VIETNAM AD HOC WORKING GROUP, OCTOBER 27, 1970

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-488-19-17-2
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: October 30, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

DTs-Nk- Ahu-cS
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/02: LOC-HAK-488-19-17-2
MEMORANDUM
INFORMATION
October 30, 1970
State, JCS,
OSD reviews
completed
pages 1-4
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES
SUBJECT: Vietnam Ad Hoc Working Group, October 27, 1970
Ambassador Sullivan observed that the North Vietnamese had been
very coy and cagey on the President's peace initiative. They were
evidently attempting to convey the impression that they were not
interested in it (e. g. Xuan Thuy's announced trip to Budapest) so
as to build up a back-lash against it. However, they had not been
very successful in this. Sullivan noted that he had talked with
Bob Kleiman of the New York Times, who had reported he was
receiving a great many letters from left-wing intellectuals, which
were hostile with respect to the peace initiative. Kleiman wanted
a few letters on the other side which could be printed on the "Op Ed"
page to help offset the hostile pieces which the New York Times had
run. (Evidently as an editorial writer he was able to exercise some
discretion in the selection of letters.) I suggested he might wish to
get in touch with Herb Klein in generating favorable comments.
Sullivan said that he was having Mary Lord do a letter. According to
Sullivan, Kleiman had recently talked with Peter Weiss, who had
received a map from the PRG delegation in Paris proporting to show
the areas of South Vietnam under Communist control -- inevitably,
almost all. Weiss had said that he wanted to talk to people in State
and Kirk would see him. I mentioned that I had seen this map, as
well as a map indicating areas of Cambodia allegedly under Communist
control. The Cambodia map had actually shown a smaller area under
the Communists than that depicted in DIA maps.
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
ARMY, NAVY, OSD,
DOS, JCS, USAF,
reviews completed.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/02 : LOC-HAK-488-19-17-2
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/02: LOC-HAK-488-19-17-2
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE 2
Sullivan remarked that an article datelined Saigon on U. S. combat
losses in Laos appeared to him to be far more than a leak. In his
judgment, this sounded like a backgrounder and he had sent a cable
to Saigon to ask about the circumstances of any such backgrounder.
The press had already gotten on to the State spokesman and to
Freidheimer in Defense in a very clever way: the reporters had
asked for the release of statistics on casualties in Laos which had
been reported by the Embassy in Vientiane. Because the President
had said that we would be free and frank, this data had to be made
available. General Smith declared that Admiral Moorer had been
very disturbed over the Saigon story, and had expressed his concern
to General Abrams via a back-channel message. Sullivan felt that
there would surely be hearings on this issue when the Senate reconvened,
since on the face of it we seemed to be cutting across the Church
Amendment.
Sullivan recalled that Dr. Kissinger had affirmed in his conversation
with Ky in Paris that the President would see Ky after the elections.
There was still no date for this meeting, though. Bui Diem was putting
together a schedule for Ky on the assumption that he would be in the
U. S. between November 15 and 25. The schedule included many stops,
but we couldn't prevent Ky from traveling widely. Sullivan was stressing
to Bui Diem that nothing could be firm until the President's date had
been received. General Smith said that General Minh, the GVN Military
Attache, had presented a schedule to Fruend in Defense which had indeed
contained many stops. Fruend had just "accepted" the schedule and had
disclaimed any authority to make arrangements on the grounds that the
matter was up to the White House and to State. General Smith furnished
a list of U. S. military installations where Vietnamese were training as a
possible basis for scheduling visits by Ky (Tab A).
Sullivan asked General Karhohs about a cable which had been sent to
Defense for clearance concerning the release of a substantial number of
POWs for the forthcoming holidays. Was Warren Nutter holding clearance
up for some reason ? Sullivan had heard that such was the case.
General Karhohs said that Ralph Jefferson acted for Nutter on POW
matters and he doubted that Nutter was personally involved; nevertheless,
he would look the matter up. Sullivan pointed out we had released POWs
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/02 : LOC-HAK-488-19-17-2
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/02: LOC-HAK-488-19-17-2
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
before, and in fact had done so last year. I asked Sullivan what was
done with these POWs, and Sullivan replied that this was a problem --
most became Chieu Hois. About 200-odd had been involved.
Sullivan referred to a recent conversation between Thieu and Tran Van
Don, in which (according to Don) Thieu had said he would reorganize the
government to bring in more people and would also meet Big Minh. Had
Carver anything further to add ? Carver said that he had no information,
and noted that Tran Van Don was not famous for being an accurate reporter.
He would inquire.
Sullivan brought up an AID message to Saigon, apparently sent by the Public
Administration people, proposing changes in a government reorganization
bill in the Lower House. Sullivan said that this message was unacceptable
We had now gone past the stage when we needed to tell the GVN how to
organize the government. If the subject came up at all it should be at the
,Bunker/Thieu level and also should be discussed in Washington.
Sullivan noted that with NSDM 89 we now had a level of expenditures
for Cambodia on the economic as well as the military side, and asked
Nooter what pain this would cause AID with respect to its Vietnam program.
Nooter replied that AID cannot now make its $350 million budget for
Vietnam unless there is a supplemental, and may be as much as $30 to $40
million short. If there was a short-fall, it might be possible to make a
transfer next spring from the Development Loan Fund to supporting
?assistance in order to carry Vietnam through.
Sullivan noted that there was a North Vietnamese Red Cross Mission
in Bangkok, and wondered if we had adequately explained why it was there.
Was there a larger signal involved ? He called attention to the face that
the Second Secretary of the North Vietnamese Embassy in Vientiane had
invited a representative of Operation Brotherhood to come to North Vietnam
to help handle medical problems. Was Hanoi trying to establish good
relations with Southeast Asian countries which were not involved in Indo-
China? Carver agreed that there might be greater political significance
than met the eye, and said he would look into the situation.
Sullivan turned to the question of'Congressman Price visiting Hanoi in
return for extending an invitation to Vy to come to the U. S. He had
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/02: LOC-HAK-488-19-17-2
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/02: LOC-HAK-488-19-17-2
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE 4
heard that Defense believed that there was a difference between an official
visit by Vy and a private one, and that Secretary Laird felt that Price
should keep in touch with Vy and maintain the contact. General Karhohs
confirmed this, and added that Secretary Laird doesn't think much of
Senator Pell and believes Price would be a more reliable representative.
Sullivan stated that he disagreed on the desirability of having Price issue
an invitation to Vy to come, even in a private capacity, and added that if
Defense wanted it this way there would be a split position sent to
Dr. Kissinger.
General Karhohs said that Secretary Laird had approved a message to
MACV which he, Karhohs, had drafted on what could be done to improve
the Phoenix program. Sullivan declared that Colby had sent in a letter
asking the Ad Hoc Group to cover the same point, and requested Karhohs
to hold up Laird's message until a reply could be drafted to Colby and
the matter coordinated. Sullivan would circulate the Colby letter, which
addressed itself to criticism of the Phoenix program which had been put
forward by Bob Kohmer.
Sullivan informed the group that he had been asked -by State to do a
backgrounder on Indo-China. This was not intended to be a commentary
on the President's October 7 proposal, but rather a description of the
way things stood in Indo-China. Originally, it had been intended only
for the foreign press, but State had felt that it would be impossible to
hold the line against U. S. journalist and had added some of these.
Nooter mentioned that AID at Saigon had just come up with an engineering
study of the transportation system in Vietnam which took a dim view of
the GVN's purchase of another Boeing 727. What may have been upper-
most in the minds of those drafting the study was whether the funds for
the purchase of this expensive aircraft in effect come from U. S. aid.
The Congressional reaction was a sensitive point.
Carver touched briefly upon CIA Director Helm's trip to Southeast Asia,
,,and casually let it drop that he, Carver, had drafted the report to the
President.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/02 : LOC-HAK-488-19-17-2
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/02: LOC-HAK-488-19-17-2
SECRET-SENSITIVE
VIETNAMESE
SERVIC
INSTALLATION
STUDENTS
TYPE TRAINING
F
Air Force Academy-
0
AF
Lackland Randolph AFB
233745
VNAF--English lan-
? guage training/
UPT-T-Z4-l
AF
Keesler AFB, Miss
200
T--2 pilot training
AF
England AFB, La
50
CCTS for C-47, A-1.,
A-37
AF1
Fort Wolters., Tex
280
TH-55 Helicopter
Tn
AFl
Ft Hunter - Stewart
33
UH-l Helicopter
AF Ga.
Tng "
Navy
Newport RI
250
OCS
Navy
US Naval Training Center
100
Various enlisted
reat Lakes, Ill
specialists
Navy
US Naval Station,
702/
Electronic
Treasure Island Calif
Technicians
Navy
Naval Training Center
100
Various enlisted
San Diego Calif
specialists
Army
Rucker, Ala
16
Helico ter Training
Army
Ft Leavenworth, Kansas
.11
Command & General
Staff College
Army
Ft Braga, NC
5
Psy Ops
Army
Ft Benning, Ga
11
OCS and Inf Off
Advance
Army
Ft Sill, Okla
23
Arty Off Adv, Radar
Technicians and
Communications
Training conducted by Army funded by AF.
On 15 Nov an additional 60 OCS graduates will be training
in small boat operations.
SECRET-SENSITIVE Tab
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/02: LOC-HAK-488-19-17-2