CABLE TO HENRY KISSINGER FROM GRAHAM MARTIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-165-5-17-5
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: October 12, 1971
• Content Type: CABLE

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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/12/20: LOC-HAK-165-5-17-5
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TO THE -WHITE HOUSE
ZE
SECRET 1216151 OCT 71
11MEDIATE WHITE HOUSE
FOR: DR. HENRY KISSINGER
FRCM:_- AMBASSADOR GRAHAM MARTIN, ROME 1495
REF: WH 10857 (052038Z)
1. I HAVE JUST RECEIVED THIS MORNING THE POUCHED MATERIAL
REGARDING THE NSSM 129 STUDY ON POST ITO YUGOSLAVIA. RESISTING
THE D1PULSE TO COMMENT EXTENSIVELY, I WILL LIMIT MY OBSERV-
ATIONS TO THE SHORT TERM AND THE USEFULNESS TO THE
UNITED STATES OF TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE EXPLORATORY
CONTACTS NOW UNDER WAY BETWEEN THE YUGOSLAV AND ITALIAN
ARMED FORCES.
2. DISPOSING FIRST OF YOUR QUESTION ON THE YUGOSLAV-ITALIAN
TERRITORIAL ISSUE, IT IS MY CONCLUSION THAT, WITH ONE
EXCEPTION, THERE IS NO DISPOSITION ON THE PART OF ANY
ITALIAN POLITICAL PARTIES TO QUESTION THE DE FACTO PERMANENCE
OF THE PRESENT BORDERS. THE ONE EXCEPTION IS THE MST PARTY
WHICH MAY BEAT SOME MUTED DRUMS AT ELECTION TIME. EVEN HERE,
THE MST LEADER, ALMIRANTE, IS TRYING TO ELIMINATE
LRREDENTIST CLAIMS OF HIS FOLLOWERS AS ONE OF THE REMNANTS
OF FASCIST TRAPPINGS WHICH IS HARMFUL TO THE IMAGE OF THE ?ISI
HE IS TRYING TO CREATE AS A FULLY RESPONSIBLE MODERATE PARTY OF'
THE RIGHT. IT IS MY BELIEF THAT HE HAS NO DESIRE T 0 SEE THIS
BECOME A MAJOR ISSUE AND THAT, INCREASINGLY, HE HAS THE POWER
WITHIN HIS PARTY TO ENFORCE HIS WILL. THIS QUESTION IS NOT
LIYELY TO BE RELEVANT, ALTHOUGH IT MAY STILL TAKE A FEW YEARS
TO MOVE TO A DE JURE RATIFICATION OF THE STATUS QUO.
IF THE TENTATIVE FEELERS NOW UNDERWAY BETWEEN ITALIAN AND YUGOSLAV
:AILITARY FORCES DEVELOP, PRESSURE FROM ITALIAN MILITARY
ON ALMIRANTE WILL TEND TO INSURE NO TROUBLE ON THE TERRITORIAL
QUESTION.
3. LOOKING ACROSS THE ADRIATIC FROM ROME, IT WOULD APPEAR
THAT, EVEN MORE THAN THE PARTY (LCY), THE YUGOSLAV MILITARY
ESTABLISH(IENT SEEMS TO BE THE ONE ENTITY CAPABLE OF PROVIDING
THE CLUE TO HOLD THE COUNTRY TOGETHER IN A POST-TITO PERIOD.
REPORTS FROM THE RECENT MANEUVERS, INDICATING GREAT PUBLIC
SUPPORT AND PARTICIPATION, SEEM TO REINFORCE THIS CONCLUSION.
I HAVE, THEREFORE, GIVEN QUIET ENCOURAGEMENT TO GENERAL
MAR CHESI, CHIEF OF THE DEFENSE STAFF, TO AT LEAST INSURE
A FAVORABLE ITALIAN RESPONSE TO THE INITIAL TENTATIVE
ADVANCES OF YUGOSLAV AUTHORITIES._ I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE
USE 7-711, AT LEAST, TO FIND OUT WHAT THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE ON
THELR )7IND. A FORMAL VISIT TO BELGRADE WILL NOW TAKE
PLACE SHORTLY AFTER THE FIRST OF THE YEAR. GENERAL MEREU,
Y CHIEF OF STAFF, WILL PROBABLY HEAD THE ITALIAN CON-
TINGENT, WE W11,L KNOW MORE AFTER THIS VISIT TAKES PLACE.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/12/20: LOC-HAK-165-5-17-5
State Department
review completed
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VI Ink um Ricks
1114-1G
MORI/CDF per C03232815
,
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/12/20 : LOC-HAK-165-5-17-5
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THE APPROACH TO THE ITALIANS IS EXTRAPOLATED INTO AN
INDICATION,A " YUGOSL AV.. INTEREST- IN A DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP
"TM NATO , IF ONL Y IND IP.ECT. " ON SEVERAL 'COUNtS *I WOULD' DOUBT
ANY YUGOSLAV PASSION FOR A NATO EMBRACE. IT WOULD cavipRom isE
THE " IGNMENT" ; ITI'd OLILD BE A PROVOCATION TO THE
SOV IET S; AND FINALLY,HAV INC NOTED THE TENDENCY OF Si-tIE
NATO PARTNERS TOWARD THEIR GRECIAN ALLY TO INDULGE THEIR
LE-1E1'1k CONSTITUENCIES BY THE EXPRESSIONS OF THEIR
"SELECTIVE MORAL INDIGNATION" ABOUT THE NAT URE OF THE REGIME,
THIS COURSE NIGHT SEEN UNAPPEALING.
5. ON THE CONTRARY, THE NEXT PARAGRAPH (PAGES 36 AND 37)
SEEMS RIGHT ON TARGET ON YUGOSLAV DESIRE TO REDUCE DEPENDENCE
SOVIETSON AND THEIR DESIRE FOR L OGIST IC AND MATER IAL
SUPPORT FROM OTHER SOURCES. GENERAL MAR CHESI HAS JUST
INFORMED ME THAT HE FULLY EXPECTS THE.YUGOSLAVS TO RAISE
QUESTION OF LOGIST IC SUPPORT . HE BELIEVES A FAVORABLE
ITALIAN RESPONSE WOULD BE USEFUL IN SHORING UP THE YUGOSLAV WILL
TO RESIST WHICH WOULD IN ITSELF CONTRIBUTE TO DETERRENCE.
HE POINTS OUT, HOWEVER, THAT ITALIAN WAR RESERVES WILL NOT
PERM IT DIVERSION WITHOUT ASSURANCE OF REPLACEMENT. HE WONDERS
IF WE COULD HELP IN T HIS REGARD. HE DOES NOT BEL IEVE NATO
CAN POSSIBLY BE RESPONSIVE, ALT HOUGH SOME OF THE OTHER ALLIES,
NOTABLY THE FRC, COULD BE HELPFUL.
6. I THINK THIS IS WORTH EXPLORING, BUT NOT THROUGH THE NATO
MECHANIal. IN FACT,.. I WOULD ELIMINATE THE LAST OPT ION ON PAGE
35 AND SUBSTITUTE ?SOMETiiING ON THESE LINES:
--ALTERNATIVELY, THE US COULD QUIETLY ENCOURAGE SUCH
INITIAL EXPLORATION TO BE DISCREETLY UNDERTAKEN, WITHOUT
COMM 1TMENT DURING THE-FORTHCOMING VISIT OF ITALIAN -
MILITARY DELEGATION TO BELGRADE. THE RESULTS OF SUCH EXPLORA-
TION,WITHOUT INITIALLY DIRECTLY INVOLVING THE - US, COULD ASSIST
IN DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDELINES DEFINING THE EXTENT KIND, AND
MODALITIES OF COOPERATION IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE TO TAKE.
7. IN ANY EVENT, UNLESS YOU PERCEIVE SOME OBJECTION,
I INTEND TO TELL MAR CHEST THAT I, PERSONALLY, FIND HIS
THOUGHT VERY INTERESTING BUT I DO NOT. HAVE ENOUGH DETAIL TO
MAKE ANY RE COMMEND AT ION TO WASHINGTON UNTIL AFTER THE
ITALIANS EXPLORE FURTHER WITH THE YUGOSLAVS WHAT THEY HAVE IN MIND.
S. I PERSONALLY THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO CO ,FURTHER AND
ACTIVELY.ENCOURAGE OUR ITALIAN FRIENDS TO EXPLORE THESE
POSSIBILITIES IN CONSIDERABLE DEPTH.' I AM QUITE RELAXED
ABOUT THE REMOTENESS OF THE POSSIBILITY OF BEING AUTHORIZED
TO DO SO, HAVING GONE THROUGH A POST-GRADUATE COURSE IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA ON THE DEEP COMMITMENT OF OUR AMERICAN
MILITARY COLLEAGUES TO DO EVERYTHING THEMSELVES. THERE
ARE TRIES, AS, ESTABLISHED IN THAILAND, WHEN THE GOAL CAN
BF ACHIEVED MORE QUICKLY, AND AT VASTLY LESS COST, WITH A
COLDLY CALCULATED AND FIRMLY CONTROLLED INDIRECT APPROACH. THIS
COULD BE ANOTHER SUCH CASE, ALTHOUGH I AM THE FIRST TO ADMIT ,
THAT MY PREOCCUPATION WITH THE INTERNAL ITALIAN POLITICAL
SCENE, HASLIMITED MY KNOWLEDGE OF THE COMPLEXITIES OF
YUGOSLAV AFFAIRS AND THAT THERE MAY BE QUITE VALID REASONS
PRECLUDING APPROVAL- OF THIS SUGGESTION.
2154
No Objection to Declassification in. Part 2012/12/20: LOC-HAK-165-5-17-5