CIA ESTIMATES CHANCES OF PEKING'S SENDING TROOPS TO NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-449-4-22-5
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: March 17, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/01/27: LOC-HAK-449-4-22-5
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TOP SECRET/ SENSITIVE
FROM: JOHN H. HOLDRID~xE t
MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGE
SUBJECT:
CIA Estimates Chances of Peking's
Sending Troops to North Vietnam
A recent CIA memorandum (Tab A) speculates that Hanoi might ask
Peking to send troops to North Vietnam to free.the additional North
Vietnamese troops needed to deal the ARVN a critical blow in
southern Laos.
--. Hanoi might regard the present battle in the LAMSON area
as critical to its ultimate success in South Vietnam. Hanoi might,
therefore, want to move large numbers of new troops from North
Vietnam to this sector, but would hesitate to weaken the home
defense against possible Allied attacks.
-- In this case, it might ask Peking to send troops both to free
the additional North Vietnamese troops needed and to warn the Allies
that China is prepared to defend North Vietnam.
-- Hanoi no doubt calculates that ARVN forces will cease opera-
tions in southern Laos with the advent of the rainy season (early
May) and would be most vulnerable when withdrawing.
-- If Hanoi plans a major infusion of troops to this area in. time
for action in mid or late April, it would have to make preparations
without delay.
Peking would almost certainly comply, but would station troops only
-- Both Hanoi and Peking, albeit for different reasons, would be
reluctant to see Chinese troops stationed in North Vietnam; however,
the memorandum concludes, if Hanoi made a strong case for this
in the north ern part of North Vietnam.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/01/27: LOC-HAK-449-4-22-5
 No Objection
V
. -- If Hanoi believes there is a good chance of an Allied ground
combat, troops to North Vietnam could have been discussed during
Chou's recent visit to Hanoi. If so, this should soon be reflected
in Peking's propaganda and probably in other channels as well.
Comment: We have reported this CIA assessment because we
believe you should know it. However, even Mr. Helms in a brief
covering note to you has pointed out that this is an internal working
paper and does not attempt to address all the options open to Peking.
attack on North Vietnam, the sending of Chinese logistic, or even
Our own estimate is that the likelihood of Chinese troop assignments
to North Vietnam in order to relieve northern troops for duty in
Laos is quite slim at this time. Chinese forces would have to be
concentrated in northern North Vietnam, whereas the area from which
the North Vietnamese could quickly draw forces for Laos would be in
southern North Vietnam. In addition, it should be kept in mind that
the troops which the Chinese previously sent to North Vietnam did
not carry out the types of duties normally given to NVA units. They
appeared mainly intended to protect rail lines which, although they
ran through North Vietnam, were part of the Chinese rail system.
In addition, Chinese forces aided in the movement of supplies and
in construction and recovery tasks. They were not, in short, the
kind of combat forces which Hanoi might have to replace in North
Vietnam.to send to Laos.
TOP SECRET/ SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/01/27: LOC-HAK-449-4-22-5