ANGOLA - COURSES OF ACTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-102-2-6-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 23, 2011
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: June 12, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/02/23: LOC-HAK-102-2-6-9
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BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
OSD, DOS Reviews
Completed.
car/NODIS C
TO: The Secretary
FROM: AF - Nathaniel Davis
Angola - Courses of Action
The paper at Tab 1 addresses specific courses
of action that the United States might take if it
were to decide actively to involve itself in the
Angolan situation in order to assure an outcome
favorable to its interests.
I would be delinquent in my responsibility to
you if I did not say that my colleagues in this
Bureau and I believe that the benefits to us of
embarking on military assistance
actions outlined in these papers would be far from
commensurate with the risks involved.
Attachments
Tab 1 - Angola - Courses of Action.
Tab 2 - Angola.
Drafted:AF/S:AArenales:snt
x28433:6/12/75
" ?/NODIS
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COURSES OF ACTION
This paper addresses specific courses of action
which might be undertaken in the event that the United
States were to decide that its active involvement in
the Angolan situation would assure an outcome favorable
to its interests. For purposes of this paper,"
Cabinda is considered an integral part of Angola proper.
The actions outlined below relate to the two
complementary scenarios now unfolding in and with
relation to Angola:
-- The increasing momentum and ex andin
geography of violence, which offers temptations and
opportunities for growing involvement by outside,
especially communist, powers, and
-- the shifting balance of forces within
Angola, i.e., the strengthening of elements hostile
to our interests (MPLA).
Our principal objectives would be to:
-- Prevent a takeover by the MPLA, and thereby
limit the influence of its backers--particularly
the USSR--in Angola; and
-- promote the ascendancy of elements friendly
to us (FNLA and UNITA).
Two sets of actions are proposed:
-- The first--Diplomatic/Political
of communist powers, thereby reducing the
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inflow of arms to and political support for the-
MPLA. If successful, these measures would pre-
serve the currently favorable position of the
FNLA and UNITA vis-a-vis the MPLA.
-- The second set of actions--Military
Assistance--would be invoked gradually if the
first were not succeeding, or if the FNLA and
UNITA were suffering serious military reverses
and assistance were demonstrably needed to
redress the balance.
end of the range o ' ip oma is po i c
shades into the set of military actions, and
would come into play if and as diplomatic initia-
tives were beginning to break down. Military
assistance proposed in this paper does not
include the direct involvement of U.S. armed
forces.
X. Diplomatic/Political
These actions would be aimed at
-- reducing the flow of Soviet and other
communist (e.g.,'Yugoslav) arms to the MPLA;
-- preventing an increase in (or if
possible reducing) communist. political support
for MPLA (e.g., both bilaterally and in interna-
tional fora);
-- encouraging Portugal to make greater
efforts to reduce the fighting in Angola and to
treat the liberation movements impartially;
SECRET/NODIS
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-- enlisting the assistance, and supporting
the efforts, of concerned African and other
states to seek a political solution to the
Angolan conflict.
There would, of course, be trade-offs
involved. With regard to Angola itself, we would.
presumably have to limit the extent to which we
and friendly nations (Zaire, Zambia) provided
assistance to and support for FNLA and UNITA. We
might have to consider seeking, either directly
or through an intermediary, e.g., Zaire,
Tanzania, PRC agreement to limit its assistance
to FNLA as well. (And we would have to deal with,
the fact of North Korean training support for
Zairian forces, which may include some training
for the Cabindan independence movement, FLEC.)
To accomplish this,"we should be prepared to
compensate, politically or otherwise, Portugal
for an expanded effort and Zaire, and perhaps
Zambia, for limiting their support. On a broader
scale, we should be prepared to deal with the
possibility that the Soviet Union and the PRC
would demand concessions in areas of greater
importance to us, and to them, than Angola.
Although all actions are in escalating
order of precedence, two or more could obviously
be in progress at any one time.
-- Seek agreement with Portugal on the
desirability of containing the conflict and of
its playing a stronger--but impartial--role, in-
cluding the maintenance of its full troop
strength (24,000) at least until but preferably
beyond the scheduled February 1976 withdrawal
date. The Portuguese would, of course, be diffi-
cult to convince.
SECRET/NODIS
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CRET/NODI S
-- Support current efforts by Zaire
to assure Portugal's neutrality towards the
three liberation groups and to enlist its coop-
eration in limiting arms flow into Angola.
-- Together with selected NATO and EEC
countries, encourage Portugal to press the USSR,
and other communist and third world countries
(e.g., Yugoslavia, Algeria), to reduce their
support of,MPLA.
-- Encourage interested Africans (e.g.,
Zaire, Zambia, Tanzania, Tunisia---all of whom are
FNLA and/or UNITA supporters), either individu-
ally or through the OAU, to seek Soviet reduction
of its. support to MPLA.
-' Concurrently request these African
states to step down. their support of FNLA and/or
UNITA in proportion'to proven reduction of sup-
port to 1PLA..
-- Urge Zaire, Zambia, Tanzania and other
directly interested African states to take the
lead in developing an OAU consensus to seek to
end foreign arms aid to the Angolan liberation
movements, including by seeking to persuade Congo
(Brazzaville) to cease being a transhipment point
for Soviet arms.
-- Directly but privately request the
USSR to reduce its support'to MPLA, noting
Zaire's consideration of reducing its support of
FNLA and possibly offering to seek reduction of
PRC support of FNLA concurrently and proportion-
ately.
-- By public statements and speeches,
background statements to news media, and other
means, publicize our concern over the potentially
disruptive international effects of foreign inter-
ference in Angola.
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-- Encourage public expressions of concern
to the same effect by Congressional and other
opinion leaders.
-- Publicly call on the USSR to assist in
international efforts to restore peace in Angola.
-- Support or promote an African (and
possibly Portuguese) initiative to request the UN
Secretary General to call on all involved parties
to refrain from actions endangering international
peace and security.
---- Support or promote a UN Security
Council call for a cease-fire and an embargo on
arms shipments to Angola.
-- Support Or promote an African (and
possibly'Portuguese) initiative for UN cease-fire
observer teams and a small (3-5 man) peacekeeping
mission to seek ways to reach peaceful accommoda-
tion.
SECRET/NODIS
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TI. Military Assistance
These actions range up to but do not include
direct involvement by U.S. forces. The types and
amounts of assistance provided would be intended
to enable FNLA and UNITA each to hold their own
against a major MPLA challenge.
Provide, or facilitate the provision of
(e.g., through Zaire and Zambia), equipment and
supplies (uniforms, transportation, food) to FNLA
-- Provide, or facilitate the provision of,
arms and ammunition to FNLA and UNITA as necessary
to make their armament comparable to MPLA's
(e.g., bazookas, mortars, recoiless rifles, etc.).
-- Provide or facilitate the provision to FNLA
and UNITA of heavier equipment than that in use by
the MPLA (e.g., sophisticated infantry weapons,
heavy mortars, light artillery, armored personnel
carriers).
-- Provide a small team of qualified U.S. per-
sonnel to study and analyze, in cooperation with
Roberto and Savimbi, other FNLA and UNITA military
requirements, and to determine ways in which to
maximize the effectiveness of U.S. military
assistance.
SECRET/NODIS
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