MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
LOC-HAK-283-5-12-9
Release Decision:
RIPLIM
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
14
Document Creation Date:
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date:
November 19, 2010
Sequence Number:
12
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 24, 1976
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
LOC-HAK-283-5-12-9.pdf | 714.39 KB |
Body:
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/19: LOC-HAK-283-5-12-9
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
Turkey: Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, Minister of
Foreign Affairs
Amb. Melih Esenbel, Turkish Ambassador
Sukru Elekdag, Secretary General,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Amb. Ercumet Yavuzalp, Director
General for International Security
Affairs
U. S.: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of
State
Amb. William Macomber, U. S.
Ambassador to Turkey
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Wednesday - March 24, 1976
5:03 - 5:50 p.m.
PLACE: The Oval Office
President: I wish to welcome you here, Mr. Foreign Minister. You have
been here a number of times.
Caglayangil: Please excuse my English. It is very poor.
President: I am very pleased to have you here. I know that Secretary
Kissinger has discussed matters in detail with you. I hope that you will
convey to the Prime Minister my best regards.
Since I haven't had a chance to discuss your talks with Secretary Kissinger,
Henry, will you review them for us?
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A- KISSIN , F R
EXEMI'I' FRONT GENERAL DECLASSTFICATION
SCHEDULE OF T:XE:UTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATE', o.,".Y 5 b L1, 3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det_
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Kissinger: We discussed six issues. We resolved five of them and there
is no reason to go into detail on them. The remaining issue is the level
of assistance and the type of equipment we could make available. The
level of aid we proposed is $250 million a year and perhaps $50 million of
Export-Import credits. We can't frankly do any better, because we couldn't
get it through Congress. We discussed selling equipment at reasonable
prices -- like F-100's and ships. They don't need F- 1001s, though, and
Clements is looking for ways to loan them more modern ones or something
else.
Caglayangil: As Secretary Kissinger says, we have resolved five out of six
issues. We have not agreed on the level and scope of assistance to be
provided to Turkey. I am sure you know that from the Adriatic to the Sea
of Japan, Turkey is the only democratic regime in a sea of authoritarian
regimes. Our per capita income now is about $600. We have to maintain
a defense budget of about $259 per capita, and improve our economy, and
do it while maintaining human freedom. The people at times abuse these
freedoms and make it difficult for the government.
Turkish-American relations are going through a crisis and there are those
who would take advantage of this crisis. Support for our defense forces
is an integral part of our difficulties. The antagonists of NATO or of
Turkish-American relations always bring forth the aid that you provide to
Greece or places like Egypt or Iran. Dr. Kissinger says you can't increase
aid past $250 million and I am afraid this will not be satisfactory to the
Turkish public. I told Secretary Kissinger today that if he had difficulty
with the American Congress, we could modernize the Turkish armed forces
through a swap deal.
Kissinger: The problem is it won't work -- like trading F-100's for F-4's.
The problem is we don't have any F-100's left in the US Air Force.
President: We would have a terrible logistics problem, since we don't have
any.
Caglavangil: I appreciate that. We are just trying to find a way out. Let
me assure you that whether we come to an agreement or not, we still have
great esteem for our relations with the United States. We have not forgotten
the assistance from across the Atlantic when the Soviet Union made its demands
on the three provinces and the Straits. That is why I do not see any serious
implications in the discussions we are having. We will certainly try to
develop our alliance relationship.
SECRET /NODIS/XGDS
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SECRETINODIS/XGDS
I bring you very warm greetings fm m my President and my Prime
Minister -- who cherishes pleasant memories of meeting with you.
When previously I was Foreign Minister, we came to this country
and paid a visit to the American President. To greet the American
President in Turkey would be a great honor and give us much pleasure.
If I could receive acceptance, it would be the greatest gift I could
bring back.
President: I greatly appreciate the invitation. It would be a great
honor for me to go there. I unfortunately have never been there and
I will maximize my efforts to visit. We unfortunately now have some
elections coming up, but I assure you that after November 2nd, if things
go as I expect, I will certainly make every effort to visit Turkey. I
would like very much to have the Prime Minister visit this country. I
really enjoyed my meetings and discussions with him and I hope you
will convey the invitation to him.
Ca layangil: I will do so.
President: I will leave the negotiating details to you two, but since I
have been President, I have made every effort to show how important
are our relations with you. I have discussed point six with Or. Kissinger.
We have gone really as high as we can possibly go, and I hope that you
will discuss it further with Secretary Kissinger.and make every effort
to reach agreement. It would greatly facilitate all our proceedings.
Caglayangil: We have followed how consistently you have defended U.S.
-Turkish relations, especially with the Congress. We have no complaints
whatsoever. If the American Government and Congress don't see eye to
eye, that is an internal American problem. Obviously we can't explain
that to our public. This problem is not peculiar to the American scene.
We also have that same problem. The Turkish Constitution grants the
right of amnesty only to the Grand National Assembly, but nevertheless,
it has been granted by various of our governments to terrorists, etc.
The whole American picture has been evaluated in Turkey as if what has
been done has been the act of the government. This is in fact where we
find ourselves.
President: We hope that in this election we would get strong support
from our people and get some changes in the Congress. Cooperation has
gotten somewhat better in the past several months, but the real turn will
come in January.
SECRET /NODIS/XGDS
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I just want to reiterate that we want to commit ourselves as deeply
as possible to improving our relations and we have extended to the
utmost our efforts to reach a satisfactory agreement. I wish you well
in your discussions with Secretary Kissinger.
C glayangil: I wish you cell in the election. I don't pretend prophecy,
but only wishes. If the Congress can be improved, that is in the best
interests of both our countries.
President: What is the status of your discussions with Greece over
Cyprus?
Caglayangil: It is like a wound which needs medical attention. It can't
be left the way it is. The important thing is to break the connection
of American aid to the solution of that problem. While I accepted most of
the Secretary's proposals on the five issues, my objective was this point.
Turkey and Greece historically must know how to live together. The
only way to do that is to sit down and talk. We think we have a good
chance with the Karamanlis Government. Cyprus is the key to our
relations. Here there are two obstacles -- Makarios is one, and this
linkage is the othe r. Makarios is a complicated element.- so much that
we can't solve the problem with him or without him. It is hard to get
a proposal accepted by the Greek Cypriots which Makarios opposes.
Kissinger: The problem is mhich side will put forward'the territorial
proposal. Neither side wants to do it first, for good reasons. Any
proposal either one puts forward is likely to become a domestic issue.
I will talk to the Foreign Minister about some procedural ways we might
attack it.
Caglayangil : The Greek Cypriot negotiator promised his views on
territory within six weeks and the Turkish negotiator promised to
respond within 10 days. They will meet again in May. Then they will
form two subcommittees: one for territory, and one for constitutional
questions. Ithink this is a hopeful procedure.
President: I hope this vrould move as you indicate. It raises serious
questions here when there is no movement, so this would be helpful.
Caglayangil: I have done my best to encourage Denktash and have told
him he can say yes, but to tell me only when he plans to say no.
SECRET /NODIS/XGDS
[END]
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/19 : LOC-HAK-283-5-12-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/19: LOC-HAK-283-5-12-9
WASHINGTON
SECRET /SENSITIVE
MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL OF TURKEY
Wednesday, March 24, 1976
5100 p. m. (30 minutes)
The Oval Office
PURPOSE
Turkish Foreign Minister Sabri Caglayangil (Chaw-lay-UN-gill)
is in Washington at our invitation, to try to complete negotiations
on a new bilateral US-Turkish defense cooperation agreement. This
meeting will permit you and Foreign Minister Caglayangil to review
US-Turkish relations, including U. S. security assistance for Turkey,
the status of the ongoing US-Turkish bases negotiations and the
prospects for settlement of the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus.
Your purpose in this meeting will be to:
emphasize the concerted effort both you and your Administration
have made and will continue to make to restore the full balance
in our security relations with Tu rkey and, in this connection,
the importance we attach to close ties with Ankara -- bilaterally
and in the context of NATO and CENTO;
emphasize that realistically it will be difficult to induce U. S.
Congress to approve full restoration of aid without some visible
progress on the US-Turkish bases negotiations or Cyprus;
note that conclusion of a new Defense Cooperation Agreement
(DCA) with Turkey during the Foreign Minister's stay in
Washington, coupled with an understanding that U. S. operations
in Turkey can resume at an early date, would almost certainly
improve the prospects for Congressional approval of full
restoration of military assistance for Turkey in the FY 1977
aid legislation soon to be considered by both Houses; and
ST'Cf VT/81'NSIT1VF/XGDS
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encourage the continuation of direct contacts between Athens
and Ankara on issues of mutual concern, including Turkish
support of the intercommunal talks on Cyprus.
II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS
A. Back round: Foreign Minister Caglayangil
participated in your meetings with Prime Minister
Demirel at the NATO and Helsinki summits last year. The
Foreign Minister is an experienced politician and diplomat who
has a close working relationship with the Prime Minister. He
strongly believes that US-Turkish ties should be preserved and
strengthened but is sensitive to and opposes any suggestion of
outside pressure on Turkey >.. particularly by the U. S. Congress ..