(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00552R000200150003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
The Tanzanian Military:
Nyerere's Uncertain
Shield
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ALA 83-10089
June 1983
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
The Tanzanian Military:
Nyerere's Uncertain
Shield
This paper was prepared b Office
of African and Latin American Analysis, with
contributions by LA, and
Office of Central Reference. It was coordinated
with the Directorate of Operations and the National
Intelligence Council. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, Africa
Division, ALA,
Secret
ALA 83-10089
June 1983
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The Tanzanian Military:
Nyerere's Uncertain
Shield
Key Judgments The unsuccessful military coup plot in Tanzania early this year has fueled
Information available speculation among Tanzanian and foreign observers that President Nyer-
as of 7 June 1983
was used in this report. ere 's 22-year tenure may be nearing an end. The plot, which reflects broad
popular discontent, has deeply shaken Nyerere's confidence in the armed
forces.
Over the past year, mounting economic troubles-particularly worsening
shortages of consumer goods and major price hikes-have spurred wide-
spread public criticism of Nyerere's regime and, most important, have
demoralized Tanzania's 45,000-man military. Junior officers and enlisted
men in particular have grown restive over problems affecting military
living standards, such as low pay, food shortages, and lack of other basic
supplies
Several events could trigger a new military coup attempt, which could
come with little warning. An isolated mutiny, civil disturbances on the
Tanzanian mainland, or trouble on Zanzibar could prompt elements of the
military to seize power
At the same time, there are a number of factors working against a military
takeover. Nyerere is still viewed within and outside the military as the
country's father figure. More important, he probably can count on the
loyalty of most senior commanders. He has granted them a variety of
perquisites over the years and has appointed key officers to high govern-
ment and party posts. Nyerere's active role in decisions affecting the armed
forces and the widely held belief that informants are pervasive throughout
the military also may help to deter would-be plotters.
On balance, we believe that additional plotting against the government is
likely, but that there is at least an even chance Nyerere will survive until
his term expires in 1985.
We do not entirely preclude the
possibility that he might relinquish the presidency sooner. We view as more
remote the prospect that he will voluntarily retire completely from politics
within the next two years.
iii Secret
ALA 83-10089
June 1983
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Should a military-led government nonetheless come to power, we believe it
would conclude that it had no choice but to moderate Nyerere's unsuccess-
ful, dogmatically socialist policies. Such a regime-whether headed by
senior officers or more junior personnel-probably would seek closer ties
with the West and would look to the United States and West European
countries for economic and other help, although it would probably
maintain Nyerere's official policy of nonalignment.
We believe some junior military personnel are leftist oriented and receptive
to Soviet Bloc influence. We cannot rule out the possibility, therefore, that
a military government dominated by such leftist junior officers or enlisted
men might come to power. We believe even they might well look for
alternatives to Nyerere's failed economic program
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Key Judgments
Factors Inhibiting a Coup 5
A Co-Opted Military Leadership 5
Other Impediments 6
Prospects 6
A. Key Defense Officials
D. Estimated Value of Military Assistance Agreements With Tanzania 17
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Deployment of Major Military Units
Lake
Air Force headquarters Nyas
Air Force fighter unit
Air Force transport unit
Road }
Railroad ((
0 100 200
Kilometers
Zambia,)
Lake Victoria
Musoma
nP Army headquarters
Army division headquarters
Army brigade headquarters
Number indicates unit designator
iUnda
M?zamblque
Indian
Ocean
Kilwa Kivinje
lISttlty t~hryt n t;Rr
eGt nec}rtutGk~~~'~
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The Tanzanian Military:
Nyerere's Uncertain
Shield
Introduction
Tanzania's armed forces are among the largest and
strongest in black Africa. They have played an impor-
tant regional role-intervening, for example, to over-
throw Ugandan dictator Idi Amin in 1979 and to help
President Rene's government in Seychelles repulse
mercenaries in 1981-and have been a pillar for
President Nyerere's socialist regime. The uncovering
of a military coup plot against Nyerere in early
January of this year has raised the specter of a
military takeover in Dar es Salaam, which would
probably result in major changes in Tanzanian do-
mestic policies and broader regional repercussions.
This paper examines the Tanzanian military and the
likelihood and implications for the United States of its
possible ascendancy to power.
The Coup Plot
Most of the people involved in the January plot were
junior or noncommissioned military officers, accord-
ing to open-source reporting. As of mid-May, the
government had charged nine civilians, including a
former presidential assistant, and 21 military person-
nel ranging in rank from lieutenant colonel to ser-
geant, with conspiracy.
No high-ranking officers have been arrested, although
some of the accused plotters have alleged that one
senior commander, Maj. Gen. Silas Mayunga, was
involved. (Nyerere has since transferred Mayunga to
a civilian party post.) Our evidence indicates there
was no foreign involvement in the conspiracy.
The plotters appear to have been motivated primarily
by frustration over the country's acute economic
troubles.
consumer price
hikes and shortages of food and other basic supplies-
problems being increasingly felt both by the public in
general and by military units in particular.
The discovery of the conspiracy shook Nyerere's
confidence in the military
In its aftermath, he placed the armed
forces on alert and imposed tight security throughout
the country. These measures were partially relaxed in
March. In the meantime, Nyerere's new Prime Minis-
ter, Edward Sokoine-appointed in February-has
taken steps to expedite deliveries of food and other
basic commodities to important military units.
Sokoine is giving top priority to the military in the
allocation of these increasingly scarce supplies.
Calm has returned to the
barracks, in part because of Sokoine's efforts to
ensure the availability of food and other supplies.
shortages within the military have been only partially
alleviated. We believe, moreover, that Sokoine's ef-
forts will be difficult to sustain in view of the govern-
ment's acute financial problems and growing signs of
popular resentment over the preferential treatment
being given to the armed forces.
Other conditions that helped spur the coup attempt
also persist.
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embezzlement of funds and theft of supplies. Profi-
teering and corruption have been spreading through-
out the military but are most blatant among senior
officers.
Salaries are low and have not
kept pace with the 25- to 40-percent annual rate of
inflation Tanzania has. experienced over the past few
years. mili-.
tary personnel have occasionally gone on strike to
demand higher wages; the most recent incident oc-
curred at an airbase last December. In addition,
promotions, particularly for those in the lower ranks,
have slowed since the end of the 1978-79 military
campaign that ousted Ugandan dictator Idi Amin. As
a result, the high morale of Tanzanian troops at the
time of the victory in Uganda appears to have given
way to bitterness and frustration.
Recent government economic measures have added to
the disgruntlement in the armed forces. According to
open-source reports, defense spending was cut by 40
percent in this year's budget.
because of budget constraints, soldiers are no
longer issued some basic items such as soap.
many military personnel were upset by steep tax
increases imposed in early January on beer, ciga-
rettes, and other goods. Recognizing this reaction, the
government decided in March to exempt members of
the armed forces from the taxes.
Another manifestation of military discontent occurred
in mid-March. Six airmen claiming to be disillusioned
with life in Tanzania flew a military aircraft to the
Comoros, where they sought political asylum but were
jailed instead.
The Potential for a Coup
Low Flashpoint. Considering the extent of disaffec-
tion among lower ranking personnel, we believe a new
move against the government could come with little
warning. It might well be led by disgruntled junior
officers, or enlisted men. It is also possible, although
somewhat less likely, in our judgment, that senior
officers might mount a coup-perhaps to preempt a
move by their subordinates to seize power. Forces
stationed in the Dar es Salaam area would be in the
Military action against the regime could be the result
of a carefully laid conspiracy. In view of the fact that
the plot exposed in January involved a variety of
military personnel and civilians and was in, existence
Alternatively, a coup could evolve from a spontaneous
outbreak of military or civilian unrest:
? A mutiny in one military unit, for example, could
rapidly spread to others. In such circumstances,
military officers might decide to remove Nyerere
instead of trying to put down the disturbances.
? Similarly, uncontrollable civilian disorders could
lead elements in the military to seize power. We
know from US Embassy reporting that a mood of
extreme discontent prevails among urban Tanzani-
ans, in large part because of the scarcity of many
food items and other commodities. A further wors-
ening of food shortages or some other, unforeseeable
event could set off major urban demonstrations.
Military officers, called on to try to contain such
disorders, might decide instead to force the Nyerere
government to step down.
It is less likely, in our view, that widespread disorders
will erupt in the countryside. People in rural areas
have long been accustomed to a life of privation and
seem to have lower expectations than urban Tanzani-
ans. In recent years, according to US Embassy report-
ing, many farm families have reverted to subsistence
agriculture, making them less susceptible to the
vagaries of the economy..
Zanzibar. A particular development that could lead
to a military power grab in Dar es Salaam would be
an uprising on Zanzibar. According to US officials in
Dar es Salaam, separatist sentiment has grown in
recent years among the 600,000 predominantly Mus-
lim inhabitants of Zanzibar, which joined with Tan-
ganyika to form the United Republic of Tanzania in
1964 Zanzibaris in-
creasingly see themselves as politically dominated and
best position to spearhead a takeover.
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The Military: History, Structure, and Mission
The 45,000-man Tanzania People's Defense Force
(TPDF) includes an Army, Air Force, and Navy. As
President, Nyerere is Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces. He exercises this authority through
Prime Minister Edward Sokoine, Defense Minister
Muhiddin Kimario, and TPDF Commander Lieuten-
ant General David Musuguri.
History
The TPDF had its origins in the British colonial
army, the King's African Rifles. The military re-
mained politically passive in the years immediately
following independence in 1961. In January 1964,
however, a large number of soldiers mutinied over
low pay and lack of promotional opportunities.
Nyerere reluctantly called on British marines to quell
the rebellion. The incident apparently convinced him
of the need for a more politically reliable force. F_
At about the same time, Nyerere sought new sources
of military assistance, initially looking primarily to
Canada. During the 1970s, Chinese and Soviet will-
ingness to sell arms on concessional terms facilitated
a major expansion of the TPDF. By 1978, on the eve
of Tanzania's war with Uganda, the military had
grown to a 35,000-man force.
The war in Uganda, which began after President
Amin'sforces invaded northern Tanzania in the fall
of 1978 and led to Amin's overthrow six months .
later, necessitated an even more rapid expansion of
the Tanzanian military. By the end of the conflict, the
Army had grown from three brigades to three divi-
sions and had increased in numbers to a 60,000-man
force. It is now approximately two-thirds of that size.
The Services
The 43,000-man Army is the predominant service by
virtue of its size and mission. It is composed of two
divisions, each consisting of three infantry brigades,
and other combat and support units directly subordi-
nate to Army headquarters.
The Tanzanian Army is one of the largest and best
trained in Sub-Saharan Africa. Its mission is to
defend against external aggression and to assist the
police in maintaining internal order.
The Air Force, known as the Air Wing, has about
1,000 men. It defends Tanzanian airspace and sup-
ports the Army.
The Air Force inventory includes some 75 aircraft-
32frghters, 32 transports, and 11 helicopters. The
fighter aircraft are Chinese-supplied F-5s (MIG-17s)
and F-6s (MIG-19s) and Soviet-built MIG-21s. The
transport aircraft include several De Havilland Buf-
falos and a variety of other light transports.
most TPDF air-
craft are grounded because of shortages of spare
parts, poor maintenance, and low stocks of aviation
fuel
Similar problems impede the effectiveness of the 800-
man naval force, which protects the country's coastal
and territorial waters. The Navy's fleet includes a
variety of Chinese-built patrol boats, gunboats, and
torpedo boats, many of which are not operational.F-
Tanzania also has a 35,000-man Militia that pro-
vides a pool of manpower with military skills that
can be tapped in times of need, as it was during the
1978-79 Ugandan war. In peacetime, militiamen as-
sist Army personnel in border patrols and maintain-
ing internal security.
To reduce military spending the government late last
year announced that it would transfer 12,000 to
15,000 Army officers and enlisted men to their home
villages, where they are to help train Militia person-
nel. These men will continue drawing salaries but are
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The Faltering Economy a
Much of the military dissatisfaction has been caused
by the decline in the Tanzanian economy, which has
contracted at a rate of 3.6 percent annually for the
past two years.b Agricultural and industrial produc-
tion are falling, urban unemployment and rural un-
deremployment are rising, the country's trade deficit
is widening, and foreign indebtedness is growing.
Nyerere blames the economic ills on factors beyond
his government's control, including oil price in-
creases, bad weather, and international recession. His
claims are only partially valid, in our view
Oil imports last year consumed over 60 percent of
Tanzania's export earnings. Continuing drought in
recent years has hurt the country's harvests and
increased its dependence on food imports while cut-
ting exports. Declining world prices for Tanzania's
three major exports-cotton, sisal, and tea-last
year alone cut foreign exchange earnings by 10
percent.
Government mismanagement, bureaucratic inefficien-
cy, and Nyerere's efforts to foster a state-controlled
economy are also responsible for the country's eco-
nomic woes; many of the more than 400 state-owned
firms are poorly run, overstaffed, and losing money.
At the same time, Nyerere has been reluctant to
abandon expensive social programs, such as free
education and health care. Moreover, the Ugandan
war cost Tanzania more than $400 million, mostly in
hard currency.
Much of the decline in the agricultural sector-which
accounts for more than half of Tanzania's GDP and
over 90 percent of the work force-has stemmed from
the government's longstanding program of communal
farming, which has produced less than the private
farms it replaced. Moreover, the low official prices
paid farmers for their commodities encourages black-
marketing and smuggling.
Tanzanian industry is running at only about 25
percent of capacity production has fallen 28 percent
over the past two years-largely because of a lack of
foreign exchange to import raw materials and spare
parts. This has contributed to scarcities of many
goods, losses in government revenues, and increased
unemployment. Meanwhile, severe budget constraints
have led to a curtailment of major roadbuilding
projects and, more generally, to a gradual collapse of
the country's transportation facilities.
To make matters worse, the Nyerere government can
no longer count on large amounts of Western econom-
ic assistance. In recent years, Tanzania has received
more foreign aid per capita than any other African
country-a total of about $600 million annually.
Now, however, many countries-as well as the World
Bank, Tanzania's single largest donor-are linking
new assistance to Tanzania's adoption of stringent
austerity measures.
The International Monetary Fund is also pressing
Tanzania to adopt belt-tightening policies. The
Nyerere government is trying to negotiate with the
IMF a two-year standby agreement that would facili-
tate World Bank and bilateral assistance and pave .
the way for a rescheduling of Tanzania's $1.7 billion
external debt. Although this indebtedness is not large
by international standards, it is well beyond Dar es
Salaam's ability to pay. Arrears on payments for
imports currently total about $350 million and
stretch back nearly three years.
The Nyerere government has recently adopted some
measures that partially meet IMF recommendations.
It has canceled or postponed a number of develop-
ment projects, reduced the list of goods subject to
price controls, and eliminated some consumer subsi-
dies.
Substantial differences probably remain between
Tanzania and the Fund on several issues-especially
over the extent to which Dar es Salaam will devalue
the Tanzanian shilling. As a result, we believe a new
agreement will not be concluded this year. Nyerere
is unlikely to impose an austerity program that
jeopardizes his government or is inconsistent with his
socialist policies. In any case, we foresee little pros-
pect of any early improvement in Tanzania's econo-
my, either with or without new IMF assistance.
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economically exploited by the 18 million mainlanders,
who are largely Christian or animist. Many believe
that Zanzibari President Aboud Jumbe, who also is
Tanzania's Vice President, has been co-opted by Dar
es Salaam and no longer represents their interests.
An event such as the passing of Jumbe, who is 63 and
has a history of medical problems, could embolden the
separatists to stir up unrest. If Nyerere proved unable
to control the situation, we believe that he would
suffer a serious loss of prestige and that the chances of
a military move against him would increase.'
The Tanzanian armed forces held exercises on Zanzi-
bar last December, probably as a show of force=
Nyerere
earlier this year ordered that troops from the main-
land be rotated to the brigade stationed on the island.
The order is being implemented only gradually, how-
ever, and most of the soldiers in the brigade still are
Zanzibaris. Although Nyerere seems convinced that
forces from the mainland are more likely than
Zanzibari troops to remain loyal, we believe, based on
what we know about military discontent, that many
mainland soldiers also might prove unwilling to risk
their lives to suppress a major uprising on Zanzibar.
Factors Inhibiting a Coup
A Co-Opted Military Leadership. At the same time,
in our view, there are a number of factors working
against a military move to topple Nyerere. Perhaps
the most important of these is the effort he has made
over the years to shore up the loyalty of senior
officers. The regime has co-opted key senior officers
by appointing them to high government and party
posts. A number of important positions in the official
party, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Revolutionary
Party)-including some posts on its National Execu-
tive Committee-are reserved for leading military
personnel
Nyerere also has permitted senior officers to become
something of a privileged class. According to US
officials in Dar es Salaam, many profit from owning
President Nyerere: New
concerns about military
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private businesses, even though this is proscribed by
the country's official "leadership code." Moreover,
senior commanders are able to siphon military funds
and divert rations and other supplies for their own
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seems reluctant to take strong measures to end such
practices, probably reasoning that this would under-
mine support for his regime among senior officers.
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anticorruption campaign Nyerere and Sokoine
launched in late March-in which over 1,000 Tanza-
nians have been arrested thus far-probably will not
extend to senior military personnel.
discovery of the coup plot.
Nyerere also has controlled the military by personally
making most of the major decisions affecting it.
According to the US Embassy, he is the final author-
ity on matters such as troop deployments, weapons
acquisitions, and staffing of senior positions. He occa-
sionally reassigns potentially troublesome officers to
prevent them from developing power bases. A major
reshuffle of defense and security personnel in Febru-
ary probably was prompted by Nyerere's doubts
about the loyalty of some senior officers following the
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Other Impediments. US Embassy reporting indicates
that, although Nyerere's popularity among Tanzani-
ans has declined in recent years, he continues to enjoy
prestige both inside and outside the military as the
country's father figure. Moreover, even though mili-
tary personnel, like Tanzanians more generally, may
be more inclined than before to blame Nyerere's
dogmatic socialism for the country's economic de-
cline, we believe he is still credited to a considerable
degree for the regime's accomplishments. These have
been evident mainly in the educational and health
fields. Since Tanzania became independent in 1961,
according to open-source reporting:
? Life expectancy has risen from 37 years to 51, while
the infant mortality rate has dropped from 175 to
140 per thousand.
? Primary school enrollment has jumped from 25
percent to over 90 percent, with about 80 percent of
children now regularly attending school.
? Literacy is up from less than 30 percent to over 70
percent.
? Over a third of the country's 8,200 villages now
have clean water and health clinics-a substantial
increase since the early 1960s.
Another factor that works against a successful mili-
tary coup is the absence of any opposition political
group within the country that might provide a rallying
point for military dissidents. Externally based oppo-
nents of the regime, such as former Foreign Minister
Kambona who has been exiled since the late 1960s,
appear to have only a limited following within Tanza-
nia. We believe they constitute little more than an
occasional embarrassment to the government. At
most, Kambona could serve as a figurehead in a
future military government, lending it a patina of
legitimacy.
Also absent from the Tanzanian scene is a tradition of
military intervention in politics. Tribal rivalries,
moreover, are less likely to trigger a power grab in
Tanzania than in many African states. Unlike coun-
tries in which a few major tribes perennially vie for
control, Tanzania has around 120 ethnic groups, and
the largest-the Sukuma-constitutes only 15 per-
cent of the population.
Prospects
On balance, we believe that additional coup plotting is
likely in the next year or two, in view of the extent of
dissatisfaction among lower ranking personnel and the
poor prospects for improvement in the underlying
economic situation. We are not aware of any coup
plotting, but our knowledge of the day-to-day atti-
tudes and intentions of military personnel is limited.
It is more difficult to predict whether any such
conspiracies will be successful. Chance factors, such
as whether the government's security service manages
to uncover plotting in time as it did last January,
could prove decisive in determining whether a conspir-
acy leads to a successful coup. Whether or not an
incident will spark the sort of uncontrollable civilian
or military unrest that could lead to a takeover is
equally unpredictable. Our best overall judgment is
that there is at least an even chance Nyerere will
remain in office until his term ends in 1985.
Nyerere has
said privately that when his term expires he would like
to turn the presidency over to Prime Minister So-
koine, retaining power behind the scenes by remaining
party chairman for a few more years. We do not rule
out the possibility that he might make such a move
sooner, considering the intractability of the govern-
ment's problems, or he might remain president be-
yond 1985. It is less likely, in our view, that Nyer-
ere-who at age 60 appears healthy and fit-will
voluntarily retire completely from public life within
the next two years. He almost certainly knows this
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Some Top Military and Civilian Leaders
1. Brigadier A. T. Kitete
2. Major General T. N. Kiwelu
3. Major General M. M. Marwa
4. Major General S. L. Mayunga
5. Major General H. P. Lugpgo
6. Lieutenant General A.
Twalipo
7. Secretary-General R.
Kawawa CCM
8. President J. K. Nyerere
9. Colonel M. Nnauye
10. Lieutenant General D. B.
Musuguri
11. Unidentified
12. Vice President A. M. Jumbe
13. Major General I. H. Kombe
14. Major General J. B. Walden
could trigger a power struggle among a broad range
of military and civilian officials and would prompt
charges of abandoning his country at a time when it
was beset by acute difficulties that to a considerable
extent had been caused by his own policies.
A military-led regime would inherit all of the econom-
ic troubles that bedevil Nyerere. In view of the
severity and intractability of these problems, such a
regime might quickly become unpopular and could
prove unstable.
Considering the failure of Nyerere's doctrinaire so-
cialism, the acuteness of the government's financial
difficulties, and the political views of the officers (see
appendixes A and B), we believe a military-led gov-
ernment would modify many of Nyerere's domestic
policies. Such a regime, whether headed by senior
officers or more junior personnel, probably would
conclude that it must try to reduce the size of the
bureaucracy, stimulate private enterprise, and cut
government spending, although not necessarily at the
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Such a government probably would seek closer ties 25X1
with the West and look to the United States, other 25X1
Western nations, and Western-sponsored multilateral
institutions for economic assistance. It would also
expect US political support and might ask for military
aid. At the same time, it would be likely to maintain
Nyerere's official policy of nonalignment to stay on
good terms with fellow African and other Third 25X1
World countries. 25X1
A government dominated by leftist junior officers or
enlisted men might come to power. We believe some
of the junior personnel are leftists and receptive to
Soviet Bloc influence. Like Nyerere, senior officers
tend to distrust Moscow
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Tanzania's armed forces are among the largest and
strongest in black Africa, and they have been called
on to assist other Africans on a variety of occasions.
TPDF personnel are serving in several neighboring
states, including Uganda, Mozambique, Seychelles,
and Zimbabwe.
Tanzania does not appear to face an external military
threat at this time. Although the country's perennial-
ly uneasy relations with Kenya were further strained
last year when Dar es Salaam granted asylum to two
leaders of a failed coup attempt by Kenyan Air Force
personnel, we believe a major Tanzanian-Kenyan
conflict is unlikely, in part because both governments
are preoccupied with serious internal problems=
Relations. with President Obote's government in
neighboring Uganda, are friendly.
modest augmentation of the Tanzanian presence but
probably would resist a substantial increase unless
security sharply deteriorated or Kampala were will-
ing to foot the bill.
Approximately 150 TPDF personnel have been in
Mozambique since the fall of 1982 training enlisted
men and junior officers; the Tanzanians have also
been training Mozambican military personnel in Tan-
zania. Between 200 to 230 Tanzanian troops are in
Seychelles helping protect President Rene's govern-
ment, which barely survived a mercenary attack in
November 1981 and an Army mutiny last August.
According to the US Embassy in Dar es Salaam, the
Nyerere government would like to withdraw these
forces but fears such a move would jeopardize Rene's
position. A similar number of Tanzanian troops were
in the Comoros from 1975 until 1978, when the
socialist government in power there was overthrown
about 50 TPDF personnel are
now in Uganda serving as artillery and officer candi-
date instructors. As many as 40,000 Tanzanian
troops were stationed there during the 1978-79 war to
oust Ugandan dictator Amin.
by a more Western-oriented group.
Zn our judgment, Nyerere might agree to a
Moscow almost certainly is trying to exploit its mili-
tary aid program in Tanzania to cultivate officers at
various levels who could participate in a future gov-
ernment.
Nyerere's departure also would probably weaken the
Frontline States, at least temporarily. Nyerere for
years has been the chairman and main driving force
behind this six-country grouping.' If he were removed
from office, the group's ability to speak with one voice
on Namibia and other southern African issues-
already frayed as a result of ideological and tactical
differences among the member countries-would be
weakened further until someone else filled Nyerere's
A military power grab in Tanzania might have a
regional impact. In our view, a successful coup in
Tanzania could have a "demonstration effect" in
neighboring East African countries. In particular, we
believe a takeover by lower ranking military men in
Tanzania might embolden junior personnel in such
countries as Zambia and Kenya, just as Flight Lieu-
tenant Rawlings's 1979 coup in Ghana was followed
Frontline role.
3 The Frontline States include two Marxist-oriented countries (An-
gola and Mozambique), three nations that strongly espouse social- _
ism (Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe), and democratic, moder-
by similar moves elsewhere in West Africa
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Appendix A
President, TPDF Com- Zanaki
mander in Chief
Prime Minister and Secre- Masai
tary, CCM Defense and
Security Committee
Muhiddin M. Kimario Brigadier Minister for Defense and Chagga
National Security
Tumainieli N. Kiwelu Major General Regional Commissioner for Chagga
Tanga
Imran H. Kombe Major General Director, Tanzanian Intelli- Chagga
gence and Security Service
Michael M. Marwa Major General Regional Commissioner for Kuria
Mara
Silas P. Mayunga Major General Regional Commissioner for Sukuma
Kilimanjaro
Joseph R. Hall Brigadier Commander, TPDF Train-
ing Team, Mozambique
January C. Kisanko Brigadier Deputy Head, CCM Muha
Defense and Security
Committee
Ahmad T. Kitete Brigadier TPDF Chief of Operations Manyema
and Training
G. B. Kusiga Brigadier Executive, Tanzania Wood Hehe
Industry Corp.
James Luhanga Brigadier MP and Executive Chair- Hehe
man, Air Tanzania
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Key Defense Officials (continued)
Mwilipanga R. Lupembe Brigadier Commandant, Military Kinga
Academy
Gideon F. Sayore Brigadier Commandant, TPDF Mwarusha
Infantry School
Seif Bakari Colonel Deputy Minister for Defense Zanzibari
and National Security
Sylvester A. Hemedi Colonel Acting Commander, Zanzibari
202nd Brigade
Beatus K. Kabogo Colonel Acting Commander,
320th Brigade
CCM Central Committee Makonde
member
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Appendix B
Brig. Muhiddin M. Kimario
Minister of Defense and National Service
Career military officer who distinguished himself
during the Ugandan campaign. Appointed in early
1983. Previously served as Minister of Home Affairs,
regional party commissioner, and elected member of
parliament. US Embassy officials describe him as
young, bright, and ambitious. Although a mainlander,
is one of the country's most prominent Muslims. J
Lt. Gen. David B. Musuguri
Commander, Tanzania People's Defense Force (58)
One of the most popular and respected officers in the
armed forces, according to US Embassy officials. Has
held post since November 1980. Thought to be a
cousin of Nyerere and to enjoy the President's full 25X1
trust. Began military career in colonial army and has
little formal education.
Probably resents taking orders from
Defense Minister Kimario, whom he outranks.F-
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Lt. Gen. Abadallah Twalipo
Minister Without Portfolio (61)
Longtime Nyerere loyalist. A former Defense Minis-
ter and TPDF Commander. Joined colonial army as a
private in 1945. Rose through the ranks despite being
virtually illiterate. US Embassy reports indicate he
lacks drive, ability, and initiative
Likely to
Maj. Gen. Ernest M. Kiaro
Commander, TPDF 30th Division
Commands key division responsi-
ble for both Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar. Career
military officer. Previously commanded Militia. Ap-
pointed in February 1983. Member of the Kuria tribe,
which has the largest representation of any ethnic
group in the TPDF. Has headed military delegations
to the Soviet Union and China.
Maj. Gen. Herman C. Lupogo
Commander, TPDF 20th Division (Midforties)
Since February has commanded one of the TPDF's
two divisions. US Embassy views him as intelligent,
confident, highly loyal to Nyerere. Among the more
competent officers in the TPDF. Young for a senior
retire and to play little if any role in future military rising star.
affairs
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Maj. Gen. Imran H. Kombe
Director, Tanzanian Intelligence and Security Service
A favorite of Prime Minister Sokoine, who probably
chose him for his present post. Sandhurst educated,
joined the Army in 1963. Performed well in Uganda
and was named TPDF Chief of Staff. Bright and hard
working
Has advanced rapidly despite allegations that
he has misappropriated military funds and that he has
ties to dissident Oscar Kambona, to whom his wife is
Maj. Gen. Michael M. Marwa
Regional Commissioner for Mara (61)
Unhappy with his party post, which he views as a
form of military exile,
Had been commander of the TPDF's 20th
Division until last February. Began career as enlisted
man in colonial army. Once enjoyed close ties to
Nyerere but in recent years has fallen into disfavor.
has promoted the interests of his fellow
dislike the Soviets and their allies.
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Maj. Gen. Martin N. Mwakalindile
TPDF Chief of Staff (39)
Appointed in February 1983 after serving briefly as
Militia Commander. Sandhurst educated. Previously
was Chief of TPDF Operations and Training and
before that headed Tanzanian military assistance
Described as pro-Western.
Maj. Gen. Silas P. Mayunga
Regional Commissioner for Kilimanjaro
been commander of the important 30th Division until
last February. Probably suspected by Nyerere of
possible role in recent coup plot or, at a minimum, of
failing to detect it. Remains popular among fellow
Sukuma, the country's largest tribe.
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Appendix C
Communist Aid to Tanzania
The TPDF depends on Communist countries for
almost all of its military equipment and training
assistance. The USSR replaced China as the principal
source of such support in the mid-1970s, when the
Nyerere government decided it needed more sophisti-
cated arms than Beijing could provide
During the 1970s China supplied F-5 and F-6 fight-
ers, armored vehicles, rocket launchers, and naval
craft, all on concessional terms. The Chinese have
continued to provide military aid in recent years, but
on a reduced scale. In 1981, for example, the two
countries concluded a $7 million military agreement.
there are now about 55
Chinese military personnel in Tanzania overhauling
tanks, repairing artillery pieces, and helping maintain
naval facilities. Another 45 are to arrive this year to
repair Chinese-manufactured naval gunboats that are
The military's large inventory of Soviet hardware
includes MIG-21s, armored vehicles, artillery, and
trucks. Moscow also has provided radars as well as
SA-3, SA-6, and SA-7 missile systems. As of last
year, approximately 120 Soviet military advisers were
in Tanzania training TPDF personnel to use and
maintain Soviet equipment as well as infantry weap-
ons provided by Moscow's East European allies.
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LJA I
In recent years, Tanzania's inability to pay for Soviet
arms on time has led to occasional strains. Given its
weak financial position, Dar es Salaam probably will
be unable to make major purchases of new Soviet
equipment any time soon.
The UK, Egypt, India, and West Germany have
provided small quantities of arms or training over the
past several years. In our view, however, these coun-
tries are unlikely to supplant the USSR as Tanzania's
preeminent arms supplier and source of training in the
near future. The following tabulation shows training
received by Tanzanian military personnel in Commu-
nist countries last year and during the period 1955-82:
3,185
2,110
50
1,025
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Appendix D
Estimated Value of Military
Assistance Agreements With Tanzania
Total
1955-82
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
Total
644.6
228.0
41.7
39.5
102.1
7.0
0
Communist
570.6
201.0
39.7
38.8
102.1
7.0
0
Bulgaria
82.9
27.0
48.1
China
118.0
9.0
4.0
15.0
7.0
Cuba NEGL
13.0
3.0
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Secret
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