(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003700120001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 14, 1962
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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SECRET
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY'
COPY NO. 72
OCI NO. 0434/62
14 Sept 62
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
` I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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SECRET *NW
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 September 1962
T 11 E W E E K I N B R I E F
(Information as of 1200 EDT 13 Sept)
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Although Moscow's statement of 11 September on Cuba
was designed to advance a variety of Soviet objectives, the
most immediate aim was to deter the US from active interven-
tion in Cuba. While the statement again avoided a specific
commitment to defend Cuba, it further engaged the USSR's
prestige in ensuring the survival of the Castro regime.
The statement conveyed an indirect assurance that
Moscow does not intend to confront the US with simultaneous
challenges in both Cuba and Berlin. The Soviet leaders ap-
parently envisage a hiatus in serious Berlin talks until
late this year. This will provide time for them to assess
the impact on the West's negotiating position of attacks
on US "aggressive actions" at the UN as well as of probable
maneuvers to involve the UN in a Berlin settlement.
Moscow may attempt to strengthen its position in the
UN disarmament debate by introducing a new test-ban pro-
posal based on the "compromise" plan advanced at Geneva
last April by the eight nonaligned nations.
SOVIET MILITARY AID TO CUBA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
The flow of Soviet military equipment and personnel
o Cuba continues.r
Soviet MIG-21 (Fishbedl) single-jet interceptors
have also arrived in the current deliveries, as well as
tanks, artillery, and large amounts of transportation equip-
ment.
OAS ATTITUDES ON CUBA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
Most Latin American governments are apparently willing
to have foreign ministers meet this month or early in October
to discuss the Soviet presence in Cuba, but prefer an in-
formal meeting rather than invoking the formal machinery
of the organization of American States. Peru and several
others will not attend if Venezuela persists in demands
that the meeting should also discuss military coups. Bra-
zil and Mexico are willing to participate but will probaby
be reluctant to endorse any joint action against Cuba.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 September 1962
SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
Prospects for Sino-Indian talks this fall, even on pro-
cedural matters, are dim in view of Peiping's recent charge
that New Delhi is seeking to use "phony negotiations" to
cloak military pressure against China along the disputed
border. Skirmishes may recur in the next four or five weeks,
after which weather conditions will force a reduction in
forward patrolling.
.. . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
The new Yugoslav constitution, to be made public on
20 September and adopted before the end of the year, aims to
improve governmental efficiency, institutionalize the re-
gime's unique internal system, and provide for the orderly
transfer of power after Tito's death. Some of its provisions,
however, will probably cause conflicts within the regime
and between the republics and the federal government. The
document will be opposed in the bloc on ideological grounds,
but Moscow will probably refrain from attacking Belgrade
with vigor in the interest of continuing their rapprochement.
ALGERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
The authority of Ben Bella and his political bureau
is not being openly challenged--at least for the moment.
Algerian Popular Army chief Colonel Boumedienne and his
military staff are potential challengers, however, while
Ben Bella's opponents in Wilayas III and IV retain their
troops and arms. Ben Bella is trying to reassure European
interests, but these as well as the French Government are
awaiting clearer si ns of what his economic program will
be. r
CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
UN chief representative Gardiner has presented to
Adoula and Tshombd the schedule of specific steps to get
Katangan reintegration under way. Progress is likely to
be slow. The Leopoldville-Katangan joint commissions en-
visaged in the plan are almost certain to become involved
in lengthy palaver. The draft federal. constitution is
nearly completed, but UN officials are already concerned
that the Congolese parliament may not ratify it. Congolese
and Katangan military forces, meanwhile, continue to
jockey for position in northern Katanga. The release from
detention of South Kasai "King" Albert Kalonji may presage
the release of leftist former Stanleyville leader Gizenga.
LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1.3
There are continuing indications that North Vietnamese
troops in Laos have been pulled back from forward areas,
but there is no further evidence that significant numbers
have actually been withdrawn. At least some North Vietnamese
forces appear to be remaining to bolster the Pathet Lao.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 September 1962
Meanwhile, Souvanna is on a tour of several rightist-held
towns, probably in an effort to drum up popular support
for the coalition government. The government now is in
the process of establishing diplomatic relations with
North Vietnam and Communist China, but apparently has de-
ferred exchanging diplomatic missions with East Germany
and North Korea.
SOUTH VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
Viet Cong guerrilla activity has again increased after
several weeks of decline. Small-scale attacks continue against
the government's regular and paramilitary forces, along with
sabotage of road and rail facilities. The Viet Cong, despite
losses inflicted by increasingly effective government security
operations, retain a capabilit to make coordinated attacks
using several battalions.
CEYLON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16
Prime Minister Bandaranaike's failure to make any signif-
icant headway in the economic sphere during her two-year
rule is creating serious political. problems for the gov-
ernment. The regime seems able to withstand the current
political wrangling within its own ranks
but may be losing some of
its original strong popular support.
IRAQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . Page 17
The gradual erosion of Prime Minister Qasim's support
continues. Opposition elements are still disorganized,
however, and are kept off balance by Qasim's policy of
playing off his antagonists against each other. The army's
failure to suppress the Kurdish rebellion is increasing dis-
satisfaction among army leaders, who might attempt a coup
to save face. Assassination is the most likely means of
removing Qasim.
BRITISH GUIANA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 18
Political maneuvering is growing more intense in ad-
vance of the London conference on independence, now con-
templated for late October. Dissatisfaction with Premier
Jagan seems to be increasing among the East Indian popula-
tion, although not to the point of challenging his leader-
ship of the People's Progressive Party. The opposition
to him remains seriously divided and unable to agree on a
position to take at the forthcoming conference. Meanwhile,
the country's economic position continues to deteriorate.
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Awi wvnul 7kow
14 September 1962
Osten Unden, Sweden's foreign minister since 1945 and
widely regarded as the architect of its alliance-free
foreign policy, is to retire later this month and will
probably be succeeded by another Social Democratic leader,
Torsten Nilsson. Nilsson, a former minister of defense,
is staunchly pro-Western. He is not :Likely to advocate
any marked changes in foreign policy, but he will probably
adopt a more flexible attitude about cooperating with
Western Europe. In the absence of prospects for an agree-
ment on disarmament, he will probably support those ele-
ments in the cabinet and the party which favor Sweden's
acquiring an independent nuclear weapons capability.
Page
DE GAULLE'S VISIT TO WEST GERMANY . .. . . . . . . . . . . Page 20
During his 4-9 September tour of West Germany, De
Gaulle went to extraordinary lengths, even for him, to
win popular support for himself and his European policy.
Bilateral cooperation between France and West Germany will
probably become even closer than before. However, some
of De Gaulle's statements have stiffened Benelux opposition
to his concept of a loose European confederation with the
Bonn-Paris alliance at its center.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN FRANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 21
Mounting interest in De Gaulle's prospective announce-
ment of a referendum on a proposal to elect his successor
by universal suffrage overshadows the senatorial elections
of 23 September, in which no noteworthy shifts are expected.
The minor cabinet reshuffle announced on 11 September has
led to some speculation that De Gaulle is grooming a suc-
cessor to Premier Pompidou.
THE EAST GERMAN ARMED FORCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The armed forces of East Germany, with Soviet assistance,
have continued a gradual buildup which is probably intended
chiefly to make East Germany a more effective member of the
Warsaw Pact alliance. They now have a capability for con-
ducting limited defensive operations and maintaining order
within the country except in the event of widespread revolt.
Khrushchev's threats to conclude a peace treaty with the Ul-'
bricht regime have not been accompanied by any substantially
increased flow of Soviet military aid or other sudden in-
crease in Fast Germany's armed strength.
KHRUSHCHEV, CEMA, AND THE CHINESE . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
In a recent major policy statem ent,Khrushchev has
clarified the double task which he envisages for the Com-
munist bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA).
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SECRET Vad
14 September 1962
He is planning to have CEMA take a more active role in
achieving the economic integration of its member states
as one means of countering the growing: impact of the
European Common Market (EEC). He is also ustng it to exert
economic pressures on those Communist countries, led by
the Chinese, which were excluded from membership at the
June meeting of CEMA because they refuse to fully sup-
port the Soviet Union. Peiping's response has been to
renew its polemical attacks on Khrushchev':s leadership
and views.
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%W-11 I 11%W
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEEKLY SUMMARY
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
Moscow's statement of 11
September on Cuba-was designed
to advance a variety of Soviet
objectives, foremost among them
being to deter the US from
active intervention in Cuba.
It was intended'as the USSR's
response to President Kennedy's
request for authority to mobilize
reserves--a move which the Soviet
leaders felt called for a strong
reaffirmation of their support
for Castro.
Although this statement, like
previous Soviet pronouncements on
Cuba, used vague and ambiguous
language to avoid a clear-cut
commitment to defend the island
in all contingencies, it has
further engaged Soviet prestige
in ensuring the survival of the
Castro regime. Moscow carefully
refrained from spelling out its
precise reactions in the event
of an attack on Cuba. In some
respects, the statement was less
specific than previous Soviet
warnings, such as. that contained
in Khrushchev's letter of 18
April 1961 to President Kennedy.
As before, however, Moscow at-
tempted to create the impression
that Cuba .is under the protection
of the full range of Soviet nu-
clear and missile power.
In addition to the deterrent
effect, the Soviet statement
was calculated to enable Moscow
to claim full credit for having
protected Cuba if no US-supported
invasion or interference with
Soviet shipping materializes.
The Russians apparently were
also seeking to check growing
concern in the US and Latin
America over Soviet intentions
in Cuba. The statement stressed
the defensive nature of Soviet
military equipment being fur-
nished the Cubans and implicitly
denied any intention to establish
Soviet military bases in Cuba.
In this connection, Soviet
Ambassador Dobrynin told Am-
bas;sador Stevenson on 6 Sep-
tember that only defensive weap-
ons; were being. shipped and that
both the Cubans and Russians
were.genuinely apprehensive over
a possible US attack on Cuba.
The statement, moreover, con-
veyed an indirect assurance that
Moscow will not confront the US
with simultaneous challenges in
both.Cuba and Berlin.
At the same time, however,
the USSR strongly advanced the
argument that it has a right to
provide military assistance to
Cuba and cited the.existence of
US military alliances and bases
on the periphery of the Sino-
Soviet bloc and the presence of
American fleets in the Medi-
terranean and the Taiwan Strait.
The statement reflected the So-
viet leaders' long-standing de-
sire to "settle old accounts"
with the US by establishing a
military and political presence
close to the US in an area which
traditionally has been an Amer-
can sphere of influence. Mos-
cow's policy toward Cuba has
been strongly influenced by this
desire to establish the USSR's
claim to great-power equality
with the US.
Although the statement was
brusque and threatening regard-
ing Cuba, it was moderate on
Berlin. Moscow apparently in-
tends to launch a strong attack
on US policy at the UN General
Assembly. The Soviet leaders
appear to recognize that these
tactics will rule out any prog-
ress in the Berlin talks for
the time being. The statement
tacitly acknowledged this by
noting that a "pause now has
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'INV SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
been reached" in these talks and
by observing that it is "diffi-
cult" for the US to negotiate
during an election campaign.
Although Moscow reiterated.
the usual line that it favors
the "earliest conclusion" of a
German peace treaty and. a Berlin
settlement, the Soviet leaders
probably do not wish to break
off diplomatic contact altogether.
They probably envisage a resump-
tion of high-level talks on
Berlin late this year. They
may feel that, in the meantime,
propaganda denunciation of US
"aggressive actions" will enable
them to further delay a sep-
arate peace treaty with East
Germany without appearing to re-
treat on this issue. Such a de-
lay would also permit them to
assess the impact on the West's
negotiating position of this
propaganda offensive as well as
of probable maneuvers on their
part to involve the UN in a Ber-
lin settlement.
Dobrynin informed Ambassador
Stevenson that Khrushchev would
not attend the UN General As-
sembly before mid-November, but
left the impression that no fi-
nal decision had, been reached
and that there was more than a
possibility that the Soviet pre-
mier will come to New York.
Dobrynin said Foreign Minister
Gromyko would deliver the So-
viet speech during the Assembly's
general debate.
Local Berlin Developments
Soviet authorities in East
Germany continued to comply with
Western instructions on trans-
porting their guards to and
from the Soviet war memorial in
West Berlin. There have been
no incidents to date.
The Soviet officer in charge
of the guard. convoy, however, re-
fused to acknowledge a Western
request on 10 September that the
guards be transported in buses
rather than in armored personnel
carriers. He asserted that any
communication must be addressed
to General Yakubovsky, chief of
the Soviet forces in East Germany.
The Soviets nevertheless,
are evidently preparing to comply
with the Allied request. A
Soviet Embassy spokesman made a
statement to this effect in a
background briefing to a West
German correspondent. He as-
serted that the use of the armored
personnel carriers was necessary
for the protection of the guards
and implied, that, if the security
of the guards could be assured,
they could return to the use of
buses.
Allied military convoys have
not experienced any difficulties
or delays in transiting the au-
tobahn, despite Soviet hints to
retaliate against Western access.
De Gaulle Visit to West Germany
Soviet propaganda on De
Gaulle's visit to West Germany
has attacked the French for
"following in the wake of Bonn"
on major international issues.
Moscow claimed,to be surprised
at the "naivete" of French
leaders who think that Paris
and not Bonn will dominate
the close alignment between the
two countries.
Moscow gave wide coverage
to De Gaulle's appeal for a "dam"
against the USSR and. asserted,
that French policy on a military
and political union with West
Germany is "shortsighted and
dangerous." It charged that
France plans to harness its
nuclear capacity to West German
"revanchism."
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SECRET 4VOW
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The USSR continues, however,
to avoid attacks on De Gaulle
personally.
Disarmament and Nuclear Test Ban
At the final session of the
Geneva disarmament conference
prior to the recess, Soviet dele-
gate Kuznetsov delivered a harsh
indictment of US policy, charg-
ing that the US was seeking to
expand the arms race and. planning
preventive war. He and the
satellite delegates insisted that
no progress had been achieved
since the opening of the con-
ference and blamed the US for
the impasse.
Kuznetsov charged that the
US aimed to undermine Soviet
security by proposing a reduction
of nuclear delivery vehicles
while at the same time maintain-
ing US bases abroad. He rejected
all Western control proposals on
the ground, that they were designed
to give the West military ad.-
vantages over the USSR.
The Soviet delegate also
reaffirmed the standard Soviet
position on a test ban and termed
the US and British position as
"tough and uncompromising." He
charged. that the US and Britain
were unwilling to take as a
basis for negotiations the "com-
promise" memorandum of the eight
nonaligned powers.
In an informal meeting with
the US delegate on 7 September,
Kuznetsov firmly indicated that
the USSR will not compromise on
the question of obligatory on-
site inspection under any test-
ban agreement. He attempted to
play up the importance of Soviet
acceptance of an international
commission, claiming that this
had only been achieved after
several days' debate in the So-
viet party central committee.
He expressed confidence that the
Soviet Union would issue irlvita-
tions for on-site inspection if
the commission, after.consulta-
tion, was not satisfied about the
nature of any suspected, seismic
events. He stated, however,
that the USSR could not commit
itself in advance to issue the
invitation in each and every
instance.
Kuznetsov's remarks to Am-
bassador Dean and Soviet propa-
ganda stress on the neutralists'
"compromise" memorandum suggest
that the USSR may be drafting a
treaty based on the memorandum
for presentation during the UN
discussion of the test ban issue.
Moscow probably feels that this
draft, which would modify the
Sov.et.d.raft treaty of November
1961 and provide for invitational
on-site inspection of suspicious
events, will place the USSR in a
better position during the debate
and will draw considerable support
from the uncommitted nations. The
Soviets are probably confident
that, given the US announcement of
more high-altitude tests, there
will. be a neutralist move at the
UN fora ban on atmospheric, under-
water, and outer-space tests,cou-
pled with an uncontrolled morato-
rium on underground testing.
Congo
Soviet reaction to the UN
Congo reunification plan indicates
that while Moscow seeks to main-
tain overt good relations with the
Adoula government, the primary So-
viet interest continues to lie in
an enduring political instability
in the Congo. Characterizing the
plan'as a Western "conspiracy,"
Moscow declared that thefionly
function of the UN is to neu-
tralize foreign interests in Ka-
tanga, a task which should require
no more than a month, after which
time the UN should withdraw.
This renewed. note of urgency
in Moscow reflects Soviet sensi-
tivity to the possibility of a
solution of the Congo problem
under Western auspices and may
presage Soviet efforts to end the
UN Congo operation at the forth-
coming UN General Assembly meeting.__...
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1.4 Sept 62 WEEKLY REVIEW Pace 3 of 22
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SOVIET MILITARY AID TO CUBA
The flow of Soviet mili-
tary equipment and personnel to
Cuba continues. As of 8 Septem-
ber Soviet ships were still
leaving the USSR with military
cargoes for Cuba, many of them
now making their second voyages
in the current series of ship-
ments. Another Soviet passen-
ger vessel disembarked person-
nel in Cuba this. week, raising
the total number of Soviet per-
sonnel believed to have arrived
in connection with the current
shipments to at least 3,500 and
possibly many more.
Current Soviet deliveries
also have included additional
combat aircraft.) 125X1
at least one Soviet MIG-21 (Fish-
bed) single-jet interceptor
had been assembled at Santa
Clara airfield, and 25X1
the total num- 25X1
ber of MIG-21s to be located
there may be as high as 20. In-
troduction of this aircraft--
normally armed with air-to-air
missiles--into operational sta-
tus in Cuba doubtless will re-
quire extensive Soviet assist-
ance.
Such assistance is still
being provided on older models
of Soviet fighters in the Cuban
Air Force. Prior to the delivery
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*001 L31MUIM.1 -*W
of the MIG-21s,Cuba had about
60 MIG fighters, including
Fagots (MIG-15s), Frescos (MIG-
17s), and at least a dozen Farm-
ers (MIG-19s), all of which
were delivered in mid-1961.
So far no bloc bombers are
known to be in Cuba.
Additional tanks (prob-
ably including T-54s), assault
guns, field and antiaircraft
artillery, and large numbers of
trucks and transportation
equipment also have arrived in
Cuba recently. Information
available thus far, however,
suggests the bulk of current
shipments is made up of equip-
ment to strengthen Cuba's air
and coastal defenses rather than
the ground forces, which have
been receiving Soviet land ar-
maments for more than two years.
The large amounts of motor trans-
port equipment, electronics
equipment,-and other material
associated with each missile in- 25X1
stallation could account .for
most of the current shipments.
Most Latin American govern-
ments appear willing to have
their foreign ministers attend
an informal meeting in late
September or early October to
discuss the recent arrival in
Cuba of Soviet military tech-
nicians and material.
result in a boycott by Peru,
Paraguay., and Argentina. Peru
in any case will probably not
attend, even though disturbed
by Cuban developments, in the
expectation that Venezuela will
bring up the subject whether
it is on the agenda or not.
The Central American coun-
tries, the Dominican Republic,
Venezuela, Colombia, and Argen-
tina are taking the strongest
positions in favor of collective
action against the increasing
Soviet presence, some feeling
that an informal meeting is not
a sufficiently forceful show
of concern.
Several countries have in-
dicated, however, that their
foreign ministers will attend
only if the meeting is truly
informal rather than an official
session of the Organization of
American States (OAS), and
only if the discussion is con-
fined to the Cuban problem.
Brazil, Mexico,, and Haiti are
willing to take part in an in-
formal meeting, but will prob-
ably be reluctant to endorse
any joint action against Cuba.
Venezuela, still smarting
over its recent failure to con-
voke a formal meeting of OAS
foreign ministers in response
to the Peruvian coup, insists
that the mee.ting should also
discuss military take-overs of
Latin American governments.
Any such agenda would probably
SECRET
Chile will not attend for
fear that the Lauca River dis-
pute with Bolivia will be
brought up. Bolivia has sus-
pended its participation in
the OAS because the organization
has not taken the action Bolivia
sought in the dispute with
Chile, and hence will attend
the foreign ministers' meeting
only if it is in fact informal.
Although the Mexican foreign
minister probably will not
attend because he plans to tour
the Orient with President Lopez
Mateos, his government is will-
ing to have its acting foreign
minister at the meeting.
An indication of the dif-
ficulties to be encountered in
trying 'to get an agreement
for action is the failure
in late August of the Guatemalan
effort to invoke the Rio Treaty
against Cuba. Several countries,
most notably Brazil and Mexico,
have felt strongly that the OAS
must not take action in matters
which they feel are internal af-
fairs of a hemisphere country.
There are indications, however,
that Mexico is becoming-in-
creasingly concerned about
the :soviet buildup.
25X1
25X1
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`' SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Both India and Communist
China are maintaining a tough,
unyielding military stand along
the disputed border, and new
clashes have occurred. In early
September Peiping charged that
"large numbers" of Indian
troops fired some 200 rounds
at a small Chinese force in
the Chip Chap River area of
Ladakh.
there was a sep- 25X1
arate clash the previous day
in the same area, with the odds
greatly reversed. At the other
end of the Sino-Indian border,
in the Northeast Frontier
Agency, recent press reports
claim the Chinese have crossed
into Indian-claimed territory
adjacent to Bhutan.
AFGH ANI$WAN
IRAN
a000 4
Rudog
Ha e;
Taphigong
Demarcated
Delimited only
Indefinite
Boundary shown on, recent Chinese and Indian maps
(where differing from US and Western maps)
Chinese
Indian
SECRET
Road
Major caravan route
or trail
1t1 ~.' -+ 0- r) WTiT!TTT V ) TTL'W
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Skirmishing may recur during
the next four.or five weeks.
Thereafter severe winter con-
ditions will hinder forward
patrolling and force both sides
to withdraw to more permanent,
less exposed positions.
Each side, meanwhile, is
seeking to bring the problem
to the conference table, but
on terms unacceptable to the
other. At present prospects
for talks even on-procedural
matters seem dim.
India's latest note, dated
22 August, proposed a meeting
of Indian and Chinese repre-
sentatives in New Delhi to
discuss preliminary matters.
but reiterated that Chinese
withdrawal from the disputed
area of Ladakh is. essential
to the start of "purposeful"
negotiations.
While Peiping has not yet
formally replied, a People's
Daily editorial of 7 September
inc sates that the Chinese will
not accept the bid for ex-
ploratory discussions. The
editorial calls the Indian
proposal an attempt to use
"phony negotiations" to cloak
military pressure against China.
It calls once again for nego-
tiations without conditions.
Peiping probably regards New
Delhi's initiative for talks
as a victory for the tough
Chinese stand against Indian
military pressures in Ladakh.
The Indian Government, al-
ready under fire domestically for
its "vacillating" China policy,
is unlikely to yield in its
demand for a Chinese pull-back
in Ladakh. New Delhi may in
fact welcome a Chinese rejection
of its offer to open preliminary
talks--not only on domestic
grounds but also as refutation
of Peiping's persistent propa- 25X1
ganda efforts to portray India
as the intransigent party in the
dispute.
YUGOSLAVIA'S NEW CONSTITUTION
On 20 September, a joint
meeting of Yugoslavia's Par-
liament and of the federal
board of the mass political
organization (SAWPY,) will be-
gin debate on a draft of the
country's new constitution.
After this group has approved
the draft in principle, the
local units of SAWPY will or-
ganize meetings to explain the
document to the public. The
new document is intended
primarily to improve govern-
mental efficiency, institution-
alize the regime's unique in-
ternal system, and achieve
greater stability by providing
for the orderly transfer of
political power after Tito's
death.
The constitution, accord-
ing to the Yugoslav press, will
call Yugoslavia a "socialist
republic." Such a status in
the Marxist lexicon is an im-
portant step toward Communism
and equivalent to the level of
development which the USSR
claims to have achieved in 1936.
Yugoslavia's pretensions to a
similar status is intended to
enhance its prestige in the
Communist world and in Marxist-
oriented non-aligned states.
This claim will be opposed in
the bloc on ideological grounds.
Otherwise Yugoslavia,; which has
not met many of Moscow's criteria
for such status, would outrank
most of the European satellites.
Other than the USSR, only
Czechoslovakia has thus far
been allowed to declare itself
a socialist republic.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The new constitution will
also institutionalize many
features of Yugoslavia's domestic
system which are considered
heretical by the bloc, such
as workers' councils and
administrative and economic de-
centralization.
Moscow, however, will
probably refrain from at-
tacking Belgrdde's pre-
tensions with any vigor in the
interest of continuing the
present rapprochement..
Peiping and Tirana, consistent
opponents of the Belgrade re-
gime, may condemn the entire
document in strong terms.
Apparently in the belief
that when the 70-year-old Tito
dies no one man can fill his
shoes, the regime seems to be
setting the stage for rule by
a triumvirate of the secretary
general of the League of Com-
munists(Yugoslavia's party),
the president of the republic,
and the president of the Federal
Executive Council (premier).
All three posts now are held by
Tito.
he constitution will
redefine the functions of the
presidency and premiership.
After the new law is adopted,
Tito is expected to step down
from the premiership in favor
of Edvard Kardelj, who would
become the government's chief
administrative officer. By
retaining the presidency, Tito
would still represent Yugoslavia
at heads-of-state gatherings and
set overall governmental policy.
The constitution will also
strengthen the government as an
organization separate from the
party-by discouraging persons
from holding high party and
governmental posts simultane-
ously. To prevent the govern-
ment's degeneration into a
stagnant bureaucracy and to
bring new blood into its leader-
ship, the constitution will limit
the tenure of most government
positions.
As in.all Communist states,
the party is the primary source
of power in Yugoslavia. Aleksander
Rar.Lkovic seems to be the leading
contender for party leadership
after Tito's death. Should
Rankovic bid for unchallenged
power, the provisions of the
new constitution probably would
not prevent his achieving that
goal but would make it more
difficult than now is the case.
Regime hopes to ease the suc-
cession problem would therefore
not seem
to be assured.
The
constitution may'instead
have
made the
succession issue
po-
tentially
more explosive
by
providing
Kardelj as premier
a semi-independent power bake
from which to contest any
moves by Rankovic as party
leader to assume dictatorial
powers.
The constitution will also 25X1
redistribute power among the 25ni
federal government, the republics,
and the opstinas, Yugoslavia's
smallest territorial unit.
This was the issue which was
most hotly contested in the
sessions of the constitutional
revision commission. The
Yugoslav federalists wanted
to diffuse the republic's
powers among the opstinas so
that the federal government
would be left the only ef-
fective seat of power. Re-
publican nationalists were
apparently able to defeat
this move, however, so that
the republics and opstinas will
probably have their powers in-
creased at the expense of the
federal authorities.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The authority of Ben Bella
and his political bureau has
not been effectively challenged
since 9 September, when Colonel
Boumedienne personally led some
4,000 troops of his National
Popular Army (ANP) into Algiers.
However, Boumedienne himself
and members of his military
staff are potential challengers,
and Ben Bella's opponents in
Wilayas III and IV retain their
troops and arms.
The consulate points out that
a military coup would be some-
what easier before the installation
of an assembly--possessing the
sanction of a popular vote.
The public generally
25X1
25X1
remains uncommitted to any faction.
The ANP entry into Algiers
--displaying heavy equipment
and other evidence of Soviet
bloc aid--apparently was not
envisaged in the earlier com-
promise. whereby the leaders of
Wilayas III and IV agreed to
make the capital a "demilitarized"
city. The move probably was a
concession by Ben Bella to ANP
The appearance of a de-
militarized city is being main-
tained, however. The ANP troops
are said to be quartered on
the periphery of the city, al-
though they obviously are easily
available to back up the political
bureau if necessary. According
to press reports, no armed
soldiers were visible in Algiers
on 11 September. Wilaya III
forces reportedly suffered few
if any casualties in the recent
fighting, and appear to have
withdrawn intact into the
Kabylie mountains to await further
developments.
The US Consulate General
in Algiers thinks it con-
ceivable, although not likely,
that the ANP could assume power
before the elections, now
scheduled for 20 September.
Ben Bella is continuing
efforts to reassure the European
community. He reportedly has
told the French Consul Gen-
eral that all Europeans ar-
rested while Wilaya IV con-
trolled Algiers will be re-
leased. A high official of
the Ministry for Algerian
Affairs told a US Embassy
officer in Paris on 6 Septem-
ber that he did not regard
Ben Bella as the wild-eyed
extremist pictured by certain
press circles, and felt that
the Algerian leader was not
unduly inclined to listen
either to local Communists or
to the USSR. The French of-
ficial said that the political
bureau would probably prove
sufficiently reasonable and
interested in getting the.
country on its feet to-enable
Paris to do business with it.
France nevertheless has
moved cautiously on major aid
projects, partly to. await the
Algerian elections, but also
because there have been
Algerian threats to nationalize
European-evacuated property
on ;a large scale, and such
action would increase com-
ensator costs f r France.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
UN officials in New York
and Leopoldville have worked
out the schedule and procedures
for carrying out the UN plan to
reintegrate Katanga into the.
Congo. UN Chief Representative
Gardiner on ll September pre-
sented these to Congolese Pre-
mier Adoula and to Katangan
President Tshomb?.
The plan consists essen-
tially of producing a new federal
constitution, splitting Katanga's
revenues with the central gov-.
ernment, and assimilating the
Katangan forces into the-Congo
National Army (ANC). The first
phase involves setting up
several joint.Leopoldville-
Katangan commissions which,
with the help of UN experts,
are to work out details.
Progress is likely to be
slow. The mechanics of the
joint commissions appear cumber-
some. Differences almost cer-
tainly will arise not only over
interpretation of the plan it-
self but also over what each
side has agreed to.
uinely" federal constitution.
The constitution, moreover, will
have to win the approval of the
Congolese parliament and all
the provincial assemblies, and
might even, as Tshombe has sug-
gested, be submitted to a
popular referendum.
UN officials in Leopold-
ville are becoming concerned that
parliament may not get around
to ratifying the constitution
at all. President Kasavubu and
Interior Minister Kamitatu have
indicated that the body will
be in no hurry to do so and
will probably examine each
article carefully.
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
The draft federal consti-
tution is to be ready for Adoula
to present to parliament in
late September. Tshomb6 has
been asked to present his views,
however, and this may create
delays. The Katangan leader re-
gards a new constitution as the
core of the UN plan, and he has
hinted that Katanga's financial
and military integration hinges
on'the production of a "gen-
/' LE
LEOP01
bal . .
II{wanga5 Nyunzu
C aniama Marl ro' Beudouinville
)Kamine K A N G A
4~=m a
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PorNhervilT
oro
Brk-
Klndu
S POLD V I LL~' {~/, \.KKakongo
-
DVILLE Port F rance i~ K A
i j
Kengalo
Bondo
'0 -11o LAketi. J Mungh
Bu `6a ~".3 ?ButO IENTALE
Y~~ St nleyville S?~?r F7,1A,
EQUATEUR
M_ v
Coquilhatville e
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Furthermore, there is like-
ly to be new political maneuver-
ing in Leopoldville among the
anti-Adoula parliamentary bloc.
Last July this bloc, which
Tshombe has supported, failed
to topple Adoula but prevented
him from getting absolute
majority approval of his re-
organized government. Tshombe's
interest in supporting this
group's efforts again would
presumably be to win another
breathing spell.
The escape of South Kasai
"King" Albert Kalonji, jailed
last December, appears to have
been masterminded by Minister
of Interior Kami.tatu, who has
been working for the release
of Kalonji, as well as of An-
toine Gizenga.
settlement. He had been arrested
partly to undercut radicals
who opposed the arrest of the
leftist Gizenga.
Kalonji's release now may
presage the release of that
former Stanleyville leader.
Adoula, although acutely aware
of the dangers of such a move
and, of the propaganda advantage
it would give Tshombe, may feel
that it would relieve radical
pressures on him.
Leopoldville and Katangan
military forces continue to
jockey for position in North
Katanga, on the assumption that
possession will. prove nine-
tenths of the law regarding 25X1
the area's eventual. disposition. .,~"A
Kalonji on his return to
the South Kasai capital vowed
that he is devoted to the cen-
tral government, but the Elisa-
bethville press reports that
Kalonji has invited Tshombe to
the province to "renew amicable
relations." Kalonji is a minor
figure on the "conservative"
end of the Congo's political
spectrum, but with his own
2,500-man South Kasai Army and
backed by revenues from diamond
mining, he could be another
disruptive element in a Congo
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V0011" AM Ard %41%.rj .1
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
There are continuing in-
dications that substantial num-
bers of North Vietnamese troops
are withdrawing toward the
border. It is. probable, how-
ever, that at least some of
these troops are not returning
to North Vietnam, but are being
located in inaccessible re-
Z.1119,
Vien Tha ?' \Na Mo -1
Pou Kha? ('Muong?.,
Han NAMTHA
nelj $al Sai
LUANG
PRABFl-
Pak _
BengMuon Hourt'
Pr ba?g ~Khng Ban
\ 5 Khay r
Sayaboury uhh0? .Nong .Net
uo?g~ld s A
Ou Neua
0"U, Tay-)
M nolJ.gdL~ XIENC KHOUA4G
K sy J Pa Dong' Tha T m
Vieng
VIENTIANE
11.
NTIAN
4
,OFF ?'w~NOni;
T H A I L AND
L A O S
Royal Army base area
Meo base area
Kong Le/Pathet Lao/North
Vietnamese areas
--ICC checkpoint
Road
Trail
Route number
Road under
construction
gions in eastern Laos. These
troops presumably would remain
in Laos to stiffen Pathet Lao
forces, but would be in posi-
tion either to disperse or to
retire.to North Vietnam should
the International. Control Com-
mission or a similar body initiate
inspections.
KHAMN UAN
Nh?m- rath
Maliaxay~,_
kavannakhet Muongg1
SAVANNAKHE Phine
r OL)urr
VIETFNA
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Meanwhile, Souvanna Phouma,
probably in an effort to drum
up popular support for the coali-
tion, has embarked on a tour
of several rightist-held towns
in central and southern Laos.
Souvanna has expressed
confidence that later he would
visit such Pathet Lao strong-
holds as Sam Neua, Tchepone,
and Nam Tha. He has not spec-
ified when he will do so, or
whether any rightist elements
would accompany him; nor is
certain that the Pathet Lao
it
will
allow him to make the
trip.
They show no inclina-
tion
to
open up their terri-
tory
and
are continuing ef-
forts
to
consolidate their
control in the country.
The coalition government
is in the process of establish-
ing diplomatic relations with
North Vietnam and Communist
China but apparently plans
to defer action on North Korea
and East Germany. Although
Pathet Lao propaganda has
declared that the Council of
Ministers on 4 September ap-
proved the exchange of repre-
sentatives with the Communist
German and Korean regimes,
the director of protocol in
the new government subsequently
stated that "no action will
be taken" on their requests
for agrement.
Nationalist China--adamantly
opposed to any "two-China"
arrangement--announced the
severance of diplomatic relations
with Laos on 7 September. In
Taipei, Foreign Minister Shen
asserted that the action had
been taken only after it became
evident that the Nationalist
ambassador was being treated
as a, "second-class, 'nonrecog-
nized"' representative.
South Vietnam has special
interests in Laos and is reluc-
tant to leave the field to the
Communists. It has recalled its
ambassador for consultations to
determine whether some modus
vivendi can be worked out.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SOUTH VIETNAM
Viet Cong guerrilla action
has again picked up after several
weeks of decline. Activity has
been small-scale but widespread.,.
including attacks against regu-
lar and paramilitary government
forces, ambushes, and sabotage
of road and rail facilities.
The aggressiveness' displayed in
these actions demonstrates that
the Viet Cong have been able to
absorb losses inflicted by sus-
tained government security oper-
ations.
The Viet Cong also retain
the capability for coordinated
attacks involving several battal-
ions. There are continuing in-
dications of possible prepara-
tions for a large-scale effort,
which would be intended primarily
for psychological impact to off-
set recent government successes.
The government's military
efforts show steady improvement
in coordination and flexibility..
The airborne operations, par-
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ticularly, are proving increasingly
effective in seizing the initiative
and.. keeping the Viet Cong off
balance. Making contact with
sizable Viet Cong formations is
still difficult, however.
Government efforts to pro-
vide security for the peasants
and obtain their support are also
showing progress. These efforts
center on the.strategic hamlet
construction program and. pro-
vincial_ rehabilitation projects.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The failure of Ceylonese
Prime Minister Bandaranaike to
.make any significant economic
headway during her two years
in office is increasing politi-
cal pressure on her government.
This pressure comes both from
within the cabinet and from
the opposition. -The government
seems able to withstand the
current wave of maneuvering
and rumored plotting against
it, but in the process may be
losing some of its original
strong popular support.
The resignation on 25
August of Finance Minister
Felix Bandaranaike, the prime
minister's nephew, highlighted
the sharp disagreement within
the cabinet over economic prob-
lems. External assets have
steadily declined, budget defi-
cits have risen, and the many
development plans have not been
carried out.
In his budget speech in
July, the finance minister
introduced some highly unpopu-
lar fiscal measures designed
to reduce government spending
and conserve foreign exchange,
including a 25-percent reduction
in the government-subsidized rice
ration. The cabinet had origi-
nally gone along with this
latter proposal. However, when
the opposition whipped up wide-
spread popular feeling against
it, the cabinet eliminated it
rather than risk defeat. As a
result, the strong-willed min-
ister resigned, but he continues
as parliamentary secretary to
the Prime Minister and retains
considerable influence as her
chief political adviser.
This dispute touched off a
rash of political controversy.
Leftist forces claim that they
forced withdrawal of the rice
cut, and long dissatisfied con-
servative elements have become
more depressed.
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VJ.:IVLWA
NOOO~
IRAQ
Iraqi Prime Minister Qasim's his severe restrictions on
political prospects still seem ammunition supplies and on the
bleak. Nearly every political actions of his subordinates
element in Iraq is arrayed in militate against a sudden move-
some degree against him. Civilians ment by disloyal army elements.
are disaffected with his However, this does not preclude
failure to fulfill promises his assassination by an individ-
to return to constitutional ual or small group, and chances
government and hold parliamentary are strong that he will be over-
elections. Army officers are thrown in this way--probably by
blaming him for the army's military rather than civilian
inability to make headway against opponents.
the Kurdish rebels.
The handling of the
Kurdish rising remains the re-
gimes most conspicuous failure.
The revolution of 1958, followed
by massive re-equipment with
Soviet materiel, was supposed
to have transformed the army from
an imperialist-dominated police
force into the strong arm of
Iraqi nationalism. For over a
year this army has been engaged
against the Kurds; over half
its 70,000 men are committed
to this campaign. The Kurds
appear as tough as ever, however,
and indiscriminate bombing of
Kurdish villages by the Iraqi
Air Force has alienated even many
of those who were not followers
of rebel leader Mulla Mustafa
al-Barzani.
Qasim's policy of playing
one group off against the other
and shifting suspected officers
from command to command, and
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The Communists, while not
wholly satisfied with the Qasim
regime, apparently feel that any
change would be for the worse
and have been distributing pamphlets
warning against the dangers of a
*AMMAN
U S S R
60,000 i
SAUDI
ARABIA 25X1
"reactionary coup"--Communist
terminology for a.blow struck
by Arab nationalist elements.
Mosul -1
As
800,000
000 Number of Kurds
in each country
Proportion of population made up of Kurds
100 7060 40 20 0
percent
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Jf, Lait!'.r l *00
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Political maneuvering in
British Guiana is growing more
intense in advance of the Lon-
don conference on independence,
now contemplated for late Octo-
ber. Dissatisfaction with Pre-
mier Jagan seems to be increas-
ing among the East Indian popu-
lation, although not to the
point of challenging his lead-
ership of the People's Progres-
sive Plarty (PPP). The opposi-
tion to him remains seriously
divided, and is unable to agree
even on a position to take at
the forthcoming conference.
A few of Jagan's govern-
mental colleagues are displaying
increased restlessness. Legis-
lative Assembly Speaker Gajraj,
a Moslem leader who has been
disenchanted with Jagan for
some time, recently said he
would break with the PPP on the
ground that Islam and Communism
are incompatible. However, Ja-
gan apparently cannot constitu-
tionally force him out of office,
and Gajraj now has indicated he
will not resign. The US consul
general believes Gajraj is es-
sentially an opportunist and in
any case lacks the drive to
sustain an effort to build an
anti-Jagan opposition. He ap-
pears to be only another unsuc-
cessful challenger to Jagan's
leadership.
Attorney General Ramsahoye
also appears discontented but
not to the point of resigning
in an attempt to bring down
the government.
Former PPP minister Rai,
although he has skillfully at-
tacked Jagan in the Assembly,
has apparently made little ef-
fort to rally his personal sup-
porters to form a rival party
since his ouster from the gov-
ernment in June.
The Jagan government's
draft constitution for discus-
sion at the independence con-
ference provides for a republic
--to be called "Guyana"--within
the Commonwealth. Jagan has
refused to accede to opposition
demands for new elections before
independence using a system of
proportional representation.
People's National Congress leader
Forbes Burnham, now visiting the
US, is particularly insistent
on introducing such a system,
because he believes it would give
his party substantially increased
representation in the Legislative
Assembly. In the last election
the PPP gained a plurality of
only 1.7 percent over Burnham's
party, but obtained nearly twice
as many seats.
.Jagan might accept
a delay of independence of as
long as three years provided a
definite date is set and US and
British financial assistance is
assured. The consul general
believes, however, that this
version of Jagan's position re-
flects only his harassed state
of mind, and is unlikely to be
accurate. The consul believes
also that the PPP may take some
sort of "sudden rash action" if
an independence date is not set
soon.
Trade ties and student ex-
changes with Cuba and the bloc
are increasing. The first bloc
trade agreement--for the sale of
rice to Czechoslovakia--was con-
cluded in July. A new trade
agreement with Cuba, primarily
for additional rice sales to
Havana, has just been concluded.
There are now 17 students from
British Guiana known to be in
Moscow, plus 26 en route; there
may be as many as 60 in Cuba.
Janet Jagan was received with
much fanfare during her August
visit to Peiping, but no substan-
tial Chinese Communist aid is
likely to be forthcoming.
25X1
25X6
25X6
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Jl.Ciltf l
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SWEDEN
Osten Unden, Sweden's for-
eign minister since 1945 and
widely regarded as the architect
of its alliance-free foreign
policy, has announced his inten-
tion to resign later this month.
He is expected to be succeeded
by Torsten Nilsson, now minister
of social affairs. Unden is
disliked by the dominant right
wing of his own Social Democratic
Party as well as by the opposi-
tion bourgeois parties
His long tenure and prestige,.
however, gave him virtually a
free hand at the Foreign Minis-
try. The party leadership has
indicated it wishes to replace
him with a less controversial
figure more responsive to party
views on foreign policy.
The 57-year-old Nilsson,
who became an active union and
party member during his youth
as a bricklayer, is a typical
example of the second generation
of Swedish Social Democrats who
have advanced solely by means
of their association with the
party. One of the most influen-
tial and popular figures in the
party, Nilsson is staunchly
pro-Western in outlook. As
defense minister during the
period 1951-57, he built up
the defense establishment, and
strengthened ties with Sweden's
NATO neighbors Norway and Den-
mark. He lacks the prestige
and authority of Unden, however,
and is handicapped by limited
experience beyond the domestic
field.
making the appointments.
SECRET
iatory gesture to this faction in
Prime Minister Erlander is
expected to play a much more
prominent role than previously
in foreign policy decisions and
Nilsson probably will rely more
on career officials in the min-
istry than did Unden in formu-
lating policy. Although no
marked change is likely, Sweden
probably will play a more pas-
sive role in international af-
fairs, in contrast to Unden's
proposals and initiatives which
were often embarrassing to both
Sweden and. the West.
As the new foreign minister,
Nilsson's views may be decisive
in determining the final out-
come of the two major issues
confronting the Swedish Govern-
ment: acquisition of a domestic
nuclear weapons capability, and
relations with the Common Market.
On the question of EEC ties, he will
be more flexible than Unden, who
has stressed the limits imposed
on cooperation with Western
Europe by Sweden's policy of
neut:ra l,it y .
On the issue of nuclear
weapons, Nilsson is expected to
support acquiring them if pros-
pects continue to fade for an
agreement on disarmament. He
and -the cabinet will be primarily
concerned., however, with avoid-
ing an open rift in the Social.
Democratic Party. Unden, as
the 'Left wing's most stalwart
member and spokesman, has been
strongly opposed to acquisition
of nuclear weapons. The left
wing's threat to leave the party
influenced the leadership in
1959 to postpone until 1963 a
decision on this controversial
issue.
Other cabinet changes pre-
cipitated, by Unden's resignation
are likely to follow the local
elections of 16 September. Al-
though of no great significance
otherwise, the election outcome
may have some bearing on the in-
dividuals chosen by the party lead-
ership to fill other cabinet posts.
If the outcome indicates that the
left wing is disgruntled and in
sizable numbers either had voted.
Communist or had failed to vote at
all, the leadership would probably 25X1
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During his 4-9 September
tour of West Germany De Gaulle
went to extraordinary lengths,
even for him, to win popular
support for himself and his
European policy. Foreign Min-
ister Couve de Murville de-
scribed the visit as intended
"to submit the policy of the
French and German governments
to the people for approval."
De Gaulle thus apparently re-
garded it as akin to the appeals
to the people he has often suc-
cessfully launched in France.
This, however, was his first
such venture in'the broader
European context.
Virtually all West German
comment hailed the unexpectedly
enthusiastic welcome given De
Gaulle as an impressive demon-
stration of Franco-German rec-
onciliation. The American am-
bassador in Bonn viewed the
visit as at least temporarily
strengthening Adenauer's hand
in seeking to make progress on
European political integration
without waiting for an agree-
ment on the terms of Britain's
accession to the EEC.
Many newspapers warned, how-
ever, against permitting the in-
creasing rapprochement with
France to damage either the
larger concept of a united Europe
or Bonn's close alliance with
the United States. The in-
fluential Die Welt , for example,
asserted that "close coopera-
tion with France is desired as
a firm link in the chain of
Western solidarity, but is not
an exclusive friendship." Eco-
nomics Minister Erhard stated
publicly on 10 September that
"apart from France, we must
seek and establish friendship
with the whole free world...
integration must not stop at
the six Common Market countries
but should include the whole
of'Western Europe."
De Gaulle's speeches, al-
though well received by the
German public, raised strong
objections from representatives
of the smaller Common Market
members--notably Belgium's
Spaak, one of Europe's strong-
est pro-integration leaders..
Spaak has commented to US Am-
bassador MacArthur that De
Gaulle is apparently offering
Bend lux not a unified Europe,
but a Franco-German alliance
which "De Gaulle will generously
permit" the Benelux countries
to Join as satellites. Spaak
says he is willing to continue
working with France and West
Germany toward an integrated
Europe, but has.no intention of
joining France and Germany in
the establishment of a European
alliance from which "the Anglo-
Saxons" are excluded.
De Gaulle's public state-
ments on the need for closer
French - West German ties were
couched in general terms. Offi-
cials connected with the visit
deny that any specific institu-
tional steps were considered and,
according to West German press
chief von Hase, the strengthening
of contacts between France and
Germany as cited in the official
communique'of 7 September will
not require special institutions.
Although subordinates on
both sides have denied that any-
thing occurred during the visit
to open the way for a joint
nuclear weapons effort, and even
that the nuclear weapons problem
was discussed, De Gaulle publicly
urged "organic coordination" of
the two armed forces as required
by "modern necessities." De
Gaulle specifically mentioned
coordination of research, financ-
ing,and industrial capacities.
Extensive Franco-German
joint projects in the develop-
ment of conventional weapons,
logistics, and troop training
are already in progress, but De
Gaulle's statement at the Hamburg
military school went beyond
the official communiques in
advocating cooperation on "mod-
ern" problems. From the French
side, at least, the statement
appears to offer sufficient lee-
way for lower level, unpublicized
agreements in the nuclear weapons
field covering the exchange of
technicians and possibly some.
West German financial aid.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
De Gaulle is expected to
announce shortly a referendum
on his proposal that the con-
stitution of the Fifth Repub-
lic be amended to allow elec-
tion of his successor by uni-
versal suffrage. He will pre-
sumably use the attempt on his
life last month as justifica-
tion for such a direct appeal
to the electorate. The tactic
would permit him to circumvent
hostile groups in parliament
which could block him if he
followed .the alternative means
of going through parliament to
amend the constitution. De
Gaulle may be strongly criti-
cized, however, on the ground
that the referendum procedure
is unconstitutional.
There has been speculation
that De Gaulle would welcome
a move by the.National Assembly
to censure the government over
the referendum proposal. He
could then dissolve the Assem-
bly and precipitate new elec-
tions for this body at the same
time as the referendum. Can-
didates pledged to support him
thus would receive the benefit
of the public backing he enjoys
on the issue of direct election
of the president. Assembly
elections have been expected
to occur next spring.
The decision on 11 Septem-
ber to bestow the prestige of
cabinet rank on Christian Fou-
chet, former high commissioner
in Algeria, has led. to specula-
tion that De Gaulle is grooming
a successor to Premier Pompidou.
Some commentators-see the move
as giving De Gaulle an alterna-
tive to dissolution of the As-
sembly should Pompidou suffer
U N ION FOR THE
PARTY
STRENGTHS
IN FRENCH
SENATE
NEW REPUBLIC
3(3)
(00) SEATS UP FOR REELECTION-23 SEPTEMBER
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a vote of censure over the ref-
erendum issue. Fouchet is a
Gaullist of long standing and
would be an acceptable replace-
ment for Pompidou if De Gaulle
decided not to risk elections
this fall.
Other commentators main-
tain, however, that De Gaulle
instead is planning early dis-
solution of the Assembly in
order to set a precedent for
a successor who might otherwise
be hesitant about dissolving
an assembly before its term.
Mounting interest in the
prospective referendum has
overshadowed the senatorial
elections of 23 September, in
which no noteworthy shifts are
expected. There has been lit-
tle change in the composition
of the senatorial-electoral
college which put all the in-
cumbent senators in office in
1959, and few of the seats at
stake in the current election
are likely to change hands.
PROCEDURES FOR FRENCH SENATORIAL ELECTION
As election for France's 274-seat Senate is held every
three years. For these elections the country's 90 departments
are divided in alphabetical order into three groups of approx-
imately equal population. In each election senators from one
of these groups are chosen for nine-year terms. This year's
election will be held in the first 37 departments, as determined
by lot in 1959 after the entire Senate was renewed. In addition,
senators will be elected in French Guiana and Polynesia.
Senators are chosen in each department by an electoral
college composed of National Assembly deputies, members of
departmental councils, and delegates of municipal councils.
In departments entitled to less than five senators, the outcome
is decided by majority vote, and a second ballot is held where
necessary. Elsewhere--this year only in Bouches-du-Rhone--
a system of proportional representation is used.
While De Gaulle had ear-
lier been reported consider-
ing a drastic revision of the
Senate's composition and pow-
ers and a severe curtailment
of its legislative role,. he
does, not seem to-have such a
proposal in mind at present.
Should the elections reduce
his relatively small majority
in the upper chamber, how-
ever, he might be influenced
to seek to make it a. purely
consultative body before the
next; Assembly elections.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SPECIAL ARTICLES
THE EAST GERMAN ARMED FORCES
The armed forces of East
Germany, with Soviet assistance,
have continued a gradual build-
up which is probably intended
chiefly to make East Germany a
more effective member of the
Warsaw Pact alliance. They
now have a capability for con-
ducting limited defensive opera-
tions and maintaining order
within the country except in
the event of widespread revolt.
Khrushchev's threats to conclude
a peace treaty with the Ulbricht
regime have not been accompanied
by any substantially increased
flow off' Soviet military aid
or other sudden increase in
East Germany's armed strength.
Despite the adoption of con-
scription by the army for the
first time this year the num-
ber of personnel under arms
remains about what it was last
year, and no new major military
units have been created.
The Army
The 90,000-man East Ger-
man Army (EGA) has four infantry
and two tank divisions. These
units--organized, equipped, and
trained on the Soviet pattern--
are believed to be at about 80
percent of wartime strength.
They are dispersed evenly
throughout East Germany, and
there have been no recent moves
suggestive of a changed mission
for any of them
analysis of military
exercises indicate that the
wartime mission of the EGA would
be to defend against a NATO
attack and, in conjunction with
the 20 Soviet divisions in East
Germany,. to spearhead a counter-
attack which would be followed
up by an offensive by Soviet
troops now in the western USSR.
Thus far the Soviets have
not suppled the.. East Germans--
or any of the other satellites
--with large free rockets or
ballistic missiles which are
used by Soviet military units
as nuclear weapons deliver
vehicles
there
is no evidence that East Ger-
many's air force is trained
in the use of nuclear weapons
for ground support missions.
The EGA--as well as the
other satellite armies--is being
given increasingly extensive
experience in combined exercises
with other bloc forces. EGA
units have trained with the So-
viets in East Germany and with
the Poles in Poland. There are
indications that the largest
Warsaw Pact exercises to date
will be held this fall. These
may involve the movement of EGA
units to Poland and Czechoslo-
vakia.
EGA armor, artillery, and
motorized transport are of So-
viet and Czech manufacture.
About two-thirds of the 1,575
EGA, tanks are T-34 medium and
JS-?2 heavy tanks of Soviet World
War II design. There is no
evidence of any priority attempt
to replace these with later
models or to increase their num-
bers.
During the past year the
eight brigades of the East
German Border Command were
made subordinate to the Minis-
try of Defense and reorganized
along the lines of army units.
This may have been done to facil-.
itate the eventual conversion
of these brigades to army divi-
sions. Thus far, however, they
have not been given enough
heavy arms to change their basic
capabilities, and there is no
indication that this will be
done in the near future.
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The Air Force
During the past year the
USSR has augmented the East
German Air Force (EGAF), here-
tofore quite small. More than
200 Soviet jet fighters have
been delivered, and a more com-
prehensive and realistic train-
ing program has been provided
for EGAF personnel. When this
program is completed and all
the fighters are integrated in-
to operational units, it would
permit an expansion from the
present six understrength reg-
iments to nine full-strength
operational fighter regiments
and allow a wider geographic
disposition.
The EGAF now has some 370
jet fighters, about 10 Beagle
(IL-28) jet light bombers, 30
helicopters, about 25 piston
light transports, and some
jet trainers. Some Fishbed-C`
(MIG-21) Mach 2 fighters re-
cently were assigned.
Although only about 50
EGAF fighters are known to have
some all-weather intercept capa-
bility, this number may have
been increased with the past
year's delivery of jet fighters.
Even the Fishbeds are limited
to air intercepts under con-
ditions of good visibility
because of their "range-only"
radars.
Some EGAF fighters are
known to be equipped with anti-
aircraft missiles, but the bulk
of the force--about 200 air-
craft--are Fresco (MIG-1.7) types,
and few, if any, of these. are
missile-equipped.
The present deployment of
EGAF units is confined to'the
eastern half of East Germany.
No westward deployment of bases
has been noted--a move which
could be expected if the EGAF
were to assume broader responsi-
bilities for the defense of
East Germany or for interference
with traffic in the Berlin air
corridors on a continuing basis.
The intended role of EGAF
Beagles is not clear. They
might form a small unit for
utility and reconnaissance func-
tions, but the force would have
to be augmented before it would
provide any significant strike
capability.
The East Germans have about
50 radar sites available for
early-warning purposes and
ground control of fighters.
Missile and Antiaircraft
Capabilities
Surface-to-air missile
(SAM) defenses under control
of the East German military
forces are gradually expanding
and improving. During the past
six months additional SA-2
(six-launcher) SAM sites have
been activated and SAM-as-
sociated training exercises
have been increased. Of the
approximately 30 operational
SA-2 sites identified through-
out East Germany, at least 11
are believed to be under the
control of East German military
forces with the remainder under
Soviet control.
Four of the East German
sites are located in a semi-
circle just north and east of
Berlin and thus would appear
to have a marginal capability
for interfering with Western
flights in the air corridors
near the city. The Berlin area
sites are manned by four SAM
battalions controlled from a
regimental headquarters at
Ladeburg, the central support
facility. Four additional EGA
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
support facilities without
launch sites are located west
and south of the city and may
eventually complete an eight-
site SAM ring. The remaining
East German SAM sites primarily
defend selected targets in
northern East Germany, some
near the Baltic coast.
At least six additional
East German SAM sites are re-
ported to be in various stages
of completion but there is no
confirmation these are.oper-
ational. A limited number of
mobile SA-2s may be organic
to the East German Army.
Ta date, at'least three
East German SAM regiments, each
consisting of.four firing battal-
ions, have been activated and
.have undergone training at Pin-
now. On the basis of the pace
of this training since November
1960, it is estimated that be-
tween one and two regiments
could be added each year.
Weapons available to the.
East German Army's antiaircraft
artillery (AAA) regiments con-
sist of about 875 light AAA
guns,. These include 400 of the
improved 57-mm. type--some twin-
mounted on tank chassis--and
200 of the 100-mm. medium guns.
Three of the AAA regiments--one
at Potsdam in the Berlin area,
and one each at Erfurt and Halle
just south of tha,boundaries of
the southern air corridor--could
pose a threat to Allied air
traffic at lower altitudes.
C,.(,-J Tutow
CENTRAL
AIR CORRIDOR
Eggesin
? 0
Potsdam INZ Striusberg
EAST GERMAN MILITARY FORCES
l Aimy headquarters Surface-to-air missile (SAM) site + Fighter base
f1 Wtorized division ? Confirmed C,,L,-7 Naval headquarters
6 Tank division o Incomplete/probable ,L, Naval base
Military Strengths
Army 90,000
Border Command .40,000
Security Alert Police 22,500
SAP(Berlin) 4,500
Navy 11,000
Air Force , 8,000
Total 176,000
Air Force
Jet fighters 370*
Light bombers 10
Helicopters 30
Light piston transports 25
Total aircraft 435
Total fighter regis 6"
Surface-to-Air Missile
(SAM) and AAA 125X1 S
Confirmed SA-2-sites !t.
Incomplete SA-2'sites 6
AAA guns 875
Operational ships include four
Soviet-designed Riga-class
destroyer escorts, 51 patrol
vessels and torpedo boats, 34
auxiliary vessels, and numerous
service craft. The navy may
have absorbed the East German
Coast Guard, which has 1,000 men
and 50 small surface units.
The East German Navy (EGN)
is primarily a coastal defense
organization but is developing
its patrol and antisubmarine
warfare capabilities. The navy
has a few helicopters, but no
air arm or coast artillery branch.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Electronic Warfare Capability
The East Germans have only
a modest capability of their own
to wage electronic warfare (ECM)
against flights in the Berlin
Paramilitary Forces
Germany's police and paramili-
tary forces have the primary
missions of ensuring internal
order, preventing escapes to
West Germany, and assuring that
the restless population continues
to fulfill regime plans.
The most reliable element,
the Security Alert Police (SAP),
now-is undergoing reorganization,
the details of which are not yet
clear.. The two SAP brigades
posted on the sector and zonal
borders of West Berlin were
subordinated to the new East
German commandant of East Berlin
following the abolition of the
Soviet commandant's office and
now are reported to be subordinate.
to the East German Army. SAP
units in the 14 East. German
districts are being subordinated
to district People's Police com-
mands. At this time the SAP
probably numbers about 22,500,
but this force may be scheduled
for expansion.
The Interior Ministry's
civil police force, probably
numbering 60,000 men and women,
has no military role and in a
crucial situation probably
would not be reliable.
The largest paramilitary
force--the Kampfgruppen--is
believed to total 300,000
persons. It has elements in
all, important factories and
establishments in East Germany.
Kampfgruppe members are chosen
primarily for political re-
liability. During the last
two years they have been given
more rigorous training, and
the majority have probably been
integrated into the regular
military reserve structure.
Under present circumstances
they Kampfgruppen probably could
be used to maintain order in
industrial plants, but they have
only a marginal military capa-
bility.. ? Until recently Kampf-
gruppe: units were equipped with
World War II infantry weapons.
Since the 1961 Berlin crisis
some units have received modern
small arms, and a few battalions
reportedly have mortars, anti-
tank guns, and field pieces.
Conscription
East Germany, enacted com-
pulsory military service on 24
January 1962 after the regime
had acted effectively to block
the escape of East Germans to
the West. A major reason for
introducing conscription was
the-poor showing of the all-out
recruitment campaign in the fall
of 1961. The move also permits
the regime more easily to al-
locate, its scarce,manpower re-
sources between the armed forces
and industry,.'
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
.Under the conscription laws
all East German males between
the ages of 18 and 50 are sub-
ject'to military call-up. Dur-
ing a "state emergency of de-
fense" the age limit is extended
to 60. Moreover, all men liable
to military service and officers
up to age 60 are included
in the reserve and are subject
to annual refresher training,
whether they have served on
active duty or not. Women
between the ages of 18,and 50
are also subject to service in
support functions.
In February 1962 about
550,000 youths between the
ages of 18 and 22 were registered
and in July and August about
400,000 in the 23-26 age.group
were registered. About 75,000
of the former group have been
inducted into the armed forces,
and about.50,000 of the older
group are expected to be in-
ducted in October. However,
the number of inductees normally
would be offset by releases of
eligible two-year enlistees
throughout this year.
About 250,000 East Germans
constitute a.qualified, trained
reserve not now on active duty.
It is estimated that within
180. days after mobilization
was ordered, East German forces
could total 450,000. East Ger-
many has about 3,352,000 men
between the ages of 15 and 50,
about three fourths of whom
are believed physically able
to perform military duties.
About 1,074,000 of these are
in the 18-26 age group.
Ulbricht reserves to him-
self, under a law of 21 Sep-
tember 1961, sweeping powers
to declare a ."state of defense"
under which the National Defense
Council, which he heads, can
assign East German citizens to
"personal services" as desired,
alter arbitrarily production
and financial plans, suspend
constitutional "guarantees,"
and requisition property. The
law provides that all males
from 16 through 65 and females
from 16 through 60 can be en-
listed for compulsory civil
air defense service.
Defense Expenditures
Available information does
not suggest that there has been
any great or sudden increase in
East; German defense expenditures
for weapons procurement, con-
struction of new military facil-
ities, or conversion of a
significant number of industrial
plants from civilian to military
production. The announced
figure for military expenditures
remained virtually constant'at
1 billion East marks ($250 mil-
lion) per year between 1956
and 1961. This is only about
2 percent of the total budget,
although the figure is believed
to represent only personnel
costs. This year the announced
figure was increased to 2.7
billion East marks ($675 mil-
lion), or 4.9 percent of the
total budget. Part of this
increase may be explained by
some rise in personnel costs
in 1962, and part may be the
result of a decision to pub-
licize a larger fraction of
total East German defense and
security expenditures.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
KHRUSHCHEV, CEMA, AND THE CHINESE
In a-recent major policy
statement, Khrushchev has clar-
ified the double task which he
envisages for the Communist bloc's
Council for Mutual Economic As-
sistance (CEMA). He is plan-
ning to have CEMA take. a more
active role in achieving the
economic integration of its
member states as one means.of
countering the'growing impact
of the European Common Market
(EEC).. He is also using it to
exert economic pressures on
those Communist countries, led
by the Chinese, which were ex-
cluded from membership at the
June meeting of CEMA because
they refuse to give the Soviet
Union unqualified support.
merits and to draw neutrals into
the military schemes of NATO
and SEATO. In contrast, he pre-
sented the bloc economic group-
ing as a model for. the "inter-
national division of labor"
which permits each country to
develop its specialized economic
skills to the utmost.
.To reinforce this image,
Khrushchev enumerated a number
of ways in which,the economic
integration of CEMA member coun-
tries is to be hastened. These
include plans for a joint elec-
tric power network, pooling of
capital investment resources,
and possibly the establishment
of a "collective bank of social-
ist, countries."
This twin task--begun at
the 7 June meeting of CEMA coun-
tries' first secretaries--is the
burden of an article under
Khrushchev's signature entitled
"Vital Questions of Development
of the World Socialist System."
First published in the September
issue of the Marxist internation-
al journal Problems of Peace and
Socialism, the article was given
a d1 onaT weight by being re-
printed in the authoritative
Soviet doctrinal journal Kommu-
nist.
CEMA and the Common Market
Moscow has become increas-
ingly strident in its denuncia-
tions of the EEC but at the same
time seems to be setting the
stage for working relations with
that organization as it becomes
the major economic force in
Europe. Both-these elements
were present in Khrushchev's.
statement and were the under-
lying theme of the conference
of Communist economists which
convened in Moscow on 27 August.
In his article, Khrushchev
excoriated the. Common Market.as
a "monopolist amalgamation" set
up to.isolate the bloc from fa-
vorable European trading arrange-
To satisfy the demands of
Marxist ideology,Khrushchev
asserted that these plans would
accelerate the "historical
quarrel between socialism and
capitalism" and inevitably re-
sult in, the '.'replacement of
the capitalist system by the
socialist on a world scale."
At the same time, however,
Khrushchev implicitly admitted
that EEC was a clear success
and he hinted that he expected.
developing trade between it and
CEMA.
Khrushchev's article brings
into the open the division of
the Communist world into Moscow-
led and Peiping-led components
which was implicit in the ac-
ceptance of Mongolia as a full
member of CEMA at the 7 June
meeting and the exclusion of
China, North Korea, North Viet-
nam, and Albania. The article
features a sharp polemic against
"people who call themselves
Marxists"--i.e., the Chinese.
It accuses them of "scholasticism"
and at the same time rejects
their thinly veiled charge that
Moscow is guilty of "economism,"
a cardinal Marxist sin. In
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
mid-May Peiping's doctrinal
journal Red Flag, ostensibly
in a discussion of Lenin's
What Is To Be Done, had attacked
economism, with t e Soviet Union
as its obvious target.
Even more striking is Khru-
shchev's division of the "so-
cialist camp" into CEMA members,
whose industrial development is
sufficiently advanced to permit
them to enter into a system of
international division of labor,
and unnamed others with whom
CEMA members "are developing
broad economic ties, facilitating
the maturing of conditions for
their still broader economic
cooperation." The implied
differences between CEMA and non-
CEMA members of the bloc are so
great as to postpone almost
indefinitely the latter group's
association with CEMA. Khrushchev
also argues strongly against
autarkic development of the
satellites' economies, a develop-
ment which Peiping favors for
itself,
The Chinese Response
The increased economic and
political pressure which Khru-
shchev is exerting through CEMA
and the Soviet rapprochement with
Yugoslavia have spurred the
Chinese into a renewed polemical
defense of their own positions.
The new open antagonism of the
Chinese may also be a reflection
of the stepped-up behind-the-
scenes maneuvering between the
two countries for a tactical
advantage over the other.
The Soviet Union has sent
letters to China, and has in-
spired letters from other Com-
munist parties, suggesting
that the dispute could be
handled by "consultations" among
the parties. The USSR, however,
wants such meetings to cover
the issues in dispute, other than
Albania, and the ground rules
the Soviets would want--
majority decision--would obviously
resu]tin a Soviet victory.
The Chinese have responded with
letters of their own, and have
inspired letters from their sup-
porters, suggesting that the
meeting discuss primarily the
question of Albania and that it
be governed by the principle
of unanimity.
Two recent statements by
Chinese Foreign Minister Chen
Yi also suggest that the USSR has
tried to pressure the Chinese
into accepting its demands.
On 23 August at a Rumanian
Embassy reception on the occa-
sion of the 18th.,anniversary
of the Rumanian liberation,
Chen Yi reiterated Peiping,'s
thesis that common views must
be worked out through consulta-
tions among equal parties and
that violation of this principle,
or "attempting to impose one's
views on.others," is detrimental
to the unity of the bloc and the
international movement. This
was the first open statement
by a regime leader on this ques-
tion since December 1961. In
an even stronger statement at
a North Vietnamese anniversary
celebration, Chen Yi noted that
"we have never forcibly imposed
our views on others, nor re-
placed comrade-like discussions
and consultations with mutual
interference in inter-nation af-
fai:rs."
The Chinese had been re-
stricting their polemics to
successive articles in Red Flag,
but during the. last two weeks there
has been a significant increase in
attacks on the Soviets in other
publications and forums. On 1
July, Red Flag had attacked
"revisionists" for their ideas
on the "parliamentary road to
socialism" and pointed out
that French and Italian Com-
munist parties ~ had lost ground
by following this "road." On
16 July, Red Flag carried an
article on "sophism" which at-
tacked "revisionists" and their
"anti-Marxist distortions."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
In early September, Red
Fla launched an outright attack
on Yugoslavia--a move which
points up the direct contrast
between Peiping's continuing
enmity toward Belgrade and Mos-
cow's efforts to improve Soviet-
Yugoslav relations. The latest
issue of the Soviet journal
New Times, for example, carries
an article praising Yugoslav
foreign policy. In July, while ,a
Yugoslav economic team was in
Moscow, an agreement was reached
that will allow Yugoslavia to
take part soon in some CEMA
subcommittee meetings, and on
1 September Moscow announced
the dates--24 September to 4
October--for titular President
Brezhnev's visit to Belgrade.
On 25 August the Chinese
Peoples Daily carried a glowing
account of the 20-year history
of Albania's official newspaper
Zeri I Po ullit, which it
characterize as "waging a?
resolute and uncompromising
struggle for defending the
purity of Marxism-,Leninism and
opposing modern revisionism."
People's Daily chief editor Wu
eng- s , at the Albanian'Em-
bassy reception that evening,
added his congratulations to
Zeri I Popullit for its "iinre-
mi ing opposition to modern
revisionism as represented by
the Tito clique of Yugoslavia."
The Chinese have renewed
the attack on other'issues as
well. After suppressing their
views on the importance of the
national liberation movement at
the Soviet-led World Peace
Congress (WPC) disarmament con-
ference in Moscow in early July,
they reversed their tactics at
the Tokyo ban-the-bomb conference
in August.
The Chinese have described
the Tokyo congress, in which
they took the leading role, as
the most successful and signif-
icant world peace conference
in 1962." Chinese speakers at
a 27 August rally in Peiping
singled out as "correct" posi-
tions the Tokyo designation of
the United States as the "enemy"
and the "clear" definition of
the "correct" relationship
between peace and the national
liberation movement--elements
absent from the WPC appeal.
Peiping's staunchest ally,
the Albanian Communist Party,
has also joined in the attack.
On both 24 and 27 August, Al-
banian party leaders condemned
Khrushchev by name. No such
statement had been made since
16 July, and this followed four
months of silence concerning
Khrushchev.
While the Chinese have much
to be angry over,inciuding
Khrushchev's rapprochement with
Yugoslavia and the attempts to
sell MIG-21's to India, the
vehemence and depth of the re-
newed polemics suggest a more
negotiations may be
under way attempting to estab-
lish.a suitable agenda for
another conference of world
Communist parties. The Chinese
offensive may be a reflection
of Peiping's dissatisfaction
with the course of the negotia-
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