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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Page Count: 30
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• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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offectorate CII
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i, Intelligence
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Zambia: Growing Problems,
Gloomy Prospects
An Intelligence Assessment
MASTE
ALE'ruill
IliJNOT GIVE NT
OR MAK ON
ALA 83-10018
83-10018
? February 1983
Cop.);
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Zambia: Growing Problems,
Gloomy Prospects
An Intelligence Assessment
This assessment was prepared by
of the Office of African and Latin
American Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Southern
Africa Division, ALA,
This assessment was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations and the National
Intelligence Council.
Secret
ALA 83-10018
February 1983
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of 1 February 1983
was used in this report.
Zambia: Growing Problems,
Gloomy Prospects
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When Zambia became independent in 1964, it was widely viewed as
possessing considerable economic promise because of its substantial miner-
al resources. The country was led by a charismatic African nationalist,
Kenneth Kaunda, and ruled by a dynamic political force, the United
National Independence Party (UNIP). Today, however, Zambia's econom-
ic and political problems typify those of many Third World countries, and
the country has fallen far short of realizing its promise.
Over the past 18 years, the economy has been buffeted by fluctuating
world mineral prices, rising costs of oil and other imports, and recurring
trade and transport disruptions. In recent years, the worldwide recession
has hit Zambia particularly hard. Government mismanagement and
corruption, neglect of agriculture, and a costly expansion of social services
have added to the country's difficulties. At present, national output is
declining, more than a third of the country's wage earners are out of work,
and inflation and commodity shortages are worsening.
The government has recently begun to impose austerity measures to signal
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that it is serious about negotiating
a new loan agreement to replace the one that collapsed in 1981. It will be
difficult for President Kaunda to meet all of the IMF's austerity require-
ments, however, because he will be campaigning for reelection later this
year. As a result, he will probably try to walk a fine line between satisfying
the IMF and maintaining popular support. We expect that Kaunda will
win the presidential contest, but by a smaller margin than in the past.
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For a variety of reasons, we believe that for at least the next two years
Kaunda should be able to withstand any political turbulence stemming
from Zambia's economic and social ills. He remains in firm control of the
ruling party and the government. Potential opposition elements?the
volatile labor movement, the urban elite, and the Bembas, a perennially
disgruntled major tribal-linguistic group?probably lack the power to
overthrow him. We believe the one group that seems capable of toppling
the regime?the military?lacks the will to attempt a coup, at least in the
near term.
111
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ALA 83-10018
February 1983
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Should Kaunda die, we believe that a period of intense jockeying for power
would ensue between pro-Western leaders, such as party Secretary General
Humphrey Mulemba, and more doctrinaire supporters of Kaunda's version
of African socialism, including defense and security chief Grey Zulu. Any
successor, however, would probably find most of Zambia's social and
economic problems to be intractable. Although some policy shifts would be
likely, a change in government, even a military takeover, probably would
not move Zambia far from the nonaligned, socialist course that Kaunda
has set.
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Contents
Page
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Key Judgments
111
Introduction
1
Growing Domestic Problems
1
Deteriorating Economic Conditions in 1982 1
Dwindling Financial Options 1
Political and Social Developments 3
Outlook for 1983
7
Somber Economic Prospects 7
Political Consequences 9
The Elections 9
Policy Directions 11
The Longer Term 11
The Economy 11
Succession Scenarios 12
Implications for the United States 12
Appendixes
A.
Methodological Notes on Economic Forecasts 15
B.
President Kaunda: A Troubled Leader 17
C.
Potential Successors 19
D.
Central Committee of the United National Independence Party 21
E.
Zambian Cabinet 23
F. Distribution of Senior Party and Cabinet Posts by Linguistic Group 25
G.
Distribution of Senior Party and Cabinet Posts by Province 27
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Zambia
TANZANIA
International boundary 0 Province capital
National capital Railroad
Province boundary Road
Mpulungu
Mbeya
Lake
Mweru
Mwinilunga
Likasi
ZAIRE
umbashi
Mansa
Lake
Bangweulu
Lake
asa
khat
Bate Ba
Solwezi
Chilila
Lundazi
Chingo a
Kitwe
Luansh
Zambezi
Serenje
LILONGWE
Kapiri Mposhi
Petauke
atete
Kafue
Kabwe
Mange
Man koya
Kataba
Mulobezi
Namwala
Maza uk
Chirund
hirundu
Choma
Victoria
Falls
Maramba
ARARE
BOTSWANA
Hw.n
eoundary repreitentation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Zambia: Growing Problems,
Gloomy Prospects
Introduction
Zambia has long suffered from social and economic
problems with which its political leaders are ill
equipped to deal. Over the past two years the coun-
try's problems have intensified, largely because of the
deepening of the worldwide recession. According to
most observers, growing numbers of Zambians would
welcome a change in government.
This paper examines Zambia's problems and the
potential for political unrest in the context of Presi-
dent Kaunda's quest for reelection later this year. The
paper also assesses Zambia's longer term economic
prospects and the implications for the United States
of Kaunda's continued rule or of his replacement by
another civilian or a military leader.
Growing Domestic Problems
Deteriorating Economic Conditions in 1982. By al-
most any measure, the Zambian economy is worse off
today than at any time since the country gained
independence in 1964. According to the US Embassy
in Lusaka, more than a third of the country's wage
earners are out of work, and most of the rest of the
population is underemployed. Inflation of 20 to 25
percent in 1982, spurred by commodity shortages and
increases in government-controlled prices, has re-
duced the purchasing power of consumers. In addi-
tion, pervasive drought has brought new hardship to
the country's 600,000 subsistence farmers. US Em-
bassy officials report that in some rural areas, particu-
larly in western Zambia, much of the population is
suffering from severe malnutrition.
Lusaka and the economically and politically impor-
tant copper-producing region are better off than the
rest of the country, despite the deterioration in overall
living standards. The government has kept stores well
stocked in those areas through foreign aid and heavy
foreign borrowing. The government lightened the
economic burden of mineworkers and citydwellers
even further by forestalling both layoffs of public-
sector employees and large cuts in social spending.
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According to our analysis, Zambia's GDP declined in
1982 by a real rate of about 2 percent. Drought
reduced agricultural production by almost 20 percent.
Transport bottlenecks and import constraints caused
factory production to fall by over 5 percent in real
terms. Only a slight recovery in mining output from
an all-time low in 1981 kept the decline from being
more severe.
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The country's balance-of-payments situation also
worsened further. Despite the small rise in production
of minerals, the continuing drop in world demand for
copper and cobalt caused Zambia's export earnings to
fall in 1982 to about 10 percent below the depressed
1981 level. Based on data for January-June 1982, we
estimate that Zambians cut imports last year to about25xi
10 percent below the 1981 level. Even so, the country
accumulated a payments backlog of over $800 million
on its short-term debt, and its foreign exchange
reserves fell to a level sufficient to finance only two
weeks' imports. Because of Lusaka's poor cred-
itworthiness and tight world credit conditions, inter-
national bankers virtually ceased to extend new cred-
its to Zambia in 1982.
Dwindling Financial Options. In view of Zambia's
serious economic difficulties, Lusaka in our judgment
has no practical alternative to the adoption of at least
some tough austerity measures as a condition for new
international assistance. Zambia has received sub-
stantial amounts of assistance from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in the
past. Its most recent IMF support?a three-year,
$900 million Extended Fund Facility that took effect
in May 1981?was suspended late that year because
Lusaka failed to meet stipulated performance targets.
At the same time, the World Bank, pending a resolu-
tion of the status of the IMF program, withdrew its
support for several multimillion-dollar projects de-
signed to rehabilitate Zambia's ailing mining indus-
try.
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A Fragile Economy
The Zambian economy shares many of the character-
istics that impede development in other LDCs. Zam-
bia's problems include:
? A widening gap between the rich and the poor, the
cities and the countryside.
? A narrow export mix (copper and cobalt provide 95
percent of export earnings, 45 percent of the govern-
ment's revenues, and 35 percent of GDP) that holds
the country hostage to fluctuations in the industri-
alized world's demand for minerals.
? Interruptions in social services resulting from sharp
fluctuations in exports and government revenues.
? Poor internal transportation networks (except those
serving the mines) that hinder the movement of
agricultural goods and the development of internal
markets.
The Zambian economy has performed much worse,
however, than those of most LDCs. Even during the
copper boom years of 1971-74, and despite heavy
foreign borrowing, Zambia's real economic expansion
averaged only 4.3 percent annually, compared with 7
percent among other Sub-Saharan African countries.
The government's economic policies have been largely
responsible for Zambia's deep-seated structural prob-
lems. Since independence in 1964, inefficient state-
owned enterprises have steadily taken control of all
sectors of the economy except agriculture and con-
struction. This process has discouraged foreign capi-
tal inflows and encouraged the flight of expatriate
managers and skilled labor needed to develop extrac-
tive industries and to keep other production at full
capacity. At the same time, Zambia's shift away from
food processing, beverage, and tobacco industries
toward import-intensive manufacturing of textiles,
tires, and chemicals has increased import require-
ments and strained the country's balance of pay-
ments. Moreover, low producer prices, high internal
transport costs, and shortages of credit and public
investment have cut farm output.
External factors took a heavy toll after 1974. The
sharp decline in world copper prices dealt the worst
blow, but there were other setbacks:
? Soaring oil costs boosted petroleum's share of
Zambia's import bill.
? Wars in Angola and Rhodesia added to Zambia's
problems by effectively closing transport routes
through those countries.
? Periodic drought, together with counterproductive
agricultural policies, led to food shortages, forcing
Lusaka to import maize?the main staple.
As a result of these forces, Zambia was on the brink
of bankruptcy during much of the late 1970s. More-
over, per capita income in 1979 was less than 80
percent of the 1974 level.
In 1980, long-nurtured expectations that a "peace
dividend" would result from the end of the war in
Rhodesia put pressure on the government to eliminate
commodity shortages and to raise low industrial
inventories. As a result, imports soared, public ex-
penditures exceeded revenues by more than 50 per-
cent, and foreign exchange reserves were nearly ex-
hausted by the end of the year, forcing Lusaka to stop
repaying short-term debts.
Kaunda's efforts to revive the economy were ham-
pered in 1981 by labor unrest in the mining sector.
Prolonged strikes hobbled the copper industry, and
production fell 10 percent below the already low level
of 1980. Only a respite from drought that allowed
farm output to rebound kept the economic situation
from worsening further.
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Figure 1
Zambia: Economic Comparisons
GDP per Capita, 1981 Real GDP Growth, 1977-81 a
US S Percent
Non-OPEC
LDC Average
Zimbabwe
Zambia
Kenya
Zaire
760
170
400
620
Kenya
Non-OPEC
LDC Average
560 Zimbabwe
Zaire
Zambia ?3.0
5.3
4.8
10.3
?0.8
Adult Literacy, 1977 Urban Population, 1980
Percent Percent
Zimbabwe
Zaire
Kenya
Non-OPEC
LDC Average
Zambia
74
50
48
44
Zambia
58 Zaire
Non-OPEC
LDC Average
Zimbabwe
Kenya
43
14
23
34
32
Debt Service as a Share of Agriculture as a Share of
Exports", 1980 GDP, 1980
Percent Percent
Zaire
Non-OPEC
LDC Average
Zambia
Kenya
Zimbabwe
38
a Average annual.
b Excluding arrears.
20
19
13
10
588366 2-83
Kenya
Zaire
Non-OPEC
LDC Average
Zimbabwe
Zambia
34
33
15
18
28
Since the collapse of the IMF agreement, the Kaunda
government has delayed making debt payments, cut
imports, and sought new foreign assistance from other
sources. Kaunda's brief 25X1
trip to the Middle East last summer in search of aid,
and similar missions by other Zambian officials, have
produced new commitments of about $100 million in
development loans, mainly from the Arab Develop- 25X1
ment Bank and from Kuwait. This assistance, how-
ever, falls far short of meeting Zambia's substantial
need for short-term funds.
As a result, the government has opened negotiations
with the IMF for a one-year, $225 million standby
loan and has taken a series of steps designed to
convince the IMF that it is worthy of further assist-
ance. According to the US Embassy in Lusaka, the
Zambians in late 1982 began to reduce government
spending, raise farm prices, deregulate most consumer
prices, and divert internal credit from the mining
sector. In early January 1983 Lusaka also devalued
the Zambian currency?the kwacha?by 20 percent,
placed a 5-percent ceiling on 1983 wage increases,
raised interest rates, and indicated that it will
continue to pay the interest on its medium- and long-
term debt but will suspend payments of principal
while it seeks a Paris Club (official debt) rescheduling.
Even if the Zambian budget that was announced on
31 January 1983 is sufficiently austere to satisfy the
IMF, a further devaluation of the kwacha may be
required.
Political and Social Developments
Zambia's mounting economic difficulties have eroded
popular confidence in the government, according to
the US Embassy in Lusaka, but critics usually have
not blamed Kaunda personally. Moreover, Kaunda
has managed to maintain the upper hand with poten-
tial opposition groups.
Government and labor leaders observed what amount-
ed to an uneasy truce in 1982. Kaunda's jailing of
four key union officials following labor unrest in 1981
evidently dampened labor's enthusiasm for confront-
ing the government directly. The government placated
workers in the volatile copper belt by concentrating
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Figure 2
Zambia: Mineral Prices and Production Trends
Copper
Prices
$ per Pound
Production
Thousand Metric Tons
Cobalt
Prices
$ per Pound
750 25
0.20
0
1970 75 80 82a
a Annual average.
b Estimated.
550
500
.0
ni
00 00
Current
20
15
Constant
1970 75 80 82a
Production
Thousand Metric Tons
5
4
_ ?
3
2
1
0 .0
cv
oo oo
0, ON 0, ON
588367 2-43
Zambia: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators
1978
1979
1980a
19816
1982c
1983d
1983e
Current account balance
Million US $
?241
133
?402
?550
?600
?500
?150
Trade balance
57
426
?5
70
60
60
350
Exports, f.o.b.
828
1,374
1,405
1,220
1,100
1,250
1,250
Imports, c.i.f.
?771
?948
1,410
1,150
1,040
1,150
900
Net services and transfers
?298
?293
?397
?620
?660
?600
?500
Debt service as a share of exports f
Percent
23.4
21.1
19.0
. 23.0
25.0
NA
NA
Inflation rate
16
12
20.0
20.0
20-25
35-40
40-50
Real GDP growth
0.5
?8.9
?0.9
?1.8
?2.0
1.0
?2.0
a Preliminary.
d Projected; assuming an IMF standby program in early 1983 and a
b Estimated.
a Projected; excluding arrears.
rescheduling of most debt (including arrears) due in 1983.
a Projected; assuming a failure to get an IMF standby or debt
rescheduling.
r Excluding arrears.
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The President's Assets
Political. President Kaunda makes virtually all ma-
jor policy decisions, according to US Embassy offi-
cials in Lusaka. He controls the ruling United Na-
tional Independence Party. He appoints?and
periodically reshuffles?members of UNIP's Central
Committee, the country's preeminent policymaking
body, as well as Cabinet ministers. The Zambian
Parliament occasionally engages in lively debates
over government policy but in the end invariably
endorses executive decisions.
Kaunda despite some erosion of his popularity?
retains considerable personal and political assets.
Zambian media, although at times critical of the
government's shortcomings, are government-con-
trolled and consistently supportive of Kaunda 's lead-
ership. Kaunda plays effectively on his carefully
cultivated image as Zambia's indispensable leader;
many Zambians still believe there is no acceptable
alternative. Most seem to respect him?with reason,
we believe?for honesty and integrity.
Kaunda seems to enjoy his greatest support in the
countryside, where 60 percent of the population lives.
The vast majority of rural Zambians are engaged in
subsistence agriculture. They have a tendency to
remain passive despite scarcities and other economic
hardships. They have little contact with the modern
economy aside from bartering for cooking oil and
kerosene. These farmers have few dealings with the
government aside from a few primitive schools and
clinics. Long inured to hardship and without any
tradition of violence, they have been too busy making
ends meet to find time for political action?though
many do vote. Kaunda is still their revered leader,
and suffering is seldom attributed directly to him.
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Military. We believe that members of the Zambian
military are generally loyal to Kaunda, despite some
dissatisfaction over poor pay and perquisites. The
military has a strength of about 20,000, including a
5,000- to 6,000-man paramilitary force and 1,500-
man Air Force.
In recent years, Kaunda has taken a number of steps
to reduce the risk of a military move against his
government. These include:
? Rotating senior commanders periodically, making
it more difficult for any to develop independent
power bases. No Zambian service chief has been
permitted to remain at his post beyond the age of
40.
? Purchasing sophisticated arms?notably $200 mil-
lion worth of weapons from the Soviet Union in
I979?partly to placate members of the military
critical of Zambia's weak defenses.
? Striving for ethnic balance within the military. To
be effective, a concerted move against the regime
would probably require military support from more
than one major tribe.
consumer goods there at the expense of other areas of
the country and by replacing an unpopular labor
minister with a less controversial one.
The potentially troublesome nongovernmental urban
elite was also quiescent in 1982. Alleged coup plotting
in late 1980 by a number of prominent professionals
had made better educated, relatively prosperous Zam-
bians outside the ruling power structure suspect in the
5
government's eyes. The detention of those accused
probably had a chilling effect on the political activi-
ties of others. Church leaders, however, took strong
exception in March 1982 to Kaunda's endorsement of
a controversial proposal to introduce a Marxist curric-
ulum in Zambian schools, and since then the govern-
ment has done little to implement it.
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Kaunda inspecting the troops
Times of Zambia
The Bembas, Kaunda's principal tribal critics, many
of whom are prominent members of the urban elite
and of the labor movement, remained without a
spokesman of national stature in 1982. Many proba-
bly were disappointed that labor leader Frederick
Chiluba failed to play this role aggressively.
The military has remained subservient to the govern-
ment although, according to US Embassy officials,
Kaunda has been deeply concerned about the possibil-
ity of a military coup. Most senior officers, particular-
ly Army Commander Malimba Masheke, have been
loyal to Kaunda, however, and seem to be without
political aspirations. Kaunda apparently believes?
correctly in our view?that any military coup attempt
most likely would be led by a small group of middle-
or junior-level officers or enlisted men.
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Potential Opposition Groups
The Unions. Zambia's powerful trade unions long
have been at odds with the government. Frederick
Chiluba, the head of the Zambian Congress of Trade
Unions, which represents approximately 60 percent of
the country's 375,000 wage earners, portrays the
unions as champions not just of labor but of the
population as a whole. He and other labor leaders
have confronted the government not only on wages,
pensions, and other bread-and-butter issues, but also
on such broader questions as the government's man-
agement of the economy.
The Urban Elite. We know from US Embassy and
other reports that many members of Zambia's non-
governmental urban elite?businessmen, profession-
als, church leaders, and former government offi-
cials?are privately critical of Kaunda's rule. These
influential Zambians, who tend to be better educated
and more Western-oriented than most officials in the
Kaunda regime, generally advocate more pragmatic,
less socialist-inspired approaches to the country's
economic problems. They also tend to hold UNIP in
low esteem and to dislike the constraints of one-party
rule. They view most of the present generation of
government and party leaders as excessively wedded
to Kaunda's socialist policies and insufficiently edu-
cated to deal with the country's difficulties.
The Bemba. Kaunda, whose tribal origins are ob-
scure, has long encountered opposition from members
of the country's largest and most influential tribal-
linguistic group, the Bemba (see map), who comprise
about a third of the population and reside mainly in
the copper belt and other parts of northern Zambia.
They view Kaunda's efforts to maintain a balance of
power among various regional groups as inimical to
their interests. Many resent Kaunda's heavy reliance
on defense chief A. Grey Zulu, party boss Reuben
Kamanga, and other prominent Nyanja-speaking,
eastern Zambians in key party and government jobs.
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Zambia
Economic Activity
FROM
OAR ES SALAAM
Mining
Copper belt (acopper mine
Acopper and cobalt mine)
ULI Coalfield (*nine)
Zn Zinc mine
Pb Lead mine
Agriculture L Limestone quarry
f-4-1 Tobacco
Ant Amethyst mine
.1_,2 Corn Win Manganese mine
Peanuts Pe Iron deposit
Manufacturing
Copper refinery
Copper fabrication plant
? Metal products
sq Railshops and yards
* Mining equipment
? POL storage
? Textiles
? Wood products
? Cement
O Explosives
CP Chemicals including fertilizers
* Sugar refinery
? Hydroelectric powerplant
Oil pipeline
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In mid-1982, in an apparent effort to ensure military
loyalty, the government ordered that all new recruits
be members of the governing United National Inde-
pendence Party (UNIP) party. It also proceeded with
efforts to form a new presidential security detachment
with North Korean assistance and to strengthen the
country's paramilitary forces. Such units could be
used in a crisis to counter mutinous or other unreli-
able Army troops.
7
Outlook for 1983
Somber Economic Prospects. Even if Zambia reaches
an agreement with the IMF, we believe that economic
pressures on the Kaunda regime will continue to
mount and will pose more difficult problems in the
future. Zambia's economic fate will remain largely
dependent on world demand for copper and cobalt,
which we expect to remain slack throughout 1983.
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Figure 3
Selected Countries: Total Debt End of 1981
Billion US $ 0
Brazil
Mexico
Algeria
Chile
Sudan
Nigeria
Zaire
Zambia
Costa Rica
20 40 60
The Best Case. According to our analysis, even under
the best of circumstances the Zambian economy can
achieve a real rate of growth in GDP of no better than
1 to 2 percent in 1983.1 This scenario assumes that
Zambia secures IMF agreement on a standby loan of
80 $225 million in early 1983, that it is able to meet
performance requirements stipulated by the Fund, but
that private lenders remain wary until rescheduling
agreements are completed. The IMF loan would allow
Zambia to increase imports only about 10 percent
over their 1982 level, an amount not adequate to bring
about a strong recovery in the capital-intensive min-
ing and industrial sectors. Moreover, the IMF would
require cuts in public spending and restrictions on
domestic credit that would further limit growth.
588368 2-83
An IMF accord would probably make international
creditors more receptive to rescheduling Zambia's
$2.2 billion medium- and long-term debt and at least
part of its burgeoning short-term debt. Zambia is now
more than a year behind in making scheduled pay-
ments of principal to several Western official credi-
tors, including the US Export-Import Bank and West
Germany; it is also delinquent in repaying a number
of private Western creditors.
Even if Lusaka comes to terms with the IMF, there
would probably be a substantial timelag of six months
to a year before debt rescheduling agreements could
be signed because of the large number of Zambia's
creditors and of Zambian inexperience in compiling
the kind of documentation that would be required.
Much of the financial benefit of an IMF standby loan,
therefore, probably will be lost because part of the
proceeds would have to go toward meeting overdue
commercial debt payments and interest on longer
term debt until rescheduling agreements are conclud-
ed.
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Much of the stimulus to growth in this case would
have to come from a recovery in agriculture, which
accounts for about 15 percent of GDP. The key factor
would be the cessation of drought rather than any
positive programs to increase output.
A Worst Case. If Lusaka fails to reach an agreement
with the IMF and to reschedule its debt, the govern-
ment would not have enough foreign exchange to
finance essential imports of oil, food, and producers'
goods. Moreover, the backlog of payments on Zam-
bia's commercial credit obligations would continue to
mount and Lusaka might have to default on some
outstanding loans.
Because of a need to increase export volume in order
to generate foreign exchange, Lusaka would have to
give the mining sector a greater share of the country's
scarce credit and other resources, despite the unprofit-
ability of the mines. On the basis of its past perform-
ance, we believe that the government also would try to
compensate for declining revenue from import duties
by increasing the already heavy tax burden on profit-
able enterprises, a measure that would further damp-
en private initiatives.
The important agricultural sector may again suffer a
severe drought. In any case, imports of farming
equipment and supplies of chemicals and fertilizers
' See appendix A for methodology.
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will probably be curtailed by the country's financial
problems. Thus, agricultural output could be stagnant
or even decline slightly again
In this situation, Lusaka would almost certainly in-
crease the money supply and government spending in
an attempt to alleviate some of the public distress.
Because of the impending election, Kaunda would feel
particularly compelled to take such measures to shore
up popular support. On balance, we believe that this
chain of events could lead to a real decline in GDP of
2 percent?or more?and inflation closer to 40 per-
cent
The Most Likely Outcome. In our judgment, Kaunda
will try to reach an accord with the IMF as soon as
possible in view of Zambia's worsening financial
situation. Fund officials are likely to drive a harder
bargain in 1983 than they did two years ago, however,
because the IMF concluded?correctly, in our view?
that Lusaka showed bad faith in 1981 when it used
Fund credits primarily to purchase imports rather
than to pay off overdue debts. We expect, therefore,
that Zambia will not be able to conclude an IMF
agreement until the second quarter of this year and
that debt reschedulings probably will be delayed
another six months to a year while Zambia assembles
the necessary paperwork.
As a result, we expect that Zambia's 1983 economic
performance will fall somewhere between the two
extreme cases. An infusion of IMF funds might well
come too late in the year to have much impact on the
economy. Until Lusaka reschedules its debt, IMF
requirements to stem payments backlogs on short-
term debt will cut severely into the foreign currency
supplied by the Fund. Thus, in our judgment, Zambia
probably will continue to experience recurrent foreign
exchange crises leading to shortages of spare parts
and other essential items.
Regardless of when or whether Zambia reaches
agreement with the IMF, the austerity measures
announced in January 1983 are likely to constrain
economic growth severely. Restrictions on credit and
cuts in public spending, particularly reductions in
government subsidies to mining and industry, will
cramp production. Meanwhile, higher import costs,
comprehensive price increases, wage ceilings, and
9
rising unemployment will dampen the purchasing
power of consumers.
Political Consequences. In our view, there will be a
deterioration in living standards even if Lusaka ob-
tains an IMF agreement, and Zambians will blame
the government. At present, Kaunda's most powerful
critics, the labor unions, are relatively quiet, largely
because urban shops are still fairly well stocked.
Unless new sources of aid can be found soon, however,
local businessmen predict that stores will be nearly
empty in three to four months.
At the same time, acceptance of IMF conditions
would impose a different type of austerity. IMF-
inspired budget cuts could compel the government to
lay off hundreds of public employees, causing eco-
nomic hardship in urban areas where Kaunda's politi-
cal standing already is weak. Moreover, the Fund's
insistence that Zambia place a ceiling on wages and
reduce subsidies to the unprofitable mining sector?in
which the present return on each dollar invested is
only about 80 cents?could well spark violent labor
unrest.
In the past, Kaunda has displayed a willingness to be
tough when necessary. For example, when violent
labor strikes erupted, he did not hesitate to take
strong measures against recalcitrant labor leaders.
Likewise, he has kept most of the alleged coup plotters
of 1980, whose marathon trial has not yet ended, in
jail for over two years. These actions will make
potential opponents of the regime reluctant to chal-
lenge Kaunda's authority unless they assess their
chances of success as extremely high.
The Elections. Kaunda will be campaigning for re-
election later this year.' Assuming that Zambia
reaches an accord with the IMF, Kaunda will proba-
bly try to delay implementing or to water down at
'Under the Zambian Constitution, presidential and legislative
elections must be held every five years. They were last held in 1978.
The UNIP General Conference, a broad body of party officials,
elects the party president, who becomes the sole candidate for
president of the country in what amounts to a popular referendum.
The candidate is elected if he receives a majority of the popular
vote cast in a "yes-no" ballot. If he fails to achieve a majority, the
General Conference reconvenes to choose another nominee for a
second election.
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Zambia
Language and Population
.Kasama
Samba
winilunga
Sotwezi
*Mpika
Lunda
Zambezi
bunda
uchaz
ho
Lambe
Ndola,
Lund
CheWa
Luvale
Lima
*Serenje
\
ata.
gont
Mumbwa.
Petauke
?
1,1senga
ngu
Kwanga
LUSAKA
Soli
Totela
Tonga
Chom:
Linguistic Group
Bemba
ii Nyanja
Tonga
Lunda/Luvale
Lozi
Mambwe
Tumbuka
Other
Percent of
Black Population
33.9
17.1
15.2
10A
9.2
5.1
4.7
4.4
505539 2-83
least some of the belt-tightening reforms mandated by
the Fund until after the voting in December. Even if
Kaunda is required to ask Zambians to swallow a
large measure of the bitter economic medicine the
Fund is prescribing, we do not believe he will face a
serious electoral challenge. Among his political assets
are his control over the party, the machinery of state
(including, at least for the time being, the military),
and the media, as well as his still-considerable?
although probably declining?support among the peo-
ple.
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Kaunda will present himself as the only politician who
can effectively unite and lead Zambia. He probably
will blame the country's economic troubles largely on
factors beyond his government's control, such as the
world recession, the high cost of oil and other essential
imports, and what he regards as insufficient levels of
external assistance. He will also emphasize his role as
a peacemaker and Third World statesman; he will
continue to cast his meeting in April 1982 with Prime
Minister Botha of South Africa in a favorable light,
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interpreting it as a positive step toward achieving a
dialogue with South Africa and progress toward
Namibian independence.
We expect that the Zambian electorate will return
Kaunda to office, although perhaps by a smaller
margin than in the past.' Kaunda probably will fare
best in the Nyanja-speaking areas of eastern Zambia
and worst in areas of traditional antigovernment
sentiment, such as the south and the mining regions
where Tonga and Bemba speakers, respectively, are
dominant. Discontent over the economic situation
probably will lead to defeats for some influential
members of the party and government running for
reelection to Parliament, as occurred in the 1978
general elections.
Policy Directions. Kaunda will probably interpret his
reelection as a mandate for more of the same policies
he has long espoused. He may shuffle some senior
Cabinet and UNIP officials, as he has often done in
the past, but his longtime political cronies will proba-
bly continue to dominate the upper ranks of the party
and government.
Kaunda's preference for collectivist and authoritarian
policies is reflected in programs he has endorsed in
recent years to create large state farms, to establish a
curriculum based on "scientific socialism" in Zambi-
an schools, and to tighten government control over the
media. A small group of committed Marxists, several
of whom occupy key posts in the government and
party, will urge Kaunda to press forward with these
policies, which for the most part are still in early
stages of implementation. According to the US Em-
bassy these leftists look to
Kaunda's longtime crony, defense and security chief
A. Grey Zulu, as the main protector and promoter of
their interests. The principal members of the group
are Henry Meebelo, Minister for National Planning;
Leonard Chivuno, Director of the National Commis-
sion for Development Planning; and Henry Matipa, a
prominent UNIP Central Committee member.
In 1978, Kaunda obtained approximately 82 percent of the vote;
the turnout that year was 67 percent. Five years ealier, he won an
88-percent majority, although only 43 percent of registered voters
cast ballots.
11
At least until he is reelected, we expect that Kaunda
will subordinate his socialist sympathies to the need
for reaching an accord with the IMF. He can count on
a moderate, pro-Western group identified with UNIP
Secretary General Humphrey Mulemba to support
this approach and to oppose any further drift in a
socialist direction. Kaunda, moreover, finds it useful
to encourage competing factions among his subordi-
nates as a way of preventing any single group or
individual from becoming so powerful as to threaten
his own control.
The Longer Term
The Economy. We see little chance that there will be a
recovery in mineral prices over the next several years
adequate to redress Zambia's severe economic prob-
lems. International demand for copper will remain
directly dependent on economic conditions in the
industrialized world. Longer term demand for cobalt
already has been dampened by past high prices that
have led to the use of other minerals as substitutes
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Moreover, Zambia's need for foreign exchange to pay
for imported oil, food, and capital goods?and to pay
overdue debt?will force Lusaka to continue diverting
scarce credit and other resources to the unprofitable
mining industry. Even so, cost-cutting measures in the
mining sector?including cutbacks in skilled foreign
labor, capital, and operating expenses?run the risk of
reducing production.
As the world economy recovers, the demand for
copper will be accentuated because stocks in consum-
ing countries have been allowed to drop to extremely
low levels. When demand picks up, we would expect a
rapid turnaround in Zambia's trade balance as Lusa-
ka sells off its inventories. The resurgence in copper
prices probably will enable Zambia to achieve an
annual real rate of growth of 2 to 4 percent. The rise
in Zambia's export earnings could be briefly broken,
however, by a lag in raising copper production once
again to levels of the early or mid-1970s.
In time, Zambia's leaders will probably conclude from
the harsh economic realities of the late 1970s and
early 1980s that they need to diversify their economy
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further. We believe that they will try to build on the
modest steps that Kaunda has taken to expand the
agricultural sector to avoid heavy dependence on food
imports. They will probably also try to decrease
Zambia's dependence on imports of oil by pushing
ahead on planned electrification projects using the
country's considerable hydroelectric potential. We
doubt, however, that Zambia will move far from
Kaunda's commitment to a largely government-run
economy
Succession Scenarios. Despite Zambia's economic
difficulties and the government's declining popularity,
we do not expect Kaunda to leave office any time
soon.
At 58, Kaunda?a teetotaler and a nonsmoker?
seems to be in good health. Should he depart the scene
unexpectedly by natural causes, however, we believe
that constitutional procedures for an orderly succes-
sion probably would be followed.
The Zambian Constitution provides that the Secre-
tary General of the ruling party?currently Mu-
lemba?would become president for three months. A
meeting of the party's General Conference would be
convened during this period to select a new party
leader, who would then be confirmed or rejected in a
general election.
We believe that, in practice, fewer than a dozen
influential members of UNIP's Central Committee
would choose the new leader, most likely from among
themselves. Mulemba, as Secretary General, would
have the advantage of dominating the party machin-
ery and of acting as temporary chief executive. His
efforts to succeed Kaunda probably would be opposed,
however, by a coalition of other influential party
leaders such as Zulu and Reuben Kamanga. There
would probably be a period of intense jockeying for
power.
Should these factions reach a stalemate, a darkhorse
candidate acceptable to both, such as Prime Minister
Nalumino Mundia, most likely would be chosen as
party leader and president. This choice probably
would be ratified by the party and electorate.
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In our view, any successor to Kaunda would probably
be in a weak position at the outset because he would
lack the personal prestige that Kaunda enjoys. As a
result, he would probably continue most of Kaunda's
present policies in an effort to maintain the support of
as many government and party officials as possible.
We believe that his longer term prospects would
depend largely on the degree to which his government
is representative of Zambia's major tribal and region-
al groups and is able to deal with the country's
economic problems.
Although we do not expect a military coup against
Kaunda, we do not rule out the possibility that
elements in the military might be tempted to seize
power. They might do so in exasperation over the
failings of the regime or in the event of a protracted
succession struggle following Kaunda's demise. We
believe a military regime might be somewhat more
zealous than a civilian government in efforts to root
out corruption, at least initially. It would, however,
probably lack the skills needed to rule without sub-
stantial civilian participation.
Because many officers have been educated in the
West and identify to some extent with Western
values, a military government, in our judgment, would
probably be friendly to the United States. Although
the emergence of some left-leaning or populist-orient-
ed junior officer as a strongman cannot be ruled out,
we believe that almost any government, whether
military or civilian, sooner or later would feel com-
pelled to look to the West for new aid, investment, and
markets for Zambia's mineral resources.
Implications for the United States
Kaunda assumes that Washington holds the key to
meeting Zambia's immediate economic needs because
of US influence in the IMF. If the IMF does not
grant the economic assistance that Zambia needs, we
believe Kaunda will try to make the United States a
scapegoat for the country's problems. In the past, he
has on occasion tried to link the United States and
South Africa in what he evidently viewed as a wide-
ranging "capitalist conspiracy" against his govern-
ment. Zambia's relations with the United States have
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improved considerably, however, since the low point in
June 1981, when Lusaka expelled two US diplomats
and arrested a Zambian Foreign Ministry official on
charges of spying for Washington.
Should Mulemba or another pro-Western leader suc-
ceed Kaunda, he probably would try to encourage
greater Western investment and place greater empha-
sis on private enterprise. We believe that he would
find it difficult, however, to curtail drastically the
major role that the state now plays in the Zambian
economy because so many Zambians have a vested
interest in the system. Moreover, like Kaunda, Mu-
lemba or another pro-Western leader probably would
quietly support US efforts to resolve the Namibian
problem and seek to maintain Zambia's status as a
reliable supplier of copper and cobalt to the West.
In the unlikely event that Zulu or another influential
leftist-oriented figure takes over, the government
probably would take a more doctrinaire turn domesti-
cally and move closer to the Soviet Union in foreign
policy. Such a shift might be tempered, however, by
the desire of the new leadership to build some degree
of consensus for its policies and to establish a stable
governing coalition. We believe that such a govern-
ment would seek to tighten control over the country's
major institutions, including the party, the education-
al system, and the media, and that it would take an
increasingly tough stance toward dissent. It probably
would continue to supply minerals to the West for
lack of alternative markets, but it would oppose many
US positions at the United Nations and in Third
World forums.
Should a more leftist government come to power in
Lusaka, Zambia's uneasy relations with South Africa
probably would deteriorate. Officials in Pretoria al-
most certainly would interpret such a change in
Zambia as potentially threatening and tending to
confirm their "onslaught" theories. In our view, South
Africa would then become more inclined to intervene
economically, and possibly militarily, in Zambian
affairs.
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Appendix A
Methodological Notes on Economic
Forecasts
In assembling and producing the economic data pre-
sented in this assessment, we relied primarily on
analyses by several US government and nongovern-
ment sources. In addition, we made various assump-
tions concerning the performance of the world econo-
my and key commodity markets.
Lacking timely official Zambian statistics, we used
several other sources to establish primary data. Our
principal sources were publications of the Internation-
al Monetary Futid and the World Bank, whose con-
sultations with the Zambian Government produce the
most current and consistent series of data on domestic
economic indicators.
Trade and International Financial Developments
In preparing our estimates of Zambia's current ac-
count position for 1-983, we made certain key assump-
tions about factors affecting global demand for copper
and cobalt:
? We assume only a slight economic recovery in the
industrialized countries in 1983, resulting in aver-
age OECD growth- of about 1.5 percent. This
assumes that activity in major Western economies
will not pick up significantly until the second half of
this year. Moreover, several major US minerals
forecasters predict that any recovery in the industri-
alized world will result in increased utilization of
existing capacity rather than new capital
expenditures.
? We assume that the so-called Newly Industrialized
Countries, which accounted for an increasingly
large share of world copper purchases in the 1970s,
will continue to experience sluggish growth in 1983.
? We assume some buildup in consumer countries'
copper stocks this year, given their current low level
and lowered interest rates that should boost demand
in the copper-intensive housing and auto industries.
15
? We assume that the process of satisfying a substan-
tial share of international cobalt demand by draw-
ing down European cobalt stockpiles will continue
through 1983. European inventories are now the
equivalent of one year's world supply.
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We expect that these conditions will result in world
demand for copper of about 7.2 metric million tons in
1983, slightly above the level of 1982. Assuming that
Zambia will account for about the same proportion of
copper production in the non-Communist world that it
has since the mid-1970s-9 percent?we believe that
it will export about 0.7 million tons of copper in 1983.
This would permit sales of about $1.0 billion, based on
our projections that world copper prices will average
about 75 cents per pound in 1983.
World demand for cobalt is expected to remain low.
Experience suggests that Zambia will probably main-
tain cobalt production at about the 1982 level of
approximately 4,500 tons. Even though cobalt prices
may rise somewhat from their current low levels, we
believe that average prices in 1983 will probably be
about $5 to $6 a pound, representing a 30 to 40
percent drop from the 1982 average. As a result,
Zambian cobalt sales revenue would amount to only
$50-60 million in 1983.
In deriving our estimates of expenditures for imported
goods for 1982, we assume that Lusaka will continue
to give a higher priority to keeping import levels
stable than to repaying overdue debt. The US Embas-
sy reports a steadily increasing payments backlog on
its short-term debt, with total claims of more than
$800 million as of late 1982.
In projecting imports and net services for 1983, we
constructed two scenarios. In the first, we assume that
an IMF standby agreement is quickly negotiated and
that most debts due in 1983 are rescheduled. In the
second, we assume that Zambia fails to get an IMF
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agreement or a rescheduling of its debts in 1983.
Neither scenario portends a bright balance-of-pay-
ments picture for Zambia.
Under the first scenario, we would expect the IMF to
impose strict foreign exchange constraints to keep the
government from again using IMF funds to flood the
country with imports, as it did in 1980. As a result, we
would project only a 10-percent increase in imports in
1983. We would predict a slight decrease in net
services and transfers in 1983 because of a probable
decline in Zambian interest payments on foreign debt.
That would result, in turn, from Lusaka's inability to
enter as heavily into the short-term Eurocurrency
financial market as in 1982. These circumstances
would suggest that, under the first scenario, Zambia
would have a current account deficit in 1983 of about
$500 million, slightly lower than the $600 million we
projected for 1982.
Under the second scenario, we would predict that
Zambia will have to cut imports in 1983 by at least 10
percent. This judgment is based on the assumption
that, without an IMF agreement, Zambia's sources of
foreign exchange from bilateral donors and interna-
tional bankers would dry up, leaving Lusaka to
depend solely on export receipts to finance imports.
Under these conditions, we would also predict a large
drop in service payments as Zambia becomes unable
to secure any short-term financing in 1983. This
situation would leave Lusaka with a current account
deficit for 1983 of approximately $150 million.
In assessing the rate of real growth in GDP in 1982,
we estimated an increase in output in the mineral
sector of about 10 percent. The increase was out-
weighed, however, by declines of almost 20 percent in
the agricultural sector and over 5 percent in the
industrial sector. We believe that even if other sectors
of the economy managed a modest improvement,
GDP probably fell in 1982 by a real rate of as much
as 2 percent.
The key factor suggesting a continued worsening in
GDP in 1983 is the probable decrease in copper
production caused by continued low world demand
and a shortage of imported parts for the mining
industry. We believe that the only way Zambia might
achieve positive economic growth in 1983 would be if
good weather enables agricultural output to outweigh
the negative impact of the mining sector. Under the
best of circumstances, however, we expect no more
than 20 percent growth in agriculture this year.
Domestic Indicators
In estimating Zambia's domestic economic indicators,
we focused mainly on production in the mining and
agricultural sectors, which together account for al-
most half of GDP. Although services account for
another one-third of GDP, this mainly represents
government employment and is unlikely to change
much over the near term
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Appendix B
President Kaunda:
A Troubled Leader
President Kaunda, 58, has been the preeminent politi-
cal figure in Zambia for over two decades. Since
coming to power at independence in 1964, he also has
been one of Africa's most respected heads of state
Kaunda is the son of Presbyterian missionary parents
who came to Zambia from present-day Malawi. His
obscure ethnic origins have enabled him to portray
himself as a truly national leader untainted by too
close an association with any Zambian tribal group.
Although highly intelligent, according to US Embassy
officials in Lusaka, Kaunda received only a secondary
school education. He was a teacher by profession
before becoming involved in Zambian politics over 30
years ago. During the independence struggle, Kaunda
was twice imprisoned for his political activities. In
1960, he helped found the United National Independ-
ence Party, under whose banner he led Zambia to
independence.
Kaunda is an emotional man who often weeps in
public as he did at a White House reception when he
last visited the United States in 1978. He does not
smoke or drink and is highly religious. Unlike many
other African leaders, he has not sought to build a
cult of personality or to amass a fortune at the
public's expense. He has sought to rule by consensus
when possible but has resorted to harsher tactics on
occasion.
Kaunda has propagated a pet philosophy, "Zambian
Humanism," which is a blend of Christian, socialist,
and traditional African values. He has frequently
used this philosophy to justify a wide range of poli-
cies?from the nationalization of much of Zambia's
mineral-based economy to his government's strong
commitment to black majority rule in southern Africa
as a whole.
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Appendix C
Potential Successors
Humphrey Mulemba
UNIP Secretary General Mulemba, 50, wields con-
siderable influence in party and government circles
and is, at present, constitutionally first in line to
succeed Kaunda. A former mineworker and trade
union leader, he has become wealthy as a business-
man. According to US Embassy officials in Lusaka,
Mulemba is intelligent, articulate, and a good admin-
istrator, but his name has been linked to scandals and
corruption. Kaunda probably appointed him Secre-
tary General in part because Mulemba, as a member
of the small Kaonde tribe of North-Western Province,
is generally acceptable to leaders of the large Bemba
tribe in neighboring Copperbelt Province. Mulemba is
outspokenly pro-Western and advocates a greater role
for private investment in the Zambian economy.
19
Reuben Kamanga
Kamanga, 53, is a longtime friend and confidant of
Kaunda from the Nyanja-speaking region of eastern
Zambia. During the independence struggle, Kamanga
spent more time as a political prisoner than any other
nationalist leader. Since independence he has held a
number of senior government and party posts, includ-
ing the now-abolished office of vice president. He is a
key member of UNIP's powerful Central Committee
and after Kaunda is its most influential spokesman on
foreign policy. According to US Embassy officials in
Lusaka, Kamanga is a tough and wily politician with
a reputation for sexual escapades and shady business
dealings. He is a native of eastern Zambia and a
staunch proponent of socialism. In his speeches,
Kamanga often praises the Soviets for assisting Zam-
bia and South African insurgents. He is generally
critical of US policy in the region.
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Alexander Grey Zulu
Secretary of State for Defense and Security Zulu, 57,
has long been among Kaunda's closest advisers. He
ranks fourth in the formal power structure behind
Mulemba and Mundia but probably wields greater
authority with Kaunda, to whom he reports directly,
than either of the other two men. US Embassy
officials in Lusaka describe Zulu as a man of modest
intelligence and little demonstrated administrative
ability. Nevertheless, he has acquired considerable
power through his control over the military, police,
and intelligence service. Zulu, who is a Nyanja speak-
er from eastern Zambia, has often been described in
the Western press and elsewhere as head of a loosely
defined leftist faction within the Zambian leadership.
We do not believe Zulu is a doctrinaire Marxist, but
Embassy reporting indicates that he is anti-Western
in outlook and favors closer ties with the USSR and
its allies.
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Nalumino Mundia
Prime Minister Mundia, 55, is a talented administra-
tor, well educated, and relatively honest according to
US Embassy officials in Lusaka. Although a founding
member of UNIP, Mundia, a member of the Lozi
tribe from western Zambia, broke with Kaunda in the
late 1960s to form a regionally based splinter party.
He rejoined UNIP in 1974, a year after Kaunda had
made Zambia a one-party state. Mundia has re-
mained outside of Kaunda's inner circle, however, and
his appointment as Prime Minister last year probably
was intended primarily to add regional and ethnic
balance to the country's senior leadership. Kaunda's
decision to assign him the finance portfolio, in addi-
tion to his other responsibilities, as a part of a Cabinet
shuffle in early January 1983 reflects Kaunda's confi-
dence in him. He seems to take a pragmatic, middle-
of-the-road approach to most domestic and foreign
policy issues
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Appendix D
Central Committee of the United National Independence Party a
(as of 1 January 1983)
Name
Position
Tribe
Province
Kenneth Kaunda
President
Humphrey Mulemba
Secretary General
Kaonde
North-Western
Nalumino Mundia
Prime Minister
Lozi
Western
Reuben Kamanga
Chairman, Political and Legal Subcommittee
Chewa
Eastern
Elijah Mudenda
Chairman, Economic and Finance Subcommittee
Tonga
Southern
Daniel Lisulo
Chairman, Appointments and Disciplinary Subcom-
mittee
Lozi
Western
J. Bob Litana
Chairman, Elections and Publicity Subcommittee
Lamba
Copperbelt
A. Grey Zulu
Chairman, Defense and Security Subcommittee
Ngoni
Eastern
Kapasa Makasa
Chairman, Rural Development Subcommittee
Bemba
Northern
Henry Matipa
Chairman, Social and Cultural Subcommittee
Chishinga
Luapula
Shadrack Soko
Chairman, Industrialization Subcommittee
Ngoni
Eastern
Chibesa Kankasa
Executive Secretary, Women's League
Bisa
Northern
Bautis Kapulu
Executive Secretary, Youth League
Lamba
Copperbelt
Axon Soko
Administrative Secretary to the Secretary General
Ngoni
Eastern
Pius Kasutu
Member for Central Province
Bemba
Northern
Alex Shapi
Member for Copperbelt Province
Ushi
Luapula
Joshua Mumpanshya
Member for Eastern Province
Soli
Lusaka
Mary Fulano
Member for Luapula Province
Bisa
Central
Fines Bulawayo
Member for Lusaka Province
Lunda
North-Western
Joseph Mutale
Member for Northern Province
Bemba
Northern
Fine Liboma
Member for North-Western Province
Lozi
Western
Edward Liso
Member for Southern Province
Ila
Southern
Felix Luputa
Member for Western Province
Chikunda
Lusaka
Maxwell Beyani
Member
Tonga
Southern
Samuel Mbilishi
Member
Lunda
North-Western
a The Central Committee consists of 25 members including the
President. The party General Conference elects 20 members and the
President appoints three. The Prime Minister serves as an ex-officio
member. The President names the party Secretary General from
among the members of the Central Committee.
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Appendix E
Zambian Cabinet
(as of 1 January 1983)
Name
Position
Tribe
Province
Kenneth Kaunda
President
Humphrey Mulemba
UNIP Secretary General
Kaonde
North-Western
Nalumino Mundia
Prime Minister
Lozi
Western
A. Grey Zulu
Secretary of State for Defense and Security
Ngoni
Eastern
Wilson Chakulya
Defense
Ushi
Luapula
Lameck Goma
Foreign Affairs
Tumbuka
Eastern
Kebby Musokotwane
Finance and Technical Cooperation
Toka
Southern
Gibson Chigaga
Legal Affairs and Attorney General
Ngoni
Eastern
Frederick Chomba
Home Affairs
Bisa
Northern
Unia Mwila
Agriculture and Water Development
Bemba
Northern
Mufaya Mumbuna
General Education and Culture
Lozi
Western
Remmy Chisupa
Higher Education
Ushi
Luapula
Haswell Mwale a
Power, Transport, and Communications
Chewa
Eastern
Haswell Mwale
Works and Supply
Chewa
Eastern
Henry Meebelo
National Planning and Development
Tonga
Southern
Ben Kakoma
Health
Lunda/Luvale
North-Western
Frederick Hapunda
Labor and Social Services
Tonga
Southern
Basil Kabwe
Mines
Ushi
Northern
Clement Mwananshiku
Commerce, Industry, and Foreign Trade
Ushi
Luapula
Mark Tambatamba
Information and Broadcasting Services
Kaonde
North-Western
Rodger Sakuhuka
Tourism
Luvale
North-Western
Kingsley Chinkuli
Youth and Sports
Lenje
Central
Arnold Simuchimba
National Guidance
Nyamwanga
Northern
Fitzpatrick Chuula
Lands and Natural Resources
Tonga
Southern
a Acting Minister.
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Appendix F
Distribution of Senior Party and Cabinet Posts by Linguistic Group a
(as of 1 January 1983)
Linguistic
Group
Central Committee
Members
Cabinet
Members
Total b
(percent)
Percentage of
Population in
Linguistic Group
Total
24
23
47(100)
100.0
Bemba
9
6
15(32)
33.9
Nyanja
5
4
9(19)
17.1
Tonga
4
5
9(19)
15.2
Lunda/Luvale
2
2
4(9)
10.4
Lozi
3
2
5(11)
9.2
Mambwe
1
1(2)
5.1
Tumbuka
1
1(2)
4.7
Other
1
2
3(6)
4.4
a Does not include President Kaunda.
b Members of both the Central Committee and Cabinet are counted
twice.
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Appendix G
Distribution of Senior Party and Cabinet Posts by Province a
(as of 1 January 1983)
Province
Central Committee
Members
Cabinet
Members
Total b
(percent)
Percentage of
Population in
Province
Total
24
23
47 (100)
100
Central
1
1
2(4)
12
Copperbelt
2
2(4)
20
Eastern
4
5
9(19)
13
Luapula
2
3
5(11)
8
Lusaka
2
0
2(4)
6
Northern
4
4
8(17)
13
North-Western
3
4
7(15)
6
Southern
3
4
7(15)
12
Western
3
2
5(11)
10
a Does not include President Kaunda.
b Members of both the Central Committee and Cabinet are counted
twice.
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