LAOS - YOUR TUESDAY MEETING WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-4-6-6-4
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 9, 2009
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 16, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

f
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/09: LOC-HAK-4-6-6-4
1. W.
M.F,1\ GRAN UM
THE W111TE1 HOUSE
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: Lindscy Grant
IN F ORMMA TION
lvTarch 16, 1970
SUBJECT: Laos - Your Tuesday Meeting with Congressional Leaders
You are scheduled to meet -with Congressionca.l. leaiders friendly to our
role in Southeast Asia at 4:30 p- n-1. on Tci.esclay, to discuss =Laos.
I enclose the following materials:
Taal, A T h.a.e U. S. Role in Laos lii :stor. y -.cilcl Reasons
Tra1) Ti - MiIIt.::ry Op rnilcn aIl,~~ v`1tet.i.c:3es
'Cab C --- The Sy.tni.ngton. Stab cone ~itt:c c:
Disclosure Policy
y
drniY'istration
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
There are also attached:
Enclosure I -- Your briefing book for the March. 6 Bacl.. grounder.
Enclosure II -- Packets for Congress ion.al Leaders (Consistin, of
The President's Marcia 6 Statement; Kissinger
March 6 Baclzgrounder; Q FY A; The U. S. Role
in Laos)
The Congressional packets are of course intended to provide guidance
for their to use in preparing statements and rebuttals on Laos policy.
You will, mote that Tab A 11, 5. Role in. Laos") is included in the
I
Congressional pacts. :L'lhis is done to give; the h'ic lc-izclcrs a Checklist of
your t il+cing points which Cic_:yr can talc. with then.
SECR7':,'1'
OSD Review completed pages
7-8
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/09: LOC-HAK-4-6-6-4
 No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/09: LOC-HAK-4-6-6-4
I recommend that you lead off with the following
GF;T'; 1:1,.n L, 7"ALI;:titirG J:() I r'.I_' ,:
1. You wish to go over the argumentation in support of the Presid('t's
policy in Laos. You will, cover three areas which appear to be of parti-
cular interest on the Hill: the rationale for, our role; the statistics on
U. S. per sonnet, fatalities, and operations; and the reasons for our
disclosure policy concerning the Symington Sul)-conimittce transcript on
Laos.
O
2. On the first point -- the rationale for our role -- you are goi-fig to
provide them with the basic texts, some Q & As which you found useful.,
and. a. brief sstm-.ir ary? of our argul~rc :city.
3, In sumn:i.arizing our a.rgu:tnonts in an unclassified document, you have
dealt with. the justification for our ral.e, but not; really With the reasons
why should nlti} this role, The answer to the latter qts ,,st.i.carz is straight-
fc;rVI/ard:
Laos provides access from Corrr:r.-nu.nist areas to South Vietnam
and Thailand, and. to a neutral -- Cambodia - which is finding
itself increasingly threatened by a sem i-perm anent Vietnamese
Cone-nunist Occupation c>f its bo ccler areas, and by support which
those Coxaaan.i. ni ~t:s are ;ivixrg to Cambodian dissidents.
Laos needs some help, and no other signatory of the 1962 Geneva
accords has the will and the resources to help it.
If our failure to help the legitimate Government should result in
its collapse and replacement by a tool. of the Communists, the
logistic routes would be cleared for support to dissidence in
Thailand and Cambodia.
Similarly, a pro--Communist government in Laos would make
every effort to mobilize world opinion against our interdiction
efforts against the Ho trail,
4. Perhaps because of the 'Vietnam e.xperi.cnec, there is a tendency to look
at all our policies in East Asia in terms. We have said that
we don't plan to put ga-ou :..d combat troops into ]:. aos, At the sani.e: ti:nnc, we
think that La.r :tl is, war0i. Pie support we are t;ivi.rtil it economic and
rr>:i.li.t ,;
~t;ssi.~ Lance, plus tactical air support t:o Sotuvarra'ra's troops, plcl..s advice and
ascsi.,st~rr),r,c: in, air