THE ISLANDS OF ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-558-15-10-5
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: February 19, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/10/23: LOC-4-558-15-10-5 x
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM:
SUBJECT:
ACTION
February 19, 1974
W. R. Smys
The Islands of Asia
This memorandum responds to two requests from you. Your first
request, issued at a WSAG meeting, was for a CIA study of the
likelihood of conflict over some islands in the China Sea. That study
is attached (Tab B) and will be drawn upon in the first part of this
discussion. Your second request, which you wrote on an earlier
memorandum I sent you (Tab C), was for a paper on the subject of
Asian concerns about islands in the China Sea.
This memorandum also sketches some U.S. policy considerations,
which are on the difficult side. It leads to a request for better
information on legal claims to the islands and on our position (Tab A).
THE ISLANDS IN QUESTION
Conflicting claims to the off-shore islands of Asia "arise because the
long and uneven histories of the states in the area led to periodic
changes in political control, because the age of colonial occupation
coincided with the period when many claims might have been finalized,
and because several nations are still divided. Claims and counter-
claims to at least seven groups of islands in the East and South China
Seas could produce conflicts involving the U.S. or its allies:
1. The Spratly Islands (see fold-out map at Tab D). These
islands are sprinkled over an area 500 miles long and 200
miles wide between Borneo, Vietnam, and the Philippines.
They are claimed by the People's Republic of China, the
? SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY - XGDS
DE C LAS - IMPDE T; BYAUTH HAKISSINGER
NSS, State Dept. reviews
completed
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/10/23: LOC-HAK-558-15-10-5
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/10/23: LOC-HAK-558-15-10-5
SECRET/SENSITIRJEYES ONLY 111
2
Republic of China, the Philippines and South Vietnam. We under-
stand that the Philippines occupy the islands of Nanshan, Thitu,
Loaita, West York and Northeast Cay, generally in the northern
part of the island group. The ROC maintains a garrison of marines
on Itu Abs, right in the center of the island group. South Vietnam
has long occupied one island, called Namyit, and has recently also
occupied Sand Cay, Sin Cowe, Spratly and Amboyna, all in the south-
west part; it was also planning to occupy Northeast Cay but nobody is
certain if it tried to do so.
Z. The Paracel Islands (on map at Tab D). This island group is
claimed by both Chinas and by South Vietnam. North Vietnam has
not made a claim. It is now occupied by Communist Chinese forces
who expelled the South Vietnamese several weeks ago.
3. The Macclesfield Bank (on map at Tab D). This is a submerged
atoll about 75 miles long and 30 miles wide, almost in the middle of
the South China Sea. It is claimed by both Chinas. The Philippines
may have a claim, but they have not formalized it. A similar situ.-
ation prevails in the Scarborough Shoal (not shown on map), a
submerged reef southeast of the Macclesfield Bank.
4. The Pratas Reef (on map at Tab D). Pratas is a coral reef
southeast of Hong Kong, about 13 miles in diameter with one main
island at its edge. Both Chinas claim it, but the ROC has occupied
it and has built an airfield with a 6, 000-foot concrete runway on the
main island.
5. The Senkaku. Islands (see fold-out map at Tab E). These islands,
northeast of Taiwan and west of Okinawa, are small and rocky with
no inhabitants except occasional visiting fishermen. The islands are
claimed by both Chinas and by Japan, with the Japanese claim
strengthened by the reversion of Okinawa in 1972.
6. The West Coast Korean Islands (on map at Tab E). These five
islands form an extended crescent pattern just off the southwest
coast of North Korea. They are claimed by both Koreas. Under the
terms of the 1953 Armistice, they are controlled by the United Nations
Command (UNC) and are lightly garrisoned by South Korea, which plans
a heavier garrison. The inhabitants are farmers and fishermen.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/10/23: LOC-HAK-558-15-10-5
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/10/23: LOC-HAK-558-15-10-5
IP -
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY 3
7. The Take Shima Islands (on map at Tab E). This is a group
of small islands in the Sea of Japan, halfway between South Korea
and Japan. They are unsuitable for civilian settlement, but are
occupied by a small South Korean garrison.
CURRENT IMPORTANCE
The disputes over all these islands, long based on political and
security considerations, have now intensified for two reasons:
-- Oil. Virtually every one of the disputed islands or island
groups lies near and perhaps on top of an area where oil may
be found and where exploration is either going on or contemplated.
This is particularly true of the Paracels, the Spratlys, the Sen-
kakus, and Take Shima. The Chinese already have an oil rig on
one of their long-held islands in the Paracels. Philippine military
occupation of some of the Spratlys coincided with growing oil
company interest in that area two to three years ago. Several
oil companies have made studies showing a good likelihood of
oil in the Senkaku area. South Korea has 1.-..t.;ent.ly ticignet1 an
agreement with Japan for oil exploration in the Sea of Japan
near Take Shima. South Korea has also granted concessions to
oil companies in the Yellow Sea south of the West Coast Islands.
The South Vietnamese have granted some exploration rights in the
off-shore areas between South Vietnam and the Spratlys, though
most of their exploration area lies south of Vietnam.
-- The Law of the Sea Conference. Nobody knows what will emerge
from that conference, and that uncertainty breeds some urgency to
act. If the more extreme proposals for a 200-mile wide sovereign
area off all coasts and islands are accepted, as now seems unlikely,
the PRC could gain sovereignty over almost all the South China Sea
and, in effect, close the Malacca Straits, if it held the Paracels,
Macclesfield Bank, and the Spratlys. Even if only the patrimonial
concept is adopted, Peking could gain access over most of the area's
resources. Other states have conflicting ambitions. Even if none of
these far-reaching proposals are adopted, simple calculation of median
lines or of continental shelf areas argues that everybody should grab
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/10/23: LOC-HAK-558-15-10-5
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/10/23: LOC-HAK-558-15-10-5
IP
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
as much as they can while the grabbing is good and while the
rules are being written. This is true not only in the South China
Sea but in all the other island areas. Islands have become more
important than they ever seemed before, since they may give
claim to so many other things.
ATTITUDES OF DIFFERENT STATES
People's Republic of China
4
The Chinese want to get control over all the islands they claim, but
they want to get it without generating undue tension and alarm that
could lead to greater Russian opportunities in the area or that could
weaken some of the links that China has recently established with its
neighbors and with the United States.
? The Chinese crowded the South Vietnamese on the Paracels, setting
up a situation in which the South Vietnamese would and did appear to
be the provocative party. They may now intend to create a similar
situation in the Spratlys, and they have formally denounced South
Vietnamese occupa.Lion of soute of those islands.
Under the terms of the Shanghai Communique, the Chinese are restrained
from direct attack on Republic of China forces which occupy at least one
island in the Spratlys as well as some other islands elsewhere. If they
attack Philippine forces, they could provoke an American reaction and
considerable alarm throughout all Southeast Asia. They are also con-
strained by the size of a potential Spratly operation. Taking and holding
those islands would require a major military effort, at a distance of 600
miles from Hainan with a supply line subject to Vietnamese air and naval
attacks.
The CIA memorandum (Tab B) concludes that the Chinese are likely to
avoid a military clash over the Spratlys and are highly unlikely to
attack the Prata,s Reef or the Senkakus. The Chinese decision to
release all South Vietnamese captured in the Paracels bears out this
analysis that Peking does not now want a major crisis.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
---,--- No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/10/23: LOC-HAK-558-15-10-5
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/10/23: LOC-HAK-558-15-10-5
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
The Republic of China
Taipei has taken steps to avoid provoking either the South Vietnamese
or the Philippines over the Spratlys, and would clearly feel extended
and uncomfortable if Communist Chinese forces began operations there.
Nonetheless, it is continuing naval patrols in the Spratlys, and it has
stated its determination to fight over Pratas Reef, which lies closer to
Taiwan and is less subject to conflicting international claims. Taipei
also continues to assert rights over continental shelf resources.
Japan
Tokyo has been deeply disturbed by the implications of the Chinese
military action in the Paracels. It fears for the Senkakus and also
for the future of the oil concession areas that it wishes to develop on
or near the Chinese continental shelf. The Japanese are also worried
about our attitude. They have wondered internally whether the Chinese
would have acted in the Paracels if they had not been sure of American
restraint. They have come to us at various levels to get our support
for their claim to the Senkakas, citing the Okinawa reversion 1-realy.
The Philippines
The Philippine Government has sought indications of American intent
even more than the Japanese. Mr. Rol=lo has spoken to Ambassador
Sullivan several times, once comparing the Chinese move into the
Paracels with the "Nazi movement into the Rhineland." He has not
formally invoked our bilateral defense treaty but has asked for con-
sultations that could ultimately force discussion of our attitude on the
applicability of that treaty to Manila's island claims and to the forces
it maintains there.
The Philippine Government is not only concerned about Peking, however.
It has also protested to Taipei and Saigon about their conflicting claims
to the Spratlys. To buttress its claim to at least some of the Spratlys,
it has asserted that the Spratly Islands that it occupies constitute a new
and separate grouping discovered and explored after World War II by a
Philippine adventurer who gave them the name of "Freedomland." Being
new, the islands allegedly become "res nullius" and not subject to his-
torical claims by China and others.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/10/23: LOC-HAK-558-15-10-5
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/10/23: LOC-HAK-558-15-10-5
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
South Vietnam
South Vietnam has island disputes with a number of states. Its
claims conflict with Cambodia's in the Gulf of Thailand and with
several other states in the South China Sea. Because of this, the?
South Vietnamese regard any challenge to their islands anywhere as
an extremely serious matter. Moreover, since the discovery and
development of oil could revolutionize South Vietnamese relations with
many countries, even including the United States, Saigon is determined.
It has, nonetheless, shown a readiness to discuss its claims with
competitors.
The South Vietnamese quickly learned that we were not behind them
on the islands issue and they have tended to act unilaterally. Their
occupation of several Spratly islands reflects President Thieuls
judgment that China will not attack such a distant target and his feeling
that he has gained a strong nationalist issue no matter what the outcome.
He has used that issue to embarrass Hanoi and the "PRG, " who obviously
do not want to offend China.
Indonesia
The Indonesians have stated that China owns the Paracels and the
Spratlys. They do not want to get into an argument with Peking over
this issue at this time, when general relations are slowly improving.
They have asked our views, but without such urgency as Manila or
Tokyo. They think the International Court of Justice should resolve
the conflicting claims.
Other ASEAN
Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore have generally remained silent.
They have some sympathy for the South Vietnamese but they want to
improve relations with China and do not want this to become an issue
with Peking. Malaysia, whose possessions in Borneo are only 100
miles from the Spratlys, has expressed some concern about the
extension of China into Southeast Asia.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/10/23: LOC-HAK-558-15-10-5
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/10/23: LOC-HAK-558-15-10-5
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
The Koreas
The West Coast Islands dispute is near becoming a vital issue for
both Koreas. South Korea has made firm statements asserting its
control and has moved to expand its garrison. North Korea has
begun a political challenge to UNC control of the islands, probably
intending to demand them for its own if and when the UNC is dissolved.
It has stepped up naval patrols around them. For both countries, oil
rights as well as naval control in the Yellow Sea could be at stake, but
the dispute over these islands is primarily political. North Korea's
immediate objective is probably to increase pressure for early termi-
nation of the UNC,
LIKELY SITES FOR CRISES
Though all the islands are in dispute, not all are likely to become
a focal point for crisis in the next year or two. Foremost candidates
for attention are:
-- The Korean West Coast Islands. It is difficult to believe that
North Korea, having voiced its legal claims to the waters around
these islands, will not challenge South Korea for them at some
point in 1974 or 1975. One can hope that the challenge will only
be legal and diplomatic rather than military. Even if no such
challenge is issued, there is great danger of incidents between
the two Koreas. Both are exercising their claimed rights with
some restraint but their forces in that area are in such proximity
and in such uncertain positions that they are almost compelled to
interact and very probably to overreact.
..- The Spratlys. The greatest likelihood of incidents and even of
major military engagements over these islands arises out of the
conflicting claims of Peking and Saigon. If the Chinese try to
take even some of the Spratlys, the South Vietnamese will be sure
to fight. They will undoubtedly give a better -- and longer --
account of themselves than in the Paracels. There is also the
danger that our three allies may stumble into mutual confrontation
over these islands, though to date they have all been very careful
to avoid that.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/10/23: LOC-HAK-558-15-10-5
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/10/23: LOC-HAK-558-15-10-5
SECRET/SENSITR/EYES ONLY
? The Paracels. If the South Vietnamese challenge Chinese
occupation of the Paracels, which seems unlikely, another
battle could develop that the Chinese would probably win. With-
out such challenge, there is still some risk of incidents,
? The Senkakus and the oil areas. It is also possible, though
less likely, that a crisis could flare up if western oil rigs begin
moving into the concession areas northeast of the Senkakus in
the East China Sea. But all parties to such a potential dispute
are acting with considerable restraint.
PROBLEMS FOR US
All the states involved in these disputes are faced with difficult
decisions complicated by uncertainties about the results of oil
drilling and of discussions on the law of the sea. All want to defend
their interests firmly and even vigorously without appearing aggressive.
Our situation is different, since we have no direct interests though some
concern about the outcome and the , process by which it is reached.
The principal problem for the United States arises out. of certain
complexities of the Nixon Doctrine. That doctrine has enabled us to
reduce our forces under the cover provided by a more active diplomacy
that has promoted restraint by those who might have tried to profit from
our withdrawals. Nonetheless, we have stated that we would honor our
commitments even while we have tried to create a diplomatic framework
in which they were less likely to be challenged. The islands problem
strikes us at our weakest point. It makes states less inclined to show
restraint. It also compels us to deal with situations in which our
commitments are not clear because of legal uncertainties, but in
which at least some allies will ask us to live up to them. If we fail
to live up to them, even for the legitimate reason that we do not know
whose claim is valid, some may argue that this indicates a lessened
determination in cases where our obligation is categorical.
A special dichotomy exists between our assertion that others must
be more self-reliant and our natural tendency to urge restraint upon
our allies. We are asking them to protect their interests themselves
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/10/23: LOC-HAK-558-15-10-5
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/10/23: LOC-HAK-558-15-10-5
w.
IP
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
at the same time that we are restraining them from actions that they
may regard as imperative. We have faced this issue already in the
Spratlys and the Korean islands. The result in both cases has been
the same although our internal justification has been different. We
have let our allies proceed pretty much as they wished even though
we feared that their actions would appear provocative and even though
we have admonished them. This may have to be our general stand. It
enables us to maintain some distance from potential crises and better
preserve alliance ties. It enables our allies to protect their interests
and to help forestall changes in the balance of power. But it does in-
crease the likelihood of confrontations.
Some of our friends may not let us have our way on this. Manila and
Tokyo are moving toward direct demands for an expression of our
intent. Fortunately, they seem less likely to become involved in
military confrontations in the near future unless Chinese forces
challenge Philippine claims to the Spra.tlys. The Vietnamese, thinking
correctly that we do not want to give them full support, have taken the
attitude that we should stay out. The Koreans have tried to get our
diplomatic support and to keep us involved politically, but have been
more independent La their military thinktoz. A clear statement of
U.S. readiness to support Japan and the Philippines in disputed areas
cannot help but jaundice Vietnamese attitudes since we are not supporting
them, just as our reluctance to become involved in the latter's quarrels
has raised doubts in Tokyo and Manila.
We ultimately need to consider the geopolitical implications of what
might happen as well as our current dilemmas. An Asia in which China
? controls all the islands that it now claims will look very different from
the Asia we think about today. The preliminary attitudes of some of
our friends suggest that it could be an Asia in which we will once again
be drawn into the kinds of difficult involvement a that the President and
you have striven to reduce, or -- paradoxically ? in which our friends
will feel greater compulsions for unilateral actions.
As this suggests, the outcome of the islands issue, and the form in
which it is resolved, could have major impact in Asia. But each
particular problem is different, and it is hard to see the forest for
the trees.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/10/23: LOC-HAK-558-15-10-5
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/10/23: LOC-HAK-558-15-10-5
111P
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
10
Our policy dilemmas could be difficult if crises erupt, and even if
they do not. We will need to decide where and where not to commit
ourselves, where and where not to call for arbitration or other forms?
of peaceful settlement, and what role -- if any. -- to play as the situ-
ations in these islands evolve. We also need to decide whether to take
initiatives to forestall crises or to let situations heat up to create
pressures for resolution.
THE LEGAL PROBLEMS
We cannot now sort out all the complications or even identify them.
It seems premature to suggest a NSSM, since few policy issues are
clear-cut and we will need to retain great flexibility. I believe,
however, that we should at least have a clearer understanding of our
own legal position, and that is where we should start. At Tab A is a
memorandum to the Deputy Secretary of State requesting a legal
study.
Recomtnen.dation
?That you sign the attached memorandum to the Deputy Secretary of
State.
Approve Disapprove
Coordination: Richard H. Solomon
Donald Stukel
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/10/23: LOC-HAK-558-15-10-5 ?