CABLE TO HENRY A. KISSINGER FROM ELLSWORTH BUNKER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-490-4-54-4
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 54
• Publication Date: September 18, 1971
• Content Type: CABLE

? CTs-\--
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/02: LOC-HAK-490-4-54-4
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1971 SE 13 1.2 53
0181023Z SEF 71 VIA CAS CHANNELS
FROM: AMBASSADORDBUNKER SAIGON 0198 IMMEDIATE
TO: THE WHITE yousE, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY HENRY A. KISSINGER
REF: WHS 1102
SECTION 1 OF 5
NSS, State Dept reviews completed
MORI C03317877
1. IN RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST FOR MY VIEWS ON THE
CURRENT SITUATION HERE, I AM SUBMITTING MY THOUGHTS ON DEVELOP-
MENTS IN THE POLITICAL AREA AND THE STATUS OF SECURITY.
A. POLITICAL: THE PRESIDENTIAL "ELECTIONS" AND THE IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE FUTURE.
2. FOLLOWING IS MY ASSESSMENT AND INTERPRETATION OF WHAT HAPPENED
HERE IN CONNECTION WITH THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, ALONG WITH MY
THOUGHTS ON THE LIKELY COURSE OF DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE NEXT FEW
MONTHS, AND WHAT THIS MAY MEAN TO OUR POLICIES AND EFFORTS.
3. NONE OF THE THREE CENTRAL FIGURES EMERGES WITH ANY CREDIT.
THEIR ACTIONS, DECISIONS AND STATEMENTS REVEALED THAT IN TERMS OF
THE NATION'S INTERESTS EACH HAD SERIOUS FLAWS IN HIS MAKEUP.
4. THIEU:
A. IT IS NOW EVIDENT THAT THIEU HAD FOR SOME TIME NOT INTENDED
TO ALLOW A REASONABLY FAIR ELECTION TO TAKE PLACE. HE CONVINCED HIM-
SELF THAT HE COULD NOT WIN OR RAN SERIOUS RISKS IN A THREE-CORNERED
RACE, AND ACCORDINGLY MADE HIS PLANS WELL IN ADVANCE TO CUT KY OUT OF
THE RACE. WITH THAT IN MIND HE DEVELOPED THE ELECTION BILL, OVER-
RODE THE SENATE'S OBJECTIONS, BRIBED THE LOWER HOUSE TO PUT THE BILL
THROUGH IN EARLY JUNE, AND THEN SEWED UP ENOUGH ENDORSERS TO
KEEP KY OUT OF THE RACE.
B. TOWARD THE END OF MAY, EVEN AS HE WAS PUSHING THE BILL
THROUGH THE LEGISLATURE, WRITTEN SECRET INSTRUCTIONS WENT OUT TO
THE PROVINCE CHIEFS TO DO WHATEVER WAS NECESSARY TO ASSURE HIS
VICTORY. THIS WAS NOT DUE SO MUCH TO A LACK OF CONFIDENCE ABOUT
THE ELECTION OUTCOME AS IT WAS EVIDENCE OF HIS INTENTION TO PILE UP
AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY. FOR FOUR YEARS HE HAS .SMARTED UNDER THE
CHARGE THAT WITH 35 PERCENT OF THE VOTE HE WAS A MINORITY PRESIDENT.
THIS HE WAS DETERMINED TO RECTIFY AT WHATEVER COST.
C. HIS BASIC MISCALCULATION WAS HIS CONVICTION THAT MINH WOULD
RUN, EVEN THOUGH I WARNED HIM REPEATEDLY AND HAD MY STAFF WARN HIS
CLOSEST ADVISERS THAT MINH WAS A MOST RELUCTANT AND TIMOROUS CANDIDATE
WHO WOULD WITHDRAW IF HE THOUGHT HE COULD NOT WIN, USING THE EXCUSE
THE ELECTION WOULD BE RIGGED. THIEU'S SECOND MISTAKE WAS TO ASSUME
THAT THE WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS TO THE PROVINCE CHIEFS WOULD NOT BE
LEAKED TO MINH. '
D. IN SHORT, THIEU OVERREACHED HIMSELF. WE, IN THE MISSION,
AND MOST LOCAL OBSERVERS, WERE CONVINCED THAT HE COULD HAVE WON
HANDILY IN EITHER A THREE-MAN OR TWO-MAN RACE, AND I TOLD HIM SO
EARLY THIS YEAR AND SEVERAL TIMES SUBSEQUENTLY. BUT THIEU WAS
APPARENTLY INCAPABLE OF APPROACHING THE ELECTION OBJECTIVELY.
5. MI t No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/02: LOC-HAK-490-4-54-4
? No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/02: LOC-HAK-490-4-54-4
.W
A. FROM THE VERY OUTSET MINH WAS A HESITANT Cf
.WHO WAS PUSHED INTO RI! 'ING AND KEPT IN THE RACE b, A HANDFUL OF
SUPPORTERS WITH POLITIt,p..1., AMBITIONS, HE NEVERrSHOWED ANY REAL
DRIVE FOR POWER, NEVER BUILT ANY EFFECTIVE COUNTRY-WIDE ORGANIZA-
TION TO CONTEST THE ELECTION, AND TIME AND AGAIN PUBLICLY AND
'PRIVATELY SAID HE WOULD RUN ONLY IF THE .ELECTION WAS FAIR AND HONEST.
HE GAVE THE APPEARANCE OF A MAN LOOKING FOR ANY EXCUSE TO WITH-
DRAW, AND FINALLY FOUND THAT EXCUSE IN THREE DEVELOPMENTS WHICH
CONVINCED HIM HE WOULD BE DECISIVELY BEATEN: THE SECRET WRITTEN
INSTRUCTIONS TO PROVINCE CHIEFS TO ASSURE THIEU'S VICTORY; AN "
QUANG'S RESERVED POSITION ON OPEN AND ALL-OUT ENDORSEMENT OF
?HIM; AND KY'S INITIAL DISQUALIFICATION, WHICH ASSURED THIEU THAT
THE MILITARY VOTE WOULD NOT DIVIDE AND WOULD GO OVERWHELMINGLY
IN HIS FAVOR.'
B. WHILE MINH MAY HAVE HONESTLY BELIEVED THAT THE GREAT
MAJORITY OF PEOPLE FAVORED HIM AND THAT IN A FREE ELECTION HE
WOULD WIN EASILY, THIS WAS SHEER FANTASY. WHAT WAS CLEAR WAS
THAT HE WOULD GET A VERY LARGE VOTE (PERHAPS IN THE AREA OF 35 PER-
CENT TO 40 PERCENT) BASED ON GENERAL WAR-WEARINESS AND THE HOPE THAT
HE MIGHT BE THE MAN WHO COULDDERING PEACE, VC SUPPORT, THE BACKING
OF. AN ASSORTMENT OF POLITICAL ELEMENTS OPPOSED TO THIEU, INCLUDING
AN QUANG, AND THE FACT THAT HE WAS A SOUTHERNER. HAD HE BEEN AN
AGRESSIVE LEADER, HE COULD HAVE EXPLOITED CORRUPTION, THE PEOPLE'S
DESIRE FOR PEACE, THE HARDSHIPS OF THE LARGE BODY OF WAR VICTIMS
AND REFUGEES, AND THE PROMISE OF PRODUCING POLITICAL UNITY; AND HE
COULD HAVE MADE AN ISSUE OF THE SECRET INSTRUCTIONS TO THE PROVINCE
CHIEFS AND FOUGHT THIS ISSUE OUT IN THE COURTS AND BEFORE THE ELEC-
TION COUNCIL. ALL OF THIS WOULD HAVE ADDED TO THE BASIC VOTE HE WAS
ASSURED OF. ? ??
C. IN HIS FINAL CONVERSATIONS WITH ME, HE MADE IT EVIDENT THAT
HE WOULD NOT RUN UNLESS HE WAS CERTAIN OF WINNING. I POINTED OUT
THAT HE WOULD GET A VERY LARGE VOTE AND THAT HE HAD A CHANCE TO WIN
IF HE CONTESTED THE ELECTION VIGOROUSLY. IF HE DID NOT WIN, THE VOTE
FOR HIM WOULD BE SO LARGE AND IMPRESSIVE AS TO MAKE HIM THE LEADER
OF A FORMIDABLE OPPOSITION AND A POWERFUL CRITIC OF THE GOVERNMENT,
IN WHICH CAPACITY HE COULD PERFORM A GREAT AND CONSTRUCTIVE SERVICE
TO THE COUNTRY. HIS REPLY TO THIS WAS THAT HE WS NOT INTERESTED IN
BEING A MINCRITY LEADER OR PERFORMING THAT FUNCTION. HE CHOSE
INSTEAD TO WITHDRAW--AN ACT OF POLITICAL IRRESPONSIBILITY IN A MAN
WHO LIKES TO PICTURE HIMSELF AS THE SOUL OF PATRIOTISM WHO WILL DO
ANYTHING FOR HIS COUNTRY.
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVE EYES OP11
?
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/02 : LOC-HAK-490-4-54-4
e
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/02: LOC-HAK-490-4-54-4
.111P
RECEIVED
PICA
34
13 ' ,
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 1971 SEP 1?
EXCLUSIVE, EYES111LY
?
OPSECR.ETSENSITIVE 181023Z SEP 7/ VIA CAS CHANNELS
FROM: AMBASSADOR BUNKER SAIGON 0198 IMMEDIATE
TO: THE WHITE HOUSE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
REF: WHS 1102 -
SECT/ON 2 OF 5
D. IN ANY FUTURE DEALING WITH THE SITUATION HERE; WE MUST KEEP
, IN MIND THAT MINH IS NO POLITICAL ANIMAL, HE HAS NEITHER GUTS NW
ADMINISTRATIVE ABILITY, AND HE HAS NO CAPACITY FOR POLITICAL W
NATIONAL LEADERSHIP. IF HE EVER CAME TO POWER HE WOULD BE A
DISASTER FOR THE SECOND TIME. THIS WE SUSPECTED, AND HIS RECENT
BEHAVIOR HAS MADE THIS UNMISTAKABLY CLEAR NOT ONLY TO US BUT TO
MANY VIETNAMESE., INCLUDING AN QUANG WHICH WAS HIS MAIN HOPE
OF. SUPPORT.
6.- KY:
A. KY PLAYED 'A VERY DIFFERENT GAME FROM THIEU OR MINH.
AS A NORTHERNER* KY KNEW HE HAD NO CHANCE OF WINNING. HIS AIM
FROM THE START WAS MISCHIEF..MAKING, I.E., TO EMBARRASS, DIS-
CREDIT AND DESTROY THIEU. IF THIS LED TO A MINH VICTORY, THEW KY
FORESAW THAT IT COULD NOT LAST AND THAT THE THREAT OF A MILITARY
TAKEOVER WOULD OPEN NEW OPPORTUNITIESFOR HIM. KY THEREFORE
WANTED MINH TO STAY IN THE RACE, AND SAW HIS OWN ROLE AS ONE OF
TAKING wags AWAY FROM THIEU SO AS TO ENHANCE MINH'S CHANCES
OF WINNING. .IF MINH LOST, THEN THIEU WOULD HAVE TO FACE GOVERNING
AGAIN UNDER THE CLOUD OF ANOTHER MINORITY MANDATE.
B. IN HIS PRE..CAMPAIGN MANEUVERING KY COULD HAVE DONE'
MUCH MORE IN PRESSING HIS NOMINATION. HE WAS SLOW IN ORGANIZING
HIS EFFORT, SLOW IN SEEKING NOMINATORS, AND SLOW IN MAKING COM..
PLAINTS TO THE PRIME MINISTER, THE COURTS AND THE PRESS AFTER IT
BECAME EVIDENT, THAT THIEU WAS PREEMPTING THE PROVINCIAL COUNCIL,
ENDORSERS AND OBSTRUCTING KY'? EFFORTS TO GET THE PROVINCE CHIEFS
TO CERTIFY HIS ENDORSEMENTS. HAD KY FOUGHT HARDER AND EARLIER,
THERE WAS A GOOD CHANCE HE COULD HAVE GOT HIMSELF QUALIFIED, AND
THIS MIGHT HAVE PERSUADED MINH TO RUN. BUT WHEN KY WAS.INITIALLY
DISQUALIFIED IT GAVE MINH THEFINAL IMPETUS TO WITHDRAW.,
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/02: LOC-HAK-490-4-54-4
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/02: LOC-HAK-490-4-54-4
?
C. WHEN MINH WITHDREW AND THE SUPREME COURT "REVERSED:
11SELF ON THIEU'S INSTRUCT"ONS TO FIND AWAY Tp QUALl'-' KY, KY THEW
.SAW THAT HIS BEST WAY TO V, 3CREDIT,THIEU WAS TO WITHDhAW HIMSELF
SO AS TO MAKE THE ELECTION A FAP1E. KY IS HOPING THE U. S. CONGRESS
WILL REFUSE AID TO VIET-NAM UNLESS THERE IS A. CONTESTED ELECTION AND
THAT THIS WOULD FORCE TE/EU OUT OF OFFICE AND PUT OF THE RUNNING* HE
SENT IHOI TO THE U. So TO STIR THIS POT.' IN A NEW ELECTION KT NO
DOUBT THINKS THAT IN VIEW OF MINK'S WEAKNESS AS A LEADER HE WOULD
HhVE EVERY PROSPECT OF WINNING, SINCE HE ASSUMES HE WOULD BE THE
PREFERRED CHOICE.: OF THE MILITARY, AS WELL AS THE U. S. ,
7.- IN ALL /XIS, ALL THREE HAVE BEHAVED IRRESPONSIBLY, BUT I WOULD
HOLD THIEU MOST TO ACCOUNT.- HE SHOWED HIMSELF TO BE POLITICALLY
NAIVE BY MANEUVERS-WHICH IN THE END PUT HIM ON THE DEFENSIVE
AND AT THE-MERCYH.OF KY AND MINH. PERMITTING WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS
TO GO OUT TO HIS PROVINCE CHIEFS WAS AN ACT OF STUPIDITY.- HE HAD
-EVERY CHANCE OF WINNING EITHER A TWO-WAY OR A THREE-WAY RACE IN.A
,FAIR. ELECTION, ESPECIALLY IF HE HAD CULTIVATED DR. BONG'S NATIONAL
PROGRESSIVE PARTY AND, suu-s FARMER-LABOR PARTY. HE CHOSE
INSTEAD TO IGNORE THEM, AND BY PUTTING UP HIS OWN CANDIDATES
AGAINST THEIRS IN THELOWER HOUSE ELECTIONS HE FURTHER ALIENATED
HIS NATURAL ALLIES, WHO WANTED AND WERE,READY TO SUPPORT HIM AS
THE BEST BY FAR OF THE THREE CANDIDATES. WHAT HE SOUGHT TO DO IN
THE LOWER HOUSE ELECTIONS WAS TO KEEP THE ORGANIZED POLITICAL
FORCES-DIVIDEIYAND'KEEP POLITICS PERSONALIZED RATHER THAN
INSTITUTIONALIZED.
S. THIEU'S STOCK WHICH WAS VERY HIGH FOUR MONTHS' AGO HAS FALLEN*
BY CREATING PROBLEMS WHERE FEW EXISTED, HE HAS PRECIPITATED
DOMESTIC TURMOIL AND HAS CREATED DIFKICULTIES BETWEEN HIMSELF AND
MANY OF THOSE AROUND HIM, INCLUDING HIS NATURAL ALLIES AMONG THE
MILITARY AND POLITICAL LEADERS. SINCE HE ARRIVED AT THIS JUNCTURE
WITH VIRTUALLY NO CONSULTAION IN ADVANCE WITH ANYONE OUTSIDE HIS
-IMMEDIATE CIRCLE, THOSE WHO SUPPORT HIM FEEL ANNOYED, SADDENED
OR BITTER FOR HIS HAVING LANDED THEM AND THE COUNTRY IN THE SITUATION
IT IS IN, WITH ALL THE INTERNAL UNCERTAINTIES OF THE FUTURE PLUS THE.
PROSPECT OF EVEN MORE SERIOUS TROUBLEWITH AMERICAN:CONGRESSIONAL
AND PUBLIC OPINION AND THE DANGER OF AN AID CUTOFF.
TIPSECRETSESITO EXCLUSIVE EYES EY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/02 : LOC-HAK-490-4-54-4
( No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/02: LOC-HAK-490-4-54-4
IP
1E,(si,E,I,v
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE ,Ekt.0 YES ONLY
1971 SEP 18 17 06
T OP,SECRETSENSITIVE 181023Z SEP 71 VIA CAS CHANNELS
FROM: AMBASSADOR...BUNKER SAIGON 0198 IMMEDIATE
TO: THE WHITE HOUSE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
REF: VHS 1102
?"
SECTION 3 OF 5
9. WHEN THE CRISIS FINALLY CAME WITH KY'S WITHDRAWAL, MANY
VIETNAMESE FELT THE MOST FEASIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL COURSE WOULD HAVE
BEEN FOR THIEU AND KY TO HAVE RESIGNED, ALLOWING THE SPEAKER OF,
THE SENATE HUYEN TO TAKE OVER AND ARRANGE NEW ELECTIONS, KEEPING
THE.CABINET MORE OR LESS INTACT. WITH THIEU, KY AND GENERAL
VIEN ACTING IN THE CAPACITY OF MILITARY ADVISERS TO HUYEN. HAD
KY NOT MADE THIS PROPOSAL INITIALLY, I THINK THIEU MIGHT HAVE
COME TO THIS VIEW OR BEEN PUSHED INTO IT BY THOSE AROUND HIM.
BUT ONCE KY HAD, PUT FORWARD THE PROPOSITION, THIEU WOULD HAVE,
NO PART OF:IT. THIS SOLUTION, OR SOMETHING.APPROXIMATE TO IT,
STILL REMAINS A POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT, IF THIEU FINDS HE
CANNOT GOVERN AFTER OCTOBER 3.,? -
ICJ. BETWEEN NOW AND OCTOBER 5, THE DEGREE OF TURMOIL IN THE
STREETS WILL DEPEND LARGELY ON AN QUANG'S TACTICS. THE ACTIVIST
ELEMENTS AMONG STUDENTS, WAR INVALIDS, WAR WIDOWS, AND SUNDRY
MINOR POLITICAL GROUPINGS ARE TOO WEAK BY THEMSELVES TO CREATE
ANY SERIOUS TROUBLE. IF KY DECIDES TO STIMULATE THEM. WITH A'VIEW
TO FORCING THIEU TO ABANDON THE REFERENDUM IN FAVOR Or A NEW
ELECTION, WHICH IS THE DIRECTION IN WHICH HE IS GOING, TROUBLE IN
THE STREETS WOULD INCREASE BUT WOULD NOT BE UNMANAGEABLE.
It. ONLY IF AN QUANG DECIDES TO TAKE TO THE STREETS WOULD THERE
BE REALLY SERIOUS TROUBLE. PRESENT INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE
OFFICIAL LEADERSHIP OF AN QUANG WILL NOT ADOPT THAT POLICY, PARTLY
BECAUSE THEY DID QUITE WELL IN THE LOWER HOUSE ELECTIONS AND ARE
NOV COMMITTED TO A COURSE OF LEGAL ACTION, BUT MAINLY OUT OF FEAR
THAT STREET VIOLENCE COULD GET OUT OF CONTROL AND ONLY PLAY INTO
COMMUNIST HANDS OR FURTHER KY'S PLANS. EXTREMISTS IN AN WANG
WILL SEEK TO ENCOURAGE AND SUPPORT STREET PROTESTS BUT, WITHOUT
.OFFICIAL AN WANG APPROVAL LARGE SCALE AND PERSISTENT RESORT To
VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIONS IS UNLIKELY.
12? A NUMBER OF MINOR POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS- LEADERS AND PART/ES,
INCLUDING SOME CATHOLICS, ARE SPEAKING OF ORGANIZING A BOYCOTT,
AND AN QUANG'S PRONOUNCEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 16 THAT THEY WILL
NEITHER TAKE PART IN THE ELECTION NOR RECOGNIZE ITS RESULTS IS
TANTAMOUNT TO A BOYCOTT. BUT CONCERTED ACTION BY DIVERSE GROUPS
HAS NEVER BEEN A VIETNAMESE FORTE AND THESE EFFORTS WILL HAVE VERY ?
LIMITED EFFECT IN THE RURAL AREAS ALTHOUGH THEY WILL MEET WITH SOME
SUCCESS IN THE LARGER CITIES. THESE EXPRESSIONS OF DISSATISFACTION
POINT TO THE PROSPECT OF A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF INSTABILITY AFTER
OCTOBER .7
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/02: LOC-HAK-490-4-54-4
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/02' : LOC-HAK-490-4-54-4
13. WE RULE OUT ANY REAL DANGER OF COUP, FOR APART FROM WIDE?.
.SPREAD LOCAL OPPOSITION T IS WELL KNOWN THAT AMER:" IN SUPPORT
COULD HARDLY SURVIVE ANI,4HER COUP. AN ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF
THIEU IS A MORE LIKELY PROSPECT*
14. AS THE THIEU ADMINISTRATION GEARS UP FOR THE REFERENDUM,
THE STRESS IS ON TECHNICAL ARRANGEMENTS, ON GETTING OUT THE VOTE
AND ABOVE ALL ON SECURING A LARGE MAJORITY IN FAVOR OF THIEU. THERE
HAS BEEN -LITTLE ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE OPPOSITION TO ENTER INTO A
DEBATE, NO OFFER OF EQUAL FACILITIES ON TV AND THE RADIO, AND NO
EDUCATIONAL CAMPAIGN ON HOW TO EXPRESS NO?CONFIDENCE IN THE
"sePOLLING BOOTH. I HAVE REPEATEDLY URGED THIS ON THIEU IF THE
?'REFERENDUM IS TO BE MADE BELIEVABLE, AND TODAY I HAD A REPORT -
THAT HE MAY DO SOMETHING ALONG THESE LINES. ,
15*. THF PROSPECT IS THUS FOR AN UNCONVINCING "EXERCISE, BUT IT WILL
NOT SERIOUSLY IMPAIR THIEU?S ABILITY TO GOVERN IN THE SHORT RUN
FOR HE STILL COMMANDS VERY CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT IN THE COUNTRY*
16* THIEU WIWWIN THE ELECTION IN TERMS OF VOTES CAST BY A LARGE
? MAJORITY, WITH A HIGH -TURNOUT IN THE RURAL AREAS, ORGANIZED AND
ENCOURAGED BY THE LOCAL OFFICIALS, BUT WITH A SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED
TURNOUT IN THE LARGER CITIES* THE SCENE OP ACTION WILL THEN SHIFT
TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WHICH MEETS IN,OCTOBER TO START ORGANIZING
ITSELF.
GIVEW-A MANDATE OF LIMITED CREDIBILITY, THIEU CAN EXPECT TO
FACE CONTINUOUS .CRITICISM FROM THE ENLARGED OPPOSITION IN.THE
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND FROM POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS. THE
FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS OF THE LOWER HOUSE WILL BE TO VALIDATE THE
LOWER HOUSE ELECTIONS. SINCE THE COURTS HAVE ALREADY FOUND
SERIOUS IRREGULARITIES IN TWO CASES AND OTHERS HAVE YET TO BE
DECIDED THEREWILL LIKELY BE CONSIDERABLEAGITATION NOT TO SEAT THE
WINNERS IN SEVERAL OF THE PROVINCES* WE EXPECT THIS WILL BE
FOLLOWED BY EFFORTS IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND OUTSIDE TO FORCE
A NEW PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, BUT AT THIS TIME IT DOES NOT APPEAR
THAT THE OPPOSITION TO THIEU WILL BE SUFFICIENTLY STRONG OR UNIFIED
TO ACHIEVE THIS. SHOULD CONGRESS CUT OFF AID, THIEU HAS SAID HE
WOULD RESIGN AND NOT BE A CANDIDATE AGAIN. ON THE LATTER POINT
HE MIGHT HAVE SECOND THOUGHTS. '
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE ExcuSIVE EYES tai
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/02 : LOC-HAK-490-4-54-4
r
e
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/02: LOC-HAK-490-4-54-4
s
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE E.(1vED
r
OPiECRETSENSITIVE 181023Z SEP 71 VIA CASCHANNELS
FROM: AMBASSADOR BUNKER SAIGON 013 IMMEDIATE
TOS THE WHITE xplusg EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR HENRY A. KISS/NGER
REFS VHS 1102 '
SECTION 4 OF 5
18; AS WE ASSESS THIEU IN RETROSPECT OF THE PAST FOUR YEARS
AND IN THE LIGHT OF THE MOST RECENT EVENTS WE HAVE TO CONCLUDE THAT,
? WHATEVER HIS VIRTUES IN OTHER FIELDS, AND HE DOES HAVE MANY
VIRTUES, IN POLITICAL MATTERS HIS PERFORMANCE HAS FALLEN SHORT OF
THE COUNTRY'S NEEDS. IN POLITICS HE IS A MAN WHO DOES NOT REALLY
? CONSULT WITH OTHERS, HE DOES NOT REVEAL HIS HAND, HE DOES NOT SEEK
TO ENLIST OTHER LEADERS AS GENUINE ADVISERS, AND HE DOES NOT EVEN
? CULTIVATE HIS NATURAL ALLIES. IF HE PERSISTS IN THIS COURSE HE WILL
HAVE A STORMY SECOND TERM, AND HE WILL HAVE TO RESORT MORE AND
MORE TO SUPPRESSION OF HIS CRITICS AND THE PRESS IN ORDER TO GOVERN;
A FAILURE BY HIM TO START BUILDING A GENUINE POLITICAL GROUPING OF
FORCES AND A WIDER BASE OF SUPPORT SOON AFTER OCTOBER 3 MAY WELL
PROVE DECISIVE FOR CONTINUED STABILITY HERE. SHOULD THIEU GO ON
GOVERNING ON A PERSONAL BASIS AS HE HAS IN THE PAST THEN I FORESEE
SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES AHEAD., '
? 19. DESPITE THESE SERIOUS SHORTCOMINGS IN THIEWS HANDLING OF
HIS POLITICAL PROBLEMS, HE HAS TO HIS CREDIT SUBSTANTIAL ACHIEVE-
MENTSIN OTHER AREAS. HE HAS SIGNIFICANTLYIMPROVED THE'COMMAND
STRUCTURE OF THE MILITARY FORCES AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS (TO WHICH
OUR OWN EFFORTS HAVE MADE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION); HE HAS SHOWN '
IMAGINATION AND DRIVE IN PRESSING THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM; HE HAS
RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPING THE TERRITORIAL AND LOCAL
SELF-DEFENSE FORCES; HE HAS BEGUN THE BUILDING OF DEMOCRACY AT THE
GRASS ROOTS LEVEL; HE HAS INSTITUTED THE REVOLUTIONARY LAND-TO-THEi-
TILLER PROGRAM; AND HE HAS SUPPORTED ECONOMIC REFORM MEASURES
WHICH HAVE EFFECTIVELY RESTRAINED INFLATIONARY PRESSURES. CONSIDER".
ING THE FACT, THAT THE COUNTRY IS AT;WAR,,A LARGE-LATITUDE FOR CRITI-
CISM IS PERMITTED TO THE OPPOSITION. IT CAN BE FAIRLY SAID THAT THE
PRESENT GOVERNMENT,HAS GROWN IN EFFECTIVENESS OVER THE LAST FOUR YEARS
AND IS TODAY FUNCTIONING BETER THAN AT ANY TIME IN THE PAST. THERE IS-
A GROWING COMMITMENT TO CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES AND TO THE PEACEFUL
TRANSFER OF POWER. ON THE BASIS OF PERFORMANCE, I THINK IT /S FAIR
TO SAY THAT THIEU STANDS OUT IN COMPARISON WITH THE OTHER CANDIDATES
AND COMPARED TO ANY OTHER INDIVIDUAL PRESENTLY ON THE HORIZON.
20. IF THIEU SHOULD FOR ONE REASON OR OTHER FIND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO
GOVERN, I AM FAIRLY CONFIDENT THAT THE VIETNAMESE WILL TRY TO FIND
A SOLUTION BY CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL MEANS. THIS IS WHAT MOST
? PEOPLE WILL WANT.FOR MEMORIES OF THE 1963 OVERTHROW OF DIEM
AND THE ANARCHY THAT FOLLOWED ARE VIVID AND ALMOST NO ONE WANTS'
TO REPEAT IT. IN NEW ELECTIONS, IF THIEU DOES NOT RUN, KHIEM
WILL""' reVOTATMIV NAVA" A Rtn reR THE succESSION. HE IS A
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/02: LOC-HAK-490-4-54-4
SOUTHERN1 .No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/-10/62 : LoF-H-AK:450-71-15"47
? ON THE SUPPORT OF MOST'. THE MILITARY. HE HAS SIIMO nilwr.LF TO
BE A GOOD AWINISTRATOR4 HE HAS POLITICAL SENSE. "n4 IS FAR MORE
INTELLIGENT TIAN PEOPLE GIVE HIM CREDIT FOR. IN TWO AND HALF YEARS
OF WORKING WITH HIM, WE HAVE FOUND THAT HE HAS A GOOD INSTINCT
FOR DOING THE RIGHT THING. KHIEM BROKE WITH GENERAL KHANH IN
1964 WHEN KHANH REFUSED TO CARRY OUT THE AGREEMENT TO MOVE
.TOWARD A CONSTITUTIONAL. AND ELECTED GOVERNMENT. KHIEM OPPOSED
*THIEUYS HANDLING OF THE CHAD CASE, BUT WAS UNABLE TO INFLUENCE
*THIEU IN THAT UNFORTUNATE ENTERPRISE. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT .
;MIEN HAD ANY PART IN THIEWS PLANNING FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.
WHILE-KHIEM MAY BE ACCUSED OF NOT STANDING UP TO TRIED MORE
STRONGLY ON BASIC ISSUES, AND WHILE HE-HAS A REPUTATION FOR
TOLERATING CORRUPTION, HE SEEMS AT THIS?TIME JO REPRESENT A BETTER
CHOICE FOR THE sucpgssum, IF IT SHOULD COME TO THAT, THAN EITHER KY
00 M/NH.
B. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND VIET CONG.
21. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND VIET CONG WILL ,SEEK WHATEVER ADVANTAGE
THEY CAN FROM THISCOMPLEX SITUATION. THEY ARE LEDBY THEIR OWN
DOGMA TO SEE GREATER LIKELIHOOD THAN WE DO.OF A.COUP OR OF LARGE ANTI?
GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH THE GUN WILL BE UNABLE TO CONTROL.
THEIR SPECIFIC TACTICS WITH REGARD TO THE OCTOBER 3 ELECTION WILL BE A
MIX OF ENCOURAGING DEMONSTRATIONS, URGING PEOPLE,TO BOYCOTT THE
ELECTION OR DEFACE THEIRBALLOTS, AND ATTEMPTING, WHERE THEY HAVE
THE CAPABILITY; TO DISRUPT THE,ELECTION ITSELF THROUGH MILITARY ANP
TERRORIST ACTION. IN ADDITION, BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER THE ELECTION,
THEY WILL TRY (A) TO ACCELERATE THE INFILTRATION OF LEGAL CADRE INTO
URBAN AREAS AND (B) TO MOVE MILITARY AND GUERRILLA UNITS NEARER.TO-
SAIGON TO TRY TO EXPLOIT THE SITUATION SHOULDA MAJOR OPPORTUNITY TO
DO SO SUDDENLY DEVELOP.
22. THE CAPABILITY OF HANOI AND THE VIET CONG TO DO THESE THINGS NOW
OR IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS IS ACTUALLY QUITE LIMITED. THEY DO NOT NOW
HAVE IN PLACE NEAR THE CAPITAL, AND IN OUR OPINION WILL BE 1.14ABLE.TO
BRING INTOTHE SAIGON AREA, ENOUGH MILITARY FORCES (IN COMPARISON
WITH THOSE AVAILABLE TO ARVN) TO CAPITALIZE ON A COUP ATTEMPT OR ON
ANY LARGE ANTId.GVN DEMONSTRATIONS. AT MOST, THE ENEMY COULD -
- PROBABLY GET OFF SOME HARASSING ATTACKS NEAR SAIGON WHICH MIGHT BE
TROUBLESOME FOR THE ARVN IN A CONFUSED PERIOD, BUT IN NO SENSE A
DECISIVE INFLUENCE ON THE SITUATION. SOME INFILTRATION OF ENEMY
TROOPS FROM CAMBODIA BACK INTO GUN MR...3 HAS OCCURRED IN RECENT
MONTHS, BUT NOT IN AMOUNTS SUFFICIENT TO-AFFECT THIS JUDGMENT. THE
PICTURE WOULD CHANGE ONLY IF LARGE-'SCALE NEW INFILTRATION OF TROOPS
FROM NORTH VIETNAM GOT UNDERWAY WHEN THE DRY SEASON DEGINS IN
OCTOBER IN THE LAO PANHANDLE AND THE LOWER HALF OF SOUTH VIET-NAM.
IF THIS OCCURRED, THE TIME OF MAJOR THREAT WOULD NOT COME UNTIL EARLY
1972. ELSEWHERE IN SOUTH VIETNAM, THERE IS NO AREA; EXCEPT . -
POSSIBLY NORTHERN MR..1 (WHICH IS NOW ENTERING THE MONSOON SEASON),
WHERE THE ENEMY COULD LAUNCH A MAJOR BIG--UNIT OFFENSIVE IN THE NEXT
TWO OR THREE MONTHS.
23. SIMILARLY, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE- AND VIET CONG PROBABLY DO NOT
POSSESS AND CANNOT MOVE ENOUGH LEGAL CADRE INTO URBAN AREAS TO .
FORMENT OR INFLUENCE THE COURSE OF ANT/m.TH/EU DEMONSTRATIONS
FICANTLY. THE GVN'S INTERNAL SECURITY AND POLICE FORCES HAVE DEALT
FAIRLY EFFECTIVELY WITH THE SUBVERSIVE AND LEGAL CADRE THREAT OVER THE
PAST YEAR AND SHOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. ?
THE VIET CONG MAY BE ABLE TO INFLUENCE THE SITUATION MARGINALLY BY
INSTIGATING OR ENCOURAGING DEMONSTRATIONS IN SOME AREAS, BUT HERE.
AGAIN THEIR ROLE WILL NOT BE DECISIVE.
iyeiIIRIVF "Ile re
No Objection to Declassification in Full2012/10/02: LOC-HAK-490-4-54-4
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/02: LOC-HAK-490-4-54-4
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE E1CS EYES ONLY ig
8'17 15
TOPSECRETSENSITIVE /81023Z SEP 41 VIA CAS CHANNELS
FROM: AMBASSADOR BUNKERSAIGON 0198 IMMEDIATE
TO: , THE WHITE HOUSE wupway EYES ONLY FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
REF: VHS 1.102
FINAL SECTION OF 5
C: SECURITY:,
24... ENEMY INTENTIONS: ALL INDICATIONS ARE .THAT DURING THE REMAINDER
OF 1971, THE ENEMY WILL HAVE ONLY A LIMITED CAPABILITY TO CARRY OUT
MAIN FORCE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. THE EFFECT OF THE OPERATIONS IN
LAOS CLAM SON 719) ANP IN CAMBODIA EARLIER THIS YEAR HAVE BECOME
INCREASINGLY APPARENT. TOGETHER WITH GREATLY IMPROVED METHODS
OP INTERDICTION, THESE OPERATIONS HAVE SERIOUSLY DISRUPTED THE
ENEMY'S LOGISTIC RESOURCES AND INFILTRATION ROUTES. THE COMMITMENT
OF SIZEABLE FORCES IN LAOS, CAMBODIA, AND SOUTHERN NORTH VIET-NAM
ARE ALSO LIMITING FACTORS IN HIS ABILITY TO UNDERTAKE-ANYLARGE SCALE
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS.
25. THE COMMUNISTS' LIMITED CAPABILITY; THEREFORE; WILL BE DIRECTED
PRIMARILY TOWARD SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS, GUERRILLA TACTICS, AND
TERRORISM. EFFORTS AT DISRUPTION OF THE LOWER HOUSE ELECTIONS WERE.
INEFFECTIVE AND IT IS PROBABLE THAT SIMILAR EFFORTS,DIRECTED_AGAINST
THE PRESIDENT/AL VOTING WILL BE EQUALLY SO. HE MAY, HOWEVER, ATTEMPT .
HIGH POINTS IN SELECTED AREAS DURING THE TIME FRAME OF THE PRESI...
DENTIAL ELECTIONS AND DURING THE REMAINDER OF 1971. -
26. DURING THE PERIOD FROM OCTOBER 1971 TO THE END OF THE YEAR; THE
ENEMY WILL PROBABLY PLACE PRIMARY EMPHASIS ON HIS DRY SEASON ,
LOGISTICAL MOVEMENT WHICH WILL BE INITIATED IN MID-OCTOBER CONCEN..,
TRATING HIS EFFORTS ON BUILDING UP, HIS DEPLETED STOCKPILES IN VIET-
NAM AND CAMBODIA IN PREPARATION FOR STEPPED UP OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
IN THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN OF 1972. ,
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/02 : LOC-HAK-490-4-54-4
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/02: LOC-HAK-490-4-54-4
?
r
2 .1.- RVNAF IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION PROGRAM. THE VIET-
.
NAMIZATION PROGRAM IS ON SCHEDULE AND CONTINUES TO Fq0GRESS
REASONABLY WELL. ,AVNAF S SHOWN STEADY IMPROVEMEN IN ITS
CAPABILITY TO PLAN, COORuINATE, AND EXECUTE LARGE REALIGNMENT OF
FORCES AND TO CONDUCT MULTI-1ATTALION OPERATIONS. THERE ARE
DEFICIENCIES, AMONG THE MOST SERIOUS BEING THE FACT THAT MANEUVER
BATTALIONS ARE moi BELOW STRENGTH. THER7 ARE STILL ALSO DEFICIENrn
CIES IN LEADERSHIP. THESE WEAKNESSES ARE COMPENSATED BY SIGNIFICANT
tIMPROVEMENTS IN OTHER DIRECTIONS - IN BATTALION DAYS ON LARGE SCALE
OPERATIONS; IMPROVEMENTS IN FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION; WEAPONS
1CAPTURED/LOST RATIO; AND ENEMY/FRIENDLY !CIA RATIO. OVERALL, THE
_PERFORMANCE OF ARVN,REGULAR FORCES CONTINUES TO IMPROVE.
28. THE VIETNAMESE NAVY HAS ASSUMED FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL
NEAR COAST AND COASTAL WATERWAY OPERATIONS.
29. THE VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE IS' STEADILY TAKING OVER MORE OF THE
AIR SUPPORT ROLE. THE VNAF CAPABILITY WHICH NOW INCLUDES ELEVEN
FIGHTER/GUNSHIP SQUADRONS WILL BE INCREASED DURING CALENDAR 1972 BY
THE OF TWO MORE SQUADRONS. IT HAS ACTIVATED TEN UH SQUAD-
RONS AND HAS FOUR MORE FOR ACTIVATION /N OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER 1971.
VNAF IS NOT EQUIPPED NOR TRAINED FOR CONDUCT OF AIR INTERDICTION
OPERATIONS IN THE HIGH THREAT AREAS.OF_LAOS; THE VNAF PROGRAM HAS
BEEN BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT U. SA,AUR INTERDICTION IN LAOS
- WILL CONTINUE INDEFINITELY.
30. VNAF IS PERFORMING EFFECTIVELY WITHIN ITS CAPABILITIES, BUT CAN
BE CHARACTERIZED AS A FLEDGLING AIR ARM WITH LIMITED NIGHT SUPPORT
CAPABILITY AND NO HEAVY BOMBERS. U; S. AIR SUPPORT, THEREFORE,
WILL BE REQUIRED FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD.
31. I HOPE THE ABOVE WILL BE RESPONSE TO YOUR NEEDS. GENERAL
ABRAMS IS SENDING TO ADMIRAL MOORER AN ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY
SITUATIONS IN RVN RUAL AREAS; ,
32. WARM REGARDS. .
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
cuisivE .0IES
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/02 : LOC-HAK-490-4-54-4
or"-