MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT, DR. KISSINGER AND GENERAL HAIG, THURSDAY, JULY 1, OVAL OFFICE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-464-6-1-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 127
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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tI4E WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT:
July 1, 1971
THE PRESIDENT'S FILES
Meeting Between President, Dr. Kissinger
and General Haig, Thursday, July 1, Oval
Office
At the outset of the meeting a discussion was held with respect to the
public statements the U.S. Government would make on the Seven Points
tabled by the NLF at Paris that day. The President instructed General
Haig to insure that our official position included a reiteration of his
determination that no compromise solution would be accepted that would
be tantamount to turning over 17 million South Vietnamese to Communist
rule.
The President next turned to Dr. Kissinger's proposals for discussion
with xepreboni.atives of the People's Republic of China during his forth-
coming side visit to Peking. The President stated that the communique
resulting from the visit should not include names and that in his view
the President noted that the position which Dr. Kissinger proposed to take
was not strong enough, that it was far too forthcoming and that he wished
him not to indicate a willingness to abandon much of our support for Taiwan
until it was necessary to do so.
The President emphasized that the issue of "one China vs two Chinas"
should be mentioned only once in the conversation rather than threaded
throughout it as in the present text. He stated that with respect to United
Nations representation Dr. Kissinger should specifically ask for the
Chinese viewpoint. Concerning the section on Vietnam the President
suggested that it be reduced in length and tightened considerably.
The President stated that during the discussions he felt it was important
for Dr. Kissinger to emphasize more clearly to the Chinese the threat of
Japan's future orientation. He pointed out that Dr. Kissinger should
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state that the Chinese must recognize that a number of nations are
concerned about Asia, particularly the role of Japan in the event the
United States leaves. In the case of Japan it is obvious that they have
both the ability, resources, and know-how to rebuild their military in
a precipitous fashion and that a total disengagement of the United States
or a misapplication of forces in the area could result in a resurgent
Japanese bellicosity with considerable danger for all.
The President stated that he wanted a somewhat heavier emphasis on the
Soviet threat. Dr. Kissinger replied that this issue would have to be
handled gingerly and that the Chinese might report what was said to the
Soviets. The President agreed but stated that the way to handle this was
to refer to facts rather than U.S. interpretation of these facts. For
example he should tell the Chinese that we note that there are more Soviet
divisions on the Chinese border than those arrayed against all of the NATO
pact countries. He should refer to this as reports in the press.
The President summarized by stating that in his discussions with the
Chinese Dr. Kissinger should build on three fears: (I) fears of what the
President might do in the event of continued stalemate in the South Vietnam
war; (2) the fear of a resurgent and militaristic Japan; and (3) the fear of
the Soviet threat on their flank.
The President stated that prior to a summit certain accomplishments should
be arrived at between the two governments. First, the release of all U.S.
POWs held in China. Second, at least some token shipments of U.S. grain
to Communist China. Third, some progress on the Vietnam war issue.
Four, we might conclude, as the outcome of a summit, the establishment of
a hotline between the two governments and some kind of agreement on the
issue of accidental nuclear war.
Finally the President stated Dr. Kissinger should make it very clear to the
Chinese that we expected them to institute a severe limit on political visitors
prior to any summit with President Nixon. Following that summit visits of
any kind would, of course, be authorized.
The President then returned to the subject of Taiwan and the treatment of it
in the discussions with the Chinese. He told Dr. Kissinger to tone down any
reference to the fact that Vice President Agnew and Secretary Laird had
cancelled their trips. He emphasized that the discussions with the Chinese
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cannot look like a sellout of Taiwan. He instructed Dr. Kissinger not
to open up with a discussion on what we've done and the fact that we
will not need troops there forever, but rather to restructure that point
by emphasizing that the Nixon Doctrine provides for help to those nations
who help themselves and thus it will not be essential for our military
presence to remain in some areas forever. The President stated that
the overall statement with respect to Taiwan should be somewhat more
enigmatic.
The President asked Dr. Kissinger not to mention the Truman 1950
statement with which he personally did not agree. In sum, the President
asked him to review the entire discussion of the Taiwan issue so that
we would not appear to be dumping on our friends and so that we would
be somewhat more mysterious about our overall willingness to make
concessions in this area.
With respect to future meeting places between the two governments,
President Nixon stated that he preferred London where communications
would be secure and where the size of the city added to the kind of security
that would be necessary. He instructed Dr. Kissinger to refer to London
as our first choice. Warsaw would be best for diplomatic contacts, but
above all, Ottawa would be unacceptable to the President.
Again concerning Taiwan the President made the point that six thousand
of our troops in Taiwan were directly related to our conduct of the war
in South Vietnam so that as that issue was solved the requirement for
these troops would disappear.
? The President stated that the section on Korea was exceptionally well
done.
The meeting concluded with a further discussion of the press treatment
that would be made concerning the NLF Seven Points. All agreed that
we should not get into a detailed exposition of the pros and cons of the
NLF proposal, but should merely make the point that it has some positive
and some clearly unacceptable aspects. Above all, it should not be rejected
publicly at this time. We should emphasize, however, that the other side
knows precisely how to conduct these negotiations within the established
forums and that we would hope that they would pursue further discussions
within such framework.
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Table of Contents
POSITIONS
Scope Paper
Opening Statement
Agenda
Summit
Communiques
Taiwan
Indochina
Great Power Relations
? Communications
Trade and Travel
South Asia
Korea
U.S. Detainees in China
Toasts
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Chinese Objectives
In agreeing to a visit by me and to a subsequent summit, the
Chinese are expecting to make major political gains. They will anticipate
that the PRC's prestige will increase enormously, and in effect China
will become unequivocally one of the "big five"; the ROC's international
position will erode very considerably; the PRCis chances of getting into
the UN this year on its terms (i. e. expulsion of the ROC)'will rise; and
the Soviets will be presented with a new complexity in their confrontation
with the Chinese. There may also be some disarray among U.S. friends
and allies in Asia. The fact that the Chinese want to publicize my visit
underscores their interest in deriving the maximum possible benefit from
-' it. If my visit is surfaced, they stand to reap some of those benefits
by my very presence in China quite apart from whatever happens after-
It is conceivable that the Chinese may be hoping to achieve what
could be considered an even more sensational gain in the psychological
and ideological sense by demanding in the actual meetings that we end all
our defense t,T4Abialez and get out of Asia, and spurning any further
relationship if we refuse to do so. This? would humiliate us and leave the
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Chinese standing firm on
'principle" before their own people and before
other militant revolutionary groups in the world. It would also put the
Chinese in a good position with respect to North Vietnam and North Korea,
which have shown signs of unease over "ping pong diplomacy" and the
possibility of U.S. -Chinese contacts.
However, a U.S. humiliation would not appear to square with the
circumstances under which they have moved toward my visit and a
subsequent summit. We have assumed that they are acting' in part in
response to the Soviet military threat along their borders, and it would
not help them to humiliate us if they want to use us in some way as a
counterweight to the Soviets. A U.S. withdrawal from Asia (which Chinese
propaganda has called for in years past) would not necessarily suit this
purpose either, since it would leave areas of vacuum into which the Soviets
could move quickly. If the Chinese are now governed more by practical
considerations than by militant ideology, as seems to be the case, they
might also want us around to exercise restraints on Japan, which is
looming increasingly larger in Chinese eyes as a rival and potential threat.
In any event, they might reason that it would be impossible for the U.S.
to accept an emasculated role in Asia, and that by demanding this they
would not only get a rejection but may generate enough resentment on our
side to cause us to stand aside if the Soviets chose to attack them.
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It therefore appears likely that the Chinese, quite apart from
registering the gains which will accrue to them anyway, have objectives
in mind which they believe might be attainable in terms of the practical
realities governing their own and U.S. options. These could include:
An agreement from us on reducing and eventually
eliminating. our forces on Taiwan. Taiwan remains an issue at the top
of their list of disagreements with the U.S. , but while they have spoken
lately about the U.S. getting its military forces out of the .area of Taiwan
and the Taiwan Strait (in fact, they have actually employed the word
"eventually' in this connection), they have not chosen to highlight the
U.S. -ROC political relationship and might be willing to accept its
continuation wader present circumstances. (They would anticipate that
this relationship would be impaired, though by any U.S. -PRC agreement
regarding U.S. forces.)
Our acknowledgement of the importance of China in
world affairs, which would underscore their status among the "big five."
Their position on this issue was laid out some years ago by Chen Yi,
then PRC Foreign Minister, with a statement that "there are no important
questions in the world today that can be settled without the participation
of the PRC, particularly those affecting the Far East."
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Possibly some form of non-aggression treaty or agreement
under the rubric of "peaceful coexistence" which could be employed to
juxtapose the U.S. more pointedly opposite the USSR in the three-nation
power equation which the Chinese seem to be devising. Such a treaty or
agreement would also encourage other Asian states to look toward improving
their own relations with the PRC and thus heighten Chinese influence.
(At the same time, though, an agreement along these lines while we still
maintain our mutual defense treaty with the ROC might herp to defuse the
Taiwan Strait situation. The Chinese in effect offered us something like
this in the early days of the ambassadorial-level talks but we turned it
down because of the lack of specificity with respect to Taiwan. Perhaps
they were trying to tell us something, and we erred by trying to make them
accept something publically which they would have been willing to live with
privately provided they were not forced to take a stand.)
Above all affirmation of the foregoing in a summit
meeting for which President Nixon will visit Pekin&, Not only would the
President's appearance in Peking constitute spectacular proof of China's
having arrived at great power status, it would also gratify the "Middle
Kingdom" instincts which the Chinese leaders of today unquestionably
share with their predecessors. They will treat the President's visit --
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and for that matter, My own -- as being in the nature of a foreign
"imperialist" barbarian bringing tribute from the fringes of world
society to those who are truly at the center of the true culture, and
derive a great sense of personal, national, and ideological pride thereby.
(We must be prepared to accept this in full confidence of our own place
in history and national strength.) To gain a summit and all that it entails,
the Chinese will probably be prepared to pay a price. In fact, in Imperial
times those who brought tribute to Peking were customarily rewarded with
gifts which exceeded the original tribute in value.
Another objective which the Chinese would of course like to gain
would be a break in U.S. -ROC relations and full endorsement of the PRC
as China's sole representative in the UN. However, as indicated above,
they may be realistic enough to accept less and accept tacitly a continued
U.S. relationship with the ROC for the sake of achieving the other elements
on their list.
My- Objectives
y? purpose in general terms will be to get the point across to the
Chinese that we will indeed expect them to pay a price for what they expect
to achieve, particularly the summit, and to work out the parameters of
the ,quid pro quo.
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Within this framework, I will want:
Indications firm enough to be taken as assurances that
the Chinese will use their influence on the North Vietnamese to move
them toward a peaceful and acceptable settlement of the Vietnam war.
A Sino-U. S. modus vivendi on the Taiwan situation
which will permit our relations with Peking to develop while we at the
same time retain our diplomatic ties and mutual defense treaty with
the ROC.
Continuation of Sino-U.S. relations in some format
amounting to direct contacts in which matters of mutual interest can
be discussed, e. g. arms control, expanded trade and travel, reduction
of tensions in East and Southeast Asia, etc. This could include sending
a U.S. representative to Peking to work out details of a summit.
An appreciation by the Chinese of how they view the
Soviet role in world affairs and how this relates to Soviet military
capabilities.
In return, I will wish to suggest to them that we will be
responsive to their math items of concern and that we will be prepared
to go to the summit. My overall strategy is outlined below.
Strategy
To the extent possible, I should let them take the lead in laying
out the subjects which they want to discuss. This will give me the
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chance to sense the atmosphere in which they are prepared to operate,
and to judge from their tone how far they are prepared to go. They may
wish on their own to take the initiative -- in their exchanges of letters
with us and in the last two contacts at Warsaw they appeared anxious
to set forth their position -- but if they do not do soi I can draw them
out by citing the fact that issues do indeed exist between us and asking
them for their views on those issues.
Although they may refer first to the desirability of a summit, they
almost certainly will bring up Taiwan as the first order of substantive
business. This would give me the opportunity to lay out a positive
approach to the Taiwan issue which hopefully they will regard as being
sufficiently responsive to their desires to allow the discussions to proceed
to other matters. (See forthcoming separate paper on Taiwan.) Assuming
that their other major objectives are as outlined above, -
. should be
able to deal with them in a similarly positive fashion, for example, giving
an affirmative answer on some form of non-aggression agreement. my
technique should be to emphasize the areas which' I believe we have
in common, and to play down the differences, leaving them unstated so
long as the Chinese do not press 'me, too hard. Too much on the record
may force them into taking difficult stands. And if pressed, my_ line
should be "yes, provided that," rather than "no, unless." Over the years,
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they have grown tired of the latter approach in our dealings with them,
and something more upbeat is required. (We grew rather tired of
their past hard-line approach, too, but we can afford to overlook this.)
As part of mi effort to establish the right climate, I could
take the opportunity when it presents itself to assure the Chinese that
we accept China as a great power with a legitimate role to play in
international and particularly Asia affairs, that we bear them no hostility
either as a government or as a people, that we are not co.ncerned with
internal systems but rather with the state of our interrelationships on
the international scene, and that we believe their contributions are vital
to the attainment of world peace. I could cite our unilateral steps
? on the questions of broadening trade and travel between our countries
as evidence of our sincerity. A point to which I might refer as an
(historian is the uniqueness of China in the world today, in which the
government, the people, and the culture are the direct lineal successors
of the government, people and culture of 3000 years ago.
? Once a positive and businesslike climate is established,
address the issue of a summit conference -- not before. _I could take
the line that we are prepared to go through with a summit, and welcome
it, provided that the circumstances are favorable to its being held and
to achieving a favorable outcome. -Our desideratum for favorable
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circumstances would be that the North Vietnamese are not conducting
major military operations against our forces and allied forces in
Vietnam; it would be impossible for the President of the U.S. to
visit the PRC, which is a close ally of the DRY, if the converse were
the case. Moreover, as a follow-on could add that the U.S.
military presence in East and Southeast Asia, regarding which the
Chinese certainly have an interest, is contingent upon the state of
play in the Vietnam war. I I should infer that helping to wind down
the war would suit Chinese interests, and that they should move in this
direction. Other issues can be dealt with as appears appropriate.
The Chinese will probably want to talk about Japan (see forthcoming
separate paper on Japan). I am__.familiar with the subjects of travel
and trade.
We cannot of course predict the order in which the Chinese raise
any of the points of particular interest to them and to us, but the various
elements in j" our strategy can be adjusted to suit their initiatives.
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/1-441/14?k t6.4.4
c
4President Nixon has asked me to convey to
OPENING STATEMENT
7/4/71
4
you his /Personal regards.
He looks forward with warm anticipation to meeting with the leaders of:
the People's Republic of China. He has sent me on this journey to see:
whether China and the United States, together,
2:Pacific nd ps9,ci, in the w%di?de
12.4, 44-4/7
For me it is a rich experience to be here
can build towards peace in
44,01. 7',41/Y6
4444-6-44'47,/
in your country. As a
historian, I have long admired the Chinese culture, traditions and people. )(
itt4
4r;4-isti
As a student of revolution, T respect the dedication and accomplishments
f those who lead your nation today.)
T find this meeting a moving occasion, an unprecedented moment in
history. This is the first time that American and Chinese leaders Are
talking on a basis where each country recognizes the other as equal. In
our earlier contacts we were a new and developing country in contrast to
the long sweep of Chinese history, culture and power. From the middle
of the last century to the middle of this one your country has been subject
to dominance from foreign powers. Today, after many vicissitudes,
achievements and our separate evolutions, we come together again, on a
fresh foundation of equality and mutual respect. We are both turning a
new page in our histori s.
?
We meet toda separated by a vast gulf of suspicion. We have had
no meaningful contact for most of a generation. Your critical public
statements and interpretatione of history are, of course, well known to
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us. ou undoubtedly suspect our motives
4-1-44-c1ans,
It serves no purpose to ignore these facts. 1 do not intend to do
so or to use the conventional language of diplomacy. As MarXists,
protestations of good faith will not impress you. AS revolutionaries,
expressions of friendly Sentiments will not charm you. And as Chinese,
r.
clever formulations will not fool you. Lyle have too much respect for you
3 to believe otherwise.
C 1
During these past decades you endured the tribulations of the Long
-2-
d(44-
On our side there are-similar
March. You surmounted what seemed like hopeless obstacles to establish
your system. You have steered your country through twenty-two turbulent
years. And you have maintained your positions in conflict against major
powers.
During this same period my country has carried global responsibilities
flowing from the Second World War. We shed the historic isolationism fed
by our ocean-bound geography. Faced with the vacuums of the post-war
world, we ventured forth with characteristic, perhaps excessive exuberance
into international affairs, shouldering broad tasks of security and
development. We have placed men on the moon. And we have grappled with
our own domestic problems, both those spawned by industrial progress and
those that are th legacy of our mixed heritage.
,Ehurhina-atia-imerica have pursued their separate paths, so diverse
and hardly touching. Yet here we are today, brought together by global
trends. @learly we will find the guarantee of each other's actions not
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in words, but in events; not in honeyed declarations but in the objective
situation we jointly confront.7 Reality has brought 'us together. Reality
will shape our future.
(How then do we seize this moment?
How can We take advantage of the
first authoritative encounter between our two governments to begin to
cooperate across the historical gulf?
This is a rare moment in history - tipe ?when t ose p
cee,e4 (.?
can come together with al possibilities lying open before them
meet as men with high authority, insulated from outside glare. Unencumbered
by formal diplomatic discourse and free from the consciousness and
of other
countries,
pressures
the Prime Minister and I can speak with complete
frankness. And we meet as representatives of countries whose very separation
in the past gives us as clean a slate for the future as ever happens in
relations among peoples.)
Perhaps never agai as never before 7- will American and Chinese
officials have the same opportunities that we have today.
This is why we have emphasized our desire that these initial talks
be secret. For we have here the chance to set in motion a new evolution.
Let Me briefly state our general approach towards you.
We acknowledge that China, because of its achievements size, tradition
and strength, must participate on the basis of equality in all matters
affecting the peace of Asia and the peace of the world. It is in our
national interest, and the world's interest, that you play your appropriate
role in shaping international arrangements that affect you. For only then
will you have a stake in them, and only then will they last.
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This reflects the general philosophy of President Nixon's foreign
policy which is designed to take account of new realities. Indeed,
international affairs are undergoing fundamental change. The basic world
conditions that shaped our foreign policy -- and that of Other countries --
since World War II have been transformed. We are moving to reflect these
new realities,j
The United States emerged from the Second World War in a unique position.
Shielded by the oceans from the fields of conflict, we alone among the
Major powers Were relatively unscathed. Our enemies lay prostrate, our
allies)severtly weakened by the ravages of war. Only the U.S. had the
strength and the resources to help others rebuild shattered economies and
to shore them up against pressures towards hegemony, some of which you as
well have came to know.
We thus moved away from a long history of self-containment and plunged
with zeal and idealism into worldwide responsibilities. We provided the
bulk of both the plant and the resources for security and development
around the globe. Our military strength was overwhelming. And we perceived
our potential adversaries as amonolithic
iLWe were not setting out to establish
bloc with central direction.
our own hegemonies but rather
to deal with the objective realities of the post-war. world. You no doubt
have fundamentally different interpretations of our motives during those
post-war years.
But events have proved that the issues were more complex,
the threats more real than may have been realized -- a fact which perhaps
you j too, can now appreciate J
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Today, two and a half decades after the war there are new realities.
Other countries have gained Strength and self-confidence. The economic
power of the war's defeated has Shown immense growth, posing fresh political
and in time perhaps even security implications for their neighbors and
others. Scores of new nations have been born, are struggling with their
economic and social problems, and are acting with proud autonomy upon the
world stage. As the military potential of other nuclear countries has
developed, they have been free to shift their conventional forces to other
theaters. The time has long passed when one nation could purport to
speak for all Communist countries. And among the American people there
is a growing belief that others should do more to shape their own destinies.
These new patterns have both Changed the nature of the problems we
faced twenty years ago and produced a fresh community of interests with you
as well as others. As new centers of power have emerged, we are no longer
the only ones concerned about the possible ambitions of other countries.
Aml*',14 nation's have become increasingly autonomous, we can deal with them
more easily on the basis of mutual responsibility and mutual interest.
QIn
the light of these changed conditions,
e
to fashion a new American approach. The reng ,,of others 4jow us to
1-z-ez
reduce our role and others to enlarge their scope,II nd t e diversity of
communist voices means that we will deal with individual communist nations/
whether in Eastern Europe or Eastern Asiaion the basis of concrete issues
and a willingness to improve relations,
President Nixon has set out
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It would be a profound miscalculation, however, to believe that
America will cease playing a major international tole. We are prepared
to take new realities into account but the President has shown that he is
willing to take very painful decisions in order to defend our interests.
We will continue to be engaged when events threaten our secnr t And
'71-2(<
:our traditional concern ,f4A,,o ill continue to propel us it o
development assistance. The abundance of our resources and the scope of
our technology inevitably/haifta crucial impiE.eon the world. This is not
a matter of I teral decision. Indeed it is not really decisions
- d >el; - A 4
a
at all but ?1--#F/ne7-..dealing-,with-us-lauat-reeognize -the
reitilt4eilir----"
For us to remove our presence unrealistically would unleash (his prospect
unpre-
dictable and dangerous currents in the world. This prospect ia particularly
acute in Asia where there is now a new constellation of forces:7 Indiscriminate
American withdrawal from this regio;liwould create temptations for others
-J
that you would not welcome any more than we.
[Ls while we adjust our role, we shall see to it that we do not
- create new vacuums. We shall strike a new balance in our responsibilities
and negotiate concretely to remove causes of tensions -- seeking fresh
opportunities for a more peaceful Asia and a more peaceful world.
I have described our perspectives on the international scene and
? our place in it in order to sketch the realities of the world picture as
we see it and to suggest that these realities could foster closer relations
between China and the United States. We believe that for America to
maintain a responsible global posture can serve your interests and that
our joint task is to harmonize our policies wherever we can.
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You, of course, have your own views on the world which will guide
.AN/ ?q--rik76V77ez7:17r 44:_ev.
your policies. It appears to us that c.covcratiorWtOden?nt-Wou _
mutual aims. Your concerns about being surrounded in a hostile world
can be eased by better relations with us. And our policy will be less
rigid if we need not view you as a permanent enemy. j
LC
`,1?"41
that there are deep ideological differences
We realize i
between us. Our views on each othe/r4s systems are very plain. There is
,
no sense in pretending that t ei'e differences do not exist. Inctelett-we--
;ca-n-oxiLy-Aaakelrrogr
of-mutu
YOU are dedicated to the belief that your concepts will prevail.
ga-tha,..a?werk witldstis.mss4rWaimwox.k_-
have our own convictions about the future.
The essential question for our relations is whether both countries
are willing to let history judge which vision is correct while in the interval
l:( 6- ".
seeking to cooperate on matters of common concern 41-,--L 7Ce 7
a /
66.
at is to this dnd that President 41ixn, since the beginning of his
Administration, has directed a series of steps designed/to reestablish
Contact. We do not believe that such steps ill resolve fEijdifferences
between us. Nevertheless we have considered them important as concrete
indications of our willingness to deal with you on a/P Tactical basis.
--1-1212-------
1-7- A-- (1--
Let me, thou, make a-few-practrical_observationsi
abo t our relations
(,4L4i.e_ & i71.-1--t (.__,'" at
, _ _ _
which I will be prepared to expand as our talks proceed. L.We are aware, Z 7it
that youit concerntin great power eL.atLj, strelb,Ap_the_6 viet ion,..let
2).1._, tk$4-1:154..c,,,7,..
atla\jap,..51, Let me say now, that we will not collude with other cou
against yout Of cou
ejtV.,
recognir that you may believe that the
evt
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11444t
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-8-
objective consequences of our acts will bring about collusion, no matter
what we say. But we will consciously strive to avoid this
..
OVOw-IAAMidr'tP,_y_l_g_!nqr.qJXIGRmr,77g15V=Tiii-Uttbde'i.-at1j
.theadl.i-ty... ie most short-Sighted poli that which
constantly seeks petty tactical advantages at the expense of others.,
Moreover, 6fronted by a number of potenti9,l opponents, we see no sense
in turning against the one with which w ave the least conflicting
interests.. Indeed, given our analys,is of the long-term evolution)qe -
prefer a strong and developing China. It poses no threat to any essential
U.S. interest. It is no accident that our two, countries have such a long
history of friendship.
To make my thoughts concrete, President Nixon has authorized me to
tell you that the United States will not take major steps which affect your
interests without discussing them with you and taking Account of your views.
I hope while I am here to arrange for a channel which will enable us to
communicate directly and secretly. I am prepared to set up communications
*
IL014 comparable to those that link us to other major centers of decision.
CA", /13-6Vvh, I am ready to explain our intentions in the Strategic Arms /
Limitation Talks and other arms control issues if you wish. I would welcome
your thoughts on the recent Soviet proposal for a five power conference
on nuclear weapons -- as I told you in advance of this meeting, we have
delayed our official response so that we could hear your position. We are
prepared to initiate with you immediately talks designed to reduce the
danger of accidental war and. to fix the responsibility for those not
accidental. We are also prepared if you should wish, to return to an
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0.
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idea first advanced by you, Mr. Prime Minister,ablVA7 /dp?..")
rennouncing the use of force in the relations between our countries.
In short, the President has sent me here to begin a realistic dialogue.
Let MB review for you a few principles which will govern our dealings with
your country..
Zigsti I will
e a solutely candid with you. I want to ensure that
even if we disagree it will be in full knowledge of one another's views.
Therefore T will try to explain exactly our intentions. I believe that we
must tell one another With complete Openness and directness how we analyze
situations, what we see as, our objectives, and what we intend to do. Our
Views will certainly differ on many issues, but each country will at least
understandstys the other is acting as it is. Since I am not sure what is
on your mind, I hope you will feel free to ask me questions about our
policies. We will only be able to overcome years of isolation and suspicion
if we speak plainly and to the point.'
Second, You can rely on what I tell you. Speaking on behalf of the
President, any commitment I make will be carried out.
Third, we need a continuing direct channel between you and the White -
Rouse. This channel 'should not be vulnerable to developments in a third
country, but rather under the control of our two nations'. As I will explain
later, completely confidential communications would allow us to define for
each other our basic principles, agree on general courses of action and
set the stage for implementation in other forums.
&ourth we are prepared to discuss with you any Lesues that concern
you as a great power, whether or not they are of a primarily bilateral
nature. :We will take into account your viewpoint on all such questions
and give you frank explanations of our actions.?
*
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Rti.,014.szt_ ,
Mr. P.E4nm!--414m4m*Ort.., I see tworincipal purposes for our meetings
4 ,eitec 7,104-410V. "4,e 4'3,4-41-
today And tomorrow. First, e la the groundwork for a more constructive
? relationship between our countries bdiscussing major issues which affect
. .our?bilateral?relations, our mutual concerns in Asia, and our positions as
nations with global interests. Among the topics I.believe we should covet
are:
Taiwan, lwhich we know is your principal concern in your relations
r). ,4"4-4-.44;.*-- f .
with usr.