.
? The US trade d~cit with Nigeria in 1982 was $5.7
billion, second only to that with Japan.
? Nigeria imported about $460 million worth of US
food in 1982.
? American institutions, technology, and goods are
the most favored in Nigeria. The Embassy esti-
mates that over 30,000 Nigerian students currently
are studying in the United States.
? The US military establishment is viewed as a
model by Nigeria, and hundreds of Nigerian sol-
diers have received US military training.
? Nigeria does not receive sign cant amounts of
bilateral economic aid from Communist countries.
? The largest Soviet investment in Nigeria is the $2
billion Ajaokuta steelworks that currently involves
about 5,000 Soviet advisers and technicians. In
general, Soviet and East European assistance is
limited to teams of technical experts that provide
assistance to agricultural, construction, and engi-
neering projects.
? Total Soviet-Nigerian trade in 1982 was about
$385 million; the value of Soviet exports was about
$365 million and the value oJSoviet imports about
$20 million.
? The Embassy estimates that about 2,500 Nigerian
students are studying in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union, with about 1,000 of these in the
Soviet Union.
Soviet goods and training
? Nigeria has made no major, recent purchases of
Soviet military equipment but continues to include
MIG-21 fighters and Soviet T-SS tanks in its
military arsenal. The Soviets also continue to 25X1
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though Lagos complains about the quality of both
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expectations, Shagari could feel compelled to distance
himself to some degree from the United States during
his second term. In view of Nigeria's present econom-
ic straits, however, we do not foresee Lagos making
direct threats against US economic interests or shut-
ting off access to Nigerian crude oil. Nor does there
appear to be a strong lobby within Nigeria's civilian
elite that advocates closer ties to the Soviet Union or
Libya, or that favors attempting to blackmail the
United States and the West into providing more aid.
In our view, Nigeria would be more likely to reduce
its support for US-African policies, especially in
southern Africa, and to counsel other African states
to do likewise
US Defense Attache and Embassy reporting indicates
that most senior and middle-grade officers are gener-
ally pragmatic and pro-Western in outlook. We
believe that a government dominated by these officers
would recognize that, in view of Nigeria's present
economic straits, they could not afford to alienate
Western aid donors or the IMF.' Moreover, in our
judgment, they also would recognize that any aid
provided by Libya, the Soviet Union, or other radical
states would not come close to matching the level or
sophistication of economic assistance provided by the
West. However, such a government could try to
distance itself from the former civilian government
and divert public attention from continued harsh
economic times by blaming the United States and the
West for the global recession. In our view, such
rhetorical posturing probably would be undertaken in
conjunction with a more outspoken and active stance
against United States policy in southern Africa.
We believe that a government controlled by the
military's lower ranks would prove far more difficult
for the United States to work with, usher in a
prolonged period of domestic turmoil, and undermine
US hopes for a stable Nigeria committed to playing a
moderating role in African affairs. In our judgment, a
government dominated by more populist-oriented and
ill-educated soldiers would have great difficulty un-
derstanding or dealing with Nigeria's economic prob-
lems and would expect the United States and the
West quickly to come to their rescue with massive
economic assistance. If their expectations were not
fulfilled, we believe these soldiers might be tempted to
turn to the Soviet Union or Libya in hopes of
receiving an infusion of aid
We believe junior officers would quickly come to
realize that the Soviets and Libyans were unable or
unwilling to provide more than token economic help.
We anticipate, however, that even then these officers
would espouse a more radical anti-Western rhetoric in
an effort to burnish their nonaligned credentials and
to distinguish themselves from their more conserva-
tive civilian predecessors. Furthermore, even if Mos-
cow and Tripoli failed to achieve real inroads, an
unstable Nigeria would continue to serve Soviet and
Libyan interests in that the United States could no
longer count on the most populous country in the
region to act as a stabilizing regional player and
generally provide support for US policy initiatives in
Africa.
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 :CIA-RDP84S00552R000300030005-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 :CIA-RDP84S00552R000300030005-0
Secret
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 :CIA-RDP84S00552R000300030005-0