AMBASSADOR BUNKER'S ASSESSMENT OF THE VIETNAM SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-502-2-3-8
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 30, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

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"
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS
-Te&-ff-kettETtEYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM Fc?,.- E PRES ENT
FROM: Henry A,fis singer
f,
INFORMA.TION
October 30?
,
froteen4
SUBJECT: Ambassador Bunker's Assessment of the Vietnam Situation
Ambassador Bunker has submitted his personal appraisal of the overall
Vietnam situation to you in the attached cable (Tab A). His assessment
is pegged to the total political, military, economic and social climate
for successful Vietnamization of the war.
?
The Ambassador concludes that very substantial progress has been made
in many areas, although serious problems and deficiencies remain.
Probably the most unsettling problem is apprehension about US intentions.
Bunker particularly fears the effect on South Vietnamese morale of a
precipitous withdrawal of US forces, or a fixed timetable that would put
the reductions on an automatic basis. He believes that carefully paced
Vietnamization will work if carried out with enough flexibility to counter
any enemy moves.
? Ambassador Bunker makes the following major points on the war situation:
The Government
Khiemr s government is an improvement over its predecessor.
It is more of a team, and is focusing hard on major problems.
? Organizationally, the GVN has not been very successful in
broadening its political base. Nevertheless, it is getting
increased grass roots support and is doing a better job of local
administration. It is broadening the base from the bottom up,
not from the top down.
The Military
-- Ambassador Bunker echoes General Abrams view that there
' has been continuing improvement in the RVNAF, that gains from
here on will be more qualitative than quantitative, and that signi-
ficant problems remain, among them high desertions and poor
leadership.
20.2-5F-C-R-FT-T/EYES ONLY
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- The ARVN casualty rate, and that of the enemy faced by ARVN,
has gone up in recent weeks, indicating that the combat load of the
ARVN is increasing.
-- US force reductions have so far not hurt ARVN morale. A
precipitous US withdrawal would probably totally undercut all the
GVN military gains, however. A carefully phased withdrawal, on
the other hand, might tend to raise ARVN confidence in its ability
to take over and hence raise ARVN morale.
Enemy Intentions
-- The enemy is definitely trying to provide facilities in Laos
for potential infiltration considerably in excess of current rates.
-- The latest captured enemy resolution on strategy suggests an
intent to try and block our piecemeal withdrawals by hitting ARVN
and US troops and upsetting redeployment schedules. The objective
is to force a complete US withdrawal.
-- There are other signs, however, that the enemy may be planning
only to continue his present, low-posture military efforts. It is
possible that he has not yet decided and is leaving his options open.
Pacification
? The emphasis is now on consolidation of the substantial gains
made this year. The GVN is trying to build depth and breadth into
the program.
-- This is partly reflected in the already sizeable expansion of the
territorial security forces and other civil defense elements.
-- There is a much improved climate throughout the countryside in
terms of economic revival and popular livelihood.
-- The program is still thin and vulnerable, however. The infra-
structure has been damaged but not destroyed.
The Economy
-- We are at a critical point in which the GVN will have to fill in
behind US withdrawals with substantial additional expenditures.
Unless the GVN takes strong rneakires to up its own revenues,
TT c .rirla fel mil pncynnmic aid. inflationary pressures could
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-- The GVN is moving hard to do its share, and has taken austerity
measures beyond our expectations in raising taxes.
. The Future of Vietnamization
-- Bunker supports Thieu's proposal to expand the RVNAF to
1, 100, 000 by the end of 1970 with special emphasis on territorial
forces.
-- He believes there is a serious question as to whether any fixed
schedule for overall US troop replacements should be announced
until we have a better reading on enemy military intentions in
early 1970.
-- He mainly fears the psychological blow to the Vietnamese if, in
the face of a major enemy offensive, f automaticr US redeploy-
ments were to continue.
-- If a fixed schedule is to be announced, Bunker favors a range
tied to a later reassessment of progress.
A Ceasefire
? The Ambassador believes we should continue to insist on a
ceasefire tied to proper agreements on verification of the with-
drawal of NVA forces.
? He has not had the opportunity to discuss this question in
detail yet with Thieu, but Thieu has generally taken the position
that the present allied stance on a ceasefire is a viable one which
should be maintained.
Attachment.
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FROM: Ambassador Bunker, Saigon 287
To The White House, EYES ONLY THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Assessment of Current Situation and Outlook for
Vietnamization in 1970
I. The Current Situation
1. I shall attempt to give my evaluation on the current situation in
Vietnam with special relevance to its bearing on vietnamization both
presently and projected ahead for 1970. A definition of vietnamization,
I take it, would include all of the factors ? political, military, economic,
social and psychological -- which would make it possible for the GVN to
assume responsibility for the defense and security of the country, main-
tain a stable government and develop a viable economy. I think it is,
therefore, important to first review the situation as it appears today.
A. The Government
2. I believe that there is no question but that the Khiem government,
while it does not include all the party politicians whom Thieu had hoped
to include, is a very considerable improvement over the predecessor
Huong government in terms of effectiveness as well as politically. The
Prime Minister is not only a much more efficient executive than Huong,
but he also enjoys better relations with the Assembly. Foreign Minister
Lam is more effective than was Thanh. The economic team of Ngoc,
as Minister of Economy, and Hue, as Minister of Finance, are great
improvements over their predecessors. Working with Nguyen Huu Hanh
as Presidential Adviser, they have already demonstrated their effective-
ness. The Ministry of Public Works, Rural Development, Transport and
Post and Veterans Affairs are Proving more effective than their prede-
cessors.
3. Perhaps more important, the new cabinet is more of a team than
its predecessor. A greater participation of the party leaders would have
been at the cost, to some considerable extent, of teamwork and effective-
ness. There are, nevertheless, some politically attractive elements in
the cabinet, notably the highly respected Deputy Prime Minister Vien,
who is also an effective Minister of Education; and the articulate, liberal
intellectual Phan Quang Dan, whom Huang excluded from his government
last year because of Dan's liberal views. The new government is focus-
ing on the major problems facing the country and gives promise of
increasing effectiveness.
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B. Political Development
4. There has been a good deal of comment about the alleged failure
of Thieu to broaden the base of the government. It is true that he failed
to broaden it much in terms of the political parties. This is largely due
to the fact that most of the political leaders felt it beneath their dignity
to accept anything but the top posts and obviously there were not enough
to go around. It is wrong, however, to think that failure to include more
politicians has much relevance to the base, i. e., with public opinion
and popular support. When he formed the National Social Democratic
Front, Thieu made it clear to the political leaders that, as he put it,
they would have to earn their way into the government by organizing among
the people at the provincial level.. This they have signally failed in doing;
but Thieu also has failed to give them sustained guidance.
5. There is, on the other hand, increasing evidence that Thieu
himself, and in a wider sense the government as the instrumentality
that brings benefits to the people, enjoys greater support than it did
before and that this support is growing. The government is working
actively to bring democracy to the rice roots by supporting the elected
village governments, by training officials in administration and by
providing funds for involvement of the people in their local development.
There is evidence that this is becoming increasingly effective.
6. I believe that Thieu is correct in his view that political develop-
ment will have to come increasingly from the bottom up rather than
the top down; that effective government is the most promising way to
mobilize public support rather than through the old political parties
which have little popular support. The development of village autonomy,
the growing security in the countryside which is both stimulating the economy
and permitting refugees in large numbers to return to their hamlets, the
enrollment of nearly two and one-half million people in the peoples self-
defense force, indicating commitment to the government, the support of
the military and the civil service provide evidence of a broad base of
support for the government. This is not to say that this support could
not be impaired or shaken were the enemy to succeed in mounting heavy
attacks on the pacification program. But I think one must conclude that
Thieu and the government are moving in the right direction, and with
substantial success, toward achieving acceptance and stability.
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C. Military
7. Development of RVNAF. RVNAF effectiveness has continued
to progress as they have received more modern equipment and
intensified training. U. S. combat, logistics, communications,
air support and combined command operations with RVNAF and
U.S. units have been important factors in achieving progress.
There are still deficiencies in leadership and desertions continue
to be a problem. Nevertheless the program to add quantitatively
to the ground combat power of the ARVN is almost complete, except
for some artillery and engineer battalions. The main emphasis
now will be on qualitative improvement. While equipment of the
Vietnamese Air Force and Navy has not proceeded as rapidly as
that of ARVN they are quite effective organizations.
8. The increasing effectiveness of the RVNAF has made it possible
over the past few months to move all U.S. forces out of the Saigon
defenses, their missions being assumed by ARVN. A proposal is
now being considered to move ARVN units further out from the
capital military district as well, turning their missions over to the
territorial forces. With the departure of the U.S. 9th Division
from IV Corps, that area is now the responsibility of the Vietnamese
forces. The expansion of the role of the territorial forces with the
consequent release of ARVN for main combat functions typifies what
will have to take place in most of the key areas in South Vietnam.
9. I think it is fair to say that the Vietnamese Armed Forces have
shown steady though uneven improvement. In the last three months,
their initial reported battle losses (which invariably go up when final
figures are recorded) have been approximately twice those of the
U.S.; the last month they have been running at a ratio of about three
to one. They have also been inflicting more casualties .on the enemy.
These are welcome indications of increasing aggressiveness.
10. There are, however, defects such as a lack of trained officers
and technicians, grade imbalances and slow promotions, desertions,
a lack of thoroughness in planning and coordination and a shortage in
technical skills.
U. There is evidence among both the officer corps and enlisted
men of a greater national spirit and a feeling of pride in being given
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greater responsibility for fighting the war. At the same time, high
prices, low salaries, and a poor promotion system have an adverse
effect on morale. There is also fear among many officers that the
U.S. has already decided on a pre-determined schedule for withdrawals
and will carry these out without regard to the battlefield situation or
progress made by the ARVN. Unless dispelled this could have an
erosive effect on morale.
12. In many cases, the morale of the RF and PF is better than
that of the ARVN for the reason that they are operating at home or
close to their home bases. In I Corps and IV Corps especially they
have turned in some excellent performances.
13. I think it is fair to say that as the U.S. force reductions have
been carried out so far these have not had an adverse effect on RVNAF
morale and,in some cases this has improved. Precipitous U.S. with-
drawal would undoubtedly cause widespread apprehension and disillusion-
ment and thus could jeopardize everything that has been achieved in the
way of RVNAF progress. On the other hand, the sense of pride already
induced by Vietnamization should be exploitable. A carefully timed
withdrawal which takes into account RVNAF's capabilities and permits
time. to develop them could Well have the effect of raising morale and
the will to fight.
14. Enemy intentions. Enemy activity in the Laos Panhandle has
greatly increased as the dry season approaches, and substantial numbers
are engaged in the construction and repair of roads and in the extension
of oil pipelines. It seems evident that he is endeavoring to provide
the facilities for potential infiltration in numbers greatly in excess of
present rates. Other indicators of pending decisions are a beginning
of the redeployment of three divisions poised along the border of III Corps
and Cambodia westward; the probable movement of the balance of the
1st Division, including its headquarters, into IV Corps; and the move-
ment of the 320th NVA division in North Vietnam southward.
15. The capture of COSVN Resolution 9 on October 9, I believe,
gives us a good deal more information about enemy intentions than we
had two weeks ago. The first "basic point" in the chapter "Future
Enemy Scheme and our Immediate Task" indicates that there is great
opportunity "to concentrate our efforts to attain a decisive victory in
a relatively short time." There is a good deal more of the "continuous
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uprisings and all-out offensive" approach in this document than of
"protracted war".
16. The enemy's priorities are speicifically arranged so as to
wreck our reduction program, not by accelerating it through inaction
but, on the contrary, by making piecemeal withdrawals impossible.
He speaks of "breaking the deescalation plan of the U.S. and (its plan
of) protracting the war to obtain a stronger position, and driving the
puppet troops into total collapse (Thuy) preventing them from replacing
U.S. troops in the future." Well planned and coordinated piecemeal
withdrawal of U.S. forces is correctly recognized by the enemy as
great danger. While military actions against the pacification program
and against the cities also have high priority in the enemy's plan, I
gain the distinct impression that attacks against U.S. and South
Vietnamese troops, in order to upset departure schedules and force
the complete rather than piecemeal withdrawal of U.S. forces, are
an essential part of his design.
17. Against this view, one May cite other factors. The infiltration
rate is down. Recruitment continues, but at a reduced rate. The
enemy finds it necessary to use abduction and impressment in his
effort to make up for heavy losses. This is a result, I believe, of
significant improvement in population security in many areas. In
addition, enemy losses in KIA, died of wounds and Hoi Chanh have
continued at the extremely high rates of 1968 (Hoi Chanh, of course,
greatly exceeding last year's figure). There is no question that the
enemy has faced and continues to face a steadily deteriorating situa-
tion within country. This leads one to the suggestion that he may be
contemplating an alternate course of action to that proposed in COSVN
Resolution 9, i. e., a low level of activity punctuated by occasional
high points, in the hope of encouraging more rapid U.S. withdrawal.
If he succeeded in this, he could then exercise the option of more
massive attacks in the hope of destroying the resistance of the RVNAF.
18. It seems to be a fair assumption, therefore, that the enemy
is leaving open these options, and has not yet made a decision on
which course to follow.
D. Pacification
19. The GVN pacification program is changing its priorities to
reflect a new situation. Its primary emphasis over the past year has
been expansion. Behind an effective military shield, the GVN pacifica-
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tion program reestablished the presence and authority of the government
throughout most of the land. Since January 1,900,000 people have
been brought within reasonable GVN protection, the total now standing
at 90.5 percent. One-thousand Seven-hundred ninety-one hamlets
have been raised to C status on the HES. Territorial forces have been
increased in strength to 450,000, given M-16s, and deployed to
hitherto abandoned areas. Nearly two and one-half million people
have been enlisted in the People's Self-Defense Force; some 350,000
weapons have been put into their hands to help them defend their
communities. Perhaps most significant, some 272,000 people have
returned to the villages they abandoned under enemy threat or military
pressure and are rebuilding their homes, replanting their fields,
and reshaping their lives. While these, like many statistics, are
by no means absolute, one cannot fail to recognize that the real
situation in the rural areas of Vietnam has indeed changed in char-
acter. Open roads, crowded markets, the dissipation of fear, the
38,600 ralliers to the GVN from VC ranks, all attest to this new
situation in the countryside.
20. Viewed in perspective against the past, the pre.sent is markedly
improved. Viewed against the necessity of long term containment of
an aggressive North Vietnam, however, it is clear that the program
must build depth as well as breadth. In some respects this depth
exists; in the increased effectiveness of the territorial forces; in
the 9, 500 trained village officials returned to their homes after
training and motivation in Vung Tau; in the elections held in over 90
percent of the villages and hamlets; and in the development of a solid
command structure and national plan for pacification.
21. In other respects, however, the situation is still thin and
vulnerable to a resurgence of intense enemy attack or internal
factional demagogy. The VC infrastructure has been damaged but
not substantially eliminated though steps are being taken to improve
the program. The people's self-defense force is in its early stages
as a popular militia and has yet to develop the discipline and confidence
needed to relieve full time troops of the job of securing the villages
and hamlets. The decentralization of decision making on local affairs
to the villagers, to build a genuine political base in the population,
still meets reluctance from the civilian and military bureaucratic
establishment to yield authority to locally elected officials. And the
information program has yet to develop the dynamism necessary to
national mobilization of will and unity.
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22. It is clear, however, that the government and especially the
President have identified the problem areas and are gathering the
tools to work On them in the same effective way they organized the
expansion program this past year. Thus the President's directives
for 1970 call for first priority to be given to consolidation of security
rather than further expansion; further political development at the
provincial council level as well as the village; bringing the campaign
against the VC infrastructure into the open as a national program to
protect the people against terrorism; giving special attention to the
urban areas with their dislocated and volatile slum dwellers; and
focus on the problems of the most under-priviliged classes through
such programs as land to the tiller.
23. The expansion of pacification has produced momentum which
is being applied to its consolidation. The enemy has recognized the
substantial threat of this program and has targeted it for greater
attacks in the corning months. While he may have some local
successes, I believe it is not likely that he will be able substantially
to reverse the basic trend which has opened the countryside and begun
to give a sense of participation in their government and hope for their
future to millions of Vietnamese. The real test will lie in whether
the GVNis political consolidation strategy can develop effective
momentum to overcome the shocks emanating from the U. S. debate
over Vietnam and traditional Vietnamese centrifugla tendencies. In
my opinion, Thieu has the personal drive and conviction and the
GVN has the structure and strategy to do so.
E. Economic
24. The principal economic effect in 1970 will stem not from
U.S. withdrawals, but from the additional GVN expenditures required
to fill in behind us. The expansion in the GVN budget, therefore, for
1970 and 1971 will be substantial. In the absence of firm action by
the government to increase revenues substantially and of some addi-
tional economic assistance from the United States, the upward pressure
on prices could be disastrous. It is highly encouraging, therefore, to
report that the government has already taken strong action by raising
taxes on a wide variety of items going beyond what we had originally
thought possible. The increase in revenue through measures already
applied will amount to between 45 and 50 billion piasters. Measures
which the government proposes to submit to the Assembly should
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bring in approximately 10 billion piasters more. These measures
would reduce the budget gap to a point which would indicate that price
increases next year might be limited to approximately 15 percent,
about half the amount we have hitherto considered tolerable. Thieu
and the GVN, I think, must be credited with great courage in tackling
this difficult problem head-on and with such promptness.
25. In addition to the revenue raising feature of these measures
the large increases in taxes on luxury goods ranging up to 650 percent
(the average increase for all imports additionally taxed is 75 percent)
though it may pose some political difficulties for the government
provides a healthy emphasis on austerity.
F. The Future of Vietnamization
26. I believe that Thieu's proposal, which I have previously
reported, to expand RVNAF to a total strength Of 1,100,000 by the
end of 1970, with emphasis on the expansion of the territorial forces,
is sound and that we should encourage and help the GVN to proceed
with the planning for this expansion. I have also reported that on
Thieu's instructions JCS has initiated talks with MACV looking toward
RVNAF expansion in anticipation of the redeployment of 150,000 U.S. '
troops during 1970. It seems that Thieu's plan to upgrade the PSDF
and the territorial forces and the RF/PF with a view to their gradu-
ally taking over responsibility for security from the ARVN, thus
giving ARVN mobility and the freedom and responsibility to engate
the enemy main force units, is sound. Plans call for the creation of
four or five mobile divisions: airborne, marines, rangers, and one
or two infantry divisions. The job of providing training and leadership
will be the responsibility of the GVN, but improved weaponry must
come from the United States.
27. I believe there is a serious question whether we should fix
any overall schedule for replacements during the next year before
we know more about the magnitude of the upcoming enemy effort.
I have described above the options which I believe he is maintaining
for the year ahead. This suggests to me that flexibility in our planning
and in any announcement of targets is of great importance, i. e., that
we should not lock ourselves into a rigid position from which we would
find it difficult to depart. It might in fact be desirable to state
explicitly that the entire program would have to be reviewed in the
light of a possible enemy offensive and that while we do not intend
to allow the enemy to disrupt the overall concept, we would make
adjustments in it whenever necessary.
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28. I do not believe that a major enemy offensive early next year
will have chance of succeeding militarily, even if redeployment of a
sizeable additional increment is underway. The danger is rather in the
psychological field because of the possibility that Vietnamese morale
may be adversely affected if, there is a prospect of seemingly "automatic"
sizeable US troop reductions continuing during the year. Once the
offensive is over, we would have an entirely different situation. The
announcement of a sizeable additional increment after the failure of an
enemy offensive might be relatively easy for the South Vietnamese to
accept. This suggests the advisability of remaining flexible on the total
for next year.
29. It seems to me important, therefore, that we maintain and
reiterate the three criteria you have established for replacement of US
forces. This has the advantage of enabling us to maintain the "cut and
try" method as opposed to the impression that we are locking ourselves
into an automatic schedule of withdrawal. I believe there would be a
distinct advantage here in indicating that while the capacity of RVNAF to
replace our departing forces is all important, the criteria of enemy
activity may at any time become equally important.
30. On the other hand, should it seem desirable to announce an
overall target for 1970, I believe it might be desirable to put this in
terms of a range of figures coupled with an announcement of a forthcoming
meeting of the two Presidents, some time early next year, to review
progress in the replacement program and to compare assessments of the
overall situation. _ILto jajzImal.?-tant that tlie_public i/_?jjrj,,B?,,,,bLama?s?e.e.a?that
as a role in the decision making. This would be in line with
the pragmatic approach which has c aracterized replacement programs so
far,
31. Because there is considerable fear that the US may announce
an excessively large goal for 1970, it would seem desirable if Thieu could
start talking in terms of figures before we do. To an extent this has
already happened through his October 6 speech about replacing the "bulk
of US forces" by the end of the year. Morale is good, but is also brittle
and can be fractured if care is not exercised.
G. Cease Fire
32. 1 have not yet had an opportunity to discuss the question of
cease fire in any detail with President Thieu. I have suggested to him
that it would be desirable to discuss (a) what our joint response should
be to a proposal for a cease fire by the other side, and (b) our views
regarding the procedures or moralities which would be essential were
we to decide at some point that it would be desirable to table ourselves
a proposal for a cease fire.
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33. Thieu has indicated that he would like to discuss both points,
but that he will not himself be able to get into the problem until after
November 1. He has suggested in the meantime that we begin explora-
tions with the Foreign Minister and the Presidential Adviser on Foreign
Policy, Nguyen Phu Duc. He expressed the view, however, that we
should continue to exploit the offer already made to discuss procedures
for a cease fire and that we should continue to make it clear to world
opinion that we are prepared to enter into such discussions. He also
agreed that we should establish a common position in the event that the
other side should agree to discussions on procedures for a ce ase fire.
34. It has seemed to me that if a cease fire is to be meaningful and
stable it must at a minimum include provisions for verification and
regrouprnent (in connection with withdrawal of non-South Vietnamese
forces). This in principle was expressed in your speech of May 14 when
you said that we are prepared to withdraw the bulk of our forces within
one year provided the North Vietnamese are willing to do the same, with
the remainder to move into designated regroupment areas on the assumption
that the North Vietnamese would do likewise. This is an entirely reason-
able proposition and one which I should think would receive public approval.
It would at least provide a means for reducing the violence and prepare
for peaceble settlement by the freely expressed will of the South Vietnamese
people themselves.
35. These are preliminary thoughts and I shall be following up with
President Thieu in the coming week.
H. Conclusion
36. On balance, it seems to me that one cannot deny that very
substantial progress has been made here in many areas, especially in
the last year; in the expanding areas of security; in the growing authority
of the government; in the intensive efforts being made to improve the size,
equipment and training of the military forces; in the movement toward a
revolutionary land to the tiller program; in the development of local
self-government and the involvement of the people in their own develop-
ment programs; in the effort to improve the effectiveness of administration
at all levels; in economic and social development despite the war. These
are all indications of the growing strength and stability of the government.
37. Yet one must not be blind to deficiencies and problem areas.
The traditional inability of Vietnamese politicians to cooperate is still
a fact of life. The six-party front (now reduced to five) supporting Thieu
has made little progress. Five "loyal" opposition parties in six months
of effort have failed to find common ground. There are still some
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prominent individuals waiting in the wings and withholding cooperation
with the government hoping opportunity will come their way.
38. There is still a reluctance on the part of military and civil
bureaucracy to cede power to democratically elected local government.
While a considerable amount of housecleaning has been done in the attack
on corruption, notably in the removal of many province and district
chiefs and in the police, a great deal remains to be done. Land reform,
which hopefully 'will be passed within a month, has been caught in a
legislative cross fire. Full mobilization and the demands it has .made
on manpower and the other resources have placed a great strain on the
country.
39. Probably the potentially most unsettling factor is apprehension
about the intentions of the United States. Public statements by members
of Congress and others advocating immediate or large scale withdrawal
of US forces, and setting time limits for withdrawal, raise doubts about
the strength of our commitment and the conviction on the part of many
Vietnamese that these play into the enemy's hands.
40. 1 believe, however, that Vietnarnization can and will work if
it is carried out prudently and pragmatically and with enough flexibility
to enable us to counter enemy moves. Perhaps one yardstick with
which to measure its potential success is the enemy's violent criticism
of it.
TOP SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2014/01/02: LOC-HAK-502-2-3-8 ,