SITUATION IN CAMBODIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-547-13-1-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 25, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

DIA, ARMY, DOS reviews
completed.
MORI
C05124868
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MEMORANDUM l
THE WHITE HOUSE
EYES ONLY/UMBRA
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Situation in Cambodia
May 25, 1970
Attached are two cables from General Haig describing the military and
political situation in Cambodia, his conversations with Cambodian leaders
and recommendations for actions which should be taken to shore-up the
Cambodians.
Haig reports _(Tab A) that the military situation_is not bright..and that
Most of the Northeast is under NVA/VC control and the enemy is
infiltrating west across the Mekong. Only in the south has the situation`
stabilized as a result of ARVN cross-border operations..
-- The Cambodian army is faced with conducting a war while at the
same time developing a command and control structure, training existing
forces, and equipping and training additional forces without a source for
logistics.
The inexperienced Cambodian army:
consists of some 60 battalions,of which about 2/3 are
marginally effective.
critically needs tactical communications ?eauipment, Laipment,. small
arms, and trucks.
has an extremely weak intelligence capability, logistic system
and training capacity.
TUP
EYES ONLY/UMBRA
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TOP SECRET/ SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY/UMBRA
Although political weaknesses exist the situation is not as immediately
threatening as the military one. Haig reports (Tab B) that:
- There is no solid political opposition yet. The pro-Hanoi movement
has not gotten off the ground. However, there is potential for conflict between
younger reformers and the older political leadership, as well as the potential
for factionalism within the army.
Few individuals in the government realize that the war will be long
and there is a false optimism that massive American help and a few months
training will allow the Cambodians to route the invaders.
-- Cambodians at all levels distrust the Vietnamese.
The basic political deficiencies stem from uncertainty of purpose
and_in.experience in governing.
As a result of his meetings with Lon Nol, General Pokse (Nol's Chief
of:Operations) and with General Matak'and his assessment of the military and
political situation'.(Tab CI,_ .1-Taig believes that:
-- The situation is grave but not altogether hopeless.
-- We must recognize the seriousness of the Cambodian plight with
an even greater sense of urgency.
We -should take the following steps:
--staff--from donor Asian states.
.._, egin shipment of light weapons and individual equipment
Move Colonel Ladd to Phnom Penh as soon as possible to assist
the government of Cambodia in establishing priorities for
shipments of additional equipment, to coordinate with MACV
and a representative of the GV Nwho should be sent to Phnom
Penh, and to serve'as our liaison with a combined coordinating
up to a total of 30, 000 and ship
immediately.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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TOP? SECRET/SENSI VE
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of would warmly welcome this and the area for the most part is
in tactical and B-52 sorties in North East Cambodia (Lon.
sparsely settled).
. ("-'Commence periodic GVN convoys and patrols along the Mekong
.1 ~~ 'Rive-r to Phnom. Penh.
Expedite the rehabilitation of Cambodian T-28s and urge
-1 Thailand to furnish up to 10 T-28s on a loan basis with a US
eplacement guarantee. The planes could initially be based in
~~. ..
Thailand.
Urge the South Vietnamese and Thais to send as many Khmer
battalions as possible.
Send a ,high level US delegation to friendly Asian capitals-to
'urge increased military and economic assistance.
the basis of his trip thus far, Haig concludes that:
.._.-Without all or most of the above recommended steps the Lon Nol
governments' chances of surviving are dim at best.
The`Ca'mbodian government can be expected to fight the NVA/VC
to the best of its limited capability.
-- Thetenemy appears to be taking a desperate gamble designed to
offset blows to his sanctuaries by setting up a liberated area in the north-
east or by liberating the entire country. The enemy is undertaking a
campaign wi.th.out prepositioning supplies or utilizing pre-established political
cadres anct political themes to motivate its forces.
The e"6my will remain inactive for an extended period in 11, III
and IV Corp. We should complicate his problems in Cambodia by helping
the Cambodian government as much as possible while we press in South
Vietnam to take advantage of the improved security situation.
The conflict in Southeast Asia has changed fundamentally. Hanoi's
deep involvement in Cambodia has seriously weakened its capacity to
'exert main force pros-sure on the South Vietnamese.
TOP SECRET/ SENSITIVE
F+v~c nn'rr.v/TT?iRRA
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TOP SECRET/UMBRA
From Brig General Haig
To The White House, For Dr. Kissinger
There follows a summary of the military and political situation.
Part One. Military Situation, Cambodia - 23 May 1970
1. (TS) Tactical Situation:
A. With the fall of Stung Treng Town, the northwest is under enemy
control except for the Bunglung - Ba Kev - Lornphat triangle in which
six Fank Bns are deployed. This triangle is cut off from Phnom Penh
by road and poor communications exist. Air resupply for food and munitions
is limited to flights of eight available air force C-47 Aircraft.
B. Enemy infiltration continues west across the Mekong via Kompong,
Cham and Kratie. Fank fears infiltrations will continue to west in the
direction of Kompong Thom toward Tonle Sap region. The large population
of Vietnamese in Tonle Sap region would be likely target to organize and
arm. Activity west of Mekong in past week included:
(1) Friendly patrol was fired on 25 KMS east north east of Kompong
Thom Town.
(2) A bridge on Route 6 southeast of Kompong Thom was damaged.
Fank speculates possible 2, 000..VC/NVA have infiltrated across the Mekong
and a potential headquarters location to control enemy operations in the area
would be vicinity Hill 2254 (WV7128).
G. Kompong Cham Town remains in friendly hands but under enemy
pressure. Fank forces have been reinforced with three Khmer Krom
BNS. Total Fank strength at Kompong Cham now consists of three brigades,
a total of nine battalions. Fank cons iders situation at Kompong Cham serious.
Estimated strength of enemy in the vicinity of Kompong Cham is two regiments.
D. Infiltrations are expected to continue to area vicinity Route 4 and
north across Route 4 west of Phnom Penh (Cardamones Mountains). Activity
in area may depend on pressure applied by SVN forces in the operations in
and around Takeo Town and Kampot Province.
2. (TS) Readiness of Fank:
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A. Lon Nol has grand dreams of armed forces totaling 400, 000. Cambodia
does not have resources to support such forces nevertheless, he keeps
pushing his staff proceed along these lines. I will furnish you separately the
results of my two hour and fifteen minute meeting with Lon Nol.
B. Fankhas approximately 60 battalions of equipped forces. These
approximate strength of 400. Toe is 607. Estimated that two thirds of
these are marginally effective; equipment is a heterogeneous bundle
consisting of equipment of U.S., Communist and Communist Bloc origin.
Communications lacking below the battalion level. Other battalions, newly
activated, exist on paper with some personnel and little equipment.
C. Training was not emphasized in Sihanouk days. As a result, all
units are lacking in readiness from a training standpoint. Fank does not
have the capability to either arm and equip rapidly expanding army or train
troops of vast numbers. Shortage of qualified officers and NCO'-s is even
more pronounced when the army is rapidly expanded.
D. Logistics. Fank logistics system has neither head. nor tail-,result is lack
of capability to suuport present forces and forces emerging in expansion.
E. Communications. Communications equipment for tactical units is
lacking. Spare parts to maintain existing equipment are almost non-existent.
Air-Ground communications for tactical operations does not exist. Fank depends
on existing commercial facilities as backup for tactical communications.
F. Transportation. Vehicular transportation to support armed forces is
in critically short supply. Commercial vehicles are used. No helicopters
are available to provide trooplift for quick reaction forces. Forces.
Movement of troops solely by trucks, if available, makes movement totally
vulnerable to enemy activity on roads and bridges which are subject to
sabotage along entire span. I note the Presidentially approved FY70 Aid
Package for Cambodia suggests existing trucks are adequate. I would question
this from my observations and add trucks to communications and small arms
as most critical needs.
G. Fank intelligence capability is extremely weak. Intelligence officers
have either been unwilling or unable to provide detailed information on the
enemy in country. I believe they do not know the situation themselves. In
early May, Fank estimated 54, 500 VC/NVA in country. They have not
provided current information to update estimate to take into consideration
impact US/ARVN border operations. I will carry this with me to Washington
and share with General Abrams. and Admiral McCain enroute.
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TOP SECRET/UMBRA
3. (TS) Assessment:
A. Military situation in Cambodia does not present bright outlook -- all
negatives and no positives. Fank is faced with problem of conducting war
and at same time develop a command and control structure, train existing
forces, and equip and train additional forces; all without a source for
logistics.
Part Two. Political Situation
The Government's political weakness is not so immediate and threatening as
its military vulnerability, but it exists and is even less susceptible to
outside help.
There is no present sign of any organized opposition within the armed forces;
though undoubtedly some Sihanouk sympathizers remain. Nor is there any
organization in the countryside, or any regional or local political bases,
which could threaten the government's hold except for the pro-Hanoi movement
which the VC/NVA are just beginning to organize. This will take time -r- perhaps
many months--to get off the ground even as..an outright Vietnamese Communist
puppet. Although no obvious or visible strains have yet appeared within the
government structure, the potential is there. There is possibility for conflict
between lreform-minded younger intellectuals and politicians and the rather
shopworn politicians who occupy most of the top positions in the government.
There is a possibility for the enlarged army, with its new-found importance,
to splinter into cliques as ambitious generals and colonels maneuver and plan
coups for personal advantage. This kind of factionalism could be reinforced
if the old political cliques, which Sihanouk superseded, begin to re-emerge.
It does not look as if the government or the public has quite grasped yet what
lies ahead. There is a touching confidence that massive infusions of American.
equipment, and if necessary American troops, will arrive and will quickly
save situation and put an end to the VC/NVA presence. There is also an
assumption that with new arms and a few months training the Cambodian
army will put the invaders to flight. A few individuals in the government
may realize that the war will be a long hard one, but the propaganda boasts
of government victories conceal the fact from most. It is impossible to tell
just what the reaction will be when the situation comes to be understood,
but a reaction against the deterioration cf conditions is one possibility.
TOP SECRET/UMBRA
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Cambodians at all levels emphasize their distrust for all Vietnamese --
including the GVN. This is another reason for the high hopes of U. S. and
third-country aid. The Cambodians hope we will dissuade the GVN from
any designs it may have on Cambodian territory and ensure better ARVN
troop behavior.
Observers in Phnom Penh are not impressed with the government's ability
to explain itself, either at home or abroad, to formulate an effective program
of reform, or to organize and coordinate any adequate defense against a
VC/NVA military and political offensive.
The basic deficiencies which exist are not shortcomings of technique
which could be corrected with the help of foreign advisors. They come from
uncertainty of purpose (now that Sihanouk's overthrow has been accomplished)
and from inexperience in governing. For fifteen years Sihanouk governed
Cambodia. He delegated no authority and allowed none of his subordinates
any room for initiative. There is a real question whether, suddenly on their
own, they can develop the confidence and sense of authority necessary to
replace him. These qualities cannot be implanted directly by foreign advice
or help, although victories made possible by foreign aid, or the acquisition
of new troops and equipment from foreign sources, may contribute to
their growth and to the government's psychological. strength."
TOP SECRET/UMBRA
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TOP SECRET/UMBRA
To White House, Dr. Kissinger
From Brig General Haig
I met with Lon Nol for 2 hours and fifteen minutes this A.M., his Chief
of Operations General Pokse Mon for one hour this afternoon and with
General Matak for an hour and one half this evening. These meetings served
to convince me that the situation in Cambodia is grave but not altogether
hopeless. I have provided you by separate message a more detailed assessment
of the military and political situation as I have been able to assess it in this
brief period. Inv sum, Lon Nol and his generals are shaken by the gravity
of the military situation which suggests that all of North Eastern Cambodia
with the exception of a network of three strong points some-50 KMS from
the border due west of Pleiku has been overrun by the enemy. There are
indicatinns that the enemy is moving north west toward the Cardamones
mountains to link up with elements of the Khmer Rouge situated there. There
are also elements (reportedly 1000-2000) of the VC/NVA who have crossed
the Mekong north of Phnom Penh in a possible move toward the Tonle
Sap region which contains a large Vietnamese population, as well as,
ample supplies of rice and fish. Only in the south has the situatuion
stabilized as a result of ARVN cross border operations. All this has shaken
the Cambodian leadership especially Lon Nol and his generals. Matak
appears somewhat more confident that the enemy's dispersed deployments also
present some opportunities over time if Cambodian resistance and the loyalty
of the Cambodian people can be. sustained.
I am now convinced that we must recognize the seriousness of Cambodia's
plight with an even greater sense of urgency and would strongly favor
the following steps to shore-up what could become another most regrettable
lost opportunity. In my view the measures enumerated can be undertaken
within the conceptual parameters already announced by the President:
1. Move Col Ladd to Embassy Phnom Penh as soon as possible to work
with the Cambodian government in establishing priorities for the shipment.
of additional light weapons and individual equipment to Cambodia. I
recommend Ladd work through Macthai for Map items and MACV and its
liaison offices for operational support from US forces in South Vietnam. I
also recommend that he establish contact with an equivalent GVN representative
who should also be stationed in Phnom Penh with compatible authority from
the Thieu government. Ladd would also ultimately become aurliason with
a combined coordinating staff from donor Asian states who could be located
here or alternately in Thailand.
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TOP SECRET/UMBRA -2-
2. Commence immediate shipments, based on Ladd?s recommendations,
of up to 30, 000 light weapons and individual equipment to Cambodia under
the FY 70 MAP. (Less items already shipped. 25X1
3. Grant immediate authority to MACV to commence tactical and B-52
sorties in NE Cambodia east of the Mekong based on ARDF and VR and
immediate coordination with the Cambodian high command here in Phnom.
Penh. I was assured by Lon Nol and his generals today that they would
warmly welcome such support and was reassured that the entire area is
sparsely populated by tribesmea except for the triangular strong points
at Bung-Lung-Ba Kev - Lomphat.
4. Authorize MACV to coordinate with the JCS in consultation with
Ambassador Bunker to urge continued periodic convoys and patrols along
the Mekong River to Phnom Penh.
5. Expedite rehabilitation of all salvageable Cambodian T-28
aircraft through Macthai as a matter of the highest priority. Urge
Thailand to furnish up to 10 T-28 aircraft on a loan basis to Cambodia with
a US guarantee to replace losses. Initially aircraft could be based in
Thailand and Cambodian pilots and maintenance personnel trained and,
operataifrom there. . 25X1
6. Authorize MACV to coordinate with the JCS in consultation with
Ambassador Bunker and President Thieu with the view toward assembling
all remaining Khmer (CIDG) forces in south Vietnam for additional
equipping and training as necessary and the earliest possible deployment to
Cambodia.
7. Create immediately an air detachment with appropriate observation
aircraft to support the defense attache at the US Embassy in Phnom Penh.
(At the present time attache personnel are prohibited by the charge from
travelling outside of the capital and are totally dependent on a morning
briefing from the Cambodian government for intelligence on the enemy
situation. This constitutes the blind leading the blind and has resulted in
a complete void of information on enemy activity here.)
8. Consider sending a high level US delegation to appropriate Asian
capitals to urge immediate military and economic assistance for the
TOP SECRET/UMBRA
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TOP SECRET/UMBRA -3-
Cambodians. We have been patiently awaiting the outcome of the Asian
Conference to keep the initiative in the Asian's Court. They all have the
picture now and I am convinced it's time for a strong expression of US
support to capitalize on the momentum which the Conference started. This
should be done quietly leaving maximum initiative to the Asian states.
Nevertheless it is true that the US Government exercised some role in
this affair which may well flounder for lack of leadership and positive US
interest.
My trip thus far has shaped some definite impressions which have led
me to the foregoing recommendations.
A. Without all or most of these steps the chances of the Lon Nol
government's survival are dim at best.
B. Even with these steps the Lon Nol government may not survive.
However I am convinced that its leadership at least has burned its bridges
and can be expected fight the NVA/VC to the best of its limited capability.
C. Intelligence here - intelligence which urgently needs refinement
confirms that the enemy has moved rapidly and decisively to control all of
North East Cambodia and deployed his limited main forces into the
western provinces of Cambodia with the view toward swiftly toppling
the Lon Nol regime despite the fact that he has had to move considerable
distances away from his disrupted bases of supply. All this suggests that
the enemy has taken a desperate gamble designed to offset the.blows to his
sanctuaries by either setting up a liberated area in North East Cambodia
or attempting to liberate the entire country. In either event, these
operations should. have- a most serious impact on his ability to conduct
main force operations in South Vietnam over the coming months in large
measure we will be able to exploit this advantage to the extent that we
can contribute to the continued viability of the Cambodian government. Even
if the effort fails, the price is cheap when compared to our investment in
South Vietnam and the benefits we gain from even a temporary extension
of what has become for Hanoi a most complex campaign on three fronts.
A review of MACV's incident rate in II, III and IV Corps has convinced me
that the enemy will remain inactive for an extended period in these Corps areas
at least. It only makes sense for us to complicate Hanoi's life in Cambodia
to the limits of our ability while we press in South Vietnam to take advantage
of the improved security his continuing problems in Cambodia must create.
TOP SECRET/UMBRA
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41, TOP SECRET/UMBRA
D. For better or worse the conflict in SE Asia has fundamentally
changed. Hanoi is deeply involved in Cambodia and although she is
meeting little resistance from Fank forces. she nevertheless has seriously
weakened her capabilities to exert main force pressure on. South Vietnam.
.Furthermore she has undertaken a campaign in Cambodia without having had
an opportunity to prepare the battlefield with supplies or to erode the fabric
of the Cambodian society with pre-,established political cadres and without
even a viable rallying theme to assist its military forces. - Thu.s Cambodia
could well turn Mao on his head by constituting its own insurgency
against an enemy invader who lacks all the advantages. on.which he has
doctrinely relied. I will return tomorrow to Saigon where I hope to
visit the Cambodian sanctuaries and see President Thieu. Therewere
some other very interesting outcomes of my meetings today which I will .
forward by message in the morning.
Best.regards.
TOP SECRET/UMBRA
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