REPORT: WORKING GROUP ON ANGOLA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-102-6-22-7
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: November 10, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

% No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/02: LOC-HAK-102-6-22-7
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ANGOLA WORKING
GROUP PAPER No. 89
REPORT: WORKING GROUP ON ANGOLA
'i 0 N 'I' v X97;;
At a meeting of the Working Group on 7 November 1975, the
following topics were covered:.
1. Military. Briefing
a. The UNITA-FNLA forces have captured Benguela
and Lobito and are north of Lobito.
b. The FNLA attack-on Luanda has been handicapped
by the failure of the two North Korean-supplied 130mm
guns which the attackers were relying on to counter the
.expected MPLA 1.22mm rockets. One gun exploded and the
other had a less serious malfunction. (Late information
was reported that the FNLA-FAZ attack on.Quifangondo
had been repulsed.)
c.> Reports of the buildup of Soviet-provided arms
and armor within Angola and Cabinda, the further intro-
duct on of Cuban} ccm,at troops and the most recent
re-Dort of the deliver of MI -2 air of o Br zaville
were discussed.
Some
anxiety was expressed about the reportedly large
quantities of weapons which had not yet been seen in
battle.
2. Debriefing of Consul General Killoran
In reply to questions, Mr. Killoran made these points:
a. The M IPLA military forces were stretched thin and
falling back. The FNLA was attacking at Quifangondo and
wasting much ammunition in the process.
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b. Recent casualties were relatively light,
unlike the July fighting within the cities in which
many civilians were killed.
c. In Luanda, most of the whites have gone. The
United States evacuation airlift took out 31,000.
The Portuguese flew out over 100,000. Enough white
technicians remained to maintain water, electricity
and such services.
d. The foreign press remains, as do consulates of
Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy and Brazil.
Brazil's representative is the highest ranking diplomat
in Luanda. He appears to favor recognition of the MPLA.
(The Brazilian Ambassador in Washington has indicated
that Brazilian recognition of the MPLA may not be that
certain.)
e The Portuguese military were leaving behind
little in the way- of significant munitions. The
Portuguese civilians were fleeing out of fear. Many
felt guilty about their previous treatment of blacks.
f. The MPiA seemed dedicated to their cause, as
did the FNLA. '14-s t of Angela's civil servants and
tech. i.c? an.s ides Z -_t ;=1 ththe _?M?LA. The country could
not he ;governed t the s..;oort of these people,
who now nearly 11 back the PL. .
~g. There i s dissension within the MLA along the
lines of black versus mulatto and of the military versus
the political le.d.ers yip.
h. Hatreds among the three liberation groups would
make a political accommodation difficult. But a
military stalemate could force a political solution.
Support of the FNLA and UNITA might be set at a level.
needed to achieve such a balance. Other possible
solutions are partition or federation.
3. Political Issues
a. The State Department representatives distributed
a draft circular message to United States diplomatic
posts which outlines the arguments against an early
recognition of the MPLA regime.
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b. Requests have been made by a Zairois official
(Bisengimana) and by Jonas Savimbi that the
United States Government use its influence to
encourage the South Africans to keep their combat
units and training teams in Angola.
c. It was agreed that the removal of these units
could result in a loss of momentum by the UNITA-FNLA
forces and a drastic shift in the course of the fighting.
On the other hand, it was also noted that:
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(1) The South African military presence
in Angola could have political repercussions
which would be difficult to handle.
(2) The United States has a 13-year old
policy of restricting military contacts with
the South Africans.
(. ) The South Africans might expect some
military or political rewards if they complied
with our request. This could lead to serious
demands on the United States, especially if
th.M fighting escalated and a confrontation
with Commuaist - orces became more intense.
(4) A. _vc_s."ale solution from the point
o` vie4ti or r ignt be for the South Africans
to maintain W. I i..? ted and discreet presence
in Angola--without being encouraged to do so
by the United States. This would enable the
South. Africans, to maintain their training
tea=rs with -UNI.TA as well as the capability
to intervene decisively and quickly as the
need arises. They would presumably also
continue their materiel support to the FNLA
and UNITA.
(5) The State representatives will present
the issue to their superior. -
d. The consequences in Zaire of the appearance of
MIG aircraft in the area were discussed. Among the likely
reactions to be expected from President Mobutu are:
(1) A preemptive strike by FAZ aircraft
before the MIG aircraft are fully operational.
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(2) Urgent requests for antiaircraft
weapons to defend Zaire, to include fighter
aircraft, radar, fire control and antiaircraft
guns.
(3) Requests for missiles including REDEYE.
(4) Requests for contract pilots to fly
Mirage aircraft.
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