SAUDI POSITION ON LIFTING THE OIL EMBARGO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-207-2-62-1
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 31, 2012
• Sequence Number: 62
• Publication Date: February 6, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANT)l :09:
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMATION
(Outside System)
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM.
SUBJECT:
February 6, 1974
SECRETARY KISSINGER
HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
Saudi Position on Lifting the Oil Embargo
The attached details the Saudi position on lifting. the oil embargo since
early November. As you know, it has evolved through these stages:
--Before and during your November 8 visit to Riyadh the
Saudi position had been that the embargo would be lifted only
when Israel had withdrawn to pre-1967 borders. Palestinian
rights had been restored and Arab rights in Jerusalem were
realized.
-.-Between your November 8 and December 14 meetings with
Faisal, we began getting reports from Prince Fahd that indicated
a shift in the Saudi position. Fahd said that Faisal was prepared
to ease the embargo provided the Arabs could see "concrete steps
toward a just peace"--coupled with some private Israeli or US
assurances that Israel intended to withdraw on a given schedule.
Fahd said Faisal did not yet have other Arab support for this
position and could not act alone. Saqqaf said that Israeli return
to October 22 lines or, better still, withdrawal to the east bank
of the Suez Canal would enable Saudi Arabia to "reopen" the matter
in Arab circles. In the December 14 meeting, Faisal was still
sticking to his desire for US assurance that Resolution 242
stipulates total withdrawal. Recognition of Palestinian rights
was still also a Saudi condition.
--Immediately after the December 14 meeting with Faisal, the
Saudis began to talk seriously of easing the embargo in January
as the disengagement was completed, but they reiterated that
they would have to see this as a step toward total Israeli
withdrawal. The exact level to which production levels would be
restored was not defined, but restoration of some sort was
implied.
MORI/CDF
C05147829
XGDS - 1
DECLAS -- Date Impossible to Determine.
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
='No'
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--This position prevailed until Asad's visit to Saudi Arabia
last weekend, particularly in the exchanges before the
President's State of the Union address.
The above is from the State Department telegrams and does not include
private conversations you may have had. The point that stands out in
this record is that the Saudis only slowly moved toward our position and
have repeatedly sought a US assurance on total Israeli withdrawal and
realization of Palestinian rights.
One way to deal with the present situation would-be to treat the February 14
meeting as the point at which we will have the definitive Saudi answer.
Rather than cutting off our effort now, this would perhaps permit us--if
the Syrians respond to your idea on handling the POW issue or some
variation--to demonstrate that progress is being made on the Syrian front.
The point would be to treat the next week as a period of continuing exchange
and not as a point where confrontation lines had been clearly drawn.
SECRET /NODIS/CHEROKEE (XGDS)
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February 6, 1974
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November 18
Prince Fahd conveys the following message to Ambas-
sador Akins: (a) King's assertions that oil policy will
not be altered until Israel withdraws to pre-1967 lines
is not the final Saudi position. (b) The boycott on US
can be modified when there are ''effective and tangible'',
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.N-ov?ernber Z4
moves toward peace, that is when Israel starts
withdrawal from [sic- to] 1967 borders. (c) Yamani
will be sent to Kuwait, Syria [sic], Egypt and Algeria
to get their views and set up a common policy on this 25X1
matter.
Sagqaf tells Akins that HAK's November 21 letter gave
Saudis nothing new to take to Algiers meeting to justify
relaxation of the oil embargo, and especially since there
had been so little progress in moving back to October 22
lines.
November 22 In formal letter from Saqqaf to H.AK, Saqqaf writes that
Faisal ~ still believes all US efforts must be made so that
Israel will respect UN resolutions, withdraw from all
territories occupied in 1967 and respect rights of Pales-
tinians to self-determination.
November 26 Prince Fahd informs Akins that Faisal is now prepared
to ease the boycott on the US and resume production
provided the Arabs can see concrete steps toward a just
peace -- that an agreement on the schedule for Israeli
withdrawals from Arab lands would be sufficient and
even private Israeli assurances to the USG that it would
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withdraw might be sufficient. At the time the boycott
would be lifted, Arabs would announce that the action
had been taken because of Nixon-HAK assurances that
US intended to work for a just peace; it would also be
announced that if Israel became recalcitrant or US dropped
its efforts, embargo would be reimposed. Fahd added
that he wasn't certain if this action, currently favored
by the King, would be carried out if there was substantial
opposition from other Arabs. A letter from Nixon to
King would help. [Nixon letter ultimately sent on Dec. 3]
December 7 Yamani informs Clements that he wouldarrange for an
additional 100, 000 bpd for US Sixth Fleet.
December 8 King Faisal, reacting to President's letter of December 3,
describes Saudi position in several points in talks: (a)
Oil embargo would end when Israel had withdrawn from
occupied territories, implemented relevant UNSC reso-
lutions and restored Palestinian rights. (b) Normal
production could resume immediately if US would announce
that Israel will withdraw from all occupied territories,
Palestinians should be given right of self-determination
and if Israel did not do these things, US would have to
review its ties with Israel, possibly considering a break
in relations. [No specific mention of Jerusalem] (c)
US should publicly call on Israel to give up occupied lands
and say it supported justice for Palestinians.
Fahd separately told Akins Saudis were consulting with
Egypt, Syria and Kuwait about prospects for resuming oil
when peace talks began; such resumption would be linked
with threat to reimpose embargo if movement towards
peace did not occur. Saudi Arabia could not act alone however.
Saqqaf separately told Akins he thought the King had been
very "soft" on oil in the above meeting; indicated King still
skeptical of US intentions. Replied positively to suggestion
that Israeli return to October 22 lines would be read as
earnest of good US intentions and suggested that Israeli
withdrawal to the east bank would be even better -- such
signals would enable Saudi Arabia to "reopen" the matter
in Arab circles. Saudi Arabia cannot move alone.
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December 14 Faisal meeting with HAK: HAK described process leading
to an Israeli-Egyptian disengagement. Faisal indicated in
reply that the oil "faucets" would be reopened if the US,
in announcing the results of that phase, would say that
this is "but one step in a solution leading to withdrawal
[later refined as "one step in the implementation of 242
which stipulates total withdrawal"] and to the realization
of Palestinian rights.
December 19 Akins reports
Yamani will soon recommend lifting of the embargo and
probable restoration of production to September levels
keyed to the successful opening of the Geneva Conference.
Source suggested that Arab petroleum ministers meeting
in Tripoli would still have to take formal decision to do
this.
Kamal Adham tells Eilts in Cairo that Faisal wants to
find a way to ease the embargo but having publicly gone
on record, he could cnly do so if (a) Sadat asks him to
on which to peg easing. Once this takes place Saudis
will be helpful.
25X1
December 21 Yamani tells Akins (a) Saudis agreed boycott would be
partially lifted and production increased but not to Septem-
ber levels; (b) Saudis needed other Arab approval but would
be willing assume flack for partial easing; (c) opposed the
notion of lifting and then having to reimpose embargo, but
if progress were made in the peace talks, Saudis would
go all the way in January; (d) hoped to announce partial
lifting by Christmas but thought other Arabs would make
this difficult.
December 23 King writes HAK that he hopes for positive results on peace
and says this can be done "realizing the hoped for goal which
the Arabs demand and which international society affirms and
supports -- that is the withdrawal of Israel to borders that
preceded its aggression against the Arabs of June 5, 1967,
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and granting the Palestinian people the right of self-
determination. We hope that the peace conference which
is now being convened shall be a good omen for achieving
a permanent peace built upon right and justice. "
December 25 King writes President that "relying on your good intentions
of working for the withdrawal of Israel from (sic] the pre-
June 5, 1967 borders and giving the Palestinian people its
right to return to its country to decide its destiny by itself.
After the implementation of what I have referred to or during
its implementation -- if we see in the immediate future that
this is proceeding in a serious way you will find that our
hand shall be in your hand and (our relations) shall return
to normal or be even stronger between the two friendly
countries.... that the storm cloud shall be dispersed and
that matters shall return to normal in the first part of the
coming Christian year. "
Saqqaf tells Akins that above mention of "storm cloud" refers
to lifting the boycott and restoring September production
levels as early as January when the Arabs see that progress
towards peace is being made. He said this would be when
disengagement begins or even is announced.
December 27 Yamani tells Akins that Saudi position had changed but had
no satisfactory explanation. Said King had decided on
lifting boycott immediately after .HAK visit but then backed
down, though King had toyed with idea of "easing" embargo.
Said King was not prepared to fight for US on oil in Arab
councils yet. Yamani said that disengagement of forces
between Egypt and Israel would give the King his opportunity
to move; they understood disengagement would come soon
and then boycott could be lifted or eased. [Yamani thought
Saqqaf may have been responsible for the King's changed
position; Saqqaf had recently had meetings with Sadat. He
maintained that Fahd, Sultan and himself favored lifting
the boycott while His ham Nazir and Saqqaf opposed. ]
December 28 Yamani tells Akins he had made no definite commitments
to Clements that boycott for US military would be eased and
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indicated King's initial reaction had been negative.
However, second time around, when Yamani explained
US military needs, King did not respond and Yamani is
taking silence as assent. He is working with Aramco
to arrange for added deliveries for Sixth and Seventh
Fleets but not other US forces.
December 29 In a lengthy harrangue about "unfulfilled" US promises
Saqqaf argues the case that the Saudis cannot lift the
embargo "now" because the Israelis have not begun to
withdraw -'- the Israelis were still "squabbling" about
their troops in Suez City and the Saudis could not move
before the Israelis did. He made one reference to the
fact that it would not be necessary for the Egyptians to
intervene "when disengagement was achieved" since the
Saudis themselves would be "disposed" to lift the embargo
anyway. He said there was no difference between his views
and those of the King. He blamed Iran for the oil price
increases and said the Saudis had a moderating influence.
December 31 Saqqaf (following visit to Eg)p t) tells Akins that the
Saudis saw nn way the boycott could be lifted until
"disengagement of forces takes place" or ''once disengage-
ment is completed.. " He said Sadat completely agrees with
this view. Though Saqqaf cannot absolutely deliver the King,
he said he thought it unlikely that the King would go against
his and Sadat`.s views on this.
January 1 Saqqaf tells Akins that (a) the Saudis have decided to lift
the boycott after disengagement is completed, coupled with
announcement that it would be reimposed if there were no
further progress; under the circumstances of disengagement
Saudi Arabia would not try to stop oil leakage to the US;
there will still have to be an inter-Arab meeting on the boy-
cott -- that Iraq, Libya and perhaps Kuwait would oppose
but that Egypt and Saudi Arabia would insist it must be done
and hoped to carry Algeria. He again maintained there was
no difference in Egyptian/Saudi views on this. Fahd was out
of line in indicating the boycott might be lifted sooner.
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Saqqaf also showed Akins a letter from Sadat to Faisal
which urged that the US be assured that the boycott would
be lifted "as soon as disengagement is accomplished"
which Sadat said would be very soon. Saqqaf indicated
some ambiguity on whether this meant when disengagement
"is reached" or "is completed" but said this didn't matter
much since the time frame would be short. Sadat also
suggested Saqqaf might visit the US to explain current
Arab thinking and also expressed concern about the Syrian
front.
January l Saqqaf letter to HAK -- presented to Akins on Jan. 2 --
which he asserts has been approved by the King makes the
following points: During the HAK November visit, the King
indicated that, the embargo would be lifted only when Israel
withdrew to pre 1967 lines. During the HAK December visit
the King indicated Saudi Arabia was prepared to lift the
embargo if a schedule for Israeli withdrawal was fixed
according to a timetable guaranteed by the US. The inten-
tion of the Saudis is that the embargo will be lifted "when it
perceives that Israel prepared both to withdraw completely
and to recognize the rights of the Palestinian people. If
Israel carries out in,principle the disengagement which you
explained clearly to mean as being withdrawal from the West
Bank to the Mitla Pass as a first line, then it would be pos-
sible to lift the embargo" on the US.... "We will wait for
your pressure on Israel to be successful, whereby Israel
withdraws to the Mitla pass in Sinai as the first stage of
total withdrawal from the occupied Arab lands and gives the
Palestinians their rights to self-determination at that
point the embargo can be raised. "
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January 16 Through Kamal Adham, there are reports that Faisal
is uring President Nirneri of Sudan to come to the US
to make two points on Arab behalf: (a) That the US
guarantee publicly and officially that Israel will follow
"stage one" disengagement with eventual implementation
of resolution 242 in all its parts and (b) that you personally
conduct the Geneva negotiations.
January 17 Saqqaf tells Akins (a) he had met with Syrian Foreign
Minister Khaddam who came to assure the Saudis that
SARG wanted to cooperate fully with Egypt and Saudi
Arabia; (b) the Saudis remained convinced their action
in not lifting the oil embargo had been correct since
disengagement night not have been reached -- but on
basis of reports from Egypt they are not convinced it
should be lifted promptly and the issue will be discussed
with'Sadat on Jan. '18. (c) the arduous path'towards dis-
engagement suggested the route ahead will be tough.
January 20 Saqqaf informs Akins that (a) the King has agreed the
oil boycott should be lifted immediately with the under-
standing it would be reimposed if further moves towards
peace are not made; (b) Saudi Arabia will take this action
regardless of position of other Arabs, The focal point
for this move is a planned Arab oil ministers meeting
in Cairo on Jan. 22.
Saqqaf note to HAK expresses hope similar progress can
be made on other fronts now to that swift agreement can
be reached on Israel's total withdrawal and satisfaction
of Palestinian rights. [No mention of oil.
January 21 Yamani tells Akins that the King has decided to lift embargo
and restore production to approximately to September levels
but that the decision could not be implemented until it
was ratified by Arab oil ministers -- a meeting which could
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not take place until Yamani's return from Japan in
early February.
Saqqaf separately informs Akins that he and Fahd had
urged lifting of the embargo soonest but that Yaxnani
(as indicated above) opposed on basis that the Saudis
could not move unilaterally, and that the King agreed
with that position.
January 23 In Meeting with Akins, King Faisal variously makes
wished it could
following points about oil: (a) Saudi
lift the embargo immediately; he hoped therefore the US
"would announce that the disengagement of forces along
the Canal was simply the first step toward the complete
end of Israeli occupation; once this announcement was made
Saudi Arabia would have what it needed to influence other
Arabs to join it in a lifting of the boycott. " (b) "All that
was necessary for the Arabs to lift the embargo was for
the Israelis to complete their withdrawal as specified in
the disengagement agreement. Once this was accomplished,
Saudi Arabia would be better able to win the other Arabs
?ews o the hn~rrntt. " (c) In response to Akins
to ...14x-1. V.W-&b v i the -
proposal [that, in connection with the state of the union
message, the President be told that upon the start of
Israeli disengagement around Jan. 25, SArabia would begin
contacts with other Arabs, a favorable decision on lifting
the boycott would be possible and the Pres. could say so
in his state of union message] the King said that sounded
possible and that "if the Israelis in fact begin their evacu-
ation on schedule Saudi Arabia would begin contacts -- aimed
at lifting the boycott --- with other Arab governments on
Jan. 2 5. "
Just prior to meeting with King, Saqqaf informed Akins that
the King had given Yamani instructions on the Saudi position
on the embargo: There were two possibilities -- the first
would give the US the most favored nation treatment (i. e.
to allow the US its September liftings or just lift the boycott
completely which the Saudis favored); in either case, this
would be for a specific period of 90 days. The second plan
would be to lift the boycott partially -- 50% -- with no ter-
minal date and with the understanding that the pcercentage
would be increased with further steps towards peace.
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Saqqaf advised the US "go easy" on the King and especially
advised the US not mention any commitments made by Sadat
to HAK -- since the King is the ultimate arbiter of the oil
embargo. Fahd separately expressed agreement with
Akins and wished the embargo would be raised immediately.
January 27 Saqqaf informs Akins of message from Faisal to President
(aimed at State of Union message) on oil, saying that in
view of US efforts and the Saudi promise that "when a
withdrawal of the Israeli forces begins, we shall undertake
to contact the Arab states to obtain a lifting of the boycott
against America, I should like to inform you we have begun
to do just this. We hope that we will soon achieve positive
results toward the realization of this goal. " Later, Saqqaf
said that the King said it was possible that the embargo would
be lifted by the time the President gives his address but that
if not, he would prefer not to be quoted as urging this action.
He suggests the President saying he was in direct contact
with an important Arab leader who had called for an urgent
meeting of the Arabs to arrange the lifting of the boycott
and that he (the President) has every reason to believe
this action would be taken soon.
[Yamani makes statements in Tokyo on oil]
February 3 Saqqaf informs Akins of a message from Faisal to the
President which makes the following points: (a) Saudi
Arabia has found no support among other Arabs for the
lifting of the embargo until after agreement is reached
on an Israeli/Syrian disengagement. (b) Review of the
issue will not be positive at the February 14 Arab oil
ministers' meeting in Tripoli unless such a disengagement
has been previously reached and implementation has begun.
(c) Saudi Arabia strongly hopes the US can obtain this
goal.
Saqqaf followed with oral points: (a) Kuwait, Algiers,
Abu Dhabi all agreed with Syria's position that boycott
not be lifted until disengagement begins on Syrian front.
(b) Egypt agrees to its lifting immediately but Arabs in
fact dismayed at the withdrawal agreement leaving only
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token Egyptian forces on east bank -- this is a complete
surprise as the Egyptians had told the Saudis in November
that your understanding with the Israelis was that two-thirds
of three-fourths of Egypt's second and third armies would
stay in place; the Egyptians have been had. (c) Asad had
told Faisal explicitly that he would favor the boycott being
lifted as soon as his disengagement begins. The Saudis
might agree to this in writing. (d) The Saudis have long
maintained that the key to peace lies in Damascus; it is
asking too much to expect the Saudis to move along on
something Asad had asked the Arabs no to do. (d) Disengage-
ment on the Syrian front must occur before full confidence
in the US can be restored.
February 3 Ashraf Marwan tells Ambassador Eilts that (a) Asad is
seeking to persuade Faisal not to lift the oil embargo at
the February 14 meeting; (b) Boumediene had agreed to
Sadat's request that it be lifted and that apart from Kuwait
and Libya all other states agreed with Sadat; (c) Faisal
had personally assured him it would be unconditionally
the
lifted at the Tripoli mee ing: (d) the Egyptia Minister of
Petroleum will take the lead on February 14. [Fahmi
reaffirmed these Egyptian understandings on February 4.1
February 4 Saqqaf told Akins that Yamani was not authorized to make
the statements he made in Tokyo. He blamed the US for
building Yamani up.
February 5 Saqqaf unburdens himself on Akins about US policy towards
the oil embargo. He argued that the Saudis had moved far
in response to US wishes; the King had started by insisting
the embargo be maintained until the 1967 borders, including
Jerusalem, were restored; he then said it would be sufficient
for the USG to form a plan for the complete Israeli withdrawal
and then guarantee it; SAG then agreed that Israeli with-
drawal beyond' the passes would be sufficient; finally they
accepted the Egyptian/Israeli disengagement as a basis
for trying to persuade other Arabs to approve the lifting.
They had tried hard but failed -- they thought they had done
a lot in getting general Arab agreement to lift the boycott
once disengagement on the Syrian front begins and was even
ready to confirm this in writing. Washington does not intend
to put pressure on Israel. US policy will cause it to lose
Arab friends, and the Saudis will have to reappraise its
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relations. He asked whether the US instructions could
be withdrawn. He suggested a meeting with the King.
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