COUP POSSIBILITIES IN CAMBODIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-39-3-24-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: September 17, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-HAK-39-3-24-9
lip 5161-X
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I?MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
t5
INFORMATION e
September 17, 1973
SECRET /SENSITIVE
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
25X1
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
State Dept. review completed
MR. KISSINGER
WILLIAM L. STEARMAN
Coup Possibilities in Cambodia
Charge Enders has reported separately (Tab B) that while several key
commanders have decided the Lon Nol administration should go and are
united in their dislike of Lon Nolts watchdog on the military (General
Hon Hangsin, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations), few if any have a
MORI/CDF C03223291
SECRET /SENSITIVE
XGDS 513(2)
sr,NSITIVE
? ? : .?! ft-01Q INTI/r11 v..
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-HAK-39-3-24-9
? ow No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-HAK-39-3-24-9
A?
firm concept of what and who should replace him. Their goals are as
yet wholly negative, but Sink Matak undoubtedly would be their most
congenWe ally. Enders believes that coalescence of a coup effort by these
dispalitrite elements and personalities is not in the immediate offing unless
prompted by an ill-timed preemptive move from Lou Nol or a general
breakdown of authority. The President, however, is inost unlikely to take
the precipitous kind of action which could trigger a coup by ,sorne
generals. He notes, however, that a strong cautionary word with the
Generals is timely and recalls that he has warned them strongly that a coup
attempt could provoke the final collapse of U.S. Congressional support for
Cambodia. Enders has assured us that he will continue to make this point
to all potential troublemakers.
SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-HAK-39-3-24-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-HAK-39-3-24-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-HAK-39-3-24-9
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-HAK-39-3-24-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-HAK-39-3-24-9
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-HAK-39-3-24-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-HAK-39-3-24-9
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-HAK-39-3-24-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-HAK-39-3-24-9
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-HAK-39-3-24-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-HAK-39-3-24-9
25X1
. No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-HAK-39-3-24-9
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R 1014257. SEP 73 CONTROL: 1 8 3 0
FM ANEMBASSY PHNOM PENH RECO: 10 SEP 73Z 15 48
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2938
BT
SECRETSECTION 1OF 3 PHNOM PENH 9577
NOD'S
DEPART MENT PLEASE PASS SECDEF, cJCS, COMUSSAG CINCPAC
E.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS: PINT, PINS, CB, MILI
SUBJ: POSSIBILITIES OF A MILITARY POWER PLAY IN PHNOM PENH
1. SUMMARY. WE HAVE REVIEWED THE POLITICAL MOODS AND
INCLINATIONS OF THOSE MILITARY ODMMANDERS WHO HAVE FORCES
,NAnAr)ly ny 7,1w.*T?TrA-,-Tkirs nn esttannnTTAT. A tant-fTTPAI POW-^
PLAY IN THE CAPITAL. WHILE SEVERAL OF THEM HAVE DECIDED
THAT LON NOL'S ADMINISTRATION SHOULD GO, FE%! IF ANY HAVE
ANY FIRM CONCEPT OF YHAT AND WHO SHOULD REPLACE IT NOR HAVE
TO GO ABOUT THE OPERATION. WE m I.c g'h F
A COtP EFFORT af;111,01_,LLIELE_TattviatUlj,\Ljal,EZIP T ED
grwrIrc:TI:IEp pRE?EmpyjvE mcc4 FROM LQ N NOL !OUCH ?
THREATENS THE _sVRYIYAL OF ONE OR MORE OF THESIttE,E5
OR RY A GLQLJ'TJQBLtL THE MOOD OF THESE
ttifriiiiMzbfri-8 IS SUCH, HOWEVER, THAT WE HAVE BELIVED IT
TIMELY TO CAUTION THEM ON THE CONSEQUENcES OF A MILITARY
TAKEOVER. END SUMMARY.
2. CAPABILITIES
AM EACH OF THE FOUR DIVISION COMMANDERS HAVE THE RIGHT
NUMBERS In THE RIGHT PLACES TO STAGE A COUP OR COUNTER
COUP. ALL BUT THE THIRD DIVISION COMM-ANDER-NOM HAVE
AT THEIR DISPOSAL A SQUADRON EACH OF M-113 ARMORED PER-
SONNEL CARRIERS,. WHICH WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY LOOM IN KHMER
MINDS AS AN IDEAL WEAPON FOR AN OPERATION OF THIS SORT.
BEFORE MAKING A MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION. A DIVISION COM-
MANDER WOULD PROUBLY WISH TO HAVE ON HIS SIDE AT LEAST
ONE OTHER DIVISION (OR THE PHNOM PENH SPECIAL REGION
FORCES) AND AGAINST HIM NO MORE THAN ONE.
B. THE PHNOM PENH SPECIAL REGION COMMANDER HAS MORE MEN
AT HIS DISPOSAL THAN THE nivisiol cOMMANDERS. THEY
ARE NOT OBILE BUT THEY ARE CLOSER TO THE OBJECTIVE. HIS
SEVilET
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1TIVE SECRETARY
NOT Ti No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/1-6 :10C-HAK-39-3-24-9?
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-HAK-39-3-24-9
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SECTION 1 OF PHNOM PENH T 10
CAPABILITIES THERFORE APPEAR NEARLY EQUAL TO THOSE OF DIVISION
COMMANDERS.
C. THE ARMORED CAVALRY COMMANDER COLONEL YPI SI MDY
HAS THEORETICALLY ONLY THREE M-113ESQUADRONS UNDER HIS
DIRECT SUPERVISION BUT IN THE RECENT PAST HE HAS DEMON-
STRATED SIGNIFICNT CONTROL OVER THE LOYALTIES OF THOSE
SQUADRONS ASSIGNED TO THE DIVISIONS. ANY OFFICER ATTEMPT-
ING A COUP OR COUNTER COUP WOULD WISH TO HAVE HIM ON HIS
SIDE OR AT LEAST NEUTRAL.
D4 THE PARA BRIGADE COMMANDER HAS FOUR BATTALIONS OF
REASONABLE REPUTATION. HE WOULD FIT WELL INTO A SECONDARY
ROLE IN A COUP OR COUNTER coup ATTEMPT, THE UNITS ARE AT THE
MOMENT HOWEVER, ALL IN KOMPO NG CHAM.
Es OF THE INDEPENDENT BRIGADES PROBABLY ONLY THE 13TH
AND THE 2ETH HAVE THE STRENGTH AND THE GUTS TO JOIN IN
A POLITICAL POWER PLAY. LI KE THE PARA BRIGADE, THEY
WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO HAVE SUPPORTING RATHER THAN LEAD-
ING ROLES.
F. NEITHER THE ATR FORCE NOR THE NAVY COULD FORM THE -
NUCLEUS OF A COUP OR COUNTER COUP ATTEMPT AND THEIR COir'i-
MANDERS ARE THEREFORE UNLIKELY TO BE INSTIGATORS OF SUCH
AN OPERATION. THEY WOULD, HOWEVER BE VALUABLE ALLIES
EVEN IN A PASSIVE ROLE AND MAY BE COURTED BY DISSIDENT
ARMY COMMANDERS.
3. INCLINATIONS
A. SECOND DIVISION COMMANDER BG DIEN DEL (WHO ALSO HAS 2,500
KAND AL MSD TROOPS AT HIS DISPOSAL, HAS FOR MORE THAN
A YEAR SPOKEN OPENLY AND BETTERLY AGAINST LON NOL AND
THOSE HE REGARDS TO BE THE PRESIDENT'S PRINCIPAL AGENTS,
IN PARTICULAR ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS
MG HOU HANGSI N. HE HAS ON SEVER AL OCCASIONS SHARED WITH
US HIS BELIEF THAT LON NOL' S DEPARTURE IS A PREREQUISITE
FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THE MILITARY SITUATION AND EVENTUAL
PEACE NEGOT IT IONS. j-(E HAS EVINCED TOLERATION BUT NOT
ENTHUSIASM FOR GENERALHSOSTHE NE FERNAND'EZ. HE HAS INDI-
CATED GENERAL OPPOSITION TO CIVILIAN POLITICIANS NOW IN
THE GOVERNMET WHILE PROFESSING SOME SYMPATHY FOR THE
DEMOCRATIC PARTY. HIGH POLITICAL COUNCIL MEMBER CHENG
ENG TELLS US, HOWEVER,IHAT HE HAS DIEN DEL' S SUPPORT
AND BG UN KAUV CONFIRMS THAT THERE ARE SOME TIES BETWEEN
THE TWO.
B. SEVENTH DIVISION COMMANDER BG UN YAUV RECENTLY SHARED
WITH AN AARMA VIEYS VERY SIMILAR TOJ0SE OF DIEN DEL
A FELLOW KHMER V.RON, AS REG ARDS LON. NOL ATIN.
MI YE DIEN DEL HE HAS RECENTLY REQUESTED AND BEEN GRANTED
AUDIENCES WITH THE PRESIDENT AND THE ALIENATION HERE MAY
BT 17%1: un
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010t08/1d7 LO SECRETARY CUTIVE SECRETARY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-HAK-39-3-24-9
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Department of State Tar
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FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH CONTROL: 1 8 4 1
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2939 RECD: 10 SEP 73Z 16 11
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SECRETSECTION 2 OF 2 PHNOM PENH 9577
NODIS
NOT BE AS GREAT AS DIEN DEL'S UN KAUV IS VIOLENTLY
OPPOSED TO HOU HANGSIN, ON THE OTHER HAND, WHO HE
PPARENTLY BELIEVES HAS TRIED TO HAVE HUM KILLED. HE
LOOKS BENIGNLY BUT NOT ADMIRINGLY ON SOSTHENE FERNANDEZ,
CONSIDERING HIM, AS DO MANY OTHERS, AS SEPARATED FROM
AND THUS AN ALTERNATIVE TO TIE LON NOL-HOU HANGSIN
CHATN OF COMMAND. UN MAUV HAS HAD RECENT FRIENDLY
VISITS WITH PRIME MINISTER IN TAM AND HAS EXPRESSED TO
US SUPPORT FOR CHENG HENG.'
C. THIRD DIVISION COMMANDER BG NGUON LY KHEANG HAS,
ASIDE FROM INDICATING DISTRUST 67-UNTETATTOLITICIANS
IN GENERAL AND STRONG DISTASTE FOR GENERAL HOU HANGSIN.,*
KEPT EIS POLITICAL INCLINATIONS TO HIMSELF. ALTHOUGH ?
HE WAS THE PRESIDENT'S CHOICE TO HEARD HIS BROTHER LON VON'S
DIVISION,. THE TACTICAL SITUATION WAS ABSOLUTELY CRITICAL AND
LY KHEANG CANNOT BE CLASSED AS A LON NOL MAN, AND UN KAUV HAS IN
CONVERSATIONS WITH AARMA DESCRIBED HIM AS LEANING TOWARD THE
oProsinon CAMP. LY KHEANY HAS, HOWEVER, NOT YET TURNED THE
THIRD DIVISION INTO HIS ORGANIZATION, IS BEING CLOSELY WATCI-6)
BY THE MARSHAL AND MAY THEREFORE NOT SHOW HIS HAND UNTIL
ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY,
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D. FIRST DIVISION COMMANDER BG.ITH SUONG'S FATE IS TIGHTLY LINKED
H LON NOL'S, HE WOULD FIGHT FOR THE PRESIDENT AGAINST A COUP
teEFFORT AND HIS FORCES WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY FORM THE NUCLEUS OF ANY
COUNTERCOUP PREEMPTIVE BID LON NOL MIGHT MAKE.
(7\ E. PHNOM PENH SPECIAL REGION COMMANDER BG DENG LAYOM IS ALMOST AS
CLOSE-MOUTHED AS LY KHEANY. LIKE DIEN DEL AND LY KYEANG, DENG
LAYOM HAS INTIMATEIRTHAT HE MIGHT FAVOR MILITARY DISPLACEMENT OF
CIVILIANSPOLITIKIANS-TrUENENNE-TeigUrnVERWE-TWTENER-A-CS-44AVE SAI
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NOT_1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2616765216 : LUZ.;-HAK-:39-3-24-91ITIVE SECRETARY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-HAK-39-3-24-9
11111
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:MIS). HE HAS SHOWN STRONG IRRITATION WITH LON NOLYS MEDDLING
IN MILITARY MATTERS BUT IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT THIS REFLECTS
A BASIC ANTAGONISM. HE SEEMS TO BE ON BETTER TERMS WITH HOU
HANGSIN THAN MOST OTHER FIELD COMMANDERS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED
IN THIS RESPECT THAT HE SERVED WITH LON NOL AN HOU HANGS IN IN
BATTAMBANG IN 19539 AN EXPERIENCE WHICH FORMED STRONG BONDS
AMONG OTHER OFFICERS.
F. ARMORED CALVARY COMMANDER COL YAI SINDY IS PLACED .
BY UN KAUV IN THE ANTI-LON NOL CAMP. WE CANNOT
CONFIRM THIS AND ARE ATTEMPTING TO GET TO KNOW HIM BETTER.
A. PARABRIGAD COMANDER COL. OUM PJASITH HAS BEEN
MENTIONED BY IOU HANGSIN AS RESPONSIVE TO HIS COMMAND,
WE WOULD NOT EXPECT HIM TO JOIN AN EFFORT TO UNSEAT
LON NOL BUT NEITHER NQULD WE AT THUS STAGE INCLUDE HIM
AMONG THE PRESIDENT'S FAITHFUL. FORMER PARA BRIGADE
COMMANDER SREY YAR IS, ACCORDING TO UN KAUV, AMONG
THF ANTT-I_ONn NtT:ISTc; RHT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT HF IS
CAPABLE OF GALVANIZING ANY LOYALTIES WITHIN THE BRIGADE.
HE HAS JUST BEEN RELIEVED AS COMMANDER OF THE FIRST
MILITARY REGION.
H. 13TH BRIGADE COMMANDER BG CHANTARANGSEY WOULD
UNDOUBTEDLY WELCOME LON NOL'S DEMISE BUT HE IS A
LONER WHO IS UNLIKELY TO COOPERATE WITH DIVISIONAL COMMANDERS
IN A COUP PLOT. HE IS PROBABLY CLOSER TO GENERAL SOSTHENE
FERNANDEZ THAN ANY OTHER OFFICER MENTIONED.
HERE, BUT CHANTARANGSEY'S PERSONAL AMBITIONS ALSO
PLACE LIMITS ON THIS LOYALTY. IN ANY MILITARY ACTION
NOT AIMED DIRECTLY AT HIM WE SEE HIM RESERVING HIS TROOPS
TO PROTECT HIS OWN PERSONAL INTERESTS,
I. 28TH BRIGADE COMMANDER COL. PHENG UONIS POLITICAL
INCLINATIONS ARE UNKNOWN TO US ALTHOUGH WE'MA"VE ON
OCCASION Fount) HIM TO BE UNHAPPY WITH HOU HANGSIN.
FOR THE MOMENT, WE WOULD PUT HIM AMONG THE NEUTRALS.
J. AIR FORCE COMMANDER BG PENN RANDA SHOULD PROBABLY
BE CLASSIFIED AS A CAUTIOUS NEUTRAL. WE HAVE OBSERVED
HIM NODDING ASSENT TO SOME VERY STRONG ANTI-.NOL STATEMENTS
FROM DIEN DEL AND KOMPONG CHHNANG COMMANDER YONG YOC HANG,
BUT UN KAUV BELIEVES HIM STILL LOYAL TO THE PRESIDENT,
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NOT IC No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-HAK-39-3-24-9
TIVE SECRETARY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-HAK-39-3-24-9
' 11/
Department of State
. .46
-3-mulami2oF2 PION INP111-195771 SEPT 10
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AN ANTI-LOU NOL MOVE MIGHT, HOWEVER, GET SOME SUPPORT
fP,PM ISOLATED_AIR FORCE ELEMENTS4 IN PARTICULAR -THE
RELATIVELY DYNAMIC COMMANDER OF THE KOMPONG CHHNANG
AIR BASE LT, COLONEL SOX SAMBAUR.
K. NAVY COMMANDER COMMODORE VONG SARENDY STAYS
RELATIVELY CLEAR OF POLITICS BUT WE BELIEVE HIM TO BE
BASICALLY LOYAL TO THE PRESIDENT. WOULD PROBABLY
REMAIN NEUTRAL IF THERE WERE .A COUP OR COUNTER-COUP ATTEMPT.;
4. GOALS, WHILE SOME COMMANDERS, UN KAUV AND DIEN
DEL IN PARTICULAR, HAVE BEEN VERY EXPLICIT ABOUT THEIR
OPPOSITION TO LOU NOL, THEY_AYE_REER_EXCEEDING.LY VAGUe
AS TO THE NATURE-OF A SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENT, IT IS--DbitT.-
ITT:TWAT?Alir st-o-tert-TerEircb t4refikVERS-IfiVE A CONCEPT
.OF A POST-LOU NOL REGIME WHICH WOULD HELP COALESCE
DISPARATE OPPOSITION ELEMENTS INTO A MOVEMENT,
A6 NONE OF THE COMMANDERS WE HAVE MENTIONED, LEAST OF
ALL DIEN DEL AND UN KAUV, WHO ARE BOTH YOUNGGLAND KHMER
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BT
SECRETSECTION 3 OF 3 PHNOM PENH 9577
NOD IS
MOM, CAN ASPIRE TO NATIONAL LEADERSHIP THEMSELVES.
B. ALTHOUGH UN KAUV AND DIEN DEL MAY HAVE FOUND A
FRIEND IN CHENG HENG0 THEY HAVE NOT FOUND IN THE
FORMER CHIEF OF STATE A CREDIBLE STANDARD BEARER FOR
AN PROSITION MOVEMENT AS HE HAS NO POPULAR BASE.
CO THROWING IN THEIR LOT WITH THE NATION'S MOST
POPULAR LEADER, PRIME MINISTER IN TAM, IS NOT ALTO-
GETHER APPEALING AS IN TAM'S APPARENTLY IRRECONCILIABLE FEUD
WITH FA NK COOMANDER-IN-CHIEF SOSTEHE FERNANDEZ CAUSES
DIFFICULTIES AND HIS INDECISIVENESS AS PRIME
MINISTER IS NOT PEASSURING.
De SIRIK MATAK WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE.THE MOST' CONGENIAL
ALLY AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE HIGH POLITICAL COUNCIL
FOR THE MILITARY IN GENERAL BUT HE WOULD NOT BRING
WITH HIM A POPULAR Fog.owiNp9 HE_MOULP_ NOT AT. 7M1s.
ViTgr-MatItE_A.OLEARAIREAK.WITH_LON C-MI.15 Os
RIGHTIST ORIENTATION WOULD SEEM_TO9ORICA-CAIN5I:Mi
UNDERSTANDING-WITH JA_PTUDENTS AND _THE LEFIlt_JHIgH
,SOME DISSIDENT GENERALS_PROBABftCONSIDER A PREREOUI SITE
FOR ENDING THE_WAR. Idff gamE_Wmrcrm-morcATTn5-or-
CONTACTS.BETWEEN SIRPK MATAK,ANP DJamulaza:hanns
EJT THER HAqt-I-N Tjit at-t-gEN TIESJETWEEN HIM AND
D, I fir-6E L
mr-r-mratARy GOVERNMENT HAS OBVIOUS APPEAL FOR MOST
OF THE COMMANDERS WE HAVE MENTIONED, AND SOSTHENE
FERNANDEZ MIQHI_EEaREa_gE_A-MILIIILCLJalaU=L-Ig.
HEAD IT. SOSTHENE HAS MANY FRIENDS BUT FEWHTRUE ADMIRERS
AMOffrIRE AFOREMENTIONED OFFICERS. RIGHTFULLY OR WRONG-
FULLY, HE IS PICTURED AS A NOT VERY EFFECTIVE COUNTERWEIGHT
TO THE LON NOL-HOU HANGISN COMMAND CHANNEL AND THIS
IMAGE WOULD APPEAR TO WORK AGAINST HIS BEING HOISTED
UPON A WHITE HORSE,
F. IN SUM, THE DISCONTENTED GENERALS HAVE AS YET ONLY
NEGATIVE GOALS. VIRIT0177IT?OTTREM W1S1i TO OUST
HOU HANaIN AND-Ifin-VENTOI THE PRESIolffTrITROL
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NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WIMOkiVflE. AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-HAK-39-3-24-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-HAK-39-3-24-9
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-2-=SECTION 3 OF 3 PHNOM PENH 9577, SEPT 10
OVER FMK AND SEVERAL OF THEM WOULD OUST THE PRESIDENT
HIMSELF. TH,F,x,.,HAvnLy0,1.4.0zr2A-AatataiD.T.,Q.SERIOLISLY
CONSIDERING HIS REPLACEMENT, HOWEVER*
------------------
5. POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION
As SHOULD UN KAUV AND DIEN DEL DECIDE TO MOUNT A
COUP, THEY MIGHT HOPE FOR MORE SYMPATHIZERS THAN ACTIVE
OPPONENTS AMONG THEIR COLLEAGUES. THESE-01111S-4RE,
HOWEVER.1_ ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT GOOD .,,,,ENQQ,OILLO,B.,,,,,IHESE
C_QT1ANDEBA. THERE IS NO REASON TO EXPECT
THAT THEY WOULD DISPLAY LESS CAUTION IN THIS HIGH
RISK VENTURE THAN THEY HAVE ON THE BATTLEFIELD* AND
THEY HAVE CUSTOMARILY INSISTED ON ASSEMBLING A CLEAR
PREPOSNDERANCE OF FORCE BEFORE MOVING. - THEIR OPEN TALK
OF UNSEATING LON NOL IS PERHAPS DESIGNED TO START A
SNOWBALLING EFFECT WITHIN FANK BEFORE WHICH HOU HANGSIN
AND PERHAPS THE MARSHAL WOULD HOPEFULLY CRUMBLE WITHOUT
THE NEED TO- RESORT TO FORCE.
B. Itl '::;UPPCIRTAT 17, rge*.i.?,,,,," r'D.J LT $,,CS,IV TS ALSO
PR OBAB=S-EE ;1 AS NECESSMYA AND T CONFIDENCES THESE
E N ET? A ITS?RATE? .e..ir.?-7Fi WI T ir US WERE UNDOUBTEDLY DESIGNED
TO ELICIT IT. '0E HAVE INSTQADSTETia.juvy,
couP A TTEMP LVOULD2RQI!..6
?PUBL. It- A ND cf) N_G ESSIDIAL_SUF.R.O.B.1-EQR_P AVIB OD I A APD Pig
COJ_ITINIIEDAAS ._ A S S,IS?TARCE, AT RISK. 0U,RJLOIL-J-IGAG1Jl....0 NT
SHOULD IN MOST CIRCUMSTANCES 6-E AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT.
MED GE NERALS_S&N RETO:317/
HOU HANGSIN FROM THE GENERALHS18LEA_THIS WOULD PROBABLY
ESSEN FOR A TIME T1 AND_ DEPTH: OFTco-Rinirwrs
73t.cusEtaalr-frot.:, ro N tOL ifiN THE RNDA-ND-*?MAY-N'OT
PERMIT HOU HfNGSIN'S BEING REPLACED BY A MAN LESS LOYAL
TO THE MARSHAL, WHICH WOULD CONSISTITUTE AN IMPORTANT AND
IN THE LONG RUN POTENTIALLY CRITICA1?),_,MiliOL
OVER THE Pao T ART.,
NCL FEEL THAT A _PREEMPTIVE MOVE ,IS
REQUIRED AND SHOULD THIS MOVE AppEarnirentY TO
THREATEN THE LIVES OF DIEN DEL AND/OR UN KAUV ,A__COUP
ATTEMPT COULD BE TR MIMED. cusTollA rumj) s
110-17i ft-0TP S OPPONENTS_LN3z_ cQR NEHOUER,
AwErvIE IPIA-GITICTif At$E_JITTIQS,T,,,CARE_ TILDEAL-ING-XLT R---
113741S-Yr5.:tO-NTr NT-Eif GENERALS, HE_Hil_S___LN THE PAST DEMONSTRATED
iii?i-A-TWYLILTILCE0151:4 NG HIS SUBORDINATES.
E. ill SHORT WE DO NOT FEEL 1_1-{A,L,AiliAjaMPOWIR PLAY
NOT T`
No uojeCua IC; ureciasiiticijatiOnTinTtICrt2101.1rtal7/1176,TIATHAIK-1.3191! 2
3_EXZ9CUTIVE SECRETARY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-Hi-39-3-24-9
(%1
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Department o State.
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-3-SECTION . 3 OF 3 PEENOlv.1 PENH 95771
SEPT .10
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IS I rl IMMEPtai?amuin?.....ructuiLittLittuLaLARE. HEAR-
ING TODAY FROM DISCONTENTED GENERALS IS NO DIFFERENT
otel-vi )(A T-THEY---To-n?os ---yt-A-R-AGoort-RE?rotriLtitirroft ARE
VOW 11 OR E NUMB ER OUS BUT THE SUB LAINTE,
HAS CHANGED BUT LITTLE. THE COUNTRY'S NEAR TERM MILITARY, _AND
PcialicA PITTIM MIGHT. HOWEVER ? CONTAIN SOME -U-NSETTLEING EVENTS
(THE 'LOSS OF KO-MP NG CHOI. FOR EXAMPLE, OR THE FAILURE TO RENEW
THE MANDATE OF THE HIGH POLITICAL COUNCIL) WHICH COULD SET
LONG TALKED ABOUT PLANS INTO MOTION. WE ARE, THEREFORE,
MAK H MI GING THE NATION-S'S
LEADERSHIP THROUGH MILITARY FORCE ARE -
.jiEtiftb0:_.0 THE 'cotisttai-E-NcEr ' t1I---ssrcrn ACTION.
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NOTE; NOT PASSED. SECDP7; CJC?COMUSSAG CINCPAC BY OC/T.
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-HAK-39-3-74-q 'I ITIVP CFCD Pr A ov