PLAN FOR GROUND ACTION AGAINST BASE AREAS IN CAMBODIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-447-10-16-7
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: March 30, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
SUBJECT:. Plan for Ground Action Against Base Areas
in Cambodia
FROM: General Abrams, COMUSMACV
DATE: 30 March 1970
This message is in four parts, as follows:
ARMY review
completed.
Part I - General. Provides a mission statement; overall
assumptions; a summary of the options, risks and impacts; an estimate
of the likelihood of success; a proposed public affairs policy; conclu-
sions; and recommendations.
Part II - Option 1. Provides the plan for an attack on Base
Area 352/353, Central Office South Vietnam Headquarters (COSVN HQ).
Part III Option 2. Provides the plan for an attack on Base
Areas 704 and 367/706.
Part IV Answers questions not covered in full elsewhere.
Part I - General.
1. Mission. MACV in coordination with the forces of GVN
attacks and destroys North Vietnarnese/VC logistics sanctuaries along
the South Vietnamese /Cambodian border.
2. Assumptions.
a. There is to be coordination and cooperation between
Cambodian Government (FARK) and US/GVN forces.
b. Relief from present restrictions on B-52 and TACAIR
sorties will be granted as necessary.
c. Appropriate changes to rules of engagement will be made.
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3. Summary of Options.
a. The first option chooses to attain maximum results in
an attack into Base Area 352/353. Enemy forces in the area are large
supply storage areas and headquarters elements of COSVN, plus at
least one division headquarters and six regimental headquarters. Attacks.
into the area will require a multi-division effort by elements of the 1 st
Cav Div and ARVN Airborne Div and controlled by Hq 1 st CavDiv. The
scheme of maneuver consists of an initial attack by a two-brigade force
to destroy COSVN or other headquarters elements, and follow-on attacks
by additional forces as required. This operation would be supported by
B-52 as well as conventional fire support and could last as long as four
weeks depending on the sort of targets uncovered.
b. In second option simultaneous attacks are planned against
Base Areas 704 and 367/706. Base Area 704 is a major storage area
and transhipment point and Base Area 367/706 contains extensive logistics
bases and subregional type headquarters. Attack into Base Area 704 is
to be accomplished by the 4th Armored Brigade (ARVN) under the control
of the 44th Strategic Tactical Zone. Attack of Base Area 367/706 is
to be executed by three brigade-size forces in a combined airmobile and
ground penetration of enemy positions. This operation is expected to
last about 14 days.
c. Coordination with Joint General Staff (JGS) revealed a
desire on their part to support Option 2 with, (1) an attack by one or two
brigades from the 9th Inf Div (ARVN) to destroy rear elements of the
88th NVA Div near the western edge of the Parrot's Beak (WT 9000) and,
(2) an attack into rear areas north of Base Area 706 by reserve forces
of III CTZ if they are not committed south of that base area. Both of
these alternatives are under consideration but not further discussed in
this message.
d. The concepts of employment of friendly forces will require
modifications both to accommodate refinements in planning and the
situation existing in RVN at the time these plans might be executed.
4. Comparison of Options.
a. Option 1 has two major advantages over Option Z. These
are: (1) potential for destruction of the major enemy Command and
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Control Headquarters (COSVN) and (2) little danger of noncombatant
casualties. Most, significantly, however, Option 1 risks higher
US/RVNAF casualties than does Option 2.
b. Option 2 has more, but somewhat less significant, advan-
tages over Option 1. These include (1) greater RVNAF participation
and visibility, (2) shorter duration, (3) more favorable (open) terrain,
and (4) probability of fewer US/RVNAF casualties. Most significantly,
however, this option risks higher noncombatant casualties than does
Option 1.
5. Risks.
a. Noncombatant casualties. There is a significant risk
that there would be noncombatant casualties, particularly under Option 2
in Base Areas 706/367. Such risk is minimum under Option 1. The
degree to which noncombatant casualties could be controlled would depend
heavily on the degree of cooperation of Cambodian officials and their
ability to control the population. Unless controlled, there is a high
probability that the news media would make this a major issue.
b. Vietnamization.
(1) The principal risk attached to this plan is the possibi-
lity that its execution would trigger an all-out enemy effort .against I CT Z;
although it is doubted that he would openly launch a. major attack directly
across the DMZ.
(2) A lesser risk lies in the potential enemy reaction of a
general attack on the SVN population. Such an attack, however limited,
would have some visibility but its practical effect would probably not
amount to much.
.(3) US redeployments have reduced significantly MACV's
flexibility to reinforce or fill gaps, and the foregoing enemy reactions
could require curtailment of operations under this plan.
6. Impacts.
a. Execution of this plan to carry the war to the enemy would
have a highly favorable impact on RVNAF/GVN morale and confidence,
and hence on Vietnamization.
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b. Destruction of major base areas and facilities adjacent to
III and IV CTZ would significantly reduce the threat to those zones and
could have a salutary effect on free world and GVN programs.
c. There would be incremental costs which, if defrayed at
the expense of Vietnamization programs, could have an adverse impact
thereon. If, however, the operation is successful in its ultimate aim,
the long-term impact should be favorable and more than offsetting.
d. The impact of this plan on US troop withdrawals stems
primarily from the risk of enemy counteraction in I CTZ. Limitation
on in-country capability to reinforce I CTZ militate strongly against
any US redeployments beyond those now scheduled by 15 April.
e. Execution of this plan in itself should have minimum impact
on population security in South Vietnam. Enemy actions in I CTZ could
bring setbacks to security in that zone and in areas from which any
required reinforcements would be withdrawn. Similarly, enemy counter-
actions aimed directly at the general population could bring some setbacks.
.7. Estimate of Success.
a. Weather is important to success of'attacks under either
option. March and April are the most favorable months; after April,
time runs out.
b.. The attacks under either option will have a significant
impact on an NVA/VC attack on Phnom Penh. Disruption of command
and control elements, destruction of logistical installations and tying
units to the defense of the bases under attack, and of other bases
vulnerable to attack, could severely degrade the momentum of the enemy
attack. There are, however, other factors to be considered. The tenuous
situation in Cambodia currently reflects factors of attitude and political
orientation which can change rapidly; a major communist psychological
campaign is in progress to maintain, at least, a highly unsettled and
disoriented. political situation.
c. In sum, from a military viewpoint, it appears that the
probability of success would justify execution of either option under this
plan and that the plan should be executed in April due to weather conditions.
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However, whether or not the NVA/VC would succeed in an attack on Phnom
Penh rests to a ,greater degree on political factors at work in Cambodia.
8. Public Affairs. MACV should brief Bureau Chiefs in Saigon on
an embargoed basis 24 to 36 hours prior to the execution date. In the
event of a leak, the briefing should be held immediately and the operation
embargoed to preclude publication of any information until released by
MACV. Bureaus should also be invited to dispatch correspondents to the
field. Arrangements for press coverage should also be coordinated with
the RVNAF.
9. Conclusions. It is concluded that:
a. The success to be achieved in relieving Communist pressure
on Phnon Penh will be influenced importantly by political factors at work
in Cambodia.
b. The choice between Option 1 and 2 turns primarily on the
issues of US/RVNAF and noncombatant casualties and on the situation
in RVN at the time the plan is executed,
c. In light of the potential benefits to be gained from execution
of this plan, the risks are acceptable if US force levels are not further
reduced below the level to be reached on 15 April.
For reasons of weather, the plan should be executed during
April.
10. Recommendations. It is recommended that:
a. Option 1, which would minimize noncombatant casualties,
be executed as soon as possible after intelligence indicates a high
probability of NVA/VC attack on Phnom Penh.
b. Further US redeployments after 15 April be held in abeyance
pending developments over the next 75-90 days.
c. The public affairs policy outlined in paragraph 8, above,
be followed.
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w
Part II. O tip on I - Attack on Base Areas 352/353 (COSVG Hqs)
1. Intelligence. (See Supplementary Information, for detailed
intelligence. )
a. Due to constant shifting of enemy forces and installations,
Base Area 353 was added to this option. The Base Area 352/353 is a
large complex of troop and logistical facilities, ammunition storage
areas, hospitals, POW camps, and command and control headquarters.
These base areas are the primary staging areas for enemy units opera-
ting in War Zone C and Binh Long Province, RVN. -
b. The area is well protected, with an estimated strength of
4, 000. Known units in the area are COSVN: Hqs 9th VC Division and
its subordinate regiments, the 95C, 271st and 272D; the 65th NVA
Regiment of the 7th NVA Division; Hq, 65th Arty Cmd; and the 96th Arty
Regt.
2. Command and Control. This operation will be under the
control of CG, lst.Air Cavalry Division (AM).
3. Task Organization..
a. 1st Cav Div: 3-BDE
b. ARVN ABN DIV (-): 2BDE
c. Ilth ARMD CAV REGT (-); 2 ARMD CAV SQDN.
4. Concept.
a. This operation will be conducted in two phases. For
Phase 1 a combined two-brigade force of approximately nine battalions
(4 (US) Inf, 3 (RVN) Inf, 2 ARMD Cav Sqdn) will attack the objective area
to find, fix and destroy enemy forces. After contact is established a
determination will be made to commit additional forces based on the
worth of the results attained. Phase 2 commences upon reinforcement
or exploitation of initial successes. The operation can be initiated
within 72 hours of receipt of order to execute.
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b. The objective will be to destroy COSVN and troop and
logistics facilities. Enemy elements in Base Areas 352/353 constantly
shift and move to avoid detection. Therefore, all intelligence gathering
means will be intensified to obtain accurate locations, and specific
objectives selected about 72 hours before launching the attack.
c. Should the situation develop rapidly, the remainder of the
two divisions are to be employed to achieve decisive results. Areas
vacated by 1 st Cav or Airborne Division units will be covered by 5th
ARVN Division units or Ranger battalions.
5. Supporting Fires. Preparatory B-52 strikes in selected
areas. Operation will be supported by TacAir, Artillery and Helicopter
Gunships.
6. Coordination. There are no FARK units in the southern halves
of each base area. Cambodian civilians will not be notified until D-Day.
7. Duration of Operation. The operation will require 3 to 4 weeks.
8. Logistic Support. The logistic system is in and functioning.
Commitment of entire force will affect other operations in III CT Z.
Part III. Option 2 - Attack on Base Area 704 and 367/706.
Section A - General: Option 2 is a simultaneous, or nearly so,
attack on Base Area 704 and 367/706. These operations will be essentially
independent of each other and will be ARVN heavy with US providing some
ground combat troops and the bulk of the air, artillery and helicopter
support.
Section B - Base Area 704.
1. Intelligence.
a. Base Area 704 contains troop cantonments, medical and
logistic facilities, and headquarters elements. It is the primary staging
area for enemy units entering the Delta. It has facilities for training,
refitting and resting enemy troops. Noncombatant civilian population
is light.
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IV
b. The following military units are in the area: 295th Main
Force Battalion, 511th and 512th Local Force Battalions, and a
detached element of the Hq I st NVA Division. Estimated strength is
about 1000.
2. Command and Control. The 44th STZ will control and coordi-
nate this operation.
3. Task Organization.
a. 4th ARVN Armored Brigade: 2 Armored Cavalry Sqds,
2 Ranger Bns.
b. 4th ARVN Ranger Gp: 2 Ranger Bns, 1 Armored Cavalry
Troop (Reserve).
c. USN/VNN: River Craft and Fire Support.
4. Concept. The operation is to be in three phases.
a. In 'Phase I the 4th Armored Brigade attacks north from Tan
Chau along the east bank of the Mekong River to seize transshipment
points about four kilometers north of the border. USN and VNN river
forces will conduct patrol on rivers and canals contiguous to 4th Armored
Brigade axes of advance to the limits.of penetration by the attacking
ground elements.
b. Phase II will be a retrograde operation, in order to return
friendly elements to assembly areas in the vicinity of Tan Chau. Subse-
quent movement of forces will be by river craft over interconnecting
rivers and canals to attack positions in the vicinity of An Phu.
c. In Phase LII, the 4th Armored Brigade attacks north between
the Chau Doc and Bassac Rivers to seize logistics facilities approximately
six kilometers north of the border. USN and VNN river forces will
conduct patrol operations on the Chau Doc and Bas sac Rivers to the depth
of penetration of attacking ground elements.
d. Operation can be initiated within 72 hours.
5. Supporting Fires. Generally there will be no preparatory
fires to avoid unnecessary casualties to noncombatant civilians. The
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operation will be supported by TacAir, Artillery and Helicopter Gunships.
6. Coordination. Coordination will be effected at local (district)
level with Cambodians to assure no conflict of involvement with FARK
units, and to minimize casualties to noncombatant civilian population.
7. Duration. The operation will require 12-14 days.
8. Logistic Support. Logistic systems are established and
functioning. There are no logistic constraints visualized.
Section C - Base Area 367/706.
1. Intelligence. (See Supplementary Information, for detailed
intelligence. )
a. Base Area 706/367 is a complex for troop housing, logis-
tics facilities, hospitals, and training sites, and a command and control
center headquarters. Density of civilian noncombatant population is high.
b. The area is strongly fortified with an estimated strength of
5000. Known enemy units in the area are Hqs Sub-Region 3, element
of Sub-Region 6, Sub-Region 2 and Rear Service Group 1000.
2. Command Control, The operation will be under the command
of Hq, III CTZ (Lt General Tri).
3. Task Organization.
a. 49th ARVN Regiment: 3 Inf Bns, 1 Armored Cav Regt and
I Air Cav Troop (US).
b. Task Force 333 (Hq, 3d ARVN Ranger Gp): 2 Ranger Bns,
1 Mech.Inf Bn (US), 1 Inf Bn (US), 1 Inf Bn (ARVN), 2 Armored Personnel
Carrier Troops.
c. 3d Brigade, 25th Inf Div (US): 3 Inf/Mech Inf Bns..
d. Task Force 318 (ARVN): 1 Armored Cav Sqdn (US), 1 Znf
Bea (ARVN) and 2 Armored 'Personnel Carrier Troops.
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10
4. Concept. The operation will be divided into three phases.
Phase 1 will consist of a combined helicopter and mechanized assault
into Base Area 367 by the 49th ARVN REgiment. The 3d Brigade,
25th Inf Div (US) will provide 3 Battalions as blocking forces. Phase 2
will be a coordinated ground assault into Base Area 706 by Task Force
318. Phase 3 will be an assault by Task Force 333 through Base Area
706 and then to the north. The operation can be initiated within 72 hours
of receipt of order to execute.
5. Supporting Fires. Generally no preparatory fires are planned
in order to avoid unnecessary casualties to noncombatant civilian
population. Operation will be supported by Tac Air, Artillery and
Helicopter gunships.
6. Coordination will be conducted at local level with Cambodians
to assure no involvement with FARK units and to minimize casualties
to noncombatant civilian population. The ability to coordinate with
the Cambodians is tenuous and subject to rapid variation.
7. Duration of Operation. The operation will require 10- 14 days.
8. Logistic Support. Lostistic system is in and functioning.
There are no logistic constraints visualized.
Part IV - Answers to Questions.
1. Q: What intelligence do we have and how good is intelligence
concerning the enemy base camps and sanctuary locations?
Answer: The intelligence on which this plan is based is considered
relatively good and adequate to support the conclusions and recommendations.
As planning progresses there will be a need for current aerial photography
and updated combat intelligence.
2. Q: What size friendly forces are contemplated?
kT
Answer: See Parts II and III, above. In general, the size of the
forces planned has been designed to provide adequate combat power in
the objective area to ensure success while maintaining a reserve to
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enhance flexibility for exploitation of any unforeseen advantage or to
respond decisively to local enemy counter-action. Division-level
Reserve Forces would continue security operations in assigned Areas
of Operation, but would be prepared for rapid commitment on order.
3. Q: What would be the extent of the US involvement, i. e.,
how much air effort, ground effort, and geographical
incursion would be indicated?
Answer: See Parts II and III, above. Emphasis would be on
combined operations; however, significant US involvement is considered
essential to ensure success. Option 1, while combined, would involve
a preponderance of US involvement, including B-52 strikes in prepara-
tion and support. In those ground operations to be conducted primarily
by ARVN, i. e. under Option 2, attack against Base Area 704, US
Helicopter Naval and Air support will be substantial. Nevertheless,
every effort will be made to credit success to RVNAF, since such success
could have a favorable psychological impact of highest consequence for
RVNAF and for the people and Government of SVN. Geographical
incursion by maneuver units should generally not be required to exceed
between 10 and 15 kilometers; however, counterfires might extend beyond
that depth as might ground maneuver to exploit success or to destroy key
enemy resources in the course of the operation.
4. Q: What would be the duration proposed for the operations?
Answer: See Parts II and III, above. The duration proposed for
the operations is that --considered necessary to cause sufficient disruption
of enemy "rear" areas to reduce the weight of his attack on Phnom Penh.
The anticipated time required is varied primarily by the nature of the
terrain and vegetation in the objective areas. The concept of short
duration raid type operations has been considered and discarded, since
the impact of such operations would be limited and of doubtful remuneration.
On the other hand, while the proposed plans envision operations lasting
from 14 days in Base Areas 704 and 367/706 to 26 days in Base Areas
352/353, flexibility should be retained to remain in those areas longer
if indicated by the mission or by developments at the time. In sum, it
is not considered advisable to fix the duration; the operations should be
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mission oriented, and the time actually required would depend heavily
on the terrain and enemy reactions. As we progress into the wet season,
the operations would become more difficult and time-consuming.
5. Q. What type of command and control arrangements would
be required?
Answer: See Parts I and II, above. Operations envisioned are
based on cooperation and coordination with RVNAF, and no change from
arrangements in current use for combined US/RVNAF operations is
envisioned. Basically, command and control of all ground forces would
be exercised by a division level headquarters (ARVN or US) with all
forces under the operational control of a single commander. In that
regard the distance between Base Area 704 and Area 367/706 in Option 2
calls for separate but coordinated operations with CTZ/STZ commanders
exercising control in the two areas. Cooperation and coordination with
Cambodian (FARK) forces in the vicinity of the objective areas would
be effected primarily through GVN contacts including direct liaison
where feasible. With regard to such contacts, under* Option 1 none is
understood to exist and under Option 2 they are understood to be good
in the vicinity of Base Area 704, but limited in the vicinity of Base Areas
367/706.
6.
Q:
What amount of joint planning would be required prior
to implementing such a plan, i. e. , planning among the
US, the South Vietnamese, and/or Cambodian forces?
Answer: Setting out major framework of this plan has been accom-
plished at MACV /JGS level with assistance of CTZ /Field Force Cornman-
ders. Hereafter, combined planning down to division and lower levels,
with updating and honing to reflect changes in the enemy and friendly
situations, will be accomplished in 72 hours from receipt of the order
to execute. In regard to planning with the Cambodians, the primary
requirement would be to inform them of the purpose and scope of our
operations; this would be done, where feasible, at the latest possible date.
7. Q: What is the incremental cost and risk attached to the
proposed plan and how do the costs compare with the benefit
which would be derived?
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Answer: The incremental cost cannot be quantified with'any
degree of exactness. There would, of course, be increased expenditures
of ammunition, fuel and other supplies. A surge in air operations,
including B-52 strikes, will be necessary for preparation fires and to
support troops in contact. In this regard, the recent information pro-
vided MACVconcerning current and projected air munitions availability
indicates action is required to insure maintenance of adequate levels.
Generally, the units concerned are currently engaged in operations of
medium tempo and are located in the general vicinity of the proposed
operations, which will tend to minimize costs associated with troop
movements.
The principal risk attached to this plan is in the possibility that
its execution would trigger an all-out enemy effort against I CT Z;
although it is doubted that he would openly launch a major attack directly
across the DMZ. US redeployments have reduced significantly our
flexibility to reinforce, and such an enemy motion could require curtail-
ment of operations under this plan.
On balance, the potential benefit to be derived from the execution
of this plan is considered to outweigh the potential incremental cost and
risk. Successful disruption of enemy efforts to reinstate a government
in Phnom Penh favorable to their cause could in the long run offset
manifold any incremental cost.
8. Q: What are the budget implications?
Answer: See discussion of incremental cost and risk, paragraph
7, preceding.
9. Q: What would be the impact on other free world operations
in SVN and on the Vietnamization program assuming no
additional funds or resources become available?
Answer: Execution of this plan to carry the war to the enemy
would have a highly favorable impact on RVNAF/GVN morale and
confidence, and hence on Vietnamization.
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The extent to which any overall incremental costs would have to
be absorbed by curtailment of future free world operations and Vietnami--
zation programs cannot be determined. If, however, the operation is
successful in its ultimate aim, the long-term impact should be favorable
and more than offsetting.
The impact of this plan on US troop withdrawals stems primarily
from the risk of enemy counteraction in I CTZ. Limitations on capa-
bility to reinforce I CTZ from in-country militate strongly against any
US redeployments beyond those scheduled by 15 April so long as the
execution of this plan is considered possible.
The impact on population security in South Vietnam depends
essentially on what countermeasures the enemy undertakes. Execution
of the plan in itself should have minimum impact since the bulk of the
units involved are now engaged in mobile operations against the enemy
rather than in support of pacification. If, however, the enemy should
react in force against I CTZ or elsewhere, there could be significant
setbacks in security in the affected area and in areas from which rein-
forcements would be withdrawn. The enemy could also react with a
general attack on the population; such a counter offensive would neces-
sarily be of limited scale, but it could have adverse psychological
impact and offset the favorable psychological impact expected from
successful execution of this plan.
10. Q: What US, ARVN and noncombatant casualties are
expected?
Answer: Although US/ARVN initiative and firepower would -combine
to reduce casualties, all areas contain fortified positions and can be
expected to be heavily booby trapped. There would inevitably be some
noncombatant casualties; however, the number would depend largely
on enemy reactions and tactics. While we have a fair idea of noncombatant
concentrations, some Cambodians will undoubtedly be mixed up with the
NVA/VC forces.
In regard to military casualties, considering a scale of high,
medium and' low intensity combat, these two operations would fall into
the high intensity category. Accordingly, military casualties could be
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expected to fall into the upper range for US forces and RVNAF. With
respect to noncombatant casualties, those to be expected under Option
1 are negligible. Under Option 2 the presence of civilian population
in the projected area of operations makes the risk of substantial
noncombatant casualties high.
Additionally, loss of some tactical aircraft should be anticipated.
11. Q: What time is needed by MACV to be on alert status
prepared to execute the mission, but without preposi-
tioning forces? What time is required to commence
execution of plan from time of decision in Washington,
including prepositioning of forces and ,fina.l coordination?
Answer: MACV will require 72 hours to complete lower echelon
combined planning, commence execution, including prepositioning of
forces and final coordination, after receipt; of the order to execute.
The final 24 hours should be allowed for prepositioning of forces and
final coordination. Depending on the involvement of friendly forces
at the time execution of the plan is ordered an additional 24 hours
might be required. Therefore, MACV would need to be on alert status
for 48 hours to be prepared to execute the mission, but without
prepositioning forces.
12. Q: What is the recommendation as to best public handling,
assuming a decision to proceed, including level on which
public affairs aspects should be handled?
Answer: Preparations for this operation will be difficult to conceal
since so many individuals, both on the GVN and the US side, will have
to be briefed prior to. execution; therefore, as the date of the operation
approaches, dangers of leaks will increase. For this reason, it would
be well to brief Bureau Chiefs of the major press bureaus in Saigon on
an embargoed basis 24 to 36 hours prior to the execution date. In the
event of any indications of a leak, the briefing should be held immediately
and the operations embargoed to preclude publication of any information
until released by MACV. ;_,
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
ABSOLUTELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/02/22 : LOC-HAK-447-10-16-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/02/22: LOC-HAK-447-10-16-7
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
ABSOLUTELY EYES ONLY
16
The briefing for Bureau Chiefs should be general in nature and
not indicate specific objective areas, date of execution, or other
specific details considered especially sensitive. However, the briefing
should be sufficiently detailed to define the purpose and the general
concept of operations. Bureaus should also be invited to dispatch
correspondents to cover the operation, instructed that such coverage
is embargoed until the embargo is lifted by MACV, and given a time
and place to have correspondents report. Arrangements for press
coverage should also be coordinated with RVNAF so that on-the-spot
coverage of RVNAF participation is also provided.
Correspondents who report to field units to cover the operation
should be briefed at a time convenient for the local commander but in
no case more than 12 hours prior to the operation.
All briefing should emphasize the fact that the operation results
directly from offensive military action taken by the NVA in Cambodia
and the resultant increased threat to allied forces in Vietnam. The
limited nature of objectives and the direct significance of activities in
the objective area to the security of allied forces should receive parti-
cular emphasis.
These actions will minimize the danger of a leak prior to execution
of the operation, will insure that coverage is balanced and factual rather
than sensational, and will hopefully result in coverage which places
events in proper perspective. While it may not be possible to preclude
speculative reporting which implies a general widening of participation
by US forces in Southeast Asia, it can be expected that as a result of
this type of approach, responsible newsmen can be expected to more
accurately present to the public a report on all aspects of the operation
and its significance.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
ABSOLUTELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/02/22 : LOC-HAK-447-10-16-7