CABLE TO HENRY KISSINGER FROM W. R. SMYSER/WILLIAM STEARMAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-458-13-4-5
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 23, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

- ~, . No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/06/28 : LOC-HAK-458-13-4-5~~ ~ ~a~~~ Z
MEMORANDUM Com letel C+utside
THE WHITE HOUSE
WA3HIA1CTOIV
the System
~.,.~T^ER I May 23, 1975
MEMORANDUM F?R:
S~GRE Y KISSINGER
W s (~/
V+. R. SMYSER/WILLIAZvi STEARMAN
We have revie~u~d the .records of the NSC meetings, the military reports
and the records of military orders that~JCS and DOD have sent in. response
to the Presidebt'~- request.
On the basis of #his preliminary information, pending further reports,'
we have the frill?vvi.r~.g observations on faun matters of military execution
during the Mayaguez incident.
Tra.nsmissian df General. Presidential Orders
Beginning witku:th~s second NSG meeting on May 13, when our available
military records begin, there are two sets of instructions relevant. to
this inquirys
-- !fit the NSC meeting on NLay 13, the President ordered the
military to prepare far operations to seize the vessel, to land' on the
island, .and to b~nb around Kompang Som.
-- At the NSC' meeting on May 14, the President ordered
execution of there plans, specifying use' of Coral Sea assets, rather than
B-52s and Thad-based tar air, far attacks on the mainland.
The JG5 record indicates that appropriate orders were issued shortly
aft?r the meetings in accordance with the President's instructions.
Use of Coral Sea Assets A ainst the Island Rather Than A e.inst
Kampon~ Som Ta:r ets
The record of the NSC meetings clearly shows..a general expectation that
the Coral Sea aircraft would be used against Kampong Som targets whereas
Thailand-based aircraft would be used to support the Marines on the island.
The President's x~?marks also clearly indicates that. this was his expectation.
OSD and JCS
reviews
completed
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/06/28 : LOC-HAK-458-13-4-5
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/06/28 : LOC-HAK-458-13-4-5
TD~F SECRET,
-- ' A J+CS message sent at 1742 EDT, May l4 specified that
tac air frotxx ~v~ra1 Sea as well as froxxa Thailand was authorized against.
the island.
?- A rriessage sent by CINCPAC to USSAG at 205$ EI7T, May 14
gave USSA~ av,~hority to~ use Coral Sea tac air to support forces on the
island. These tae air strikes could preempt Cambodian strikes if required.
'.The recard of military messages shows that authority was given to use
Craral Sea asae,ts .against the island, though it does not show whether
,they were, indeed, so used, For .example:.
-- alt 2392 EDT CINCPAC infoarmed the JCS that Coral S~:a
tac air would b? used to support ground forces on the island, if needed,
and JCS ackno~a-ledged that this was within CINCPAC authority.
Termination eaf Starike s Against Korxxpong Som
.., .~
.The record of .the NSC meetings indicates that it .was generally understood
that the strikes against the mainland would continue while the Marin~:s
vcrere engaged or until orders to the. contrary were, received. The President
specifically said that the strikes against Koxnpong Some"should not stop
until we tell tlte~n. "
The xxa.ilitary record shows that, after the third wave a discussion ensued
between CINC~'AC, JCS, and Secretary Schlesinger about whether. to launch
a fourth wave? .The Secretary initially stated that we should mount a
fourth waive. General Brown recommended against it,? so did Admiral
Holloway an;d Ac~nriiral Gayler. One of the arguments against launching
was that the Coral ,Sea had to tuxn into the wind to launch aircraft ahd was
then moving away from the island. Secretary Schlesinger accepted the
recommendations of the. JCS and CINCPAC and, according to the record,
called the President at .that time to report that there would not be a fourth
wave (the exact-time of the Secretary's call was nqt given but in the context
it would have been around 0030 or 0035 EDT on May l5). The xra,ilita.ry
record shows a verbal order from Sec Def at 0038 on May 15 that the
fourth wave .should not be sent.
No ?rda~ance~kenditure an First Wave
The record of ~~ie CSC meetings indicates that the first. wave of the strikes
against Kompo ~axn would have a mission o~ armed xeconnaissauce,
~"OP SECRET.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/06/28 : LOC-HAK-458-13-4-5
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/06/28 : LOC-HAK-458-13-4-5
which by definiti:o~i iricludess authority tv strike targets .of opportunity.
the NSC record als? allows that the aircraft were to hit mobile targets
initslly.
The JCS orders to C~NCPAC (171,0 EDT on May 14) carried out the NSC
intent, stating tha=t the first flight was to be armed recce .against. aircraft
and &~.gainst Iri'ilitary water craft.
It is not clear wliy no ordnance was expended'. There was no discussion
of it in the records that we have seen. A possible explanation, arises out
of some changes in in~tructaons between about 2025 El]T and ZQ52 E]]T an
May l4, when e~~nditure of ordnance was texnporarily suspended while.
we were di~cussiug what to do about the Caxxa.bodian radio broadcast
announcing their i,]cxtent to expel the vessel. The xnore detailed records
that we understand to be forthcoming m.ay give us an answer.
As for the size of the first wave from the Coral Sea,, such discussion as
had been.. held in th.e NSC suggested that it would be a large wave. We have
peen no orders 3n the military record available to us that .dealt, with precise
numbers of aircraft or that instructed them as to whether or not to expend
ordnance on the first strike. `
TOP SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/06/28 : LOC-HAK-458-13-4-5