SITUATION IN THE COUNTRYSIDE IN VIETNAM
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
LOC-HAK-292-5-21-9
Release Decision:
RIFLIM
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date:
November 17, 2009
Sequence Number:
21
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 16, 1970
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/11/17: LOC-HAK-292-5-21-9
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
INFORMATION
November 16, 1970
SUBJECT: Situation in the Countryside in Vietnam
FROM: Henry Kissinger
This memorandum reviews briefly the current situation on the ground
in Vietnam and discusses the enemy's strategic options for the dry
season.
Recent Pacification Developments
Rainy Season Results - The overall control results (the VSSG
measure of pacification progress) are shown on the following chart. (Tab A)
Control is the ability of either the GVN or the Viet Cong to have
unimpeded day and night access to the rural population. If the
GVN has access in daytime and the VC at night, the hamlet is
influenced by both sides.
The control percentages are for South Vietnam's rural population
of 10. 8 million. Because all of the urban population of 7 million is
under GVN control, GVN control in the countryside of 60% at the
end of August is equivalent to GVN control of 76% of the total
population.
According to the chart, the GVN continued to register control gains
through the just-ended rainy season:
-- GVN control, which had begun to level off in the 45% to 50%
range in late 1969 and early 1970, rose throughout the summer
from 50% at the end of April to 60% at the end of August.
This gain was primarily due to the enemy's force diversions from
South Vietnam to Cambodia and South Laos, but improved GVN
performance also played a role.
SECRET
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
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GVN control was up 14% in MR 3 (around Saigon) and 13% in MR 2
(the highlands). Three enemy regiments were diverted from the
highlands to South Laos and at least four were transferred from
MR 3 to Cambodia.
In MR 1 the GVN made steady progress (9%) and in the Delta GVN
control advanced 7%.
Dry Season Prospects Because of continued U. S. redeployments
from MRs 1 and 3, no substantial dry season control gains are
expected in these areas and improved RVNAF performance should
prevent losses.
In MR 2, however, losses are expected due to poor GVN performance,
U. S. redeployments, and stepped up enemy activity.
Therefore, if the GVN is to achieve countrywide control gains over
the dry season, MR 4 gains will have to offset MR Z losses.
The prospects for Delta gains are enhanced by the recent appoint-
ment of a new MR 4 commander who plans to use his maneuver units
to occupy the enemy's key delta base areas. But the enemy can be
expected to strongly oppose these actions, so the overall outcome
is uncertain.
The Enemy's Recent Strategy
The Enemy's 1970 Plans - According to a high-level defector who
attended COSVN's late 1969 PRP Congress, the enemy targets in
1970 were:
-- The Delta where the enemy's forces were to retake the
initiative because "the Delta is South Vietnam's most populous
area and the party must control as many people as possible when a
ceasefire is declared, "
-- The highlands, "the areas which possess the greatest
military advantage and border on North Vietnam's rear support areas, "
SECRET
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w7I.. V11. L. 1
-- The cities, the centers of political action to exploit the
contradictions between the Thieu government and the people; ("during
the ceasefire the cities will witness decisive demonstrations, including
the demand for the overthrow of the Thieu government. ")
The enemy's goals were to:
Break the back of the pacification program and Vietnamization,
-- After the ceasefire is declared, excite the people to overthrow
the Thieu government and establish, initially, a coalition government.
Enemy Military Activity - All evidence suggests that, in accordance
with his plan, enemy military activity in 1970 has been focused
against the pacification program:
- The enemy has launched very few battalion- size attacks in
1970 compared with 1968 and 1969:
1968
1969
1970
Weekly average of
battalion-size attacks
1.98
0.6
0. 3
-- But small scale attacks have not declined:
1968
1969
1970
Weekly average of
small scale attacks
70.6
71.8
70. 0
-- And incidents of harassment/terror/and sabotage, a primary
anti-pacification tactic, have increased:
1968 1969 1970
Weekly average of
H/ T/S incidents 401.7 388.7 446.0
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SECRET
Enemy Force Structure Changes. - Moreover, the enemy has
systematically downgraded his forces to aid his counter-pacificatio
effort. We have evidence, again in conformance with captured
directives, that many (at least seven) enemy regiments and addition
separate battalions
pacification.
Target Priorities - The distribution of attacks throughout South
Vietnam in 1970 shows that the enemy is adhering to his planned
target priorities:
-- In 1968 and 1969 one-third of the enemy's effort was
concentrated in MR 3. But in 1970 he shifted to a political strategy
and only one-sixth of his total attacks occurred there.
-- In contrast, the share of total enemy attacks that has taken
place in MR 2 has risen steadily from one-sixth in 1968 to one-fourth
in 1969 to almost one-third in 1970.
-- Enemy attacks in MRs I and 4 have remained roughly
one-fourth each of total attacks.
The Enemy's Dry Season Strategy Choices
We have seen the enemy's protracted war strategy played out for
over a year now. It must be as clear to him as it is to us that
pacification has not been turned back in MRs 1, 3, and 4. In MR 2
the enemy has achieved important successes and has good opportunities.
But, the inescapable conclusion is that county ide,i pacification has
not been turned back,
Despite this failure and despite the unexpected developments in
Cambodia, there is as yet no evidence of a fundamental change in
the protracted war strategy the enemy embarked on in 1969. The
most recent directive, COSVN-27, dated August 28, 1970, (well before
your ceasefire initiative) instructed that during the dry season attacks
were to be accelerated on all fronts to aid in achieving the goals of
complete U. S. withdrawals by June, 1971. We can only make some
informed guesses on the enemy's military plans:
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SECRET 5
-- (1) The enemy's first objective will be to restore and
protect his supply lines in South Laos and Cambodia. Having moved
26, 000 tons of supplies through Sihanoukville between December,
1966, and April, 1969 (in contrast to the CIA's previous estimate
of 3, 000 to 7, 000 tons), the enemy must now insure that he can
increase his South Laos throughput by at least one-third. He must
expand his logisitic network in South Laos and set up a new logistic
structure in Cambodia and deploy forces to protect both.
-- (2) The second dry season task facing the enemy is the
requirement to prevent the loss of his base areas in MRs 3 and 4.
He must protect his threatened military assets in this, the most
densely populated area of South Vietnam, to insure the credibility
of his ultimate political demands and tie down RVNAF resources.
Besides these essential tasks, the enemy will almost certainly
attempt to go on the offensive. His offensive choices boil down to
attacks:
-- in western Cambodia,
-- in MR 2 to turn back pacification, threaten Vietnamization,
and/or hold territory in anticipation of a political settlement,
-- in Northern Laos to intimidate and possibly overrun the
RLG.
The Enemy's Strategy and Ceasefire
Further adjustments in the enemy's strategy, for example possible
enemy acceptance of a ceasefire, probably await the resolution of
three major uncertainties. .
The first is Cambodia and only after the dry season and a possible
Cambodian enemy offensive will it be clear to Hanoi whether its
position has been seriously hurt by the emergence of the Lon Nol
government.
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SECRET
The second uncertainty is U. S. withdrawals. After another 100, 000
U. S. troops have left by May 1, 1971, Hanoi will be in a position to
see what it will take to defeat Vietnamization and decide whether it
is willing to pay the price.
Lastly, the enemy is probably not yet convinced that the "fraud" of
pacification cannot be turned back, even though he must now have
serious doubts.
None of these uncertainties should remain after the dry season. It
is possible that, whatever the dry season outcome, the enemy could
well try to negotiate a ceasefire against accelerated U. S. redeploy-
ments and a fixed U. S. withdrawal date:
-- If the enemy does poorly in the dry season and is on the verge
of losing his base areas in the Delta, he could seek a ceasefire to
halt his decline and switch the struggle into the political arena before
the September, 1971, Presidential election. He might try this,
particularly if he believed he could obtain the concession of accel-
erated and complete U.S. withdrawals and prevent a possible collapse
in V GI morale or their exposure to GVN reprisals.
-- If the enemy does well in the dry season, his case at the
bargaining table will be strengthened. Paradoxically, however, this
would probably make it less likely that he would seek a ceasefire
because his military prospects would encourage him to continue
fighting rather than bear the risks of a ceasefire. But he would still
want to remove the threat posed by the continued presence of U. S.
combat forces. If he thought a ceasefire would help do this, he would
give it serious consideration..
SECRET
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CHART 1
PERCENT RURAL POPULATION CONTROL
(VSSG CONTROL INDICATOR)
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
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