EXPLOITATION OF TENSIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-289-6-4-1
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 9, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE WHITE HOUSE -
WASHINQTON
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT:
April 9, 1970
Exploitation of Tensions in the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe
Attached is an excellent CIA paper describing covert action programs
being undertaken to exploit tensions in the' Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe and identifying activities which may be emphasized in the future.
In assessing Soviet vulnerabilities the report notes that:
Although the internal dissident is not likely to signifi-
cantly influence Soviet society in the short term, existing
trends toward more active dissidence could be affected
by external developments. The discrediting of the regime
by a serious economic crisis or another Czech-type
crisis might promote radical changes in the internal
political climate.
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
MORI/CDF C05106190
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Suppression of the growing intellectual dissent by Soviet
authorities has disillusioned many foreign Communists
and Soviet sympathizers.
Among the non-Russian minorities in the Soviet Union
dissent is vocal and widespread.
-- There is also increasing criticism of the Soviet economy.
In Eastern Europe where the tensions ate-greater and the
Western orientation much stronger the Soviets will have
to rely on force to maintain hegemony.
There are numerous indications of the effectiveness of the program CIA
conducts to capitalize on Soviet vulnerabilities:
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Radio Free Europe, vhich broadcasts to an Eastern European
audience of over 30 41lion that swells dramatically during
crises, is frequently denounced by Communist leaders.
Czech Party Secretary Husak, for example, has blamed RFE
'tor his party's inability to win over the Czech population.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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.adie Liberty which broadcasts to thWSoviet Union has
bad a significant role in increasing manifestations of dis-
sent and opposition among the Soviet intelligensia. Defectors
have often commented on the significant impact of the broad-
cast of documents written by protesters.
The $150 million spent anually by the Russians for jamming
operations which are only marginally successful is indica-
tive of the value of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty
which cost less than :o operate.
Publication of smuggled manuscripts and magazines geared
to the Eastern European audience and distribution of books 25X1
not available in Communist countries have also made an
impact.
Emphasis on the following activities is being considered in planning for
future operations:
?
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? greater exploitation of dissent through modernized radio
? transmitting facilities, wider dissemination of criticism by
the intellectuals, and stimulation of nationality aspirations
? among Soviet minorities;
attacks on Soviet activities outside the bloc and intensified
exploitation of anti-Communist themes abroad; 2 5 X 1
developing leaders capable of providing a democratic alterna-
tive to Soviet-supported front organizations;
? preparations for covert programs to offset the threat of
Communist election victories in the Free World.
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Attachment
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TENSIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN. EUROPE
CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY
Introduction
?At no time in the history of the Soviet Union to date have
political forces outside the Communist Party leadership played a
significant role in influencing events. The Party apparatus, the
KGB and the deeply vested interests of the Soviet State hierarchy
are experienced in coping with dissidence of all types, and have an
impressive record of asserting their will at any cost to the rest of
society. The KGB in particular has an almost perfect record of
successful penetration, manipulation and suppression of opposition
elements. In addition there is an historic tradition of public apathy,
largely unchanged even today among the workers and peasants of
Russia, and dissident elements find little encouragement at the grass
roots. The authorities have often exploited the antipathy of the
working class toward the intelligentsia in suppressing incipient
demonstrations.
Thus the experience of Russian history strongly argues against
the proposition that the internal dissident will significantly influence
Soviet society in the short term. The conditions, nevertheless, which
abet existing trends toward more active and articulate dissidence
could be affected by external developments. A discrediting of the
regime by, say, another Czechoslovak crisis or a serious economic
crisis, might well promote radical 'changes in the internal political
climate. The paragraphs that follow should be considered in this
light.
Intellectual Dissent
To describe the nature and scope of dissidence in the Soviet
Union today poses the risk of over-emphasis. The Soviet regime
is by no means on the brink of collapse. On the other hand, some-
thing new has indeed emerged in Soviet society since Stalin's death.
The growing demand for freedom of expression has been widely
reported in the Western press, and its suppression by Soviet authori-
ties has in turn contributed to disillusionment among foreign
Communists and Soviet sympathizers.
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? Beyond the circle of leading-scientists and writers there are ..the..
active dissidents themselves. Most of them are younger members -of-
'"-th'er-Intelligentsia, but their ranks also include workers, teachers,
other professionals.
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The picture of the Soviet Union that these defectors paint is one
Of increasing cynicism and alienation on the part of the intelligentsia,
-and:apathy and bitterness in the working class/
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Minority Repression
Among many of the non-Russian minorities in the Soviet Union,
dissent is vocal and widespread. It is also vigorously repressed.
In the Ukraine, the arrests of hundreds of Ukrainian dissidents in ?
1965 and 1966, and subsequent repressions, have been vigorously
Protested by leading Ukrainian scientists, artists, and writers,
? The contempt of the Baltic pepple for Soviet rule remains as
strong as ever. It is no longer expressed in hopeless armed resis-
tance, as it was twenty years ago. Instead, these small nations
manifest a vigorous determination to preserve their national cultures.
Even the local Communist Party apparatus has sought to assert a
degree of autonomy. In Estonia many works of Western literature
that have never been published in Russian are printed in the native
language. Two of the major underground documents recently pro-
posing alternatives to the Communist dictatorship originated in
Estonia.
Economic Unrest
Since the December 1969 Central Committee Plenum, the Soviet
press has given increasing attention to the lethargy of the economy.
The best informed defectors and even Soviet economists depict the
economy as suffering from overcentralization, rigid control, and a
system of falsification and misrepresentation that prevents anyone
from knowing what the true conditions are. /
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Eastern Europe
In addition to its domestic problems, the Soviet Union has had
chronic difficulty in managing its satellites in Eastern Europe. In
Eastern Europe the tensions in society are much greater than in the
Soviet Union, the Western orientation much stronger, and the possi-
,..
'May exists that at some futu.re time one Or more of these countries
may successfully make the transition that Czechoslovakia essayed in
It seems inevitable that, as long as-the Soviet Union maintain,s
.',4-sCurrent system, it will be iMpossible for the peoples of Eastern
Europe to live in real harmony with the Soviet Union and that, to
maintain hegemony in the area, the Soviets will have to continue to
rely upon force.
?
Dissident elements in the USSR and Eastern Europe display
remarkable sympathy and under sta fo th
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Others
protested the biased- reporting in the Soviet press an oviet threats
before the troops moved in. Intellectuals in all Ea-stern European -
countries have actively collaborated with the Soviet dissidents, and--
have expressed their sympathy for those arrested and imprisoned.
With its easier access to the West, Eastern Europe acts as a
conduit for books, letters, manuscripts and ideas. The flow back
and forth across the Soviet borders is relatively easy and constant.
The fact that Eastern European 'standards of tolerance and freedom _
aiireasiiin, although restrictive, are 'ikell?aboye-the leve-ls permitted 11
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-in the Soviet Union makes the region's ability to influence the Soy-jot
Union a consideration of major importance to the United States.
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Radio Broadcasts
Free Europe, Inc., and Radio Liberty Committee, Inc., were
organized in 1749 and 1951 respectively by the CIA. The major
activity of each operation is radio broadcasting. Radio Free Europe
and Radio Liberty programming centers are located in
? ? . - ? ? ?
. The radio has achieved a high degree of -
-Eastern European listener acceptance as a station which identifies .?
-25X1 with their needs, thoughts and aspirations. It is estimated that over__
people listen to RFE broadcasts?_This percentage rises - =?
dramatically during periods of international crisis, ?RFE is denounced
almost daily by Communist media, and on occasion by-key figures of
the Eastern European governments. Czechoslovak Party Secretary
Husak has publicly placed a large share of the blame on RFE for his
Party's inability to win over the Czechoslovak population.
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The station is a political force with which the Eastern. European
ez,?t.'w1-4iregimes .must reckon. The res,scin for this lien partly in
_tp#.t,t,e,x,:n of ,cross-reporting?i e , reporting in detail to all the
Eastern European countries on domestic developments in thedi,'
Countries. This is in effect the principal way the peoples ,of -
the area learn of significant developments in their own and_ neighboring
countries. It can be demonstrated that RFE's repeated exposure of T'
domestic policies and methods has forced modification of censorship
and, sitnilar restrictions in several of the Eastern EuropeancountiR
n .
RFE's role in the 1968 Czechoslovak crisis is a striking example.
of
of the radio's effectiveness. Prior to the ousting of Party First
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Secretary Novotny in January 1968, RFE was the chief source of
factual information and research analysis on domestic affairs for
much of the Czechoslovak population. After the Soviet invasion
and the loss of their new-found freedom, the Czechoslovak
people again. became dependent on the round-the-clock reporting
of RFE. Audience research indicates that?RFE's liste.nership
rose to of the population. The station received
of letters extolling its programs, while ;the. Communist
news media unleashed an unprecedented series of attacks on RFE.
The Soviht journal Red Star describecithe,.radio as the Pmost.............
strategic weapon in the global psychological war being carried on
by the United States against thee world socia41tatNayste.4,......,..,.,_,,
Radio Liberty (RL) ,
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..contrast to RFE, RL
against the more restrictive Soviet system. Effectiveness is more
difficult to measure. However,, letters from listeners,. defector-
reports and Indicate that there is a sizeable auditenc
It is generally agreed that RL merits a sjgnificant share ef the-4. -
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--- -credit for the increasing manifestations of dissent and opposition
?
among the Soviet intelligentsia.i
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Communist Attacks on the Radios
Soviet and Eastern European attempts to discredit RFE and
RL are intensive and coordinated., The Communist regimes a're
particularly discomfited by the two.
d coverage and highly effective cross-reporting of internal devel-.3- ortinz 0
oprnents, and by their exploitation of intel1ectu,a1 ferment, _
nationalist tendencies and general dissent within the Soviet Union.
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A measure of the Soviet concern over Western broadcasts is
the extent of the Soviet jamming effort. At-this time, Czechoslovakia
and Bulgaria also extensively jam RFE broadcasts. According to a?
VOA study, the Soviets use 2, 000 - 2, 500 jammers at an estimated
annual cost of $150, 000, 000. As indicated above, however, the
jamming is marginally eTiective inasmuch as the target audiences
hear the radios on one or more frequencies. The cost of the Soviet
jamming effort can be put into perspective by comparing it with the
annual operating costs of FE, Inc., and RLC, Inc. and-
:espectively. The radios represent a 20-year krivest--
rnent of over
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Coordination and Interrelation of Programs
Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and the other organizations
and programs mentioned above reinforce ea-ch other's aetivities in
many ways, significantly enhancing the effectiveness of the ov_ezall _
P.?., ---,.,effortz--in. the ecology of dissidence in the Soviet Union and Eaator,n
Europe, political organizations such as the NTS and Prolog make
contact through Western European travelers with the dissenters inside.- ?
Through these tontacts and other means documents of protest, --
suppressed novels and similar material are brought out to the--West. -
They are published in the original language and then broadcast by
Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe back to the East, thus vastly_--
magnifying the audience for the original protest documents and in
n?ifirnulating further dissidence; Through the far-flung -contacts.,'
of the radios and other CIA instrumentalities the publications are
distributed to travelers from the Soviet Union and-Eastern Europe
4-82et1i and cheaply. Czech a.nd-Polish distributors enlist their cam.. -
n 11(1 `tratkiots to carry :back Russian volumes to Poland and Czechoslovakialo
for shipment onward. Few East Europeans need to be told that the
future of their own countries depends in large_measure upon develop--
merits in Moscow.
it this system of interlocking organizations and people, a. vital
role-i's 'also played by overt government media such as the Voice, of -
r
America and
? Their role is
media, and in
tandem to reinforce their
of course different from that of the covertly sporis,ored
recent years the two have worked harmoniously in
respective efforts.
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Planning for the Future
give..p_the necessary Rolicy,approvals.,p4d_laudget,ary,resources,,
we propose a number of additional courses of.covertaction, aimed
not only at the USSR itself, but also at Soviet presence and influence
outside the Bloc. Most of these can be undertaken with existing
some instances it will be necessary to create new ones.
Exploitation of Internal Dissent
se mode zation Ra,dio ,Fr ee Europe and ,Ra di o
Liberty Spectrum interference (including jamming) and channel con-.:-
lestion in the short and medium wave broadcasting modes have reached
such serious proportions that higher power transmitters are needed to.......
maintain an audible signal in the target area. The transmitting plants
of both Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe are outmoded and under,
powered. Both require augmentation and modernization to sustain
their effectiveness in a field of friendly and hostile "super power"-
-..-nravlitt.con-ipetitors. In addition, Radio Liberty needs new facilities
- -reach 'geographic areas of the USSR now only marginally covered. A .
-ininimurn program of modernization, established by careful Agency
review in coopetation with the Roreau of the Budget, calls for an out-
lay ol This item was struck from CIA's FY 1971- budget;
it will be included in the FY 1972 budget.
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