WARMING IN RELATIONS BETWEEN PANAMA AND CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-20-1-7-0
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 18, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM v
TY COUNCIL
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
SECRET INFORMATION
18 January 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
FROM: ASHLEY HEWITT
SUBJECT: Warming in Relations Between Panama and
Cuba
Attached at Tab A for your information is a report which I requested from
CIA on the evolution of relations between Panama and Cuba. I think you will
find it of interest.
Briefly, it notes that a clear trend toward establishing more frequent con-
tacts and closer relations between Panama and Cuba is evident and predicts
a continuation of this trend. CIA believes that, in the short term, Panamanian
strongman General Torrijos will stop short of establishing formal diplomatic
relations with Cuba, fearing that such a move might jeopardize the chances of
obtaining a new Panama Canal treaty. (In fact, Castro reportedly has advised
Torrijos against formal establishment of relations, saying this would only
cause Panama problems with the U. S.) CIA believes, however, that in the
longer term Panama may move to establish relations regardless of the out-
come of the treaty negotiations.
The change in the official Panamanian attitude toward Cuba appears to have
been an evolutionary development and is reflected in Panamanian approval in
September for the opening of a Cuban Prensa Latina office in Panama; in-
creased Panama-Cuba contacts, often at Panamanian initiative; increased use
of these contacts as an informal communication channel; and, most recently, -
Torrijos' private description of the sending of a delegation to Cuba to negotiate
the release of the crews of two Panamanian-flag ships seized by the Cubans last
month as being a first step in the establishment of formal relations. The
Panamanian Foreign Minister announced last November that Panama was
seriously studying the question of renewal of diplomatic relations with Cuba.
The official attitude change appears to have been influenced by t trends in
Panama:
-- The growing leftist posture of the Torrijos Government;
-- The development of Torrijos' nationalism along anti-US lines; and
- The efforts by Torrijos to gain international support for Panama's
demands for a new canal treaty.
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Closer Panamanian-Cuban relations are attractive to Torrijos as a means
of enhancing his revolutionary image at home and abroad and of demonstrat-
ing his independence of the U. S. To Castro, on the other hand, such
relations offer the possibility of lessening U. S. influence in Latin America
(and particularly in the Caribbean), as well as of developing some leverage
to encourage Torrijos to adopt more leftist policies.
Tab A -- CIA Intelligence Memo dtd 13 Jan 197Z
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a~4.rcra~
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
13 January 1972
Relations Between Panama and Cuba
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1. There is a clear trend toward closer rela-
tions between Panama and Cuba. Such a policy appeals
to Torrijos4 view of himself as a nationalist and as
a leader. It is also in line with his "revolution-
ary" pretensions and his apparent obsession with
demonstrating Piis independence from the US. Castro,
of course, is always willing to pursue ways of re-
ducing US influence in Latin America.
2. The question of formal diplomatic relations
.will be determined by Torrijos' assessment of US
reaction. Indeed, Castro . has. reportedly advised
Torrijos not to worry about establishing diplomatic
relations, adding that the step was not of major
importance to Havana and would only cause trouble
for Torrijos. In the short run, therefore, Torrijos
will delay such a move as long as he believes it
would have a serious negative impact on the canal
negotiations or impede ratification of a treaty by
the US Senate. Given the current delicate state of
the negotiations, re--establishment of full relations
does not seem imminent.
3.' If the treaty negotiations are broken off
or reach-an impasse which leads Torrijos to believe
he has lost his chance for a victory on the canal
issue, he might well consider it to his advantage
to recognize Cuba as part of a policy of confronts,
tion with the US. This step would cost little and
win him plaudits for standing up to the US.
4. Over the longer term and assuming conclu-
sion of a new treaty, Torrijos may see little rea-
son not to recognize Cuba. He would not want to
alienate himself from the mainstream of Latin
American policy on Cuba, but once a general move
toward establishment of relations seemed under way
Torrijos would not wait overlong to get on the band-
wagon. Given the growing willingness by Latin
Americans generally to consider Cuba's re-entry into
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SECRET
the Latin American community,. Torrijos might even
be tempted to move a little ahead of the pack in
order to establish himself as a trend setter--a per-
sonage to be reckoned with.
5. Until recently, the Torrijos' administration
has focused mainly on sports and cultural contacts
with Cuba. Panamanian teams have been flown by the
Panamanian Air Force to Cuba, and Cuban teams have
regularly been welcomed in Panama. There have been
no penalties for travel to Cuba by Panamanian citi-
zens, and Panamanian leftists have made frequent
trips to Cuba via Mexico. Of late, Panama has taken
the initiative in increasing contacts. In September,
for example, Panama gave approval for the opening of
a Cuban Prensa Latina office in Panama. In December,
for the first time in several years, a Cuban student
delegation was permitted to visit Panama.
7. Although the Panamanians have consistently
reassured the US that no change in official policy
toward Cuba was contemplated, the shift in official
attitude has been quite perceptible. While Torrijos
was willing to talk publicly of "liberating" Cuba
in 1969, by 1970 both Torrijos and Foreign Minister
Tack showed a marked disinclination even to reaffirm
publicly-Panamanian support for OAS policy toward
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Cuba. By November, 1971 the pendulum had swung so
far that Tack, while in Caracas, publicly stated
that Panama was seriously studying the renewal of
diplomatic relations with Cuba.
8. Panama's change in attitude does not seem
the result of a deliberate policy decision but is
rather an evolutionary development influenced by
three divergent trends.
First, the growing leftist post-
ure of the Torrijos government. Once
he had displaced the oligarchy, Torrijos
sought to put his personal stamp on
Panamanian history by developing a new
political system. Lacking.an ideology
or even a clear program,.Torrijos adopted..,
the rhetoric of reform and revolution
and then tried to tailor government
action to his rhetoric. He has attempted
to forge,an .alliance of students, peasants,
workers, and technocrats and has been
fostering agrarian reform, community de-
'velopment, cooperatives, and a strengthened
labor movement. In the process, Torrijos
reached an accomodation with the Moscow-
oriented Panamanian Communist Party,
allowing it a freedom of action denied
to all other political parties in return
for its active support of his policies,
This modus operandi naturally made Torrijos
attractive to Castro and,it lessened
somewhat Torrijos' own suspicions about
contacts with Communist states,
Second, the development of Torrijos
nationalism along anti-US lines. US coolness, to Torrijos immediately after his .
seizure of power and his sense of insecurity
heightened by a number of coup plots behind
which he thought he saw the hand of the
US government, seems to have set the stage
for his hostility toward the US. During
this period Torrijos seemed to have de-
veloped the view that the way to succeed
with the US and at the same time improve
his standing at home was to act tough and
to keep the US,on the defensive. Dalliance
with Cuba or the Communist bloc was appeal-
ing, therefore, both as a manifestation of
his independence from the US and as a device
for frightening the US into concessions.
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Third, the efforts by Torrijos to
gain international support for Panama's
demands for a new canal treaty. Torrijos
has always considered such support a
necessary adjunct to the negotiating
efforts. Last November, for example, as
the negotiations inched along Torrijos
attempted without much success to gain
.public backing from Mexico and Spain.
He did receive a promise of support from
El Salvador and a strong public state-
ment from Costa Rica. The Panamanians
also circulated in the UN a lengthy docu-
ment detailing their position on treaty
provisions and can be expected to use
their newly won Security Council seat
to focus international attention on the
canal negotiations. Torrijos has also
been aware that Communist states would
seize a ready-made opportunity to demon-
strate solidarity with a small Latin
American state against the US. Indeed,
news services in Communist countries
.have already begun to take up the canal
issue. Torrijos has helped such support
along by allowing Soviet cultural visits,
reportedly giving permission for the
opening of a TASS office in Panama, and
the establishment of diplomatic relations
with Rumania last October.
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9. All three of these strands were tied togeth-
er in the wake,of the Cuban seizure of two Panamanian
flag merchant vessels in December 1971. The Castro
regime stated that these were "pirate ships" which
had taken part in earlier ra.ids..agains t Cuba and . ..
that one captain and one crewman were being held on
spy charges. Castro went out of his way to assure
the Torrijos government that Cuba had no hostile
intentions toward Panama, and he invited a Panaman-
ian delegation to Cuba to negotiate the release of
all the other captured crewmen.
10. Torrijos accepted with alacrity, dispatch-
ing a three-man delegation to Cuba which he privately
described as a first step in establishing diplomatic
relations. in this way the slowly developing pattern
of indirect contacts between Panama and Cuba was
suddenly overlaid by direct official communication
on a major issue. The government-controlled press
in Panama sensationalized the cooperation and
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attention given the Panamanian delegation. Torrijos'
for his part, gave every sign of placing a high
value on Castro's attention, obviously seeing domestic
advantage in this certification of his "revolution-
ary" credentials and reveling in his diplomatic
success in an arena where the US was seemingly power-
less. Torrijos will undoubtedly milk this propaganda
victory for all it is worth and--by giving the inci-
dent a decidedly anti-US cast--signal his capacity
for generating headlines and causing trouble. Closer
ties and increased contact seem to be in prospect,
but Torrijos is unlikely to do much more at this
point. Cautioned by Castro and concerned not to
upset unduly the atmosphere for canal negotiations,
he will wait a more propitious moment to establish
formal relations with Cuba.
11. A key foreign policy goal of the Castro
regime has always been the reduction of US influence
in Latim America and especially in the Caribbean.
Castro probably has few illusions about Torrijos'
commitment to leftist reforms and seems uncertain
about Torrijos' real attitude toward Cuba. Still,
Castro has singled out Panama, along with Chile and
Peru, for special attention, and he is likely to
continue and possibly increase his public support
for the Panamanian position in the canal negotiations,
He may also hope that this assistance will give him
some leverage to encourage Torrijos to adopt more
leftist policies. He surely can see that a canal
agreement favorable to Panama could also set a prece-
dent which Castro could use as a tool to pressure
the US on the Guantanamo naval base.
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