KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS FOR FY 1974

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-453-3-9-6
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2009
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: December 10, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

SUBJECT:
THE WHITE H.OU:SE
WASHINGTON
Attachment
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/10: LOC-HAK-453-3-9-6
ing the needs of senior policymakers and developing appropriate
-responses fr the,iatelligence 'agencies. While the list is quite
comprehensive, some additions designed to round out coverage of
certain areas are attached to this memorandum.
`i-r JIM i_& I a. -3
December 10, 1973
THE 'DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Key Intelligence Questions for FY 1974
The list of Key Intelligence Questions is a valuable step in identify-
coordination be maintained with the N;6C Staff as studies ,are prepared.
Considering the complexity of the topics, I urge that continuous.
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 M w
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL,
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
SUBJECT: Key Intelligence Questions for FY 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Gener
I :Additi:22s
What are the risks of nuclear proliferation?
Wbat capabilities are possessed by other nations to develop
nuclear weapons?
By what means -- both overtly and covertly -- could this
capability be exercised? What probability is there of
detecting such activity?
What are the intentions of these nations regarding developing
nuclear weapons? What factors internally and externally
ii ,uence their deciaious?
USSR and Easter Europe
P1 #1 Soviet Political Dynamics
add: How are major defense decisions made in the Soviet Union?
What 'is the impact of major organizational entities and functions
on Soviet preparations for and perceptions of issues such as
SALT, MBFR, the Middle East and PRC relationships?
In.,ing decisions concerning the Soviet force structure, what
constraints restrict the options from which Soviet policy makers
may-chose? (eg. Technological constraints, Organizational
limitations, Doctrinal limits, Political or Bureaucratic restrictions.
P1 #2 Soviet ICBM Systems
add: What is the role of major industrial and military organizations
in Soviet ICBM programs? In what manner may these affect the
future evolution of the ICBM force?
What are Soviet capabilities to execute first strike options against
'RC strategic forces?
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TOP SECRET/GDS
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 PZ #4 Soviet Long Range Aviation
add: Why do the Soviets continue to maintain a heavy bomber force?
P2 #6 Warsaw Pact, - NATO Balance
add: What insights can be gained into Soviet doctrine, weapons and
tactics in Central Europe based upon experiences in the October
1973 Middle East War?
P3 #7 Soviet Strategic Defensive Systems
add: (Reference third item) Soviet development of laser or other non-
missile weapons
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TOP SECRET ' W
What is the affect of mobile air defense systems (eg. SA-6,
ZPU.-23) on Soviet capability to defend against U. S. heavy bombers?
What is the capability of Soviet ABM systems against PRC strategic
systems?.
P3 #8 (addition as a key topic) General Assessment of the Soviet View
of Detente
Considering present Soviet military, political and economic activity,
what are the alternative views of detente that the Soviets may have?
What evidence supports this analysis?
How has the Soviet's view of detente, and their intentions toward
it, been affected.by' recent events in the Middle East? By the
growing strategic strength of the PRC?
How does detente relate to developments in Soviet Strategic Systems?
The PRC
P5 #5 PRC Nuclear Weapons Program
add: Doctrine for use.
P4 #4 PRC Strategic Offensive Forces
add: Strategic Warning and Command and Control capabilities
Latin America
P6 #2 Cuban Policies and Programs
add: Consideration of Cuban policy directions with particular
reference to any changes.
P6 #3 Leadership in Key Countries (add Peru to list of key countries.)
P6 #4 Inter-American Regional Organizations (The present question is not
a key one. It might be more useful to look at other organizations,
especially the 'subregional groups such as the Andean Pact. Also,
what are the possibilities for effective coordination among the
Caribbean states?)
TOP SUCRET/GDS .
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 V
Capabilities and intentions of Terrorist Groupse
add: The interplay and coordination among Terrorist groups in Uruguay,
Argentina, Chile and other nations.
P6 #7 (Addition as key topic) Chile
- Continuous attention to Chile -- political trends, opposition
elements, and relations with neighboring countries.
Southeast Asia
P7 #1 Political and Military Prospects
add: What are the capabilities of NVN to launch and sustain an offensive?
Upon what factors do they most depend eg. food stuffs, weapons,
and ammunition -- and how will these constrain their activities?
What are the factors in NVN and the GVN which affect decisions
to execute offensive operations? Which of these can be subjected
to influences to deter such action?
To what extent is the Khmer Communist movement in Cambodia under
the control of NVN? What evidence supports different interpretations
of this relationship? How did the Khmer Communists form and
develop in the 1970-71 period?
Near East and Persian Gulf
P8 #3 Stabillty.of Persian Gulf Area
(The Horn of Africa -- Ethiopia and Somalia -- should be considered
and integral part of any analysis of the Persian Gulf area.)
TQP SECRET/GDS
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w
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.
MEMORANDUM ;FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FR OM.- GEORGE PICKETT
SUBJECT:
The DCI' s List of Key Intelligence
Questions for FY 1974
The DCI has sent to you and other members of the NSCIC a list of key
intelligence questions (KIQ) for comments (Tab B). This is his
perception of the "substantive matters . . of greatest importance to the
top level consumers" through June 1974. When replies have been received,
he intends to use the KIQ:
principal problem - the preparation' of significantly improved
analyses. The NSC Staff has suggested additions to the list
to insure major topics have been identified, Colby's National
Intetigennce Officers will have to coordinate continuously with
the NS;C Staff as studies are prepared to insure critical areas
are covered.
to task intelligence agencies
to evaluate their responses
? .ue . 41ie F.i'c$itt yciit. t au EV'aitiaaa.tvia of of
to provide c:Vmil.uL1yvy.
performance in responding in the National Intelligence
Program Recommendations in late 1974.
The list of questions has mixed value.
Substantively, the questions are too generalized to
constitute specific guidance. However, a more specific
list would be too voluminous and would not alleviate the
Bureaucratically, the KIQ is a technique by Colby:
(a) To obtain guidance from the NSCIC.
(b) To use that guidance to assert a leadership role over
the intelligence agencies by tasking them and evaluating
them according to it.
SECRET/GDS
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i i
These are worthwhile objectives. The NSCIC has not. issued
guidance since its inception two years ago. Considering
the demands on policymakers, intelligence should be taking
the initiative to ascertain their needs rather than wait
passively to be asked. Colby could also be helped in asserting
his leadership role as DCI by an NSCIC tasking. However, the
?KIQ is the easiest step in this process of tailoring products
to consumer needs. Colby will encounter his greatest problems
later this year when he tries to task the agencies and when he
tries to have improved products prepared.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memorandum at Tab A to Colby which:
(a) Approves the technique of the KIQ;
(b) Provides some specific comments on the list;
(c) Asks him to coordinate continuously with the NSC
Staff as studies are prepared.
I have discussed these issues and recommendations with the N;SC Staff
and with the action officer on Colby' a staff. There are no major dis-
agreements with them.
Don Stukel concurs.
Attachments
Tabs A and B
SECRET/GDS
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10P SECRET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE TS 205229/73/1
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505 Copyaof,,5.0Copies
30 October 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT:
National Security Council
Intelligence Committee
Key Intelligence Questions for I FY i974
1. Attached is my list of priority national intelligence
analytical assets of the intelligence community during the remainder
of FY 1974. The results will be used as a major indicator in assessing
the performance of the intelligence community during the balance of the
fiscal year. It is therefore important that the subjects and questions
be truly responsive to the important needs of the NSC. I request,
therefore, that NSCIC members, in reviewing this package and forming
any comments, base their judgments on their needs as consumers of
intelligence.
3. I intend to provide the USIB agencies with specific guide-
'lines as to how the responses to the key intelligence questions will
be framed. Each response will have five parts
First, inclusion of the subject in regular agency
collection and analytical work on a priority basis, the
results appearing in regular production output;
Second, a brief summation of important community
judgments on the topic as contained in recent intel-
ligence publications, with a highlighting of agree-
ments and disagreements and the uncertainties underlying
the judgments;
NSCIC members may make, as a basis for tasking the collection and
2. I intend to use this listing, as amended by any comments
greatest importance to the top level consumers of national intelligence.
subjects and related key intelligence questions for FY 1974. This
"list represents those substantive matters which I cons-fder to to of
Third, an identification of important collection
or analytical gaps;
CLASSIFIED BY - DCI
EXEAWT FR^? t GENERAL DECLASSZFIC:.T1ON
SCHEDULE OF L. C. C', 'f!XORY:
58(1), '(D. (:.) or (:) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY Dr_~'_ASSIFIO 01i
TOP SECRET
Imossib.l 2_.> .t ~ine
(sinless impassime, insert date or event)
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i i
Fourth,. a proposed collection and analytical
strategy to fill the gaps, in specified time frames;
Fifth, a recapitulation and evaluation after
FY 1974 of the performance of the community and the
individual 'agencies in responding to these subjects
and questions.. The conclusions therefrom will be
included in the resource allocation and evaluation
process at the time of National Intelligence
Program Recommendations to, the President in November
1974.
4. It will be 'obvious that the questions do not encompass
States) are not included in this listing. These will be reflected in
the comprehensiv+eiisting of U.S. Foreign Intelligence Priorities in
DCID 1/2 currently, being considered by the USIB. The purpose of the
attachment is rather to identify the subjects on which intelligence
inputs are now or shortly will become of highest interest to policy
levels of our government. It is an attempt to anticipate the needs of
pol i cymakers . The focus is entirely on the world envi roni rnt during
the balance of this fiscal year. Our longer range interests, and the
improvement of intelligence capabilities to cope with such, are
separate even though related matters.
5. I would appreciate receiving by 22 November comments
concerning. the key questions and any additions, deletions, or
re-wording you consider would improve the listing.
importance (e.g., strategic warning of hostilities involving the United
the entire spectrum of intelligence needs. Some matters of continuing
Attachment
TS 205229/73, Cy
Chmn, PFIAB
Copy to:
Chmn and Members, NSCIC
USIB Principals
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 ,I LJ I N e- 1 J _N"1
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W, 0
TOP SECRET
KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS FOR FY 1974
USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE
U.S. collection and analytical efforts against Soviet stratetic
capabilities must focus on . the early phases of Soviet military R&D and
,on Soviet planning. At issue is the degree of progress the Soviets
intend to make within'theconstraints of the SAL agreements, and whether
they intend to co gply with them. Soviet perceptions of the U.S. as a
strategic competitor will help to shape Soviet decisions in this area.
The challenge to the intelligence community in supporting MBFR
negotiations will be more difficult in some ways than it has been for
the SAL agreements. Important elements of the Warsaw Pact's capability
to fight nuclear and conventional war in Europe are imprecisely known,
and changes in force. and equipment levels will be difficult to monitor.
On the political level, the intelligence community must concen-
trate on several aspects of Soviet domestic and foreign policies. For
the next year the key intelligence questions will bp.
1. Soviet Political namics
- Factions, factors and policy differences in Soviet
decision-making circles
Soviet and Warsaw Pact strategic planning for political.,
economic and military conflict with the U.S. and Europe
- Soviet strategic planning for and consideration of
Sino-Soviet relations
25X1?
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TOP,SECRET
Soviet Long Range Aviation
Size and intended role of the Backfire force
- Soviet development of a follow-on heavy bomber
Soviet Naval Systems
--Soviet plans and progress toward the deployment of a full
inventory of DELTA/SS-N-8 submarines, or follow-on SSBN/SLBM
system
- Soviet R&D and deployment of cruise/missile systems, particularly
follow-on submarine-launched systems
Soviet R&D and deployment of advanced ASW systems
- Soviet plans for the role of their aircraft carrier and the
number and rate of construction
Warsaw Pact - NATO Balance
- Evaluation of Warsaw Pact strengths and weaknesses, including
an assessment of ground forces' combat effectiveness
Soviet criteria for establishing adequacy of forces for
military and political security
- Soviet views of major East-West military asymmetries and
of ways to resolve them
TOP SECRET
2
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lp TOP SECRET
Soviet capabilities for rapid deployment of forces
from the USSR to Central Europe
. Soviet Strategic Defensive Systems
Soviet progress in ABM development--attitudes toward
or plans for further ABM deployment
- Soviet development of look down/shoot down capability
for interceptor aircraft
- Soviet development of laser weapons
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relationship with the two superpowers and with the Third World. The key
intelligence questions concern:
nuclear deterrent against the USSR and are working on a missile system
which would provide a nuclear capability Against the United States.
These achievements; imply major qualitative :changges in Chltt a'`:s 'strategic
post-Mao leadership. The Chinese may have already achieved an effective
I V
JUP REGRET
China`s intentions depend greatly on the character of the
1. Status of Sino-Soviet Relations
- Indications that the. Chinese leadership has 10,und Soviet,
pressure so great as to modi fy its present policies toward
the USSR
- Capabilities of the forces along the border and how they
are changing
2. Possible Changes in PRC Policy and/or Political and Military
Leadership
Indications and significance of possible strains among
the present PRC leadership
Identification of the leading candidates to succeed the
present leadership, and their foreign policy/economi.c/
military views
3. Chinese Intentions and Progress Toward Leadership of the
Third World
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TOP SECRET
The status of production and deployment of the SSBN
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. vculc t V
NOFORN.
The improvement of our understanding of Latin American political
onU.S. interests. are likely to?develop. In the coming year the key
often act in concert in regional organizations and new alignments impacting
dynamics and their effect on U.S. interests is of high importance during
FY 74. While Comaamist-sponsored insurgent/terrorist activities continue
to be a threat-to U.S. interests in some countries; the preponderant
force working against U.S. interests in-most countri=es Is ,the emergence
of highly nationalistic governments. Because of the highly personal
nature of these governments, an in-depth understanding of governmental
leaders is of prime importance. Various nationalistic governments will
intelligence questions will be:
25X6
k
Cuban Policies and Programs
Cuban internal weaknesses
- Cuban subversion in Latin America
25X6
Inter-American Regional Or anization
- Alignments likely to develop in the OAS over specific issues
5. Capabilities and Intentions of Terrorist Groups
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NOFORN
The challenge of ongoing insurgencies. or the threat of latent
insurgent movements is being faced by all Southeast Asia nations.
defeat ts, particularly those of South Vietnam,
could have serious -impact on U:S, interests.
In the coming year, the key intelligence questions will concern:
1.. Political and Military Prospects
Intentions of North Vietnamese or other Communist
forces concerning major military action in Indochina
during FY 74
- Signs of any significant erosion in the position of the
Saigon government
Foreign policy or internal developments of Southeast Asia
countries affecting the short-term and long-term prospects
for U.S. military bases in countries like Thailand and the
Philippines
7
SECRET
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W
IV
SECRET
The cohesion of the NATO alliance in the face of recent Soviet
initiatives for detente in Europe requires fresh examination by the
U.S. intelligence community. Prospects for post-Tito Yugoslavia are
also of considerable interest. In the coming year the key intelligence
questions will concern:
1. Western Europe
- Likelihood of major leadership changes in near term
sharing, CSCE, MBFR, and the impact of SAL
- Attitudes of government leaders in'key West European
countries toward the U.S. leadership role in NATO
- Leadership attitudes toward the organization of and
commitment to European defense, including burden
in major countries
Yugoslavia
Likelihood of major internal changes in near term
Trends in foreign policies, especially toward USSR
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oiwct w
NOFORN
25X6
Narcotics Traffic
Identification of the major narcotics producers/traffickers
and their.. principal collaborators; 'their vul.ne.rabilities
to prosecution., exposure and di-s-ruption of them networks
Location of their laboratories and storage facilities
- Methods, routes and timing of the movement of narcotics
destined for the United States
10
SECRET
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NOFORN
ire: a ey questions. related to the foregoing
MI ne ra .rresour, ces , rasped , l y
petroleum,, is rapidly increasing. Incomes of oil-producing states
are rising, and their ability to exert pressure on the U.S. and other
Western powers by controlling oil supplies is mounting. There is,
however, a rising world demand for U.S. grains and oilseeds. More-
over, the Soviet Union is seeking to make up for deficiencies in its
econoflW; in so doing it is engaging in increased economic exchanges
With the United States Th L,
e
U.S.
U.S. dependence ono er countries c n National Secri.t .
A.- Economic 'Development-, Aff
ti
11
CfEr
SE
NOFORK
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ves
producing countries and movements from one currency
to another, particularly the sale of dollars on
European currencies markets
as oil matters
The composition of monetary reser
f
-Changes which.are likely to occur in oil producers'
policies or ne
oti
ti
g
a
ng positions that may affect
the output, export, or price of oil
Prospective major long- or short-term deals being
negotiated between the OECD countries, especially
France and Japan, with the oil-producing countries
- The degree of involvement of the Soviet Union in
Mf dd1e r
2. Soviet Economic Capabilities and Vulnerabilities
- The extent to which the USSR can cover its require-
ments for grain, oilseeds, and sugar from domestic
production in the 1974 crop year
- Soviet needs for imported technology to sustain
economic growth and successes in obtaining that
technology
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12
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VW 11L 1 ?
NOFORN
Size and economic potential of USSR's mineral
and petroleum deposits, especially the extent
of the "proved" reserves at Tyumen and Yakutsk,
and Soviet efforts, if any., to play, ,off Tokyo
and Washington re development of their fossil
Poll.
The effect of the USSR's balance-of-payments
position on its ability to trade with the West
- Constraints placed on economI.c ..pol-fc r ,by military
- Information required for making forecasts of output
of key food grains, feed grains, an'd meal s--especi ally
wheat, corn, rice, and soybeans
Worldwide Crop Prospects
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