WSAG MEETING - INDOCHINA - MONDAY, APRIL 16, 1973

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-527-1-1-4
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 14, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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a Wt,L.1
MEMORANDUM
C '-16(..-ECI0?)et`,1
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TO ET/SENSITIVE
JCS review completed pages
14-31
April 14, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
DIA review completed pages
11-13
USAF,
DOS, OSD,
JCS ,
review(s) ?
completed
pages 1-10
State Dept.
reviewed &
denied
release pages
14-31 ?
NSS review
completed.
RICHARD T. KENNEDY
JOHN H. HOLDRMGE
SUBJECT: WSAG MEETING - Indochina -
Monday, April 16, 1973
The purpose of the meeting is to review the situation and to focus on.
continued serious DRV violations of the agreement. You want to impress
on the group the President's impatience. You will want to outline steps
we should take now to impress on the DRV that we will not tolerate
continued blatant violations. You may want to advise the group that
mine clearing operations have been suspended and the JEC talks held
off until at least Thursday.
You will want to cover:
1. South Vietnam - The situation and possible responses.
-- Air attack on Khe Sanh
- GVN relief on Tonle Cham
? GVN escort on Mekong
Z. Cambodia - The situation and possible responses.
-- Increased U.S. air support
? ARVN cross-border operations
-- Speed up in MAP deliveries
-- U.S. and Thai airlift
-- Strengthened U.S. missions
3. Laos - The situation and possible responses.
-- U.S. air support if requested
4. Reconnaissance flights over DRV (ROE)
5. ?ICCS
6. Two-Party Commission and Four Party Team.
7. Summary of Actions Required
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
1. South Vietnam
[The Communists continue to build SAM sites around Khe Sa.nh
25X1 and to extend the runway, with about 4,200 feet now usable. 25X1
Apparently, they intend Khe Sanh to become a major base.. There
are tenuous indications that some NV.A units may be moving back
rth Vietnam from South Vietnam and Northern Laos. The
NVA Division moved to Nortil viPtrinm frn-t-ri Quang Tri earlier
this year. Now some units of the may also ha e been
withdrawn. Both suffered heavily in earlier fighting. The 25X1
may also have returned from Northern Laos. Forces in Northern
South Vietnam, however, are still at least equal in numbers to those
there at the beginning of last Spring's offensive and the nu.Mbers of
tanks and artillery in South Vietnam exceed last year's level.] (Tab A)
-- Ask Mr. Schlesinger to brief.
-- How certain are we that units of the Divisions
have left South Vietnam? (Ask Mr. Schlesinger)
. What does this movement mean for NV-A strength in SVN and
for the relative capabilities of the two sides?
. Do we interpret this move as evidence of compliance with
the Agreement, or as merely reflecting a military need to
refit and recuperate?
? How many of the SAM sites around Khe Sanh are occupied?
What is the total AA strength in the area? (There are 4 bns.
of SA-as in 10 sites and 860 AA guns in Quan,g Tri Province.)
(Ask Admiral Moorer)
^ Do we know whether this is limited to the Khe' Sanh area.a or
do the Communists appear to be progressively extending the
SAM envelope?
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Possible GVN/US Response
. Can the VNAF operate effectively within the SAM-protected area?
. Can the VNAF destroy the SAM sites by itself?
. What can U.S. air do?
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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? There has been a recent flare-up of fighting near Icontiml. Do you
believe this presages more significant actions, or is it only a
temporary local high point? (Ask Mr. Schlesinger.),
-- The situation at Tonle Cham seems to have stabilized. Do we
anticipate renewed enemy attacks? (Ask Admiral Moorer and
Mr. Schlesinger)
-- How serious is the threat in the Hong Ngu area?
Possible GVN and U.S. Responses
-- What is the status of ARVN plans for a relief operation?
-- Is ARVN making any serious attempt to clear the banks of the
Mekong so the supply convoys can get through to Phnom Penh?
(Ask Admiral Moorer)
? The ARVN 9th Division has been attacking close to. and across the
Cambodian border.
Possible U. S. /GVN Response
-- Would large cross-border operation perhaps capture or destroy
sizable enemy supply dumps?
What would be the likely enemy reaction?
. Would such ARVN operations be likely to relieve pressure on
communications to Phnom Penh?
-- Would increased B-52 attacks in the Cambodia areas close to the
Cambodian border with SVN be an effective help?
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
2. Cambodia
[Though the Khmer Insurgents are not believed to be strong enough
to take Phnom Penh, they apparently intend to conduct attacks near
?and-within the capital to further weaken the government. In addition,
the Communists continue to attempt to cut all lines of communication
into the capital. Most worrisome is reported movement of NVA anti-
aircraft units from southern Laos into Cambodia.]
[Sihanouk's visit to Cambodia has further moved the political initiative
into Communist hands, while in Phnom Penh Lon. Non's resignation
frorn the government has not produced any discernible improvement.
(The PRC and Hanoi have reiterated their strong support for Sihanouk. )]
Ask General Haig to brief on the political situation in Phnom Penh.
Are there actions we should take to bolster the Lon Nol government?
Is there any likelihood of a coup? What would such a change mean
for the war and for our interests? (Ask Mr. Schlesinger and.
General Haig)
?,.
-- Possible Cambodian/U.S. responses.
? Will the FANK be able to repulse Communist attacks in and near?
Phnom Penh? Admiral Moorer. )
--s FANK making any progress in opening the highways and clearing
the aver banks?
Can we get the CVN to open the Mekong and protect convoys?
(We believe this must be done.)
?? ? ? .
Or Would such operations impact adversely on the ceasefire?
(Ask AmbaSsador Porter).
-- Is our bombing effective? Is.it sufficient? (We believe it should
be stepped,up. )
? 104j we have adequate information on targets?
.? Are we attacking the NVA AAA units moving into Cambodia?
(We should do so without delay. )
-- Would FANK be helped by sizable All.VN cross-border operations?
(Ask Admiral ?Moorer) (We think it would.).
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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Would a dramatic delivery of more military equipment be
psychologically helpful? (Defense is prepared to move
quickly to provide 2 assault boats, 15 M-48 tanks and
5 APCs which General Haig offered to Lon Nol. )
-- We need to keep up the airlift of supplies to Phnom Penh
and get the Thai to participate. (Task Defense and State)
How can we strengthen our mission in Phnom Penh?
. Can we get the personnel ceiling raised? (Ask State and Defense.)
-- Phnom Penh needs an auxiliary source of power. Can AID provide
one quickly?
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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3. Laos
[The Pathet Lao are dragging their feet in the current negotiations,
probably intending to frustrate Souvanna into softening his terms and
because they believe that time favors the Communist side. Militarily
the situation remains relatively quiet, likely because the Communists
do not wish to give cause for a resumption of U.S. bombing in Laos.
But the LPF have proposed a line demarcating areas of control
which represent a massive land grab and would turn over to the LPF
or put under direct threat important bases and real estate of the RLG. ]
? Ask Ambassador Sullivan to summarize the negotiations.
-- What are the prospects for successfully forming the Provisional
Government?
-- Do we expect indefinite Communist delays, or do they have a
specific goal after attaining which they would conclude the agreement?
? Will Souvanna hold firm? (Ask Ambassador Sullivan)
-- Will the Laotians be able to maintain their military position?
jAsk Admiral Moorer and Mr. Schlesinger.)
Are there likely to be attacks on Sala Phou Kourx? (Some defectors
reported such plans.
? Will the friendly forces around Tha Wang be able to hold?
Possible U.S. Responses
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-- If fighting should increase, will our aixLlu_pitial?
. Are we prepared to provide it? (Ask Admiral Moorer)
Will we have to do some recruiting
TOP q-Pr41:2 VrT, /QV-MCP-Pi-IT'
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Reconnaissance (SR-71) fli hts over the DRY.
The President has ordered two flights this week. The first may
go tonight Washington time.
Ask Admiral Moorer (He is prepared).
-- To describe the track which will be flown
-- To discuss the Rules of Engagement
-- We will need a public position to answer press queries.
(Ask Ambassador Porter).
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
6. The Two-Party and Four-Party Commissions
a. Two-Party Commission
[GVN-PRG discussions center on attacks around Tonle Chain.
Progress is stymied while the PRG insists on a meeting of the
local commanders only (a communist general and an ARVN major),
while the GVN holds out for the commanders and a colonel on each
side.
-- Is there any prospect of progress in the Two-Party Commission?
?(Ask Ambassador Porter.)
-- Is the GVN position reasonable, or are they trying to block
agreement?
-- Can we bring additional pressure on the PRG to get the
Commission operating meaningfully?
b. Four-Party Team
[The DRV-PRG have emphasized the need for agreement on
principles governing repatriation of remains and have said the
Team "must be prepared to work for years. " We have acknowledged
the need for operational procedures for contested areas, but hope
for speedy action in areas clearly controlled by the PRC/DRV. The
DRV deputy chief has taken. our proposals to Hanoi. The DRV may
reply at the next meeting on April 17.3
? Are the communists being cooperative so far in the Four-Party
Team? (Ask Ambassador Sullivan.)
-- What do we anticipate their attitudes will be?
-- What kinds of pressures could make them more cooperative?
(Ask Ambassador Porter.)
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
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Io..E41?10.1.1?1-V.Z.
.Swnmary. of Actions Required
-- Preparation of plans for VNAF o
on the South (Defense/jCS)
? ARVN clearing actions on the Mekong (State/Defense
11;mbas sy/DAO)
? ARVN country escort on Mekong (State/Defense)
? ARVN cross-border operation planning (State/Defense
to Ernbassy/DA0)
Increased B-52 and tac air in Cambodia (Defens
-- Increased B-52 attacks inside Cambodia border with "
SVN (Defense/SCS)
-- Air attacks on NVA AAA units in
-- Airlift to Phnom Penh (Defense)
Tb.ai airlift to Phnom Penh (State/Defen
Expedite MAP deliveries to Cambodia. (Defense)
? ?Mnerating equipment for Phnom Penh (State
Ceiling relief for Embassy Phnom Penh (State)
-- Plans. for air support in Laos if requested and related PR
plans (Defense/SCS/State
to withdraw (Defense/CIA/State)
PR Plan for SR-71 flights (State)
SECRET /SENSITIVE
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April 14, 1973
?Ni"MORANDI.TiVi FOR: MR. KISSINGER
FROM: J01.-MI H. HOU:MIDGE
? SUBJECT: Communist Viblations of the Vietnam
and Laos Agreements
Attached at Tab A is the CLAIDIA weekly report, dated April 13, on
Communist violations of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements.
Among the report's most significant Sind/12gs are the following items:
Only two small groups of specialists started South during the last week.
Two other small groups were also detected for the first time in the pipe-
line. A high level of North Vietnamese logistics activity continues.
Vehicle traffic increased in Cuang Tri and over the passes into Laos.
Tenuous evidence also suggests that at least some elements of two NVA
divisions (304 and 312) in northern MR-1 may be returning to adjacent
areas ,of North Vietnam. However, even if all elements of these units
departed, the NVA would retain a force structure in MR-1 similar to
what existed on the eve of the 1972 Easter offensive. Communist initiated
combat incidents remained at a moderate level in the South but rose signi-
ficantly in Laos. ?
Highlights of the details are summarized below.
North Vietnamese Personnel Movements
.During the reporting period, the initial detection of four small
special purpose groups in the pipeline does not significantly affect our
total estimate of 35, 000 North Vietnamese personnel who were either in
the pipeline January 23 or started South since that date. No new combat
replacement personnel have started South in the past month and fewer
special purpose groups have been detected starting South, thus indicating
that infiltration of both categories may be drawing to a Close as the rainy
season approaches.
SEC RET
XGOS by Auth CIA/DIA
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3:T.C11.=
-- The evidence indicating the redeployment of some element of two
NVA. divisions to southern North Vietnam in tenuous. We do not know
-whether the change reilects a pez.-manent move or a temporary rest and
refitting period before rotating back into the South.
? A total of ten SAM-2 missile sites have now been established near
Ithe Sanh (four of their sites are occupied). Two NVA AAA regiments are
relocating from Quang Tri to the southern Laos /Cambodian border area.
The headquarters element of an NITA armored regiment has moved from
the Hanoi area. to a point north of Loc Ninh on the MR-3/Cambodian border.
1%!1ovement of Supplies
-- Heavy Communist logistics move.m.ents continued during the past week,
particularly in Quang Tri Province where supplies are being moved into for-
ward areas. Traffic moving South over the passes out of North Vietnam in-
creased sightly. The heaviest NVA truck traffic in southern Laos occurred
in areas adjacent to Quang Tri and A Shan. Valley.
Specific instances of logistics activity inside South Vietnam included:
? On Route 9 in northern Quarts Tri Province, 334 vehicles were
notedbetween April 6-10.
? On April 10, 31 x 57 nun A&A pieces were observed parked on
Route 616 near Elie Sarea.
? Forty-one buses were observed parked along Route 1 north of
Quang Tri City on April 8.
? One hundred thirty southbound cargo vehicles were observed on
Route 1033 in the western DMZ between April 6-12.
In southern Laos and northeastern Cambodia, the following acthrtties,
among others, were noted:
? On Route 99 in the central Lao panhandle, 329 vehicles were
observed between April 6-10.
? In the period 6-12 April, 322 vehicles were detected moving South
through the Ban Karel Pass.
SC RET
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N.d4Za 41.
t Activity.
-- In South Vie.tnara, ARITN reported a total of 33 major and 597 minor
Communist initiated cease-fire violations, in contrast to 122 azid 597 incidents
rZ3p actively during the previous period. These incidents includad 6 major
ground attacks, and the downing of 3 hsiicopters (two with ICCS markings).
In Laos, NITA. forces. launched 1-1,avy, sustained attacks; sunported
taz.fits against R.LG units delendin?; the Route. 4 corridor southeast of
the. Plaine des Jar.
SECRET ?
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