THE SITUATION IN INDOCHINA (AS OF 1600 EST)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-559-25-4-0
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 6, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/08: LOC-HAK-559-25-4-0
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/08 : LOC-HAK-559-25-4-0
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/08: LOC-HAK-559-25-4-0
6 April 1975
CENTRAL INTELLIrENCE Ar'.ENCY
Directorate of Yntelliaence
Tha Situation in Indochina
(As of 1600 EST)
SOUTH VIETNAM
-Political' neyelo manta
un ni q.lr rater
1. Thieu' s obvious intention to: a emain, in power has -
pr?duced .mnnunting dissatisfaction in. both . ii .,,ttary_ and.
civilian circles, but as.yet there is sic firm evidence
of a serious move to force his ouster or resignation.
? ?'2. The reactions of Senate President Tran Van Lam
may best reflect-the general political situation in the
? 'country. Lam conceded Saturday that his efforts to cer-
?euadi Thisu to step aside in favor of an "executive-
council" headed by 4enera1 icy had failed. 14oreover,
he admitted that despite what he felt was universal
.dissatisfaction with Thieu, the President still had the
trump cards and "he is playing them 'cooly . " Sone raeonle
had been arrested on vague charges of coup plotting and
others had lost their draft Jere :-nnents and, were beinc .
-sent to the front lines. The labor force, including I
government bureaucrats, ' is reluctant to speak out against
Thisu in. the 'wake of rumors that Viet Cong anents are now.
? surfacing..to -spread confusion among the people. Military
-men are equally. reluctant, fearing that any unsuccessful.
coup would bring disgrace to them and revrisals against
their families. Religious factions, especially the
Catholics, do not want to take any action that would
help the Communists, Thus,.in Lam's opinion, so long?;
as Thisu retains the loyalty of a few high-level militry
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/08 : LOC-HAK-559-25-4-0
 34Communist.reaction to political "developments
officers and the police, his removal from office will
not.be an-easy task to engineer.
Communist Reactions
in South Vietnam has focused on US support to the Thieu
government x so far, there has been no, reaction ' from
either the Viet Cong' or 'North ? Vietnamese to' TPhie-a's
speech. -Hanoi has been preoccupied criticizing the
US evacuation of Vietnamese refugees and, Iorphans.? An
article ? rticle in'the party daily Friday called the evacuations
a: !shrewd and malicious plot" to force "our people to
muntat$ also claim that a political solution could be arrived at following the departure . ,o resident ?'Thi'ett " ''' ,,r?_..
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/08: LOC-HAK-559-25-4-0
leave their native Ian a." premier ,ham van.-Dong in a
radio broadcast Sunday charged that-the US-evacuation
4. Viet Cong commentary has focused more on develop
ments in the, recently "liberated". areas of South Vietnam,
claiming: that life is "returning to normal." The Com-
and members of his clique. The Viet. Cong Kaye not
identified who they would be willing to .. negotiate 'with
In 'a new government or. who comprises Thieu's clique,
although at a press conference in Saigon:. Satutdav, a
Viet Cong spokesman claimed that the "number is not a
big one.
1 i
6. The 21st Division commander is following his
recently-adopted.tactic of maintaining a mobile blocking
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I
SECRET
3. The bulk of Communist-initiated milit ry.act$on
? continues in the form of shellinas of ~ government positions
? +a to Act On LeveJ.s %JPf
? in the northern and, central. provinces of the delta. .'t'he
Dinh. Thuy airfield, ust outside. can The, -was ~it by
seven rockets last night. No heavy' . offensive fiction was
stounted by either side on April 6, but the Nor h. Vietna-'
mess 4t Division is maintaining:pressure?on t e,South
Vietnamese units defending Can Tho City.
SEhSIiIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/08 : LOC-HAK-559-25-4-0
N ''
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/08: LOC-HAK-559-25-4-0
ing well so far, Government officials believe the'I
division's, blocking role is effectively koeninq the) I
Communists off balance, and this accounts for the .
7, A slight upswing' in optimism among regional
--staff officers rests on the substantially increased
Communists' failure thus far. to launch their expected'
attacks against the city.
large-scale offensive operations that could result'
type of defense rather than committing his troops to
in heavy casua~ties. This tactic appears to ho work-
availability and effectiveness of air support. The
delta .is now receiving at least 60 sorties of- strike
aircraft dail , and. government units are no longer
complaining that pilots are bombing, from high altitudes
that preclude any degree of accuracy.
8. The re tonal commander has been strengthen-
ing the defenses of Moc :Hoa in the northern delta and
the South Vietnamese 9th Division units supported by
armor and increased air support now have the military
edge -on the battlefront that same, milits.ry leaders feel'
Could be' the first big test of the resolve of Saigon's
.forces.in the remaining third of the country.
Status of Units Evacuated from' Northern Provinces
9, The commander of the South Vietnamese Marine.
division evacuated from Da Nang is now regrouping the
Unit atVung Tau along. the coast and has more than
5,000 marines. Of the three brigades that are being
reassembled and rearmed, one is almost :full. strei qth.,
wall-equipped, and is considered combat ready. The
other two brigades are at about. half strength and one
of these should be operational by"Late next week.
10. The Marine commander has been.given trucks
and artillery and will soon move the-operational bri<
Bade to the:Marine Training Center outside Saigon for
the purpose of bolstering the confidence of, the Donn-
cation in the capital.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/08 : LOC-HAK-559-25-4-0
 No Objection
to Declassification in Part 2010/07/08: LOC-HAK-559-25-4-0
11. Parts ' of the. South Vietnamese, Airborne bri"
gade that were brought out of the northern arovinoes
have been resting and refitting at Long Binh. One
battalion was sent on April 4 to reinforce government,
units in the Phan Rang area.of Ninh Thuan Province.-'
The government still is holding onto small pnci.aves
at both Phan Rang and 'Phan Thiet, because-the North
Vietnamese have been slow to occupy these weakly
defended areas of southern Military Region '2. There
have also been some reports that the Communists have
not yet moved into Nha .Tsang in forcer' but Saigon's
military presence there. is weak.'
12.' . Much, of the South Vietnamese 2nd' Viiliaion,
S.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/08: LOC-HAK-559-25-4-0
which fled front Quaf'fs' Ngai and Quang Tin provinces in-
Military Region 1, is now in ,Dinh Tuy ?-Province. The
-division commander is attempting to reoranize 4,000
or so ,troops . but has encountered difficulties., Many
of the soldiers have been reluctant to, turn, in their
weapons, and some were involved in stealing and loot-
ing in the- provincial capital of Ham Tan, a seacoast
city.that has been deluged with military' personnel:
? and civilians arriving by.-boat from the northern pro-
vinces. The 2nd Division'commander has managed to
-subdue many of the unruly troops and has placed them
aboard ships for several days to allow tempers to cool,
.permit a screening and selection according to military
:unit, and preclude any serious disorders when they are.
shipped to various camps for reorganization into fight
ing units.
'NORTH VIETNAM
'rransr2orts Flying into South Vietnam
413. Hanoi has bequ'7
.northern South Vietnam.
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nine North Vietnamese aircraft* including an AN 2 1, an
XL-14, an LI--2, and six helicopters flew into Phu Sal. 25X1'"
airfield on April.6. Phu Deaf is. located Just south of Z
Hue. The North Vietnamese had been flying helicopters
into northern South Vietnam 'for several--weeks, but this ? E
The stepped-up flight activity probably represents an
effort by Hanoi to .move in addittonxl administrative
personnel to stabilize the situation in the northern
.provinces which they recently captured.
? -4-_ c-
is the first tine,transports.have flown into the area.
. c
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 No Objecti
fashion from a 'position just southeast of Thnal "Totung. ? .
Despite the loss of these outlying positions' most.of the
3rd Division ? still is well dug-in along the rimarl
defense line protecting the army's main ammia itimn A"M"
on to Declassification in Part 2010/07/08: LOC-HAK-559-25-4-0
CAMBODIA
The Tactical Situation
1, Increased Khmer Communist attacks today forced
elements of the Cambodian Army's 3rd Division to abandon
the town of Thnal Totung on !outs 4 west of Pochentong
airport.* Significant amounts of ecsuipment ware left
behind and several hundred government troops late missing.
Other 3rd pivision units withdraw stn a more order'
near the. airport and should be -able' to preve t any fur.1.
Prey Veng last . night forced gov ?nm at?.auaita~ --abnr~dar~r !
an outlying position,, A small number of ,survivors from - ?. ;
Neale Luong and Banamhave begun filtering into Prey Yang
? and Svay Rieng--now the only.two government--held towns ? ~; ; ,
east of the Mekong River.. 11
up.tineir attacks against the provincial-carital'of Kom-
-pong Speu, on Route 4 southwest of-Phnom Penh
nd th
th
a
,
et
.situaion there' is becoming 'serious . Southeast of -Phnom !
Penh, ground attacks against the provincial capital of
Evacuation Status
Pochentong airport. Communist rocket-and artillery
-attacks against the airport' slackened today..
s
. . rty.
o
tha
in support of government units north and northwest of
more than fifty tactical misiairans +.^ Ali mo
t
f
.9~- WW 4.'Wff4A.J6A. CL
aircraft last night and the air force was ah a to 411.
?t .law vwaw~w..v wM T93.i. ?
'Unable to make any. :Further territorial . gains Aovera-
, i!11
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r 7~
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/08: LOC-HAK-559-25-4-0
only 69 official members of the us Mission and 102'
private US citizens remained in Phnom Penh. The
evacuation.list, however, still includes over 600
third count nationals and Cambodians.. Ambassador
Dean is stiff ll convinced that the situation in the
capital* will unravel rapidly if large numbers of
government officials and Cambodian employees of the
US Mission begin leaving and that the lives of any
remaining US officials would be eudazv erea. He' also
nnacuiates that the relative lull in'-battlefield
evacuati.of is not completed soon, trsa .. tinaa. exrrac
tion:will have to be carried out under hostile fire.
Political nevelepme~nte t
1 .. 5. Acting Cambodian Jan* Pres:Ldcpt','8Au'kh'AKT%0Y' Met
an impassioned. plea for supplemental aid, Key said
ment -to give in to Sihanouk' a 'demands and to invite
the Prince back to Phnom Penh. Koyt envisioned tying
the "invitation" to an agreement that Cocnptuinist forces
would not enter Phnom Penh and would allow the cony-'
tinued delivery of relief supplies to the capital.
If supplemental aid is not forthcoming,' KQy said that
him time to arranga..what in?offect would be an orderly
s+urender.. Koy said that under present circumstances
? the' "best .feasible 'solutibn" wdul.d he `for tahe govern'
unconditionally allowing insurgent rorces zu ws,uw& ~s?.s ~?=
Penh. 1o warned.tho Congressional staffers that a
has vanished.
government officials now realize the severity og the
situation, and that any hope of a.compromise sooLution
? M wwWV _v s . .Y
to shock his.gueste but his comments also indicate that.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/08: LOC-HAK-559-25-4-0