MEETING WITH CHOU EN-LAI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-462-5-19-3
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: June 26, 1973
• Content Type: CABLE

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Reproduced from MSS collections, Lib. of Congress
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PEKING 005
June 26, 1973
TO:
FRO
HENRY A. KISSINGERP.
DAVID BRUCE
SUBJECT: Meeting with Chou En-lai
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1. 1 was called with no prior notice on June 25 at 5 pm and told Prime
Minister Chou wanted to see me. I met him at Great Hall of the People
at 5:45 pm, accompanied by Jenkins and Holdridge. On Chinese side
were Chou, Ch'iao ',Caen-hue, Chang Wen-chin, Lin Piing (Head Amer -
can./Oceanian Department, MFA), Ting Yung-hug (Deputy Head, Ameri-
can/Oceanian Department EARAN), Nancy Vang, Shen Jo-yun, and two
others,
Z. Chou began with polite chit-chat about weather, and then worked
the conversation around to modern science -- "It can't be said that there
is no progress, but there are many unknowns". We talked about archeology,
elimination of disease in China, and cancer research. (Comment: I recall
from record of your conversations with Chou that cancer research was
often mentioned, and wonder if this subject might have a special interest
for Chou).
3. We then got on to topic of way that scientists today keep in touch with
one another in various parts of the world. Noted that this included nuclear
scientists, who often felt an obligation to share their discoveries with
fellow scientists in other countries regardless of security considerations.
Chou picked this up, saying it was not possible for nuclear secrets to be
spread throughout the world because their purpose was not to cure disease
but to cause harm. He then referred to an article he had read in a Japanese
newspaper about the U. S. S. R. having stolen secret plans, weapons and
equipment from NATO since World War II, which had given it much mili-
tary knowledge. There had been more than ten major cases of this.
4. I told Chou I accepted the dissemination of nuclear science secrets
as an exceedingly dangerous thing. I considered that any nation would
be foolish to let other nations know about its technical developments in
this field, regardless of whether these nations were friendly or not.
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5. Chou promptly agreed. No matter how friendly people are to each
other around the Western White House swimming pool, it is impermis-
sible to make an exhibition of their nuclear secrets. " There was a
political question here1 and in spite of the fact that so many agreements
had been signed, people still viewed them with suspicion.
6. Chou emphasized that this was his own view even after receiving
the President's letter. He thanked the President for writing, but the
Chinese would maintain the position set forth in the U.S. -PRC joint
communique of February 1972. This position has been conveyed to
you through Ambassador Huang Hua and Huang Chen, and so no further
renunciation necessary. Similar reactions among others in the world
would become evident in a short period of time.
7. Chou indicated the Chinese had been notified through "friends in the
White House" that they would be informed about the Brezhnev talks.
Ambassador Hwang Chen was to be invited to the Western White House
on July. 5. Colonel Kennedy had also informed them in a letter that
Brezhnev would make public the non-aggression agreement. (Chou
referred in this context to four articles,) Brezhnev had told.
President.
President he would do so.
8. Chou declared that the Chinese had expected something like this
ever since they had seen the draft agreement two days before Brezhnev's
departure for the U.S. They had said so to the President through you,
and had also forwarded their conclusions. They were quite familiar
with Soviet tricks, and could imagine what kind of show the Soviets
would pat up both before and afterwards.
9. I said I thought that the Chinese position was perfectly well known
In the U. S. , and was indeed indicated by the President's letter. It was
quite unique that in the course of all our negotiations with the USSR, the
President had instructed you to keep Prime Minister Chou informed before,
during, and after, about what had gone on. I deduced from this that there
was a certain amount of suspicion also in the U. S. regarding the USSR.
10. I remarked it seemed to me that it had been a Soviet tactic for a
considerable length of time to try to divide the U.S. and China. They
must have been surprised at the turn taken in U.S. -PRC relations, and
in fact had given every indication of it. If PM Chou recalled the original
draft agreement submitted to you by the Soviets, it was evident this was
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an attempt on their part to arrive at a bilateral agreement with the U.S.
in which the interests of third parties were not taken into account. As I
understood the present agreement, the U. S. has undertaken with the
Soviets to renounce the aggressive use of nuclear weapons, and not
only by one power against the other but against a third power. This
raised an interesting question -- if two parties entered into an agree
-
merit not to take certain action, could one nation trust the other not
to violate this agreement if it was not a treaty but an executive agree-
ment?
U. Chou said the agreement was a mere statement about which we
could ret be sure. World opinion also had dou.bts. "When a nation has
very adequate weapons, do you think it-would renounce them?" Besides,
even treaties had not been honored by the Soviets in the past. The Sino-
1 Soviet Friendship Treaty had been signed to last for a thirty-year period
E and still had seven years to run, so why was it necessary to propose
o
"a another non-aggression? (sic) To conclude a new treaty would show
la that the old one did not exist; hence, the (old) treaty was not
3
us reliable. If there was good faith, then a tacit understanding or a simple
c
0
/ statement would be useful, but without good faith nothing was useful.
/ Even a treaty would be useless.
co
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2 12. Chou raised another point: Since only the two major powers were
Iengaged in this agreement, there were grave doubts among other states
-? as to whether these two powers wanted to dominate the world. The U. S. -
m PRC Joint Communique stated that neither party should seek hegemony,
-?
0. and it was also mentioned in the President's letter that you would mention
0
ce this when you came. But from the speeches and statements of the Soviet
leaders, it could be seen they were seeking out-and-out domination by the
two world powers.
13. I said I sincerely believed that the U.S. was not out to dominate the
world even if it could. It had had enough difficulties in its worldwide
endeavors, even in the recent past. However, I frankly could not say I
had the same judgement or opinions about the Soviet Union. In my opinion,
the agreement would be inoperable in case of aggression as far as its
practical effects were concerned because its status would not affect any
existing treaties, alliances, or rights involving third parties. Therefore,
the U. S. was in exactly the same position as before -- if there were an
attack ona NATO country, or more dangerously, on Berlin, we had an
obligation under existing agreements to come to their assistance. Such
undertakings could not be breached now or in any other way.
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14. Chou observed that in this case* we would give the world the impres-
sion it was possible to have a relaxation of tension. There would be a
false sense of security.
15. I said that might be. I referred to the dangerous situation which
already had been created for us in Europe by the measures advocated by
some members of our Congress. They wanted to withdraw troops from
NATO and rely entirely on nuclear power for defense. I did not know
what the 'consequences would be if our people were lulled into a false
sense of security regarding the USSR.
16. Chou injected at this point that we would have to wait and see. It
did not yet matter, because there was still tire,
17. Continuing, I explained their attitude as being one of trying to make
arrangements of one kind or another via trade, aid, etc. to get as many
guarantees as possible no matter whether these were later violated or
not. Knowing of the President's and your own communications and talks
with PM Chou, I realized the Chinese attitude regarding this operation
was different from ours. Nevertheless., we were informing them of
what we had in mind every step of the way. In my opinion, this was a
very unique situation.
18. Chou remarked there had been direct Cirinese contact with the U.S.
for less than two years, and so there were various speculations as
far as the world was concerned. He noted that although I had just
arrived, I had read the records of previous conversations. He wanted
to repeat what Chairman Mao had said to you last February: The U.S.
wanted to step on the Chinese shoulders to reach the USSR. He, Chou,
repeated this to indicate that such things could happen. Chairman Mao
extended this philosophy to visualize what might happen if a war broke
out between China and the USSR. In the beginning, the U. S. would main-
tain a position of non-involvement, but give military supplies to the USSR.
Then, after waiting until China had dragged out the USSR for a period of
time, the U. S. would strike the Soviets from, behind. Chou reiterated
that he was only repeating what the Chairman had said; however, the
Chinese had made material preparations.
19. I said that I could see from this why they had such strong reserva-
tions about the agreement. Chou asked me if I had read the passage from
the record, and t.said I had.
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Comment: I in fact do riot recall 1/449 having spoken in such terms, though
Chou himself did speak elsewhere of the U. S standing on China's shoulders
to reach the USSR.
I added that I thought that estimate was highly pessimistic.
20. Chou declared that as he had told you, they had all along calculated
on fighting 04,trO fronts,. They were digging tunnels and storing grain,
and hence id-not fear isolation. You had said they were approaching
this quest
This was
had matle
principles.
m the standpoint of revolutionaries, and they agreed.
from the beginning ,they were revolutionaries, they
on? they would never abandon their revolutionary
said he wanted to tell me this frankly so that I could
understand thelx general picture. They were not pessimistic but had
to be realistic. This was why they went overseas to seek friends every-
where, and opposed hegemony,
21. I said I hoped and believed our people understood. Every country
had to consult its own self-interest and prepare for the worst. It should
not be optimistic; that would be foolish.
22. Chou stated that there were many people in the world however not
aware of this. They wanted to rely on other kinds of forces rather than on
their own people themselves. I observed that it would be a terrible mis-
take for a great nation riot to be self-sufficient, and to rely largely on
other nations.
23 I went on to say. that I had been refreshed and invigorated (by) the
Shanghai joint commonique because it contained statements which outlined
the differences between us -- our political and social systems.
However, there were also areas of agreement, and we could reach more
agreement if we proceeded carefully and frankly. All too often people
talked together and ignored their differences, and left them still in
existence. In our case, I did not see the differences between our two
countries as irreconcilable over the long run if we proceeded with patience.
24. Chou paused for a long moment without comment, and then asked me
how long my diplomatic experience had been -- forty or fifty years? I
replied, rot that long, about twenty to twenty-five years. He referred
to my previous statement as having been made on the basis of practical
experience, and then said in effect that if things become too complicated
and too many empty words are said, matters turn out superficially. It
would be far better to work out one thing effectively and keep one's pro-
mises.
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25. I said the U. S. would never want, nor could it achieve hegemony
over China, over the USSR, or indeed over any peoples in the world, be-
cause hegemony in the old imperialistic' sense is gone. Nationalism is
dominant. People may make a mess of their internal affairs, but it
Is their mess. This is the great change which has come about in my
life time. Chou added, especially after World War Two.
26. I continued that the real point possible difference between our two
countries might arise from each of Us acting on our own vis-a-vis the USSR.
Uwe acted independently in this regard, it could cause great international
difficulty. The situation in Western Europe also figures in the equation.
The emergence of WE economically has been startling and beneficial. But
if it could also develop political cohesion, this would be beneficial to you
and to us -- but not to the Soviet Union. Chau interjected that the Soviets
have tried different tricks to divide us. I said the Soviets since 1947
had tried to destroy Western Europe or to dominate it. I was skeptical
that they would surrender that ambition. Chou said emphatically, "they
havret." I said if WE could form its own political apparatus (economic
cohesion was comparatively easy), it would be at least as strong as the
U.S. , and stronger than the USSR. I did not know whether this could be
achieved. Some progress had been made, but they had been talking tni-
fication for thirty years.
27. Chou said Soviets were now applying pressure on Japan. He a.sk d
whether it would .be possible to improve our relations with Japan ;law,
or whether this possibility had become more doubtful. I said I would
like to answer by asking the Premier a question: Can any nation as
economically prosperous as Japan, which has had a past history of
imperialism and expansionism, ever renounce it? Chou said the Chinese
at many time expressed to us the conviction that economic expansionism
would bring about military expansionism. They also said this to their
Japanese friends. It is necessary for us to work together with respect
to Japan, for it is still at the crossroads. Chou said he had discussed
this with you several times, emphasizing that we must work to keep Japan
on the right course. Japan still speaks of its alliance with the U. S. now.
It was important that Japan not be left in a position where it felt there was
no way out. Japan should not listen to Soviet recommendations. For a time
it might be possible for Japan to derive advantage (note: "win more rights")
but this could not be relied upon.
28. I said it was essential that Japan not fall under Soviet influence.
China and the U. S. for different riasons, should take the position of
keeping Japan from engaging in some mad adventure, e. g. allying them-
selves with a great power in a way which would put them under its control.
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29. Chou observed that japan has its own self-dignity, but economically
Its development was lop-sided. With such a large population in a small
area it was dependent on foreign markets. To export, it had to import
large quantities of raw materials. It might be beneficial to export
Japanese capital to certain places, such as Siberia. The USSR has left
the door wide open. Chou said China would not mind if the U. S. and
Japan made investment there if we thought there was profit in it. We
will feel more reassured if you are in it with Japan. If you are both
in it together, you will not be so eari.ly taken advantage of.
30. At this point the conversation had lasted over an hour and a half.
Chou's colleagues were consulting their watches; they probably had
dinner engagemente. The PM said when he left.: "I've enjoyed this
alk; / wish it ttld'have continued".
31 Comment: Perhaps because of U. S.-Soviet summit, most Chinese
officials present appeared unusually serious at first, but warmed during
hour and half Meeting. Chou was relaied and friendly throughout, al-
though deputies thought he too was more serious than usual. In sorrow
but not in anger he dismissed U.S. -Soviet agreement as a fait accompli,
but several times referred to Soviet unreliability and duplicity. Neither
Indo-China nor Taiwan was mentioned.
32. Chou appeared to be in excellent health and spirits, Would appreciate
if you would have check made as to textual accuracy of Chou's reference
to Chairman Mao's statement (twice emphasized by Chou) of possibility
of Soviets attacking China, and then in turn being attacked by the U.S.
End of comment.
33. Warm regards. END ALL
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