VIETNAMIZING THE WAR (NSSM 36)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-502-1-5-7
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 67
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2012
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: June 23, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/12/28: LOC-HAK-502-1-5-7
f OSD, DOS, NSS reviews l a~ V
IrmmnI Carl
THE WHITE HOUSE
ACTION ? ?
June 23, 1969
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger -
SUBJECT: Vietnamizing the War (NSSM 36)
MORI/CDF
C03322861
Secretary Laird has forwarded to you the outline plan
(Tab A) prepared by the Joint Chiefs for Vietnamizing the war.
This plan has been coordinated with the Department of State and
the Central Intelligence Agency. The plan covers two areas:
1. Alternatives for U. S. force reductions during the
period July 1, 1969-December 31, 1969; ?
2. An outline for the final report on longer-term
Vietnamization which you are requested to approve.
Five options for 1969 redeployments are offered in NSSM
36, ranging from withdrawals of 50 to 100, 000. The first increment
has already been decided at Midway and Secretary Laird recommends
in his report an additional increment, with a total up to 50, 000 for
1969 depending upon evaluation of the reaction to the first withdrawal.'
In a separate memorandum, the Secretary of State expresses a preference
for an alternative involving a total of 85, 000, but again depending upon
further consideration after the initial withdrawal.
The longer-term plans on Vietnamization provide a series of
alternatives for U. S. troop reductions with varying timetables from
18 months to 42 months, and varying ceilings for the residual American
troops in South Vietnam ranging from 260, 000 to 306, 000. Secretary
Laird feels that even a 42 month timetable with withdrawals up to
290, 000 forces would probably result in interruption of pacification
progress. A much faster withdrawal could result in more serious
,problems for pacification and allied military capabilities, as well as
possible adverse effects. on the GVN, in the absence of reciprocal North
Vietnamese withdrawals.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
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TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
The problem now facing us is a decision on procedures for
consideration of Secretary Laird's report. There are,two principal
options open:
1. Circulating the paper as a normal NSC document for
R
regular NSC consideration (which has not yet been done); this wou? ?'
involve increased risks of leakage.
2. Treating the paper in a meeting of NSC -principals any;
in this case my staff would prepare- an issues paper for consideration
of the principals only.
Secretary Laird would prefer the paper' be handled on a tight-'?~'`"`
hold basis and, therefor e, would probably prefer the second option.
I would concur. -
RECOMMENDATION:
That NSSM 36 be considered at a meeting of NSC principals
only
That NSSM 36 be circulated as a normal NSC document for
regular NSC consideration
Other
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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THE. SECRETARY OF DEFENS I`
WASHINGTON. D. C. 20 Oi
? ~. ( tgypa..:y. F: l~.S yf=~ /' fie` ~yi~C-{~~la ~,~
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Vietnamizing the War (NSSM 36)
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have prepared an outline plan (en-
closure 1) for Vietnamizing the War, with specific recommendations
and alternatives for the remainder of 1969. This plan has been
coordinated with the Department of State and the Central Intelligence
Agency. As I shall indicate below, I believ e we can plan tentatively
to withdraw 50, 000 men in 1969, with the first increment of 20, 000-
25, 000 men to start redeployment in July. For reasons I shall outline,
I believe we must keep our planning flexible and not commit now beyond
the 20, 000-25, 000. The State Department believes the withdrawal
package for 1969 should consist of 85, 000 men (Alternative C below).
I indicated in :ny report following my trip to South Vietnam that
I was disappointed in the progress made by the South Vietnamese in
assuming more of the burden of the war. Nonetheless, they are im-
proving and with the right kind of help from us, continuing improvement
can be expected. There are a number of unknowns, however, affect-
ing the rate and absolute level of improvement in the Republic of
Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF). These unknowns include, inter
alia, the quality of leadership, the motivation of the armed forces,
the psychological reaction of the South Vietnamese to US redeploy-
ments, and the ability of the South Vietnamese to find a stronger
organizational structure. These unknowns, collectively, can be
at least as important to the over-all situation in South Vietnasn as
the more tangible and measurable elements. With such unknowns,
we must recognize the possibility that even with additional training,
improved equipment, and increased combat support, the RVNAF
twill not be able soon to stand alone against the current North Vietnamese
and Viet Cong force levels. Our timetable for withdrawal of US
forces from South Vietnam should take such conditions into account.
We should strive for a sensitive balance between too much, too soon
and too little, too late.
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I believe this is best done by making an early announcement
of the withdrawal o? a modest number of troops (20, 0~~~0-25, 000)
and then carefully weighing the situation, to include various re-
actions (NVN, SVN, US), befoxe making the newt mave. If this
announcement is made in early June, withdrawal of this initial
increment could begin in July and be completed in August.
The reaction to such a mave could kie favorable to us ixi several
ways: .
-- The North Vietnan~.ese would be very hard pressed to
counter it. Our military gosition would still be strong. Together
with our allies, we would have high confidence of being able to put
dawn, an enemy offensive. Such a posture s'.ZOUId produce a mast
desirable and widespread psychological impact.
-- The 5o=~th Vietnamese wcrsld have further opportunity
to understand that we are indeed serious about Vietnam.izing the
.war. At the same time, thdy would not be likely to feel that we
were rejecting our commitment. A successful defense against axi
,enemy offensive could help ~o condition them. for succeeding incre-
mental withdrawals.
-- Those Americans who have been most vocal against the
war probably would not be silenced by this action, but important
elements of the US public would be encouraged.
If this assessment of initial reactions proves to be correct,
you could then decide to withdraw a s~cand increment later in the
year. A decision in early August would permit redeployment tv
begin in September and, depending on size and composition, be com-
pleted in October or Navem.ber. If conditions were favarablet a
decision on a third increment could be made in October or November
?ar additional, withdrawals to begin before the end of the year and-
be completed, in early 1970. .
1969 Redeplo~rrnents
There are several alternatives as to the over-all size and
composition of the forces wlxicla might be withdrawn from South
Vietnam this year, Five of the alternative packages that l consider
feasible for im.ple~-nentatian in 1969 are;
1 ~. ~.~ v R i Uq1 .31' 'A
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 not Associated with Divisional Support
17. 3
lte rnative D
85.
0 '
100, 000 troops
1 Marine Division, Aviation Units Rz Support
27.
7
2 Divisions
I Army Division and Support
19.
6 c/
and Support
Support Elements, All Services
52.7
100. 0
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~~ ...-.-_-~-- ~,__-- ~
1969 REDEPLdYME_NT AL__TER_NATIVES - SVN a/
_~.
~~~~
3
(Str.ength 000)
Element
Alte rnatiwe A_
~ .
50, 000 troops
1 Marine Division, Aviation Units 8; Support
Z6.
8
mainly combat
1 Army Division and Support
19.
b
Z divisions
Air Force Elements
1,
3
Navy Elements
2,
3
.
_
50.
0
Alternative B
50, OOO~troops
1 Marine Division, Aviation Units & Support
26.
$
I Div, plus
Support Elements, A11 Services
23.
2
suppa~t slice
Alte_rna_tive B' b/
^
__
50.
_
0
50, 000 troops
Combat forces (2 Regiments/Brigades Pram
I Carps and 2 Brigades from III/IV Carps)
22.
?
0
4 Rgmt/Brgcl
Support Elements, All Services
28,
0
plus support
-
_
Alternative C (Rev
ised)
5 0.
0
85, 000 trao;ps
I Marine Division
~Z,
5
2 Divisions
1 US Army Div i sian ~
18,
7
plus support
Division Support Trains
25.
0 c/
l Marine Air Group
'1,
5 i
Hq & Logistics & Other Support Forces
a/ Alternatives A, B and D correspond to those in the JCS plan.
Alternative C (3-I/3 Division) of the JCS plan is not recaznmended;
a revised C has been substituted. Within each alternative the actual
mix of units may vary somewhat in final implementation.
b j .Alternative B' is in Appendix C of the JCS plan.
c/ Support spaces have been xemoved from. each Axmy support slice
to provide support to k2VNAF.
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The South Vietnamese are prepared far A, $, or. B'. Alterna-
tive C (Revised) probably would be acceptable if adequately explained,
although both it and D e.~:ceed their expectations in terms of'quanti-
tative reductions in US strength this year.
In the United States, Alternative D, closely followed by C
(Revised) probably would best mitigate pressures to curtail aux
involvement in the war. Alternatives A, B, or B' are probably
about what the US public expect. It should be recognized that ari.
enemy offensive which caused heavy American casualties during
implementation of any alternative -- ps.rticularly C or D -- could
result in seriously adverse public reaction,.
Alternatives B, B', C (Revised} and I~ withdraw mixed packages
of combat and support personnel. The JCS. consider the support units
shou.Id remain in Vietnam to support RVNAF and .the subsequent "
withdrawal of additional US forces. However, in these more balanced
packages, the support farces to be withdrawn will be carefully selected
fraxn among those which will have minimum irxips.ct on RVNAF effect-
iveness.
Lon er Term Plans
'The outline plan of enclosure 1 considers .tentative timetables
to Vietnaxnize the War during the period 1970-1972. They redeploy
US forces aver alternative periods of time and leave residual Amer-
ican troops in South Vietnam. ranging from 2b0, 000 to 30b, 000.
Although it appears feasible mechanically to withdraw up to Zg0, 000_
US forces from South Vietnam by the end of 1972, even this 4Z rsxanth
timetable would probably result in an interruption in pacification
progress. The interruption might range front only temporary re-
ductions to a long -term degradation. Ta withdraw much faster
(such as by the end of 1970), in the absence of some North Vietnamese
withdrawals, could result in serious setbacks to the pscification
program, a significant decline in allied military capability, and
the passibility of a GVN collapse. .
Recommetzdatia,zs
I believe we s'.-could stay as flexible as passible in our plannixxg.
1 do not believe it is advisable to adopt a firm plan now to redeploy
beyond the first incres?x~.ent of 20, 000-25, 000. Rather, I believe
we should take the initial step. assess the ~situaiion fully, and then
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decide on the size and timing of the next step. In the meantime,
and in concert with other agencies of the government, we will
exert a,rnajor effort to expand, train, and modernize the RVNAF,
~.nd do w?zatever else may be required to transfer progressively
to the South. Vietnamese greatly increased responsibility for all
aspects o` the war. Tn sunzznary:
-- A first increment of about 20, 000 to 25, 000 troops
should be withdrawn, starting in July 1969.
-- The composition of the first increment should be de-
termined by the JCS in coordination with CINCPAC, MACV, the
US Mission, and the GV1V.
-- The size, composition, and timirig-of a second incre- -
ment in 1969 should be based on a careful evaluation of th$ reaction
to the withdrawal of the first..increment. ~... _. _. _ ~.._
-- Current planning should be based on not more than
50, 000 troops being withdrawn in 19b g, as recommended by .the
JCS, unless an early agreement is reached with North Vietnam on
mutual withdrawals.
-- Planning should stay as flexible as passible, so that
maid and appropriate additional responses can be made to further
RVNAF improvement, the negotiations situation in Paris, and the
military situatio:~ in Southeast Asia.
Enclosures
1. JCS initial report on
ViEtnarrizing the war
2. ~l'iews of SecState
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z
DEt'AR7MENT Ot= STA"~E
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRETfSENSZTIVE
June 2, 1969
TO The Secretary of Defense
~~:
F RC1M : The Under Secretary of State
SLTSJEC2: Vietnamizing the iTJar (NSS1V.[ 36)
The Secretary of State has reviewed the memorandum for the
President which you have sent to us for coordination this marring.
He is not prepared. to concur in the recommendations as set forth
in that paper.
It is his view that the initial. decision by the President should
be limited to the matter of agreeing .to announce the initial slice.
of some 20-25, 000 men to be withdrawn in the near future.
For reasons of political impact in this country, in North Viet-
Nam, and on the negotiations in Paris, the Secretary believes, that
the withdrawal package for calendar year 1.969 should consist of
Alternative C (revised) which involves a total of 85, 000 men to be
withdrawn from South Viet-Nam.. Additionally he feels that out-of-
country withdrawals, .not only from Thailand but from oLGher countries
in the area, should be added to this package in calendar year 1969.
He believes the President should defer for the time being his
decision about announcing these further withdrawals above the
20-25, 000 man slice,. but he considers that the prospect of such
withdrawals should be foreshadowed in the first announcement to
be made, without specifying the magnitude involved.
li`inally, the Secretary feels that the President should not be
TdP SECRET/SENSITIVE
ENGL.OSURF 2
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d
TOP. SECRET~SENS7TNE ~
required at this time to approve any particular plan as tYie basis for
the final response. to NSSIVS 36, affecting the longer range withdrawal
plans which would take place follo~x~ing calendar year 1969. He~feels~
the President should address the planning basis only after decisions
have been made firm concerning the entire package contemplated for
calendar year ].969.
Tn summary, he proposes that the President decide now only
upon the announcement of the initial slice and foreshadowing. of
additional withdrawals to come in calendar year 1.969. He uiishes to
see further discussion within the Administration on the remaining
matters proposed in your memorandum before facing the President
with a. decision on all of these.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIV'E
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/12/28 : LOC-HAK-502-1-5-7
APPENDIX A
PLANS FOR VIETNAMIZING THE WAR
TABLE OF CONTENTS '
Page
Part I Summary 1
Part TI Outline Plan
Section A - Introduction 14
Section B - Military Aspects . . 17
Section C -~ Civilian Rspects 33
Section D - Initial Fcrce P.eduction
Alternatives 35
GROUP 1
EYCLUAED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADXIQG